E 470 
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vol. 7 
Copy 1 




LIBRARY OF CONGRESS. 



^1 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA. 



THE ARMY 



THE CUMBERLAND 



The Army in the Civil War 



VOLUME VII. 



THE ARMY OF THE CUMBERLAND 



HENRY M. CIST 



BREVET BRIGADIER-GENERAL U.S.V. ; A. A. G. ON THE STAFF OF MAJOR-GENERAL 

KOSECRANS, AND THE STAFF OF MAJOR-GENERAL THOMAS ; SECRETARY 

OF THE SOCIETY OF THE ARMY OF THE CUMBERLAND 



SUBSCRIPTION EDITION 




CHARLES SCRIBNER'S SONS 
NEW YORK 



V.I 



^\% 



Copyright by 
CHARLES SCRIBNER'S SONS 

1883, 1885 



TROW3 

PRINTING AND BOOKBINDING COMPANY, 

NEW YORK. 



\S- 



PEEFACE. 



The scope of this work precluded the entering into de- 
tails as to the minor operations of the troops in the com- 
mands named. It has even been imijossible to give the 
movements of troops on the battlefields in lesser organiza- 
tions than brigades. The rosters of the several armies given 
in full in the appendices will enable those interested to trace 
the movements of the minor commands. 

The subject is too great a one to be fully and justly treated 
•within the limitations, both of time and space, which have 
necessarily been imj)osed here. Still, with the hojje that the 
future student of history may glean something of value in 
this volume not found elsewhere, it is sent forth for the 
favorable consideration of its readers. 

To the many friends who have kindly aided me in various 
ways, I return my sincere thanks. To Col. R. N. Scott, 
U.S.A., I am under special obligations for data furnished. 

The maps for this volume were prepared by permission 
from those of Captain Ruger in Van Home's " History of the 
Army of the Cumberland," published by Robert Clarke & Co., 
Cincinnati. 

H. M. C. 



COI^TE^TS. 



PAGK 

List op Maps, ix 

CHAPTER L 
Early Movements, 1 

CHAPTER II. 
Mill Springs, 9 

CHAPTER IIL 
Concentration at Nashville, 21 

CHAPTER IV. 
Morgan's and Forrest's Raids, 31 

CHAPTER V. 
Bragg' s Advance into Kentucky 48 

CHAPTER VI. 
Battle of Perryville, 61 

CHAPTER VII. 
The Advance to Murfreesboro, 87 



viii CONTENTS. 

CHAPTER VIII. 

PAGE 

The Battle of Stone's River, 103 

CHAPTER IX. 
In Murfreesboro, 136 

CHAPTER X. 
The Advance on Tullahoma, 154 

CHAPTER XI. 
The Movement to Chickamadga, 173 

CHAPTER XII. 
The Battle of Chickamauga, 193 

CHAPTER XIII. 
The Siege of Chattanooga, 230 

CHAPTER XIV. 

Chattanooga, Lookout Mountain, and Missionary 
Ridge Battles, 243 

Appendix, 263 

Index, 273 



LIST or MAPS. 



General Map of the Campaign, 1 

Mill Springs, jg- 

Battle op Perryville, q^' 

Battle-M.\p Stone's River, . . . / ^ , io3^ 

Chickamauga Campaign, 1';'2 

Battle op Chickamatjga, ^04 

Battlefield of Cuattanooga, 245^ 



THE ARMY OF THE CUMBERLAND. 



CHAPTER I. 

EARLY Movements. 



In Kentucky, during tlie spring of 1861, every shade of 
oiiiuion prevailed, from tlie most pronounced Union senti- 
ment to the most ultra secession sympathy. 

The Government at Washington wished to enlist Ken- 
tucky heartily in support of the Union, while every effort 
was made by the rebel leaders to secure the secession of the 
State from the Union, and to have it join its fortunes to 
those of the South. These several efforts enlisted the active 
support of those in the State in sympathy with them, and Ken- 
tuckians became ultimately divided into two sharjily defined 
parties. Under the peculiar doctrine of " armed neutrality " 
adopted by the local authorities, no serious infraction of 
the peace of the State was had until the fall. With the invi- 
tation given General Anderson to take command in Kentucky, 
by the State Legislature, the doctrine of " armed neutrality " 
came to an end. While it at times restrained prompt action 
on the part of the Union men of Kentucky during the first 
six months of the war, and hampered the Federal Govern- 
ment in the movement of troops in the State, still in the end 
it was of immense benefit to the cause of the Union, and 

vn.— 1 



2 THE ARMY OF THE CUMBERLAND. 

enabled those in sui^port of it in Kentucky to unite and 
perfect their plans in comparative peace, unmolested by the 
rebels from Tennessee and their own State. Under cover of 
" armed neutrality " the Union men remained quiet until the 
time had arrived for prompt and decided action, with men, 
•and arms for their support, in the measures they adopted to 
retain Kentucky in the Union. 

In accordance with a general plan of operations adopted 
by General Albert Sidney Johnston, on September 18th, 
General Buckner broke camp with the rebel forces at Camp 
Boone, Tenn., near the Kentucky line, and marching north, 
occupied Bowling Green, throwing out his advance as far as 
Elizabethtown. 

On receipt of reliable information as to Buckner's move- 
ments, General Anderson sent General W. T. Sherman, 
second in command, to Camp Joe Holt, with instructions to 
order Colonel Eousseau with liis entire command to report 
at once in Louisville. The " Home Guards " were also 
ordered out, and they assembled promptly in large force, 
reporting at the Nashville depot, and by midnight they were 
started to the front by train. Eousseau's command followed 
at once, General Sherman being in command of the entire 
force, amounting to some three thousand men. The advance 
by train was stoj^ped at the Boiling Fork of Salt Eiver, 
about thirty-one miles south of Louisville, at which point 
the railroad bridge had been burned by the rebels. During 
the following day the troops under Eousseau forded the 
stream, and pressing forward occupied Muldraugh's Hills with 
its two trestles and a tunnel over fifteen hundred feet long. 
The Home Guards were left in camp at Lebanon Junction, 
some two or three miles in the rear, where Lieutenant- 
Colonel E. "W. Johnson of the Third Kentucky Cavalry 
reported later in the day with some additional companies of 



EARLY MOVEMENTS. 3 

Home Guards, and, by order of General Anderson, assumed 
command of tliis camp. 

This disposition of the trooj^s caused Buckner to retire 
with his entire command to Bowling Green, where he 
strongly fortified his position. 

The Kentucky State troops were under orders for ten 
days' service only, and their i)lace was then filled by several 
regiments from the States immediately north of Kentucky. 
These troops were placed in camp, and there received in- 
struction in drill, discipline, and camp regulations, waiting 
orders for the advance. 

General Johnston, under his general plan of creating a de- 
fensive line from Columbus on the west, running through 
Bowling Green east to some jDoint to be determined on, 
early in September sent General Zollicoflfer with a force 
numbering several thousand men to make an advance into 
Eastern Kentucky by way of Knoxville, East Tennessee, 
through Cumberland Gap to Cumberland Ford, threaten- 
ing Camp Dick Robinson. On the 19tli of that month tW 
advance of Zollicoffer's command had a spirited skirmish 
with the " Home Guards " at Barboursville Bridge. These 
troops were compelled to retire, which they did, to Eock 
Castle Hills, where they were reinforced by two Kentucky 
regiments under Colonel T. T. Garrard, of the Seventh 
Kentucky Infantry, who had received instructions from 
General Thomas to obstruct the roads and to hold the rebels 
in check. Garrard established his force at Camp Wildcat, 
behind temporary breastworks, where, on October 21st, he 
was attacked by Zollicoifer with 7,000 troops. Shortly after 
the attack General Schoepflf, with five regiments of infantry, 
one of cavalry, and a battery of artillery, reinforced Garrard, 
and after a severe fight the enemy was repulsed. 

After Buckner's retreat to Bowling Green, Zollicoflfer 



4 THE ARMY OP THE CUMBERLAND. 

fell back to Mill Springs, on the southern bank of the Cum- 
berland River, and soon afterward crossed the river to the 
opposite bank at Beech Grove, fortifying this encampment 
with extensive earthworks. 

During the month of September, General George H, 
Thomas, who with General "Wm. T. Sherman had been 
ordered to report to General Anderson for duty in Ken- 
tucky — at General Anderson's personal request of the Presi- 
dent — was placed in command of Camp Dick Eobinson, re- 
lieving General Nelson. The latter then established Camp 
Kenton in Mason County, three miles from Maysville, near 
the spot where Simon Kenton's station was erected in 1785. 

On the 7th of October General Anderson, on account of 
ill-health, relinquished the command of the dei^artment, 
and General W. T. Sherman on the following day succeeded 
him. At the same time General A. McD. McCook was placed 
in command of the force that been ordered to the fi'ont un- 
der Sherman. 

During the month of October the rebel Colonel J. S. 
Williams was organizing a force of some two thousand 
troops at Prestonburg, on the Big Sandy River, intending to 
operate in Central Kentucky through McCormick's Gap. 
General Nelson early in the month started with all the 
troops of his command to drive the rebels out of their en- 
campment. Nelson ordered the Second Ohio under Colonel 
L. A. Harris to move from Paris, and the Twenty-first Ohio 
under Colonel Norton to advance from Nicholasville to Olym- 
pia Springs, where the entire command was concentrated. 
From here he advanced to McCormick's Gap, and then di- 
vided his command, sending the Second Ohio, a section of 
Captain Konkle's battery, and a company of Ohio cavalry 
under Captain McLaughlin — all under the command of Col- 
onel Harris — through West Liberty to unite with the com- 



EARLY MOVEMENTS. 5 

mand at Salyersville. Nelson then moved forward with 
three regiments of infantry, two detachments of Kentucky 
troops, and two sections of Konkle's battery, with a bat- 
talion of cavalry, on the road to Hazel Green, On the 23d 
Han-is occupied West Liberty, after a brisk skirmish. The 
command united at Salyers\ille and followed the enemy to 
Prestonburg. At this point Nelson sent the Thirty-third 
Ohio, with the Kentucky troops and a section of Konkle's 
battery under Colonel Sill, by a detour to the right to 
flank the rebel position at Ivy Mountain. Nelson on the 
next day then advanced with his command on the direct 
road to Piketon, and encountered the enemy in ambush on 
the mountain at Ivy Creek. Pushing forward at once with 
the force under his immediate command. Nelson attacked the 
enemy, and after a brisk engagement, lasting over an hour, 
routed them from their cover and drove them in full retreat. 

Sill occui^ied Piketon on the 9th without much opposi- 
tion. General Nelson arrived there on the 10th, when the 
rebels leaving the State and retreating through Pound Gap, 
he was ordered to report with his command to General 
Buell at Louisville. 

On the retii-ement of General Anderson, as the ranking 
officer in the department. General Sherman s^ssumed the 
command. On the 9th of November, by general order from 
the headquarters of the ai*my. No. 97, the Department of 
the Ohio was created, " to consist of the States of Ohio, 
Michigan, Indiana, that portion of Kentucky east of the 
Cumberland River, and the State of Tennessee, and to be 
commanded by Brigadier-General D. C. Buell, headquarters 
at Louisville ; " and General Sherman was relieved from 
command at his own request. 

Nelson's command being ordered out of East Kentucky, 
the rebel forces again entered, and in small bands were 



6 THE ARMY OF THE CUMBERLAND. 

depredating on Union peoi^le in the Big Sandy Valley. 
The Fourteenth Kentucky under Colonel L. P. Moore was 
ordered to move from Catlettsburg and advance up the val- 
ley. General Buell finding that the rebel force had been 
largely reinforced by the advance of General Humjjhrey 
Marshall, one of the ablest rebel generals in that part of the 
country, ordered the Twenty-second Kentucky under Colonel 
Lindsay from Maysville to join the Fourteenth, and Lindsay 
was placed in command of the two regiments. Marshall 
was a graduate of West Point ; he had served in the Black 
Hawk war and had seen service in Mexico as a colonel of 
Kentucky cavalry, winning distinction at Buena Vista. He 
had now entered the State from Virginia through Pound 
Gap, and had reached a strong natural position near Paint- 
ville, where he was rapidly increasing his army, with the 
intention of raising a sufficient force — already some five 
thousand — to operate on General Buell's flank and to re- 
tard his advance into Tennessee. The Forty-second Ohio, just 
organized, was in a camp of instruction near Columbus, Ohio, 
under its colonel, James A. Garfield. While there, in Decem- 
ber, he was ordered by General Buell to move his regiment 
at once to Catlettsburg, at the mouth of the Big Sandy Eiver, 
and to report in person to Louisville for orders. 

Starting his regiment eastward, from Cincinnati, Garfield, 
on the 19th of December, reported to General Buell, who 
informed him that he had been selected to command an ex- 
pedition to drive Marshall and his forces from Kentucky. 
That evening Garfield received his orders, which organized 
the Eighteenth Brigade of the Army of the Ohio, and placed 
him in command. General Buell ith these orders sent 
a letter of instruction, giving general directions as to the 
campaign, leaving all matters of detail and the fate of the 
expedition, however, largely to the discretion of the brigade 



EARLY MOVEMENTS. 7 

commander. The latter reached his command on the 24:th 
of December, at Louisa, some twenty-eight miles up the Big 
Sandy. He then proceeded to concentrate his troops, the 
main body consisting of his own regiment — the Forty-second 
Ohio — the Fourteenth Kentucky, and a battalion of Ohio 
cavalry under Major McLaughlin, which was with him ; but 
these gave only some fifteen hundred men for duty. 

The next largest portion of his command was stationed 
at Paris, Kentucky, under Colonel Cranor, with his regi- 
ment, the Fortieth Ohio, 800 strong. Cranor was ordered 
to join the main body as expeditiously as possible, and to 
bring with him that portion of Colonel Wolford's Ken- 
tucky cavalry stationed at Stanford, consisting of three 
small battalions under Lieutenant-Colonel Letcher, and to 
report at Prestonburg. The Twenty-second Kentucky was 
ordered from Maysville, and some three hundred men of that 
command reported before Garfield reached Paintville. He 
was also joined by a battalion of West Virginia cavalry 
under Colonel Bolles. After a toilsome march in mid-win- 
ter, Garfield's command, on the 7th of January, drove Mar- 
shall's forces from the mouth of Jenny's Creek, and occu- 
pied Paintville. On the morning of the 9th, Cranor repoi-ted 
with his command, footsore and exhausted, after a march 
of over one hundred miles through the mountains of East- 
ern Kentucky. At noon of the 9th Garfield advanced his 
command to attack Marshall with his cavalry, pressing the 
rebels as they fell back. Beaching Prestonburg some fif- 
teen miles from Paintville, he learned that Marshall was 
encamped and fortified on Abbott's Creek. Pushing on to 
the mouth of the cree^' some three miles below Prestonburg, 
he there encamped lor the night, a sleety rain adding to 
the discomfort of the men. Intending to force the enemy 
to battle, he ordered up his reserves under Colonel Sheldon 



8 THE ARMY OF THE CUMBERLAND. 

from Paintville, with every available man. As soon as the 
morning light enabled the command to move, Garfield 
advanced, and soon engaged the rebel cavalry, which was 
driven in after a slight skirmish, falling back on the main 
body some two miles in the rear, strongly posted on high 
ground, between Abbott's Creek and Middle Creek, at the 
mouth of the latter stream. It was impossible to tell what 
disposition Marshall had made for his defence, owing to the 
formation of the gi'ound at this point concealing his troops 
until our forces drew his fire. Throwing several detachments 
forward, the entire command was soon actively engaged. 
The engagement lasted for some four hours, commencing at 
about twelve o'clock. At 4 p.m., the reserves under Sheldon 
reached the field of battle, and the enemy was driven from 
his position. Night coming on prevented pursuit. 

Marshall's command fled down the valley, set fire to 
their stores, and pressed forward in rapid retreat to Abing- 
ton, Va. Garfield with his command returned to Paintville, 
where it could receive supplies. In February he received 
orders from Buell, directing him to advance to Piketon, 
and drive the rebels from that place, which he did, and 
later from Pound Gap. This freed Eastern Kentucky of 
rebel troops, and relieved the Union men of that section of 
the depredations that had been committed on them by the 
roving bands of the enemy. The services of Garfield's com- 
mand were recognized by Buell, and the thanks of the 
Commanding General extended to Garfield and his troops. 
Shortly after this Garfield received his commission as 
Brigadier-General of Volunteers, to date from the " Battle 
of Middle Creek." 

In the latter part of March General Garfield was ordered 
to leave a small force in the Big Sandy Valley, and to report 
with the rest of his brigade to General Buell at Louisville. 



CHAPTER II. 

MILL SPRINGS. 

On September 10, 1861, General Albert Sidney Johnston, 
who had resigned the colonelcy of the Second United States 
Cavalry to engage in the service of the Confederacy, was as- 
signed to the command of the Department of the West, em- 
bracing, with a large number of the Western States, the 
States of Kentucky and Tennessee. On the 18th Johnston 
directed Buckner to occupy Bowling Green, and ordered 
Zollicoffer to advance from Knoxville to Cumberland Gap. 
The rebels, under General Polk, occuj^ied Columbus, Ky., 
September 7th, and the line of operations of the Confeder- 
ates, under General Johnston, as then formed, had the Mis- 
sissippi Kiver at its extreme left, Cumberland Gap at its 
extreme right, with Bowling Green as the centre. With the 
force at his command, no point in advance of Bowling Green 
could have been safely taken by the Confederate general, 
owing to the disposition of the Union troops in Kentucky 
at that time. 

As we have seen, Zollicoffer with his command was 
driven from Kock Castle Hills and Wildcat, and taking a 
new position nearer Bowling Green, encamped at Beech 
Grove, where he fortified his position. 

General Zollicoffer was a civilian appointment, without 
military training of any kind. He had been editor of a 
Nashville paper, had held a number of minor State offices, 
1* 



10 THE ARMY OF THE CUMBERLAND. 

and served two terms in Congress prior to tlie war. John- 
ston, in ordering Zollicofier to the Cumberland Eiver at 
Mill Springs, intended that he should occupy a position of 
obsei-vation merely until he should be reinforced, or his 
troops be incorj)orated in the main command. He could 
not have been located farther west without inviting the 
advance of the Federal forces into East Tennessee or to 
Nashville, flanking Bowling Green. Zollicoffer had no abil- 
ity as a soldier to handle troops, and General George B. 
Crittenden, of Kentucky, a graduate of West Point, who had 
seen service in the Mexican War, and who held, at the out- 
break of the rebellion, a commission as Lieiitenant-Colonel 
in the regiment of Mounted Biflemen, was, in November, 
assigned to the command of the district as Major-General, 
with headquarters at Knox-vdlle. Great expectations were 
entertained in regard to Crittenden's military abilities ; and 
about the first of the year 1862 he assumed command in person 
of the rebel forces at Beech Grove. The fact that Zollicof- 
fer had established his camp on the north side of the Cum- 
berland, "with the enemy in front and the river behind," 
was known to Johnston, and information given by him to 
Crittenden. General Johnston had written Zollicoffer that 
the interests of the service required him simply to watch 
the river, and that he could do this better from Mill Springs 
without crossing it. 

Zollicoffer, however, had crossed the river before he heard 
from Johnston, and replied that, while from this letter he 
inferred that he shoiild not have done so, it was now too 
late, as his means of recrossing were so limited that he 
could hardly accomi:)lish it in the face of the enemy. On 
his reaching the Cumberland with his command, he had 
sent forward his cavalry to seize the ferryboats at Mill 
Springs. In this they failed, and the crossing was effected 



MILL SPRINGS. 11 

on one feny-boat, seized lower down, and barges built by 
his troops. 

General Thomas was ordered in November to concentrate 
his command in order to be prej)ared for any movement 
Zollicoflfer might make, and, if necessary, to attack him in 
his camp. General Carter with his brigade was stationed at 
London, Colonel Hoskins was near Somerset, and Colonel 
Bramlette at Columbia, all watching Zollicoflfer's move- 
ments, and reporting them to General Thomas, who endeav- 
ored to stop his advance at the Cumberland Eiver. Five 
hundred of Wolford's Cavalry were ordered from Columbia 
to reinforce Colonel Hoskins ; and General SchoeiJif, with 
the Seventeenth Ohio, the Thirty-eighth Ohio, and Stan- 
dart's battery, to take position on the Cumberland River at 
Waitsborough, where he could command the crossing. 
Here he was to fortify and guard the river at this jjoint and 
above and below, to prevent the enemy from crossing, or 
from obtaining the means for doing so. 

On December 2d, Zollicoflfer, while building his ferries, 
sent some troops to shell General Schoepflf's camp. A brisk 
cannonading was kept up for some time, when the rebels 
withdrew. Schoepflf regarding this as a feint, and auticij)at- 
ing a movement of Zollicoflfer's troops to cross the river, 
ordered two companies of cavaliy under Captain Dillon to 
guard the ford and to give timely notice of any attempt to 
effect a crossing. He also ordered the Seventeenth Ohio 
with three pieces of artilleiy and another company of cavalry, 
all under the command of Colonel Connell, to support the 
cavalry under Dillon. The latter proved wholly incompe- 
tent, and failed to comply with his orders in any particular. 
He went into camp two miles in the rear from where he was 
ordered, and neglected even to post his men to guard the 
ford, whereby Zollicofler was enabled to occupy the north 



12 THE ARMY OF THE CUMBERLAND. 

bank of the Cumberland without opposition and without 
Dillon's even knowing that the movement had been made. 
This was only discovered on the 4th, when the rebels drove 
back the Federal cavalry and attacked Connell, who was ad- 
vancing on a reconnoissance. Connell, in ignorance of the 
movement of the enemy, had reached the vicinity of the ford 
and found liimself confronted by a strong force of rebels, 
who had crossed the river, and who being rapidly reinforced 
rendered his situation one of extreme jDeril. He withdrew 
under cover of the night beyond Fishing Creek, without 
being molested. Schoepff, finding that the advance of the 
rebels was supported by reinforcements and that Zollicof- 
fer's entire force was slowly crossing, which would make the 
enemy's force in his front largely exceed his own, asked Gen- 
eral Carter at London to reinforce him. He also ordered 
Colonel Coburn with the Thirty-third Indiana to move from 
Crab Orchard to his support ; and on the 6th established his 
camp in a strong position three miles north of Somerset, 
where he was able to command both the Stanford and the 
Crab Orchard roads. Here Carter reported with two regi- 
ments on the 9th, Colonel Vandeveer's regiment, the Thirty- 
fifth Ohio, with Captain Hewitt's battery having already ar- 
rived. On the 8th, the rebel cavalry crossed Fishing Creek 
and reconnoitred the Federal camps. They were fired on by 
Wolf ord's cavalry, which then fell back ; and after a brisk 
skirmish with the Thirty-fifth Ohio they were driven back 
with a loss of two or three men on each side. 

General Buell had ordered Thomas to keep his immedi- 
ate command at Columbia, and had directed him not to send 
any more troops to Schoepflf at Somerset, considering that 
the latter had sufiicient force to drive the rebels across the 
Cumberland. Thomas was also directed to hold himself in 
readiness to make an immediate movement, when ordered, 



MILL SPRINGS. 13 

from Columbia on tlie rebel General Hindman, who with 
some seven thousand troops was operating in that vicinity, 
throwing out his cavalry far in advance of his main column, 
and feeling the position of the Federal forces. Hindman 
had been ordered by General Johnston to make a diversion 
in favor of Zollicoffer ; and when Thomas from Columbia 
checked Hindman's advance, the latter reported that the 
force under Thomas had not been weakened to reinforce 
Schoepflf, or to strengthen the main command at Bowling 
Green, and that Zollicoffer was in no immediate danger. 

Schoepff with his entire command on the 18th made a re- 
connoissance to determine the location and purposes of the 
rebel force. Pushing his command forward he drove their 
cavaliy pickets in and found that Zollicoffer had been in- 
trenching his camp, his line of fortifications extending from 
the river to Fishing Creek and his camp being in the angle 
formed by the junction of this stream with the Cumberland. 
Having accomplished this, and not intending to bring on an 
engagement, Schoepff returned with his command to their 
encampment north of Somerset. 

Buell now finding that the only rebel force encamped in 
Eastern Kentucky was that under Zollicoffer, and deeming 
it important that he be driven from the State, modified his 
previous order to Thomas, and on December 29th directed 
him to advance against Zollicoffer from Columbia and attack 
on his left flank. He also ordered Schoepff to attack him 
in front. Two days later Thomas started from Lebanon with 
the Second Brigade, under command of Colonel Manson, and 
two regiments of Colonel McCook's brigade, Kinney's bat- 
tery of artillery, and a battalion of Wolford's cavalry. Hea\y 
rains, swollen streams, and almost impassable roads impeded 
the movement of the troops so that it was not until the 
17th of January that they reached Logan's Cross Roads, ten 



14 THE ARMY OF THE CUMBERLAND. 

miles from tlie rebel encampment. At this point Thomas 
halted his command and awaited the arrival of the Fourth 
and Tenth Kentucky, the Fourteenth Ohio, and the Eigh- 
teenth United States Infantry, detained in the rear by the 
condition of the road. He communicated at once with 
Schoepff, and the same day the latter reported in jjerson. 
General Thomas directed Schoepff to send him Standart's 
battery, the Twelfth Kentucky and the First and Second 
Tennessee regiments, which were to strengthen the com- 
mand on the immediate front until the arrival of the regi- 
ments in the rear. Thomas placed the Tenth Indiana, Wol- 
ford's cavalry, and Kinney's battery on the main road lead- 
ing to the enemy's camp. The Ninth Ohio and the Second 
Minnesota were posted three-quarters of a mile to the right 
on the Eobertsport road. Strong pickets were thrown out 
on the main road in the direction of the enemy, with cavalry 
pickets beyond. Our pickets were fired on and had a skir- 
mish with the rebel pickets on the night of the 17th. On 
the 18th, the Fourth Kentucky, a battalion of the Michigan 
Engineers and Wetmore's Battery also reported to Thomas. 

Crittenden, on learning that Zollicoffer had crossed the 
Cumberland, had sent at once an order by courier, post 
haste, directing him to recross; but on his arrival at Mill 
Springs he found Zollicoffer still on the north bank, waiting 
his arrival before retiring. Crittenden gave orders at once 
for the construction of boats to take his command across the 
river; but they were not ready when he heard of the ai> 
proach of General Thomas on Januaiy 17th. 

On the 18th, Crittenden reported to General Johnston that 
he was threatened by a superior force of the enemy in his 
front, and that as he found it impossible to cross the river, 
he should have to make the fight on the ground he then oc- 
cupied. 



MILL SPRINGS. 



15 




DESIGNATION OF POSITIO"NS OF FORCES. 

U.S. REBEL 

rirst Position ^__ , 

Secona Position c=i»3 „ 

Third Position — c=«. 

Final Position > — — » i. . 

I SCALE 

i H H H 







Mill Springs, 



16 THE ARMY OF THE CUMBERLAND. 

His weekly reports showed eight infantry regiments, fonr 
battalions (seventeen companies) of cavaliy, and two com- 
panies of artillery, making an aggregate of 9,417 men. His 
circular order of the 18th, directing the order of march in 
his advance to attack, shows that his army was on the day 
of battle composed of the same companies, and that his force 
was about the same. 

At midnight, on January 18th, in a heavy winter rain, the 
Confederate army marched out to battle with Bledsoe's and 
Saunders's independent cavalry companies in advance. Zol- 
licoflfer's brigade of four regiments, with Rutledge's battery 
of artillery, followed. Then came General Carroll's brigade 
of four regiments, one in resen'e, with McClung's battery of 
artillery, Brauner's battalion of cavalry on the right, and 
McClellan's battalion of cavali-y on the left, with Gary's bat- 
talions in the rear. After a six hours' march through the 
rain and mud, the advance struck our cavalry pickets at six 
o'clock, in the early gray of a wdnter morning, two miles in 
front of the Federal camp. Wolford's cavalry slowly fell 
back, reporting the enemy's advance to Manson, who im- 
mediately formed his regiment — the Tenth Indiana — and 
took position on the road to await the attack. Manson then 
ordered the Fourth Kentucky, Colonel Speed S. Fry, to sup- 
port him ; and reported to Thomas, in person, the advance 
of the rebels in force, and the disposition he had made of 
his troops to meet the attack. General Thomas directed him 
to return to his brigade immediately, with orders to hold the 
enemy in check until the other troops could be brought up. 
Orders were given to the other commanders to form immedi- 
ately, and in ten minutes they were all marching to the bat- 
tle-field, except the battalion of Michigan Engineers and a 
company of the Thirty-eighth Ohio, detailed to guard the 
camp. 



MILL SPRINGS. 



17 



The rebels, in their advance, opened the attack with Walt- 
hall's MississipiH and Battle's Tennessee regiments, which 
as they moved forward, forming the right of the rebel line, 
encountered the Fourth Kentucky and the Tenth Indiana,' 
formed on the first line to resist their attack in the edge of 
the woods to their front. The Tennessee regiment endeav- 
ored to flank the Fourth Kentucky on the left, while the 
latter regiment was resisting the rebel attack on the front, 
in a most obstinate manner. Carter's Tennessee brigade 
was ordered up in position to meet this flanking movement 
with a section of Kinney's battery ; and the attempt of Bat- 
tie's regiment was checked. 

Orders were sent to Colonel McCook to advance with the 
Ninth Ohio and the Second Minnesota regiments. These 
regiments coming up occupied the position of the Fourth 
Kentucky and Tenth Indiana, who by that time were out of 
ammunition. As soon as this disposition of these troops 
had been made the enemy opened a most determined and 
galling fire, pressing our troops at all points. General 
Thomas's command returned the fire with spirit, and hold- 
ing their position the contest was maintained for half an 
hour on both sides most obstinately. 

At this time. General Zollicoffer, being in the rear of 
the Nineteenth Tennessee regiment of his command, be- 
came convinced that the Fourth Kentucky (Federal) regi- 
ment was a part of his brigade, ordered the Tennessee regi- 
ment to cease firing, as they were shooting their own troops. 
He then rode to the front, where he met Colonel Fry, 
the commanding officer of the Fourth Kentucky. Zolli- 
coffer stated to Fry that both commands belonged to the 
same side, and that firing should stop. To this Fry assented 
and started to order the Fourth Kentucky to cease firing, 
when one of Zollicoflfer's aids coming up, seeing that Fry 



18 THE ARMY OF THE CUMBERLAND. 

was a Federal officer, opened fire uijon him with a revolver, 
wounding his horse. Fry returned the fire, shooting Zolli- 
coffer through the heart. 

Shortly after, the First and Second East Tennessee regi- 
ments of Carter's brigade and Hoskins's Kentucky regi- 
ment were placed on the left of the Second Minnesota 
regiment, and opening a heavy fire on the right flank of the 
rebel line caused it to give way. The Second Minnesota 
regiment kejat uj) a galling fire in the centre, while the 
Ninth Ohio charged the enemy with fixed bayonets on the 
left, turned that flank, and drove them from the field. The 
whole rebel line then gave way, retreating in the utmost con- 
fusion and disorder to their intrenchments at Beech Grove. 
Thomas ordered an immediate advance, after supplying his 
troops with ammunition, driving the rebels into their in- 
trenchments. As these were approached they were invest- 
ed by the division deployed in line of battle. Cannonading 
was kej)t up until dark, firing being in the direction of the 
ferry to defeat a crossing. During the night j)reparations 
were made for an assault on the intrenchments on the follow- 
ing morning. The Fourteenth Ohio, Colonel Steedman, 
and the Tenth Kentucky, Colonel Harlan, reported after the 
fight, were placed in the front of the advance, and were the 
first to enter the intrenchments. Schoepflf's brigade joined 
the command during the evening, and was placed in posi- 
tion for the attack. 

At midnight Crittenden abandoned everything, and be- 
tween that hour and daylight escaped across the river by 
means of a steamer and some barges at the landing, which 
he burned, leaving behind him his badly wounded, all of 
his cannon — twelve pieces — with their caissons packed with 
ammunition, a large amount of small arms, with ammunition 
for the same, over one hundred and fifty wagons, and more 



MILL SPRINGS. 19 

than one tliousand horses and mules, with a large amount of 
tools, stores, camp and garrison equipage. 

As all the boats were destroyed, it was impossible for 
Thomas to cross his command in pursuit. General Thomas 
in his oiBcial report of the engagement says : " Their com- 
mand was completely demoralized and retreated with great 
haste and in all directions, making their capture in any 
number quite doubtful if pursued. There is no doubt but 
that the moral effect produced by their complete dispersion 
will have a more decided effect in re-establishing Union sen- 
timents than though they had been ca^jtured." 

The rebels suffered terribly by heavy marching through 
the rain, mud, and cold, with insufficient food ; frequently 
with nothing but parched corn to sustain life. Crittenden 
finally took position at Chestnut Mound, within reach of 
relief from Xashville. 

In the life of Albei-t Sidney Johnston, speaking of Crit- 
tenden's retreat, the author says: "During his retreat his 
army became much demoralized, and two regiments, whose 
homes were in that neighborhood, almost entirely abandoned 
their organization and went every man to his own house. 
A multitude deserted, and the tide of fugitives filled the 
country with dismay." 

The battle fought at Logan's Cross Eoads, called by the 
rebels the Battle of Fishing Creek, and by the Federals the 
Battle of Mill Springs, was most disastrous to the enemy, 
and inflicted the most severe blow they had up to that time 
experienced. The victory for the Federal forces was the 
first complete success of the war, and was hailed everywhere 
with joy and hope. An order was issued by the President 
congratulating the troops on their success, and the general 
in command conveyed his thanks to General Thomas and 
troops for their brilliant victory. 



20 THE ARMY OF THE CUMBERLAND. 

Tliomas's command lost in the engagement 39 killed, and 
207 wounded. He reported the rebel loss at 122 killed, and 
the total loss at 349. The large projDortion of killed to the 
wounded indicates heavy fighting at close quarters, and also 
a superiority of either the arms of the Federal troops or 
theix firing. 

The body of General Zollicoflfer was treated with great re- 
spect. General Thomas had it embalmed and carried around 
by Lebanon. It was then sent by General Buell through 
his lines under a flag of truce. Zollicoff"er's death was a 
veiy depressing event to the Tennesseeans. He was their 
most popular leader, and his death was felt by the people of 
Tennessee as a personal bereavement. 

Crittenden's attack and defeat were a great surprise to 
Johnston. This force had been ordered to Mill Springs to 
maintain that point of the general military line as a corps 
of observation merely. With the attack and defeat John- 
ston found his line broken, his position at Bowling Green 
liable to be turned on that flank, and an army on which ho 
counted demolished. This with his losses on his left in 
"Western Kentucky and at Fort Henry compelled his main 
command at Bowling Green to abandon that place, and 
retire into Tennessee. Thomas, after the battle of Mill 
Springs, concentrated his command at Somerset, awaiting 
orders. He was ordered to Mumfordsville, February 15th, 
to take part in the general advance against Bowling Green. 
These orders were countermanded by reason of the evacua- 
tion of that place, on the 14th ; and on the 22d, Thomas was 
ordered with his division to proceed by forced marches to 
- Louisville, and there embark for Nashville. The command 
arrived at Nashville on the 2d, 3d, and 4th days of March. 



CHAPTER m. 

CONCENTRATION AT NASHVILLE. 

Don Caulos Buell, who was placed in command of the 
Department of the Ohio on Sherman's request to be re- 
lieved, had been serving from the early summer of 1861 
as Assistant Adjutant-General on the staff of Brigadier- 
General E. V. Sumner, U.S.A., in command of the De- 
partment of the Pacific. He had been promoted to the 
rank of lieutenant-colonel in the adjutant-general's depart- 
ment, May 11, 1861. His appointment as brigadier-general in 
the volunteer force was made May 17, 1861. General Buell 
was a graduate of West Point, and had been in the army 
all his life. He was a thoroughly trained soldier, with great 
pride in his profession, a man of great integiity, with abili- 
ties of the first order, animated by high princiiDle. His 
long training in the adjutant-general's department, added to 
his natural faculty, made him a first-class organizer of an 
army. Under his direction the soldiers of the Ai"my of the 
Ohio received their training in the drill of the camp, the 
discipline of the march, and learned endurance under fire in 
the skirmishes and engagements during his command. For 
all the soldierly qualities that the troops of the later organi- 
zation — the Army of the Cumberland— possessed, they were 
indebted in large measure to their first commander in the 
field. General Buell. He was constant in his endeavors iot 
the care of the troops, and insisted on their camps being 



22 THE ARMY OF THE CUMBERLAND. 

carefully selected and well drained. His highest aim was 
to make good soldiers of his command, and everything that 
deti-acted from this, as straggling, pillaging, disobedience 
of orders, he regarded as unworthy of a soldier, and merit- 
ing prompt and stern punishment at his hands. In the ear- 
lier days of the war, with the lack of the knowledge that 
the stricter the obedience to orders the better for the soldier. 
General Buell seemed at times harsh and severe. But as 
time brought hard cami^aigns and heavy fighting to the 
Army of the Cumberland, the older soldiers who were under 
Buell saw that he was actuated solely for their good and 
the good of the service in all he did. 

The organization of the troops into brigades and divisions 
first engaged Buell's attention on assuming command. On 
December 2d, an order was issued creating this organization 
and designating it the " Army of the Ohio," consisting of 
six divisions. The brigades were numbered consecutively 
throughout the army, and not as they were formed in the 
divisions. General G. H. Thomas was assigned to the com- 
mand of the First Division, consisting of four brigades. 
The entire force of the First Division was at Nashville on 
March 4th. 

The Second Division was organized at Camp Nevin, a 
camp established by General Rousseau, when left by Sher- 
man in command after the latter assumed the command of 
the department. General Alexander McD. McCook, who 
had relieved Rousseau October 14, by order of Sherman, was 
assigned to the command of this division, which consisted 
also of four brigades. 

The Third Division was placed under the command of 
General O. M. Mitchel, who had been in Cincinnati in com- 
mand of the "Military Department of Ohio," and who was 
relieved November 19th, after two months' service there. 



CONCENTRATION AT NASHVILLE. 23 

superintending tlie forwarding of trooj)S to the armies in 
the field. This division consisted of three brigades. 

General William Nelson, on rej)orting at Louisville after 
his Eastern Kentucky campaign, was i)laced in command of 
the Fourth Division, consisting of three brigades. 

The Fifth Division, consisting of three brigades, was 
placed under the command of General Thomas L. Crit- 
tenden, a son of John J. Crittenden. 

In January, 1862, General Buell organized the Sixth Di- 
vision, and relieving General T. J. "Wood from the command 
of the Fifth Brigade, assigned him as commander of this di- 
vision, which consisted of three brigades. 

To each brigade was attached a batteiy of artillery. 

In this organization of the "Army of the Ohio," as the 
new regiments from the North reported, additional brigades 
and divisions were formed from time to time. Thus organ- 
ized, the army under Buell, in the early spring entered uj^on 
its first campaign. There had been some slight skirmishing 
dming the winter with portions of the command. A de- 
tachment of the Thiriy-ninth Indiana, under Lieutenant- 
Colonel Jones, met a body of the rebel cavalry a few miles 
beyond Camp Nevin, and routed it with slight loss to the 
enemy. 

On December 10th, General E. W. Johnson moved onward 
his brigade, and occupied Mumfordsville, sending a detach- 
ment of the Thii-ty-second Indiana to Green Biver, where a 
temjiorary bridge was constructed. On the 17th, four com- 
panies of this regiment, under Lieutenant-Colonel Von Tre- 
bra, crossed and took position at Eowlett's Station. Gen- 
eral A. S. Johnston had sent Hindman with his brigade from 
'Bowling Green, with instmctions to destroy the railroad as 
far north as Green River. On the same day that the Thirty- 
second Indiana crossed the river, Hindman reached Wood- 



24 THE ARMY OP THE CUMBERLAND. 

sonville. On the approach of Hiudman, Von Trebra threw 
out two companies as skirmishers. The enemy fell back 
with the purpose of decoying the Federals to the point 
where his main command of infantry and artillery was 
posted. The cavahy — a squadron of the "Texas Rangers" 
under Colonel Terry — made a spirited attack. The skir- 
mishers rallied by fours to receive this charge. After re- 
peated charges from the cavalry, wliich were resisted by the 
Thirty-second — in one of which Colonel Terry was killed — 
Colonel Willich reinforced Von Trebra with four additional 
companies. After maintaining their position under fire for 
an hour and a half, the Indiana troops repulsed the enemy 
in eveiy charge, and Hindman's force then withdi'ew. Col- 
onel Willich had in the engagement only the eight com- 
panies of his command, with Cotter's battery. The enemy 
attacked with a force of 1,100 infantiy, 250 cavahy, and 4 
pieces of artillery. The Thkty-second Indiana lost 8 men 
killed and ten wounded. After the fall of Bowling Green, 
the Second Division reached Nashville on March 3d. 

The Third Division in February was ordered to make 
a demonstration, moving by forced marches against the 
enemy's position at Bowling Green, to prevent troops being 
sent from there to reinforce Fort Donelson. The rebels 
had commenced their retreat from this place to Nashville 
prior to the arrival of Mitchel's command, but the shells 
thrown by his artillery on the 14th into the city hastened 
the movements of the rear guard of Johnston's army. Be- 
fore their retreat, the enemy burned both bridges over Bar- 
ren Eiver, and set fire to a large quantity of military stores, 
railroad cars, and other jjroperty. Turchin's brigade, captur- 
ing a small feriyboat, crossed over the river, swollen above 
high-water mark by the heavy rains, entered the city at five 
o'clock the next morning, and succeeded in extinguishing 



CONCENTRATION AT NASHVILLE. 25 

the fire and saving a portion of the railroad cars. During 
the succeeding week Mitchel crossed the gi-eater part of his 
command over the river, and, without his wagons, reached 
Edgefield opposite Nashville on the evening of the 24th, at 
the same time that General Buell arrived by rail, the latter 
using some of the cars captured at Bowling Green. At 
Edgefield Mitchel found both of the bridges into Nashville 
destroyed, and his crossing was effected on the steamers 
that brought Nelson's division to that place. 

The Fourth Division was ordered in Febniary to reinforce 
the Federal troops at Fort Donelson. Nelson, with two bri- 
gades, moved from Camp Wicklifie to the Ohio Eiver on 
FebiTiary 13th, and there took steamer for the Cumberland 
Biver. On his amval at Fort Donelson, he found it in pos- 
session of the Federal troops, and ho then proceeded by the 
boats with his command to Nashville, arriving there on the 
25th. Nelson's Third Brigade reported a few days later, 
having marched direct from Bowling Green. 

General Thomas L. Crittenden's command, organizing 
at Owensboro, had a skirmish with a force of 500 rebels 
at Woodland. Colonel Burbridge was sent with some three 
hundred troojis of his own command and a small force from 
Colonel McHenry's regiment. Attacking the enemy, they 
routed him, inflicting a loss of some fifty killed, wounded, 
and prisoners. On the 24th, the rebel General Breckinridge 
made a demonstration with 4,000 men at Eochester, occupy- 
ing Greenville with his cavalry. Crittenden made such dis- 
position of his troojjs that the enemy, without risking an 
attack, returned to Bowling Green. Early in February Gen- 
eral Buell ordered Crittenden to send Colonel Cruft with 
his brigade to report to General Grant. Cruft, however, 
reached Fort Henry after the surrender, but his brigade was 
incorporated into Grant's army, and rendered efifective ser- 
VIL— 3 



26 THE ARMY OF THE CUMBERLAND. 

vice in the reduction of Fort Donelson. Later, the brigade 
was transferred to General Halleck. Crittenden, soon after 
this, proceeded by boat with the balance of his division, 
and reported at Nashville, arriving there at the same time ' 
as Nelson's division. 

The Sixth division, after aiding in the repair of the rail- 
road, arrived at Nashville March 6, 1862. 

General A. S. Johnston, at no time prior to his retreat 
had sufficient force to meet or to resist the advance of the 
Federal forces. His long line, extending from Columbus 
to Knoxville, invited attack, and wherever the attack was 
made his troops were not able to successfully resist it. 
Concentrating his command at Bowling Green, after Mill 
Springs and the fall of Fort Henry, he found that, to save 
Nashville, it was necessary to make a determined stand at 
Fort Donelson, and this he reinforced with all his available 
troops. The fall of Donelson compelled the evacuation of 
Nashville. To the Southern people these reverses were a 
bitter blow to their high hopes and boasting threats that 
the war was to be carried into the North, and peace was to 
follow the first victories to their arms. Duke, in his " His- 
tory of Morgan's Cavaliy," says : "No subsequent reverse, 
although fraught with far more real calamity, ever created 
the shame, sorrow, and wild consternation that swept over 
the South with the news of the surrender of Fort Donelson. 
To some in the South these reverses were harbingers of the 
final defeat and overthrow of the Confederacy." 

"With the fall of Donelson, after detaching the troops at 
Columbus, Johnston's force was reduced to a little over one- 
half of his total effective strength as reported by him at 
Bowling Green. In a report to Richmond, he gave the total 
of his command as barely forty-three thousand men. 

General Buell's army amounted to over seventy five thou- 



CONCENTRATION AT NASHVILLE. 



27 



sand men, not all of these available for field duty, as a very 
large proportion of the command was needed to maintain 
his line of supplies, and the farther his advance the gi-eater 
the dram on his command for railroad guards 

With the fall of Donelson, Johnston modified his plans 
of operations, and then determined to relinquish the defen- 
sive, and to concentrate all available forces of the Confed- 
eracy m the southwest for offensive operations. He had as 
early as Januaiy, 1862, contemplated the possibility of 'the 
disasters that had taken place, and the retreat consequent 
npon them, and at that time indicated Corinth, Miss., as be- 
ing the proper place to concentrate the troops 

On January 3d General Buell wrote at length to General 
Halleck proposing a joint campaign against the enemy in 
a combined attack on its centre and flanks," moving the 
troops by water under protection of the gunboats, striking 
for the railroad communications of the enemy, and destroy- 
ing his bridges over the Cumberland and Temiessee Eivers 
both of which were protected by batteries, the first at 
Dover-Fort Donelson-and the other at Fort Henry re- 
spectively thirty-one and eighteen miles below the bridges 
To this, on the 6th, General Halleck replied that, situated as 
he was, he could render no assistance to Buell's forward 
movement on Bowling Green, and advised the delay of the 
movement, if such co-operation by troops sent to Cairo 
and Paducah should be deemed necessary to the plan of 
the campaign, of which he knew nothing, and then adds : 
But It stiikes me that to operate from Louisville and 
Paducah or Cairo, against an enemy at Bowling Green, is a 
plain case of exterior lines, like that of McDowell and Pat- 
terson, which, unless each of the columns is superior to the 
enemy, leads to disaster ninety-nine times in a hundred " 
On the 30th of January, Buell received a despatch from 



28 THE ARMY OF THE CUMBERLAND. 

Halleck, "without particulars, saying that he had ordered an 
expedition against Fort Henry. On the 15th of Februaiy 
Halleck telegraphed Buell " to move from Bowling Green 
to Nashville is not good strategy. Come and hel^j me take 
and hold Fort Donelson and Clarksville, then move to 
Florence, cutting the railroad at Decatur, and Nashville 
must be abandoned precisely as Bowling Green has been." 
After the fall of Fort Donelson, and the occupation of Nash- 
ville, General Halleck directed a column of the troops 
under General C. F. Smith to proceed up the Tennessee 
Biver by steamer, and to operate as occasion presented, 
either on Corinth, Jackson, or Humboldt, destroying the rail- 
road communications at these points. At this time Halleck 
had no thought of the subsequent movement of the com- 
mand, that Johnston would concentrate at Corinth, or that 
the Armies of the Ohio and Tennessee should unite at Pitts- 
burg Landing. On the 15th General Smith dropped down 
the river to Pittsburg Landing, and there placed his troops 
in camp. On the lltli of March, President Lincoln, by War 
Order No. 3, created the Department of the Mississippi, 
consolidating the three departments under Generals Hal- 
leck, Hunter, and Buell, and placed General Halleck in 
command. Halleck at once ordered Buell to march his 
army to Savannah, and to execute the movements that had 
already been agreed on by them. 

Buell immediately gave his attention to the preparation 
of his command to carry out these orders. He directed 
O, M. Mitchel to march south, strike, and hold the Mem- 
phis and Charleston Railroad. Organizing the seventh divi- 
sion of his army, Buell assigned General George W. Mor- 
gan to this command. This division was formed of four 
brigades, out of a number of regiments gathered up from 
different points iu Kentucky. General Morgan concen- 



CONCENTRATION AT NASHVILLE. 29 

trated liis entire command at Cumberland Ford, being 
directed to take Cumberland Gap if possible and to occupy 
East Tennessee if able to enter. If not, then to resist any- 
advance of the rebels. 

General E. Dumont was placed in command of Nashville. 
The Twentv-third Brigade under Colonel Duffield, composed 
of four regiments, was ordered from Kentucky to garrison 
Murfreesboro, and protect the road from Shelbyville to 
Lavergne. 

Buell designated the First Di\-ision under Thomas, the 
Second under McCook, the Fourth under Nelson, the Fifth 
under Crittenden, and the Sixth under Wood, to constitute 
the army under his personal command, which was to join 
Halleck in the operations against the enemy's position at 
Corinth. These divisions, with cavalry and artillery attached, 
made a force of 37,000 effective troops. In addition to these, 
Buell had under his command 36,000 effective men to defend 
his communications, maintain his line of supply, enforce 
order within his lines, and to perform any special duty as- 
signed to them. The muster-rolls of his army showed that 
he had at this time 92 regiments of infantiy — not including 
those sent to Halleck under Cruft. These regiments aggre- 
gated 79,334 men. He had 11 regiments, 1 battalion, and 7 
detached companies of cavaliy, making a total of 11,496 
men, and 28 field, and 2 siege batteries, with 3,935 men. 
The grand total was 94,765 men. His effective force, how- 
ever, was 73,487 men, comprising 60,882 infantiy, 9,237 
cavalry, and 3,368 artillery. 

Buell's army, after crossing Duck Kiver, pressed rapidly 
forward. The day before Nelson's arrival at the Tennessee 
River he was informed by General Grant, to whom he had 
reported his movements by courier, that he need not hasten 
his marches, as he could not cross the river before the follow- 



30 THE ARMY OF THE CUMBERLAND. 

ing Tuesday, the 8th. Nelson's entire division, with forced 
inarches, reached Savannah April 5tli, the other division 
closely following. Ammen's brigade of Nelson's division 
crossed the river on the afternoon of the 6th, and reported to 
Buell, and was engaged in the battle of that day, aiding in 
resisting the final attack of Chalmers on the left of Grant's 
command. Crittenden's and McCook's divisions arrived on 
the field during the night of the 6th, and took an active part 
in the fighting of the next day. The rest of the command 
anived on the field after the battle. 

The movements of the troops of the " Army of the Ohio " 
in the battle of Shiloh and in the operations against 
Corinth are treated in Volume II. of this series, and it is 
not within the purview of this volume to enter further into 
the narrative of their service than to give a few brief facts as 
to the disposition of the troops, in order to follow the sub- 
sequent events in which the Army of the Ohio was the main 
actor. 



CHAPTER IV. 

MORGAN'S AND FORREST'S RAIDS. 

On April 11th, HaUeck arrived at Pittsburg Landing and 
at once reorganized the troops in his command, designating 
the divisions of his army as the right wing, centre, left wing 
resei-ves, and cavahy under Major-Generals George H 
Thomas, D. C. Buell, John Pope, and J. A. McClemand and 
Bngadier-General A. J. Smith respectively. Thomas's com- 
mand comprised four divisions of the " Ai-my of the Tennes- 
see," and Ms old division of the "Army of the Ohio " The 
remainder of that army was under the command of Buell 
After the faU of Corinth, the enemy breaking his large force 
into several smaller commands rendered necessary a similar 
disposition of the Federal forces. Buell was ordered with 
his command to enter into a campaign looking to the occu- 
pation of East Tennessee. One division of his army under 
O. M. Mitchel left Nash^-ille about the middle of March 
under orders to proceed to Murfreesboro and repair the 
railroad bridges burned by Johnston on his retreat. On 
Co onel Duffield's reporting with the Twenty-third brigade. 
Mitchel pressed foi-ward to Shelbyville and from there by 
a rapid movement on the 7th of April he occupied Hunts- 
ville Ala., with Turchin's brigade, Kennett's Ohio cavalry, 
and Simonson's battery, capturing 170 prisoners, 15 locomo- 
tives, and 150 passenger and freight oars, and a large amount 
of army stores. On the 8th, Mitchel ordered Sill with his 



32 THE ARMY OF THE CUMBERLAND, 

brigade to proceed east along the line of tlie railroad to 
seize Stevenson, the junction of the Nashville and Chatta- 
nooga, and Memphis and Charleston Railroads, and directed 
Turchin with his command to move west and take possession 
of Decatur and Tuscumbia. This was successfully done, 
and Mitchel was in possession of over one hundi'ed miles 
of this important link connecting Corinth with Richmond in 
the heart of the enemy's territory. He then posted his 
troops at the more prominent points, ready to move to any 
place threatened by the enemy. 

On April 29th, Mitchel, hearing of the advance of the 
force under Kirby Smith from Bridgeport against the com- 
mand beyond Stevenson, moved as rapidly as possible by 
rail from Huntsville to resist him. He found the enemy 
had attacked the detachment posted five miles west of 
Bridgeport, and that his troops had driven the enemy's ad- 
vance back across Widow's Creek. The bridge over this 
creek had been burned by the enemy on their retreat. 
Mitchel strengthened the detachment and engaged the at- 
tention of the enemy by an apparent effort to cross this 
creek, while with his main force he advanced on Bridgeiaort 
by a detour by the left and drove that portion of the enemy 
in the town across the Tennessee Eiver. In their retreat 
the enemy set fire to the bridge reaching from the west 
bank of the river to the Island. This bridge Mitchel suc- 
ceeded in saving, but the bridge east of the Island was 
completely destroyed. General Mitchel then turned his at- 
tention to that part of the enemy's force at Widow's Creek, 
which he succeeded in capturing, taking in all some three 
hundred and fifty prisoners. Early in May, Mitchel, who 
had been placed in command of all the troops between Nash- 
ville and Huntsville, ordered General Negley with the 
Seventh Brigade, belonging to McCook's division — who had 



MORGAN'S AND FORREST'S RAIDS. 33 

been left at Columbia on tlie advance of the main army 
upon Savannah — to make an advance against General Adams 
with a brigade of troops at Rogersville, Ala. At the same 
time Mitchel sent Colonel Lytle from Athens, Ala., to co- 
operate with Negley. On the 13th, the enemy learning of 
the ai^in'oach of the Federal forces, retreated across the 
Tennessee Eiver. This placed Mitchel in complete posses- 
sion of that portion of Alabama north of that river. On 
May 29th, Mitchel concentrated Negley's command from 
Columbia, Turchin's brigade from Huntsville, and the 
Eighteenth Ohio under T. E. Stanley from Athens at Fay- 
etteville for an expedition against Chattanooga under the 
command of Negley. These troops passed through Win- 
chester, Cowen, and University Place to Jasper. Advanc- 
ing upon the latter place, the head of his column, under 
Colonel Hambright, encountered a brigade of the enemy's 
troops under General Adams. The enemy was driven from 
the place after a sharp engagement, leaving his supply and 
ammunition trains. His loss was 18 killed, 20 wounded, and 
12 prisoners. Leaving Jasper, Negley arrived on the north 
bank of the Tennessee, ojiposite Chattanooga, on the 7th. 
Negley, on the evening of that day and the morning of the 
next, bombarded Chattanooga, and made a demonstration of 
crossing the river and attacking the town. General Duke 
says: "The commandant of the place. General Leadbetter, 
had two or three guns in battery and replied, when the 
gunners, who were the most independent fellows I ever saw, 
chose to work the guns. The defence of the place was left 
entirely to the individual efforts of those who chose to de- 
fend it, and nothing prevented its capture but the fact that 
the enemy could not cross the river.'' 

Negley then withdrew and encamped his command at 
Shelbyville. 



34 THE ARMY OF THE CUMBERLAND, 

General G. W. Morgan, under orders from Buell, assumed 
command of the forces in Eastern Kentucky early in April. 
Acting under his orders lie proceeded to Cumberland Ford 
and commenced operations at once against Cumberland Gap. 
This gap is situated in the Cumberland range on the boun- 
dary line between Kentucky and Tennessee, near the Western 
Virginia line, is a deep depression in the mountain range, 
making a natural roadway through it, and is the centre of all 
the roads in that section of country. It is a stronghold pro- 
tected by nature with abrupt slopes on the mountains, fre- 
quently so steep as to be almost perpendicular, with the 
ranges much broken by spurs, knobs, and ravines, protected 
by parallel ranges of less height in close proximity on the east 
and west. Morgan, after encountering the enemy in several 
skirmishes, determined either to compel him to fight or re- 
treat. He sent General Spears with three brigades to Pine 
Mountain, on the road to Big Creek Gap. General Kirby 
Smith, commanding the enemy's forces in East Tennessee, 
placed General Barton's command of two brigades of in- 
fantry in Big Creek Gap, and then advanced with some 
eight thousand men under his immediate command to cut 
Spears off, and to threaten the Federal forces at Cumberland 
Ford. Morgan, under orders, withdrew Spears, but learning 
a few days later from Buell of the operations of Negley's 
command before Chattanooga, and that Kirby Smith had 
proceeded with a part of his command to the relief of 
that place, resumed the advance. Negley's movements had 
caused Smith to suspend his operations, but when he 
heard of Negley's withdrawal he jiroceeded at once to exe- 
cute his plans against Morgan. On June 18th, the latter, 
finding that Kirby Smith had taken his entire command 
away from Cumberland Gap, marched his troops up Pow- 
ell's Valley and late in the evening of that day reached the 



MORGAN'S AND FORREST'S RAIDS. 35 

fortifications, found the Gap empty, and took possession. 
This natural stronghold had been extensively fortified by 
the rebels, who regarded the position of their troops such 
as to i^revent the success of any attempt on the part of 
the Federal forces to obtain possession without a battle. 
The enemy were completely out-manoeuvred, and General 
Morgan had the satisfaction of occupying this fortress with- 
out the loss of any of his command. 

In the early part of May, the rebel Colonel John H. Mor- 
gan's command of some five hundred men, in the neighbor- 
hood of Pulaski, Tenn., captured a wagon train with about 
four hundred Federal troops, mostly convalescents going to 
Columbia. On the night of the 5th, Morgan reached Leba- 
non and quartered his entire force in houses in the town. 
On the evening of the 6th, Dumont with his command from 
Nashville, joined by that of Duffield from Murfreesboro, 
surprised and attacked Morgan's troopers, completely rout- 
ing them after a severe engagement. Morgan with a few 
men under his immediate command escaped after a chase 
of twenty-one miles from Lebanon, crossing the Cumber- 
land Eiver on a feri-y. Dumont had with him detach- 
ments of Wynkoop's Seventh Pennsylvania cavaliy, of Wol- 
ford's First Kentucky cavalry and of Green Clay Smith's 
regiment of Kentucky cavalry. Morgan's loss was 150 men 
captured, with the same number of horses. The balance 
of his command was dispersed. Wolfcrd and Smith were 
both wounded, and the Federals lost 6 killed and 25 
wounded. On the 11th, Morgan with his men that had 
escaped, and two new companies, made a raid on the 
Louisville and Nashville Kailroad at Cave City, captured 
a freight train of forty-eight cars and burned it. He also 
captured a passenger train, which had a few Federal officers 
on it. His object was to rescue the men of his command 



36 THE ARMY OF THE CUMBERLAND. 

taken prisoners at Lebanon, but in this he failed, as they had 
been sent North by boat. 

From this place Morgan reported with his command at 
Chattanooga to refit, preparatory to his first extended raid 
into Kentucky. Here he was joined by two full companies 
of Texan cavalry under Cai^tains E. M. Gano and John Huff- 
man, both native Kentuckians, who, on reporting at Corinth, 
had asked to be ordered on duty with Morgan and his 
command, enlarged from a squadron to a full regiment. 
After he had obtained all the recruits he could at Chatta- 
nooga he set out for Knoxville, to further increase his com- 
mand and to re-arm. It was at this place that he received 
the two mountain howitzers which were used so effectively in 
the first raid into Kentucky, and which just before his com- 
mand started on the Ohio raid were taken from it by 
Bragg's ordnance officers. This came near raising a mutiny, 
and the only consolation that Morgan's men had was that 
Bragg lost the guns within two weeks after they were taken 
away from them. In the latter i^art of June, Colonel Hunt, 
of Georgia, reported at Knoxville with a regiment of "Par. 
tisan Eangers," nearly four hundred strong, ordered to ac- 
company Morgan on his contemplated raid, making the 
strength of his entire command 876 effective men. 

Morgan set out from Knoxville on the morning of 
July 4, 1862, taking the road to Sparta, one hundred and 
four miles due west from Knoxville, which was reached on 
the evening of the third day of this march. The Union men 
of East Tennessee frequently gave these raiders medicine of 
their own prescription, lying in wait for them and firing 
upon them from the bushes. This was a new experience for 
these freebooting troopers, who wherever they went in the 
South were generally made welcome to the best of every- 
thing, being regarded as the beau-ideals of Southern chiv- 



MORGAN'S AND FORREST'S RAIDS. 37 

airy. On the 8th, Morgan's command reached the Cumber- 
land Kiver at the ford near the small village of Celina, 
eighteen miles from Tompkinsville, where a detachment of 
the Ninth Pennsylvania, 250 strong, was encamped tinder 
command of Major Jordan. Morgan learned at Knoxville 
the fact that a Federal force was at this point, and was 
told the particulars of it on his arrival at Celina, and he 
now wished to surprise and capture the entire command. 
Sending a detachment under Gano by the right to cut off 
Jordan's retreat, at five o'clock on the morning of the 9th 
Morgan moved to the attack. Jordan posted himself on a 
thickly wooded hill and fired several volleys at the rebels 
as they advanced over an open field, but being outnumbered 
was routed with a loss of four killed, six wounded, and 
nineteen prisoners. The enemy's loss was several wounded, 
among them Colonel Hunt, who died a few days later from 
the effects of his wound. Morgan i^aroled the prisoners and 
then left for Glasgow, reaching there at one o'clock that 
night, where they were received with open arms by the 
citizens, breakfast cooked for the entire command, and three 
days' rations prepared for them. From here the command 
marched all night, and at eleven o'clock next morning was 
within a short distance of Lebanon. Morgan, prei^aratory 
to an attack, despatched one of his companies to destroy the 
raih'oad north of the town to prevent the arrival of reinforce- 
ments. The company struck the railroad at New Hope 
Church, and had just commenced their work of destruction 
when a train came up with a number of Federal troops on 
it, who drove the rebels off in confusion, but for some un- 
known cause the train then returned to Louisville, leaving 
Morgan unmolested at Lebanon, who advanced to the at- 
tack and drove in the pickets. After a slight skirmish 
the place was surrendered by Lieutenant-Colonel Johnson 



38 THE ARMY OF THE CUMBERLAND. 

of the Twenty-eiglith Kentucky, witli a small detachment 
of that command. Morgan destroyed some fifty thousand 
dollars' worth of Government stores. He left Lebanon at 
two o'clock in the afternoon, passed through Springfield, 
without halting the command, and pushed on for Harrods- 
biirg, reaching there at nine o'clock on Sunday morning. 
Here he sent Gano with his squadron around Lexington 
to bum the railroad bridges on the Kentucky Central 
Eailroad, in order to prevent troops being sent there 
from Cincinnati. Another detachment was sent to destroy 
the bridge on the Louisville and Lexington Eailroad, 
cutting ofi" reinforcements from Louisville. Morgan's de- 
sign was to make it appear that he intended to attack 
Frankfort, then turn suddenly to the right and attempt the 
capture of Lexington. He had given out everywhere in 
Kentucky that he was marching on the State Capital with 
a force five thousand strong, and had succeeded in sisread- 
ing the utmost alarm. On the 15th Morgan reached Mid- 
way, captured the telegraph operator and installed his own 
operator at the instrument, sent despatches in the name of 
Federal Generals, and changed the orders for the move- 
ment of troops. He telegraphed in all directions, without 
the slightest regard for truth, and succeeded in creating 
the utmost confusion and alarm at Cincinnati, Louisville, 
Lexington, and Frankfort. The command left Midway late 
in the afternoon and started for Georgetown, which place 
they reached at sundown, where they met a small force of 
Home Guards, who were driven out of town. From here 
Morgan sent a force to burn the bridges on the Kentucky 
Eailroad between Lexington and Paris. Then learning how 
strongly Lexington was garrisoned, he gave up all thought 
of attacking it, and finding that the Federal forces were 
closing in on him commenced his return south. On the 



MORGAN'S AND FORREST'S RAIDS. 39 

18th, Morgan attacked Cynthiana, which was garrisoned by 
some five hundred men, under the command of Lieutenant- 
Colonel John J. Landrum, of the Eighteenth Kentucky. 
The fighting continued for two hours, when the Federal 
force was driven from the town and nearly all cajitured. 
Landrum and a few of his command escaped. The Federals 
lost 16 killed and 40 wounded, and 14 of the enemy were 
killed and 42 wounded. The rebels claimed to have cap- 
tured 420 prisoners, who were at once paroled. The depot, 
with a large amount of Government stores, was burned. 
Morgan then left for Paris, where he arrived late in the 
'Evening and rested there that night. About eight o'clock 
in the morning his command was driven out of this place 
by the troops under General Green Clay Smith, numbering 
some twelve hundred men, who killed 2, wounded six, and 
captured several prisoners. Morgan pushed through Win- 
chester, reaching that point about twelve o'clock, crossed 
the Kentucky River just at dark, and arrived at Richmond 
ut four o'clock in the morning. Here he rested his com- 
iiiand twelve hours, then marched toward Crab Orchard, 
arriving about daybreak the next morning. It had been 
his intention to make a stand at Richmond, but there 
were too many troojjs marching to attack him. Besides 
General Smith's command, which was following him closely. 
Colonel Wolford was collecting forces in the southern part 
of Kentucky to intercept him, and troops were en route from 
Louisville to aid in the pursuit. Morgan left Crab Orchard 
at eleven o'clock the same morning, and reached Somerset 
about sunset. At these two places he captured 130 wagons, 
with large quantities of Government stores, of which he 
loaded as much into wagons for the use of his command as 
he wanted, and burned the rest. From Somerset he marched 
to Stagall's Ferry on the Cumberland River, and there 



40 THE ARMY OF THE CUMBERLA^^D. 

crossed, reaching Monticello, twenty-one miles from the 
river, that night, when all pursuit ended. 

Morgan's object in making this raid was to obtain recraits 
and horses, to equip and arm his men, and to prepare for his 
fall raiding trip. In his official report he says : "I left 
Knox^ille on the 4th day of this month with about nine 
hundred men, and returned to Livingston on the 28th inst. 
with nearly twelve hundred, having been absent just twenty- 
four days, dui'ing which time I have travelled over a thou- 
sand miles, captured seventeen towns, destroyed all the 
Government supj^lies and arms in them, dispersed about fif- 
teen hundred Home Guards, and paroled nearly twelve 
hundred regular troops. I lost in killed, wounded, and 
missing, of the number that I carried into Kentucky, about 
ninety." 

When Buell received his orders to open the campaign 
in East Tennessee, the key to that part of the State was 
Chattanooga, and this was the objective point of his cam- 
paign. With the concentration of the Southern forces in 
Mississippi, both Halleck and Buell thought that a favorable 
time had arrived for this movement, anticipating that no 
advance of the enemy's forces would be made to disjnite 
the occujiancy of those portions of Kentucky and Tennes- 
see already held by the Federal forces. The great prob- 
lem w^th Buell was to furnish supplies to his army, now 
some three hundred miles away from its base at Louisville, 
dependent during the greater part of the year on one line of 
road, which was subject to being raided at any time, bridges 
burned, the roadbed destroyed, and the entire road ren- 
dered useless for months. To continue this line the many 
miles through the enemy's country, subject to increased 
risks before Chattanooga could be reached, was a matter 
that requii'ed a great amount of careful thought and delib- 



MORGAN'S AND FORREST'S RAIDS. 41 

©ration. Buell had tried infantry in stockades at bridges, and 
was satisfied that this was not the proper solution of the 
problem. He then made earnest and repeated application for 
more cavahy, to protect his communications and to meet and 
repulse the enemy's raiding parties before they could reach 
his line of communication. If he was to move with his com- 
mand into East Tennessee, he regarded the line fi'om Nash- 
ville to Chattanooga as the proper road on which he 
should depend for his supplies, and to which he should give 
his care and attention for this j)urpose. 

Halleck considered the line from Memphis to Chattanooga 
the one over which the supplies for Buell's army should pass. 
The latter objected to this, by reason of that road crossing 
the Tennessee Eiver twice, thus giving two long bridges to 
rebuild and protect, instead of one, and for the additional 
reason that this road ran for a considerable distance paral- 
lel with the front of the enemy, and thus invited raiding 
parties. "Wliile the risks attending the other road were 
gi'eat enough, Buell regarded the Memphis and Charles- 
ton road far the more objectionable. Besides, he wished 
to move through Middle Tennessee to McMinnville, and 
thence to Chattanooga, with Nashville as his depot of sup- 
plies. In this Halleck ovemiled him and directed that he 
march his command on the line of the Memphis road, re- 
paiiing the track as he advanced. 

While this matter was under consideration by the Federal 
commanders, Bragg, who had been appointed to the position 
of General made vacant by the death of General Johnston, 
and who had succeeded Beauregard in the command in the 
West, put his columns in motion eastward to occupy Chat- 
tanooga. Johnston, on the retreat from Nashville, sent all 
surplus army stores to Chattanooga, and Bragg now regarded 
that point as the proper place to refit his command, and 



42 THE ARMY OF THE CUMBERLAND. 

from which to assume the offensive, and open the campaign 
he had planned to free, for a time at least, Tennessee from 
the control of the Federal forces. 

With the start thus made by both commands for Chatta- 
nooga, everything was in favor of Bragg, whose movements 
were unimpeded, as his route was south of the Tennessee, 
through his own territory, with his lines of communication 
open when he arrived at that place. "With Buell, the repairs 
of the railroad retarded his progress, and the advance weak- 
ened his command by the increased number of detachments 
required to guard his line as it lengthened. 

McCook's and Crittenden's commands were started east- 
ward, the first from Corinth, and the latter from Booneville. 
McCook reached Florence on the 15th of June, where ferry- 
boats had been provided by Mitchel for the crossing of his 
division. A delay was occasioned here by the report that 
Nelson had been attacked, but this was found to be false ; 
and, on the 26th, the divisions of McCook, Crittenden, and 
Nelson crossed, and started at once for Athens, which place 
they reached on the 29th. On the same day Buell estab- 
lished his headquarters at Huntsville, Ala., and gave per- 
sonal supervision to the repair of the railroads, now ex- 
tremely urgent. He placed his troops by division upon the 
different sections of the line, under orders to i)ush repairs 
with all possible expedition. These trooj)s, as repairs were 
made, advanced from time to time, concentrating on the 
line of the Nashville and Chattanooga road. The repairs 
to this railroad were completed on July 28th, and on the 
Nashville and Decatur road on August 3d. During the lat- 
ter part of July the last division of Buell's army, under 
Thomas, crossed the Tennessee Eiver, being relieved — on 
the line of the Memjjhis and Charleston Eailroad — by 
troops from Grant's army. Thomas established his head- 



MORGAN'S AND FORREST'S RAIDS. 43 

quarters at Dechard. It was on this marcli with his brigade 
that General Kobert L. McCook was murdered by guerillas. 
He was riding in an ambulance, ill at the time, and unarmed. 
Nelson's division had been sent to Murfreesboro about 
the middle of July, to drive FoiTest, who, with his cavalry, 
on the 13th, attacked the Federal gamson in the town. 
The post was under the command of General T. T. Critten- 
den, and the trooj)s composing the Twenty-third Brigade 
were under the command of Colonel Duffield. There was, 
unfortunately, a disagreement between the ranking officers 
at the post that led to the most unfortunate results. Col- 
onel Lester, of the Third Minnesota, during the absence of 
Duffield, commanding the brigade, had, by reason of the 
unpleasant relations existing between portions of the com- 
mand, widely distributed them in different parts of the 
town. On the return of Crittenden and Duffield on July 
11th, neither of them assumed command, and their action 
made it appear as if they were standing on their dignity, 
thinking more of their own personal importance than the 
good of the sei-vice. With no one in command, there was 
no unity or projjer esjjrit de corps among the troops, and 
no disposition for defence when Forrest made his at- 
tack. The latter had advanced through McMinnville from 
Chattanooga, with about two thousand men, and arrived 
at Murfreesboro about five o'clock on the morning of the 
13th, captured the pickets, and made disposition of his 
forces for immediate attack. Forming his entire command 
into columns of fours, with the Eighth Texas in front, For- 
rest moved forward on a trot until he reached the Federal 
encampments, which Colonel Wharton, with two regiments, 
charged. The Second Georgia dashed into the town, cap- 
tured the provost guard and all Federal officers and men 
on the streets, seized and secured the supplies. 



44 THE ARMY OF THE CUMBERLAND. 

Major Smith with the Kentucky troops was sent to the 
rear of the Federal command to cut off the retreat. The 
Texans charged into the camp of the Ninth Michigan, and 
reaching the tents, roused some of the men from sleep. A 
portion of that regiment, however, rallied by the officers, 
made a handsome stand and drove the Texans off. Duffield 
was wounded while rallying his men. The Second Georgia 
charged into the public square and surrounded the Court 
House, occupied by a company of the Ninth INIichigan, who 
tAvice repulsed the attacking force. Keinforcemeuts being 
brought forward, the doors of the building were battered 
down and the company was forced to surrender. FoiTest 
now attacked the Third Minnesota on the east bank of 
Stone's Eiver, about a mile and a half from town, which 
had just left their camp to join the force in the town, when 
Forrest with three regiments moved to the attack. 

Colonel Lester formed his command in line of battle, with 
nine companies of infantry and four pieces of artillery, 
and opened fire on the rebels as they advanced. Forrest 
attempting to get to the rear of this force, encountered the 
camp guard of some hundred men left by Lester to jiro- 
tect his camp, posted behind a strong barricade of wagons 
and some large ledges of rocks, difficult to carry. Forrest 
at once ordered a charge which was twice made and re- 
pulsed. Leading his men the third time, he succeeded in 
driving the guard from their ijosition to the main command, 
:posted some six hundred yards away. It was now one 
o'clock, and beyond the skirmishes between the commands 
but little had been accomplished. 

Forrest's officers urged him to withdraw with the results 
obtained up to that time. This he refused to do, and made 
disiaosition of his command for further attack on the Federal 
forces occupying the camp of the Ninth Michigan, which 



MORGAN'S AND FORREST'S RAIDS. 45 

consisted of this regiment and a comjDany of the Second 
Kentucky cavalry. He dismounted two of liis regiments and 
threw forward skirmishers, directed them to open brisk fir- 
ing, and sent the Second Georgia dismounted to attack on 
the left. After this he brought up the Eighth Texas and 
placed them in position to charge on the left. 

Having made this disposition of his forces, he sent forward, 
under a flag of trace, a written demand for the surrender 
of DuflSeld's command, which was complied with at once. 
After this, Forrest demanded the surrender of the Third 
Minnesota, which Lester, after an interview with Duffield 
and a consultation with his own officers, made, surrendering 
some five hundred infantry of his regiment and two sec- 
tions of Hewitt's battery of artillery. The entire forces 
sun-endered were seventeen hundred troops with four 
pieces of artillery. Forrest captured about six hundred 
horses and mules, and a very large quantity of stores and 
Government supplies, part of which he carried away and the 
rest he destroyed, to the value of nearly a million of dollars. 

This loss occurred the day after the opening of the road 
from Nashville south, and very seriously interfered with the 
movements at the front. Nelson endeavored to intercept 
Forrest, but could not successfully " chase cavalry with in- 
fantry." Forrest on Nelson's approach withdrew to McMinn- 
ville, and from there made a dash on Lebanon, some fifty 
miles distant, where he expected to find a force of five hun- 
di-ed Federal cavahy. This force escaped him, and he then 
swept around to the south of Nashville, captured 150 bridge 
guards and burned four bridges. Learning that Nelson was 
again in pursuit of him, Forrest returned to McMinnville. 

From this point he made repeated raids on the line of 
road south of Nashville, leaving Morgan to operate against 
the Louisville and Nashville Railroad. These raiders were 



46 THE ARMY OF THE CUMBERLAND. 

able to move almost without opposition, as Buell was without 
sufficient cavalry to cope with them. The latter had been 
compelled to divide his cavalry into small bands to run 
down the guerillas that had been operating on his line of 
railroad. Now that Forrest's and Morgan's commands had 
become so formidable, he was compelled to organize his 
cavah-y into united bodies for better defensive movements 
against these raiders. The Second Indiana, Fourth and 
Fifth Kentucky, and Seventh Pennsylvania cavalry regi- 
ments he formed into one brigade, and on August -11th, 
he sent it under General E. W. Johnson against Morgan, 
■who had been ordered by Bragg to break the railroad 
between Louisville and Nashville, in order to retard Buell's 
movement north to Louis\ille as much as possible, and who 
was operating about Gallatin, Tennessee, which he had cap- 
tured with 200 prisoners. Colonel Boone was in command 
of the Federal forces at this point. Morgan hearing that 
Boone slept in the town away from the camp, sent a small 
force to capture him, which was done, just as he had dressed 
and was starting to camp. Morgan then destroyed a rail- 
road bridge south of Gallatin, and the tunnel six miles 
north, the roof of which was supported with large beams on 
upright timbers. Running some freight cars into the tun- 
nel, they were set on fire and some eight hundred feet of it 
destroyed, the roof caving in. 

Johnson sought to attack Morgan before he could unite 
with Fon-est, who was on his Lebanon raid at that time, but 
Morgan hearing that Johnson had infantry and artilleiy sup- 
ports, endeavored to avoid an engagement. Johnson forced 
the fight, engaged Morgan with spirit, and although re- 
pulsed three times, after the first and second repulse formed 
promptly and renewed the attack. After the third repulse the 
Federal forces commenced retreating, when Morgan followed. 



MORGAN'S AND FORREST'S RAIDS. 47 

attacked Johnson's retreating forces and di'ove tlie Federals 
some tliree miles. Johnson reformed his lines twice, but 
the enemy broke, and drove them each time. He then re- 
formed the remnant of his command and fought the enemy 
dismounted, when the latter charged again, and Johnson, 
seeing that the greater part of his command had scattered, 
surrendered. The force that was with him at this time was 
only a small band of some twenty-five soldiers and a few 
officers. His loss was 20 killed and 42 wounded. Duke, 
in his "History of Morgan's Cavahy," says : "A great deal of 
censure was at the time cast upon these men " — Johnson's 
command — "and they were accused of arrant cowardice 
by the Northern press. Nothing could have been more 
unjust. They attacked with spirit and without hesitation, 
and were unable to close with lis on account of their heav-y 
loss in men and horses. I have seen troops much more 
highly boasted than these were before their defeat, behave 
not nearly so well." And of Johnson, Duke says : " His at- 
tack was made promptly and in splendid style ; his disposi- 
tions throughout the first fight were good, and he exhibited 
fine personal courage and energy." 



CHAPTEK V. 

BRAGG'S ADVANCE INTO KENTUCKY. 

After Nelson's pursuit of Forrest on his raid around 
Nashville, he was ordered by General Buell to McMinn- 
ville. Crittenden and McCook with their divisions were at 
Battle Creek, Thomas and Wood were on the line of the 
Nashville and Chattanooga Railroad, and Mitchel's division, 
under the command of Eousseau, on the line of railroad 
from Decatur to Columbia. Bragg had so well concealed 
his intention as to his advance, that Buell was compelled to 
be in readiness to meet him in the event of one of three 
movements, which it was supposed he would make if he 
moved before Buell was ready to advance upon him. 

The latter thought Bragg would either move by the left, 
jDass around into Northern Alabama, cross at Decatur, and 
press north for Naslmlle. This he regarded as the most 
likely movement. Or, second, move direct, crossing the 
mountains, pass through McMinnville, and so on to Nash- 
ville. Or, third, to move by way of Knoxville into Eastern 
Kentucky. The latter, ujj to the first of September, Buell 
regarded as hardly a possibility, supposing Bragg's move- 
ments all indicated an advance on Nashville. Thomas was 
ordered to assume command of the troops at McMinnville, to 
repair the railroad from Tullahoma to that point as he went, 
and to establish jjosts of observation with signal stations on 
the mountains to watch Bragg's movements. Thomas assumed 



BRAGG'S ADVANCE INTO KENTUCKY. 49 

command at McMinnville ontlie 19tliof August, on the same 
day that Bragg sent a column of three or four thousand 
troops across the river at Chattanooga. Buell, in anticipa- 
tion of this being the advance of Bragg's entire army en 
route for Nashville, despatched Wood to the vicinity of Mc- 
Minnville, to aid in resisting his advance. He then ordered 
McCook to move from Battle Creek to the Therman road, 
where he was to hold the enemy in check until reinforced 
by Thomas. Crittenden's division was sent up the valley 
through Tracy City, by the Altamont road, to be within 
supporting distance of McCook, and to watch the road 
from there to Chattanooga. Thomas was directed to hold 
his command in readiness to move at a moment's notice, 
either on the Therman or Dunlap road. On the 22d, Buell 
learned that Bragg's whole army was north of the Tennes- 
see, and he then, further to concentrate his command, 
moved his supplies from the dep6t at Stevenson to Dechard. 
Thomas on the same day telegraj^hed from McMinnville to 
Buell that he believed Bragg's movements meant an ad- 
vance of his entire army into Kentucky. Thomas recon- 
noitred thoroughly the front of his position, and ascertained 
that the enemy was not there and not as yet even in Sequat- 
chie Valley. This he reported to Buell, and suggested that 
Wood's division be posted at Sparta, to interceijt Bragg's 
advance, if made through that place ; that another division 
be left at Dechard, to watch any movement in that direc- 
tion, and that the remaining portions of the command be 
concentrated at McMinnville, ready to offer battle to Bragg's 
army if it should advance on that front. Thomas regarded 
Bragg's advance either on Nashville or Louisville as possi- 
ble only through McMinnville or Sparta, and he proposed to 
attack before Bragg could reach either. On the next day 
Buell, under advices that he regarded as reliable, ordered 
VII.— 3 



50 THE ARMY OF THE CUMBERLAND. 

the First, Second, Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Divisions to con- 
centrate at Altamont, intending there to offer battle. He 
sent detailed instructions to Thomas, in charge of the move- 
ment, as to the disposition of his command, with orders in 
the event of defeat to fall back, keeping his force between 
ithe enemy and Nashville. On the 25th, Thomas reached 
Altamont, and finding no enemy nearer than the Sequatchie 
Valley, and regarding Bragg's advance by way of Altamont 
improbable, owing to the bad condition of the roads, and 
lack of forage and water, returned to McMinnville with the 
Fourth and Sixth Divisions. On the 30th, Buell gave orders 
concentrating his entire command at Murfreesboro, still 
under the impression that Bragg expected to strike for 
Nashville. The latter's movements were so well guarded, 
and Buell had as yet so little reliable information in regard 
to them, that he hesitated even after the order was issued, 
and the next day asked Thomas's advice in regard to it, iu 
the light of any further information as to the movements 
of the enemy. Thomas advised that the movement proceed, 
having been commenced, and gave a plan of battle in the 
movement from Murfreesboro. Thomas, on the 30th, cap- 
tured a despatch that Bragg, on the 27th, had sent to Van 
Dorn, in command in Mississippi, conveying to him in full his 
j)lans in regard to his advance into Kentucky, and informed 
him that Kirby Smith, reinforced with two divisions from 
his army, had turned Cumberland Gap, and was marching 
on Lexington, Ky. 

Buell's army at Murfreesboro consisted of five divisions 
under his immediate command, the troops being then on 
the line of the railroad. In addition he had two divisions 
sent to him from the Army of the Tennessee — General J. O. 
Davis's division, under General B. B. Mitchell, which ar- 
rived at Murfreesboro on the 2d of September, and Gen- 



BRAGG'S ADVANCE INTO KENTUCKY. 51 

eral E. A. Paine's division, under the command of General 
J. M. Palmer, which reached Nashville on the 10th. This 
concentration of the army at Murfreesboro of course with- 
drew all troops from the mountains, leaving Bragg unham- 
pered in the selection of his route, either west to Nashville, 
or north to Louisville. He made choice of the latter, and 
pushed down the valley of the Cumberland to Carthage, 
■where he crossed, moving through Scottsboro and Glasgow, 
to strike the Louisville and Nashville Eailvoad. Bragg en- 
tered Kentucky with five divisions, making an army of some 
thirty-five thousand men, divided between Generals Polk 
and Hardee. While at Murfreesboro Buell first learned 
definitely of Bragg's movements, and of his intended ad- 
vance into Kentucky. The news of the movements of Kirby 
Smith and of Nelson's defeat also readied him here. 

On August 16th, Buell had ordered Nelson to assume com- 
mand in Kentucky, and to make such dispositions of his 
troops as would resist any movement by Kirby Smith, then 
threatening Cumberland Gap. The plan of the rebels in 
their campaign, which was intended to free the soil of the 
South from the Northern armies by carrying the war into the 
North, was for Kirby Smith to move through Eastern Ken- 
tucky to Lexington and thence to Cincinnati, and for Bragg 
to push through Central Kentucky to Louisville. With these 
two cities in the possession of their armies it would be a 
short step to enter upon the rich fields of the Northern 
States, and with the large number of new recruits gained 
en route their armies could resist any Northern troops that 
would be brought against them. This had been Sidney 
Johnston's plan to be worked out after he had achieved the 
victory he contemplated at Shiloh, and Bragg as his successor 
endeavored to cany out Johnston's plan of campaign. One 
was as much a success as the other, and in both the hour of 



52 THE ARMY OF THE CUMBERLAND. 

defeat trod so quickly on their apparent victory that the 
campaign in each instance ultimately resulted in failure. 
So far as the advance of Bragg and Kirby Smith into Ken- 
tucky was concerned, by it the South suffered a loss in- 
stead of a gain, and was compelled from that time on to act 
upon a steadily lessening line of defence. Bragg's report 
shows that he took a smaller command out than he took into 
the State. 

On the same day that Nelson's orders were dated, Steven- 
son appeared with his division before Cumberland Gap. 
George W. Morgan in command there immediately sent out 
cavaliy to the adjoining gaps to watch for further movements 
of the enemy. "When a short distance from Eoger's Gap the 
cavalry struck the head of Kirby Smith's army on its ad- 
vance to Kentucky. Smith's forces were those of his own 
command in East Tennessee, re-enforced by the divisions of 
McCown from Mississippi, sent him by Bragg, and also the 
two fine brigades of Cleburne and Preston Smith, ordered 
to report to him from Chattanooga. Kirby Smith moved 
with his main command to Barboursville, and ordered Mc- 
Cown to Cumberland Ford with a large force, which cut 
off Morgan, in the Gap, from his base of supplies in that di- 
rection. Leaving Stevenson in Morgan's front to engage his 
attention, Kirby Smith with his entire force advanced into 
Kentucky, thus entirely cutting off re-enforcements and sup- 
plies to Morgan's command. The latter failing in his efforts 
to bring on an engagement, placed his command on half ra- 
tions, and after a council of war abandoned the Gap, dis- 
mounting his siege guns and destroying what stores and am- 
munition he could not remove, marched out with his entire 
command, to the east of Kirby Smith's force, to the Ohio 
Biver. John Morgan's cavalry annoyed the command foi 
some days, without inflicting any material loss. 



BRAGG'S ADVANCE INTO KENTUCKY. 53 

When Nelson reached Kentucky he found that a new de- 
partment had been created, with General H. G. Wright in 
command, embracing that part of the State east of Louisville 
and the line of the Nashville Eailroad, taken from under 
Buell's command. Wright ordered Nelson to proceed to 
Lexington and assume command of all the troops in that 
locality, nearly all of them new regiments, principally from 
Ohio and Kentucky, hastily gathered together, without 
drill or discipline. Nelson concentrated these troops at 
Lexington, and organized them into a division with Generals 
M. D. Manson, J. S. Jackson, and Charles Cruft as brigade 
commanders. On August 23d, Nelson sent a detachment of 
the Seventh Kentucky cavalry and Colonel Child's battalion 
of Tennessee cavaliy, under Colonel Metcalfe's command, to 
Big Hill to resist the advance of the enemy. These troops 
being attacked by a greatly superior force the Seventh Ken- 
tucky broke and fled, leaving, however, about one-fourth 
of the command with the Tennessee battalion, which, after 
fighting bravely, was compelled to retu-e. Metcalfe rallied 
his men, but on the approach of the enemy they again broke 
and ran, leaving the Tennesseeans to resist the attack, which 
they so far succeeded in doing as to secure a safe retreat to 
Eichmond. The enemy pushed forward and demanded the 
surrender of the town, but learning that re-enforcements 
had arrived, retired. Nelson then ordered Manson's and 
Craft's brigades, under the command of the former, to pro- 
ceed to Eichmond. On arriving there Manson went into 
camp south of the town and thi-ew out his pickets. The 
cavalry, on the 29th, reported an advance of the enemy in 
large numbers, and that a heavy force of infantry was driving 
in the pickets. Manson advanced to their support with his 
own brigade, leaving Craft with his command at Eichmond. 
Moving forward with his troops he drove the attacking 



54 THE ARMY OF THE CUMBERLAND. 

party back and. formed his line of battle on each side of the 
road some two miles from the town. The enemy attacked 
with infantry, ai'tillery, and cavalry, but was driven back 
with the loss of one field piece and several men captured. 
Mauson then occupied Eogersville, where he remained in 
camp all night. In the morning he ordered Cruft to join 
him, and moved out beyond the town to meet the enemy's 
advance. After heavy fighting for over an hour the left of 
Hanson's command was fiercely assaulted, which being rein- 
forced, the right began to give way in confusion. 

The troops were rallied on a new line a mile to the rear, 
but as this was badly posted for defence, the command was 
withdrawn from this position to the line occupied the day 
before, and from this — the enemy attacking in heavy force 
— the Federal trooj)s were again routed and driven back to 
their camps, w'here the last stand was made and the heaviest 
fighting took place. Nelson, arriving on the ground, as- 
sumed command and endeavored to stem the tide of defeat. 
The enemy advanced in such overwhelming numbers upon 
the position of the Federal forces that they were driven in 
complete disorder at all points from the field. Nelson was 
twice wounded, but was able to reach Louisville with several 
detachments of his routed troops. Here he assumed command 
and bent eveiy energy to the organization of new troops, 
forming the citizens in commands for the defence of that 
city. Nelson's losses in the engagement at Eichmond were 
two hundred and twenty-five killed, six hundred wounded, 
and over two thousand captured. He also lost nine guns. 
His entire command consisted of some seven thousand troops. 
The enemy's force was twelve thousand men and thirty-six 
pieces of artillery, and he lost over nine hundred killed and 
wounded. Kirby Smith then pushed his command north, 
occupying Lexington, and sent out detachments threatening 



BRAGG'S ADVANCE INTO KENTUCKY. 55 

Louisville and Cincinnati. On the 6tli of September, Gene- 
ral Heth with some six thousand troops advanced and took 
position a few miles south of Covington. He was ordered 
by Kirby Smith not to attack, but to hold his command in 
readiness to move at a moment's notice to form a junction 
with Bragg, then marching north through Kentucky. 

Smith, while waiting to form a junction with Bragg, was 
actively employed in gathering supplies for his army in the 
richest part of the State. He also sought to obtain recruits 
for his command, but recruiting for the infantry sei-vice did 
not prove a success. During the entii'e period the rebel 
army was in Kentucky not one entire infantry regiment was 
raised. Individual enlistment was constantly going on, but 
the leading officers of that army estimated their entire gain 
was not over five thousand men, including three regiments of 
cavalry recruited under Buford. Heth's advance alarmed 
the three cities of Covington, Newport, and Cincinnati, 
spreading consternation among all classes. Martial law was 
proclaimed, and all able-bodied citizens were ordered to re- 
port for work on the fortifications south of Covington. 
These works were manned by the population of the sur- 
rounding country, coming to Cincinnati to defend that 
city from pillage. Kegiments of " Squirrel Hunters " were 
formed, and a show of force was kept up itntil veteran troops 
could be brought forward to take their place. Heth wished 
to attack, but Kirby Smith would not permit this, as he an- 
ticipated a battle M'ith Buell, and that Bragg would have to 
fight his entire army, in which event he would need every 
available man. Heth fell back in a few days and on Oc- 
tober 4th Smith reported with his command to Bragg at 
Frankfort. 

Bragg's movements became clearly apparent to Buell 
while the latter was concentrating at Murfreesboro. On 



56 THE ARMY OF THE CUMBERLAND. 

September 7th, Buell started with Ammen's, Crittenden's, 
McCook's, Wood's, Rousseau's, and Mitchell's divisions -in 
the race between the oj)i30sing armies for Louisville. If 
Bragg moved energetically and with the intent of taking 
Louisville without fighting a battle in Kentucky before 
he reached that city, his start in the race and the shorter 
line he was movang on gave him the decided advantage in 
the movement. Buell's object was to overtake Bragg, and, 
if necessaiy, force the fighting. This would compel the 
latter to move his army so closely on the one road open 
to him that his movements would be necessarily sIoav. 
Failing in this, Buell's plans were to press Bragg so hard 
that if he refused to fight in Kentucky he must leave the 
State in possession of the Federal forces before he could 
gain anything by his advance, 

Buell, after reaching Nashville, crossed the river there 
at once and pushed on with all possible speed. He left 
Thomas's, Palmer's, and Negley's divisions, with Thomas in 
command, as the garrison at this jjlace. So important did 
Buell regard the holding of Nashville, that he determined to 
weaken his immediate command and leave this strong force 
under his most trusted subordinate, to retain possession of 
that point. He considered his army in pursuit of Bragg 
of sufficient strength to make the fight for the possession 
of Kentucky, and in the event Bragg was driven from that 
State he would then concentrate in the vicinity of Nash- 
ville, where the battle for that important position with Mid- 
dle Tennessee Avould yet have to be fought. In the hajJiDen- 
ing of the latter event it was an absolute necessity that the 
Federal army should hold Nashville as a point at which to 
concentrate and move to the attack. If the result of the 
movement in Kentucky shoiild be the defeat of Buell, then 
it was important that the general in command of the forces 



BRAGG'S ADVANCE INTO KENTUCKY. 57 

at Nashville should be an oflBcer of experience, to save the 
troops left there, in their retreat to rejoin the main anny. 
Buell regarded the holding of Nashville by our forces as 
second only to the safety of Kentucky, and made the dispo- 
sition of his command accordingly. "With this view, on the 
12th, he ordered R. B. Mitchell's division to return to Nash- 
ville and form part of the garrison of that jilace. Bragg, on 
the 8th, had reached the railroad, where he burned the 
bridge at Salt Eiver, and for some days in his northward 
march was engaged in tearing up the railroad as hQ ad- 
vanced. On the 13th, his cavalry reached Munfordsville be- 
yond Green River. 

Buell, on the 10th, learning that additional forces of 
Bragg's command were crossing the Cumberland at Gaines- 
ville, at once countermanded the order to Mitchell, and 
directed Thomas to place Negley in command of Nash- 
ville, and if he regarded it best to do so, to leave Paine's 
division * with Negley's to hold that place. If Paine could 
be spared, then Thomas was to move forward by forced 
marches with his division and Paine's, and unite his com- 
mand with the main army. Thomas, knowing that Bragg 
had left a large force to threaten Nashville, ordered Paine's 
division to remain there, and started at once with the first 
division to report to Buell. 

Bragg, to reach Munfordsville, had only sixty-eight miles 
to march from his crossing of the Cumberland River, while 
Buell had one hundred and five miles to travel before he 
could intercept him at that place. Bragg's advance had 
reached and attacked Munfordsville before Buell's army 
had arrived at Bowling Green. On Bragg's advance under 
General Chalmers, arriving at Munfordsville, his cavaliy en- 
gaged the attention of the garrison there under Colonel John, 
T. Wilder, while the artillery and infantiy were being placed 

* Palmer in command. 



58 THE ARMY OF THE CUMBERLAND. 

in position. On tlie 13th, demand was made of "Wilder to 
sun-ender. This he refused to do. With the early light of 
the next day an assault was made by the enemy, which was 
repulsed with heavy loss. Two detachments reported during 
the day, reinforcing Wilder's command. One of them was 
under Colonel Dunham from Louisville, who, being Wilder's 
senior in rank, assumed command. On the following day a 
second demand for suiTender was made by Chalmers, who 
represented his command sufficiently large to capture the 
place. Dunham refused to comply with this demand, and 
the enemy then withdrew, going north. Two days later the 
^:ebels made another attack on the works and were again re- 
pulsed. In the afternoon Bragg appeared in person before 
ilhe town, and sent, under a flag of truce, another demand 
for the sun-ender of the command, as the garrison of the 
place was surrounded by his entire army, and to assault 
would only be a needless sacri&ce of human life. This was 
declined, but with the request from Colonel Dunham that 
l^tragg suspend hostilities to give time for consultation. 
This Bragg agreed to do until nine o'clock in the evening. 
Dunham, who hid succeeded in opening communication 
with General Gilbert at Louisville, telegraphed him the 
facts, and added that he feared he would have to stirrender. 
Gilbert telegi-aphed back an order placing Dunham iu 
arrest, and ordering Wilder to assume command. At the 
Council of War that was held by Wilder it was determined 
that the place should not be surrendered without personal 
inspection by the commanding officer that Bragg's state- 
ments as to his force and situation were true. Wilder, 
under Gilbert's orders, assumed command at seven o'clock 
in the evening, and notified Bragg of the result of the con- 
sultation, proposing, with Bragg's permission, to satisfy him- 
self of the tnith of his statements. Eemarkable as it ap- 



BRAGG'S ADVANCE INTO KENTUCKY. 59 

pears, this proposition was agreed to by Bragg, and Wilder, 
under escort, investigated the enemy's lines prepared for as- 
sault, and counting forty-five cannon in position, supported 
by 25,000 men, he concluded it was impossible to further 
successfully defend the place. He reported the facts to 
the Council of War, and the demand for the surrender was 
acceded to at two o'clock in the morning of the 17th. 
Under the tei'ms of the capitulation the troops marched out 
with the honors of war at daylight, retained their sidearms 
and private property, and were at once paroled. This attack 
on Muufordsville by Bragg established the fact that it was 
not his intention to press on to Louisville, and the advan- 
tage Buell derived from the delay attending this attack was 
in a measui'e some compensation for the loss of the place. 

Bragg then took position at Prewitt's Knob, where Buell 
moved with his entire army, Thomas having reported on 
the 20th. The two armies confronted each other at this 
point for three days, and disposition was made for battle. 
On the 21st, while the troops were being placed in position 
by Thomas, under order of Buell, the enemy retreated, 
marching for a short distance toward Louisville, then 
turned to the right, and took position at Bardstown. Bragg 
claimed in his official report that after mancBUviing unsuc- 
cessfully for four days to draw General Buell into an engage- 
ment, he found himself with only three days' rations on 
hand for his troops "and in a hostile countiy," that even a 
successful engagement would materially cripple him, and 
as Buell had another route to the Ohio, to the left, he con- 
cluded to turn to the right, send to Lexington for supplies 
to meet him in Bardstown, and commenced the movement 
to that place. This gave Buell an open road to Louisville, 
of which he immediately availed himself, and on the 29th, 
the last division of the Army of the Ohio reached that city. 



6Q THE ARMY OF THE CUMBERLAND. 

Tlie place was under tlie command of Gilbert, who had 
notbiing but new levies of inexperienced troops. These 
Buell incorporated with the brigades of his Army of the 
Ohio, and on the morning of the 30th, after furnishing his 
command with needed supplies, moved his army out of 
Louisville against the enemy. The movement was delayed a 
day, by Halleck's order relieving Buell and placing Thomas 
in command. The latter remonstrated against this order, 
and at his request it was withdrawn. The next day Buell 
again assumed command, with Thomas announced in Gen- 
eral Orders as second in command, and commenced the ad- 
vance movement of his army in five columns. 



CHAPTER VI. 

BATTLE OP PERRYVILLE. 

The main portion of the army had been organized into 
three coi-ps, designated the First, Second, and Third, under 
McCook, Crittenden, and Gilbert, respectively. General 
Sill, in command of two divisions, was ordered to move on 
the left toward Frankfort, to hold in check the force of the 
enemy under Kirby Smith at that place. The other col- 
umns marched by different routes upon roads converging 
upon Bardstown, through Shepardsville, Mount Washing- 
ton, Fairfield, and Bloomfield. Each column engaged the 
enemy's cavalry and artillery in a series of skirmishes 
from within a short distance of Loiiisville. As the army 
approached Bardstown the resistance constantly increased, 
retarding Buell's advance, and enabling Bragg to effect 
his withdrawal from that place, which was accomplished 
eight hours before the arrival of Buell's army. A sharp 
cavalry engagement occurred at this place between Buell's 
advance and Bragg's rear-guard, when the whole of Bragg's 
command retired, taking the road to Springfield. At 
.Bardstown Buell received information that a junction of 
Bragg's and Kirby Smith's commands would be made at 
Danville. He ordered McCook to advance from Bloomfield 
on the Harrodsburg road, and directed Thomas to move 
with Crittenden's corps on the Lebanon road, which passes 
four miles south of Perryville, with a branch to the latter 



62 THE ARMY OF THE CUMBERLAND. 

place, while lie accompanied Gilbert's corps, -n'tiicli moved 
on the direct road to Perryville. After leaving Bardstown, 
Buell learned that Kirby Smith's force had crossed to the 
west side of the Kentucky Eiver, near Salvisa, and that 
Bragg was concentrating either at Harrodsburg or Perry- 
ville. He at once ordered McCook to change his line of 
march from the former road, and to proceed direct to 
Perryville. On the afternoon of October 7th, Buell, with 
Gilbert's corps, anived in fi'ont of the rebels in strong force 
three miles from Perryville, where he immediately drew his 
troops up in line of battle. Advancing the cavalry and artil- 
lery, supported by two regiments of infantry, the rear guard 
of the enemy was pressed to within two miles of the town, 
when it was discovered that the rebels were concentrating 
for battle. Orders were sent by Buell to Crittenden and 
McCook to march at 3 o'clock on the morning of the 8th, 
and for them to take position as early as possible on the 
left and right of the centre corps respectively, the com- 
manders themselves to report in person their arrival, for 
orders, the intention being to make the attack that day if 
jjossible. 

McCook did not receive this order until 2.30 o'clock, and 
was on the march at five. Owing to the diflSculty of finding 
water for liis command where the troops were exjDected to 
encamp, Thomas, on the night of the 7th, moved off the 
direct line of march some six miles and was delayed sev- 
eral hours in reaching his position on the field. During 
the night some pools of water were discovered in a small 
creek about two miles and a half from Perryville. Col- 
onel Dan McCook with the Thirty-sixth Brigade was or- 
dered forward, and, after a sharp engagement, secured 
possession of the pools, and a suj^ply of bad water for Gil- 
bert's troops was obtained. 



BATTLE OF PERRYVILLR 63 

On Octobei 1st, Bragg, leaving Polk in command at 
Bardstown, under orders to slowly retire to Bryantsville, 
started for Lexington. Here lie ordered Kirby Smith 
with all his forces to Frankfort, to assist in the installation 
services of the rebel Provisional Governor of Kentucky at 
the capital of the State. At Lexington, on the 2d, learn- 
ing of Buell's movements from Louisville, Bragg ordered 
Polk in writing — sending two copies to him — to advance at 
once, "with his whole available force, by way of Bloomfield, 
toward Frankfort, to strike the enemy in flank and rear." 
Polk was informed in the order that Kirby Smith would at 
the same time attack in front. 

On the 3d, Polk received the orders, and, submitting them 
to a council of war, decided not to obey them, but to move 
as originally ordered. Of this Bragg was notified in time 
to prevent the attack on Buell's front with Smith's com- 
mand alone. Giving orders for the supplies that had been 
acciimulated at Lexington to be sent to Bryantsville, Bragg, 
on the Gth, proceeded to Harrodsburg, where he met Polk 
at the head of his column that had left Bardstown on the 
8d. On the 7th, Bragg ordered Polk to move Cheatham's 
division back to Perryville, and to proceed to that point him- 
self, to attack the Federal force, immediately rout them, and 
move rapidly to join Kirby Smith. These orders were given 
under the impression that Buell's command was so separated 
that his right and left were sixty miles apart. Bragg also 
sent Wither's division to Kirby Smith at Frankfort, who re- 
ported himself threatened by a large force on his front — the 
troops under Sill. 

Early on the morning of the 8th an attempt was made by 
the enemy to drive Colonel McCook from his position at the 
creek. He was supported by Mitchell's and Sheridan's divi- 
sions, which were ordered up and directed to hold the posi- 



64 



THE ARMY OF THE CUMBERLAND. 



tion until the entire army was prepared to attack. The 
assault was made with great spirit on Colonel McCook, but 
the enemy was handsomely repulsed. Buell anticipated an 
attack on Gilbert's corps in its isolated position in the early 




Battle of PerryviUe. 



morning, but nothing occuiTed until after the arrival of 
McCook's corps on the Maxville road, between 10 and 11 
o'clock, when he at once formed his command, of Rous- 
seau's and Jackson's divisions, in line of battle on the left of 
Gilbert, Eousseau on the right, and sent his cavalry to the 
front to make a reconnoissance toward PeiTvville. Thomas 



BATTLE OP PERRYVILLE. 65 

arrived and took position with Crittenden's corps about 
twelve o'clock. 

On McCook getting his command into position, he re- 
ported to General Buell in person, who ordered him to send 
out a force to the Chaplin Eiver, and find out the position 
of the enemy in his front. During McCook's absence Eous- 
seau had advanced the right of his line a half mile to obtain 
a supply of water, for which the troops were suffering. On 
seeing this, the rebels opened a heavy fire with some twenty 
pieces of artilleiy. Eousseau moved his other troops to sup- 
port his right, and, posting Simonson's and Loomis's batter- 
ies, returned the enemy's artillery fire. 

When McCook returned to his command, seeing that a good 
position on high ground could be occupied by our troops 
on the left and front of Rousseau's new line and near the 
river, he at once sent skirmishers into the woods at that 
point, to find out if the enemy held the position. He also 
directed Jackson to form a new line of battle with his divi- 
sion nearer the stream, and sent the skirmishers forward 
to the river as soon as this was done, where they obtained 
the needed supply of water. On the formation of the new 
line, as no hea\'y force of the enemy had been encountered, 
McCook, at about half-past one o'clock, rode to the right 
of his line. About half an hour later, Hardee, in command 
of three divisions, under Cheatham, Buckner, and Ander- 
son, some sixteen thousand strong, advanced to the attack 
on McCook, di'iving back the skirmishers, first striking 
those posted in the woods. McCook had formed his line of 
battle, with Eousseau's right near a barn on the right of 
the Max\dlle road, extending to the left and across that 
road on a ridge through a cornfield to the woods where the 
skirmishers were. The right of Jackson's line was holding 
a wooded elevation, running ofi" to the left in rear of Chaplin 



66 THE ARMY OF THE CUMBERLAND. 

Eiver, while his left, north of Maxville road, was thrown 
back in a northwesterly direction, forming an obtuse angle, 
deflected about thirty degrees along broken heights from 
their centre and right, the point of the angle being near 
where the Maxville road crosses Doctor's Creek. The 
enemy considered the key of MeCook's position to be at 
this crossing, and directed their main attack on that point. 
McCook had posted Starkweather's brigade in the rear of 
the left. as suj)port to Jackson, with Stone's and Bush's bat- 
teries of Rousseau's division, and had jilaced Webster's 
brigade of Jackson's division in rear of Eousseau's line. 
The enemy opened the attack on the extreme left of the 
Federal force posted in the angle. This was a very strong 
position, by reason of the character of the ground, which 
enabled these troops to sweep their front with a hea^'y fire. 
The troops here were protected by being posted behind 
stone fences, and were supported by batteries in the rear. 
In the attack on the left Jackson was killed by the first 
fire. Terrill's troops — nearly all new — were di-iven back, 
and MeCook's left turned. In falling back, Terrill endeav- 
ored to rally his command near the batteries posted in his 
rear. While gallantly doing so, he fell, mortally wounded, 
and died in a few hours. McCook sent to Sheridan, asking 
him to protect his right, and sent to Gilbert for reinforce- 
ments. 

The advance of the enemy was checked by Starkweather's 
brigade, with Stone's and Bush's batteries, all well posted 
to meet the assault after Terrill's brigade had been driven 
back. The enemy made repeated assaults with fresh troops 
at this point, but was driven back each time with heavy loss 
until the troops and batteries were out of ammunition, when 
they fell back to the original line, and obtaining a supply 
renewed the fight. 



BATTLE OF PERRYVILLE, 67 

On the right in Kousseau's front the enemy under Ander- 
son made a vigorous charge on Lytle's and Harris's bri- 
gades, attacking in greatly superior numbers. They were 
however handsomely repulsed. After fighting until their 
ammunition was exhausted, these troops retii-ed on the line 
with Starkweather's command. The rebels then pushing for- 
ward under a heavy fire from their batteries drove Lytle's 
brigade from the new line. Sloan's battery getting into 
position opened on the rebels with canister and checked 
their advance. Colonel Gooding's brigade from Mitchell's 
division of Gilbert's corps, with Penney's Fifth Wisconsin 
Battery, was ordered up, and after a brisk engagement the 
enemy was driven back and the original line of battle re- 
occupied. Steedman's brigade of SchoeijflTs division also 
came up, and attacking the enemy aided in the final re- 
pulse. 

When the heaviest attack was made on Eousseau the ene- 
my assaulted Sheridan's division in the advanced position 
which he occupied after forcing back their line earlier in the 
day. He now withdrew his troops, and posting them in 
more favorable position on the original line, opened on 
the rebels with heavy musketiy fire and canister. The ene- 
my pressing him very hard at this point, he called on Gil- 
bert for support, who reinforced him with Carlin's brigade 
from Mitchell's division. As the enemy moved forward 
in strong force to the attack, Carlin immediately ordered 
his troops to charge, which they did, and drove the rebels 
before them through Perryville, capturing in the town two 
caissons, fifteen wagons loaded with ammunition, and a guard 
of 138 men under command of three officers. Sheridan also 
drove the enemy for some distance, but did not consider it 
pi-udent to advance too far, leaving McCook's right exposed. 
He then directed his artillery fire on the enemy at his left, 



68 THE ARMY OF THE CUMBERLAND. 

and aided in checking the advance in that quarter. "Wag- 
ner's brigade of Wood's division became engaged, and did 
good service on the right of Mitchell's division. The rest 
of Crittenden's corps was not engaged in the action. 
Thomas, on arriving on the battlefield with this coi-ps, 
was directed to take position in the line of battle on the 
right and wait for orders. Here he waited during the entire 
day, and received none. Only part of Gilbert's corps was 
engaged in the fight, the heavy blow striking McCook's, 
which he failed to report to Buell until after two hours' 
fighting. The battle was closed by night coming on, and a 
general engagement was anticipated the next day. Thomas 
was directed to move Crittenden's and Gilbert's corps for- 
ward in the morning at six o'clock, and attack the enemy's 
front and left flank. 

Buell ordered McCook during the night to close the open- 
ing between his right and Gilbert's left. His orders for the 
following day were to hold his position and take advantage 
of any opportunity that the events of the day might present, 
the main attack to be made by the other coi-ps. On the fol- 
lowing morning, the advance being made in accordance with 
these orders, it was discovered that the enemy's main body 
had retired during the night, and was falling back on Har- 
rodsburg, with indications that he would there make a stand. 
Bragg left his dead and wounded on the field, but retired 
leisurely and in good order. 

Buell reported the strength of his command before the 
engagement at 58,000 effective men. Of these he claimed 
22,000 were raw troops, not drilled, and undisciplined. Less 
than one-half of this entire force was in the action. His 
reports show a loss of 4,348, being 916 killed, 2,943 wounded, 
and 489 missing. Nearly all the losses were from McCook's 
command, which bore the brunt of the heavy fighting. 



BATTLE OP PERRYVILLE. 69 

Bragg referring to his loss in liis ojfficial report says : "In 
such a conflict our own loss was necessarily severe, probably 
not less than 2,500 killed, wounded, and missing." During 
the campaign General Buell captured nearly five thousand 
prisoners. 

The enemy's troops engaged in the battle were under the 
immediate command of General Polk. Bragg had been with 
Kirby Smith at Frankfort, where these active operations 
found him engaged in superintending " the ceremony of in- 
stalling the Provisional Governor into oflSce." 

In his ofificial report of the battle of Perryville, made from 
Bryantsville, October 12, 1862, Bragg says : " After consult- 
ing with the General (Polk) and reconnoitring the ground 
and examining his dispositions, I declined to assume the 
command, but suggested some changes and modifications of 
his ari'angements, which he promptly made." In a subse- 
quent report of Perryville, made while he was at Shelby- 
ville, of date May 20, 1863, he reflects very severely upoo 
Polk's movements at Perryville. He says that he ordered 
the attack to be made by Polk on Gilbert early in the morn- 
ing of the 8th, that he waited until 10 a.m., and hearing no 
firing started to see Polk and have an explanation of the 
delay. Here he was " informed that it was determined not 
to attack, but to assume the ' defensive offensive.' " Bragg 
gave orders for some changes in the line of battle, restoring 
certain portions of the command that had been withdrawn, 
and again ordered Polk to bring on the engagement. The 
execution of this order was delayed by Polk, and Bragg, 
becoming "impatient at the delay after this order," "des- 
patched a staff officer to repeat it to the General, and soon 
thereafter followed in person and put the troops in motion.*^ 

Bragg's intention was not to fight a general engagement 
at Perryville, but merely to check the advance of Buell'a 



70 THE ARMY OF THE CUMBERLAND. 

army, thereby gaining time to gather his supjilies and 
men together and leave the State. Bragg had been urged, 
by leading Kentuckians in his command and others, to un- 
dertake the campaign in Kentucky with the promise of im- 
mense numbers of recmits and large quantities of supplies. 
He anticipated that his coming would be hailed as that of a 
■deliverer, and that the young men of the State would flock 
to his banners and fill up his army, so that he could attack 
Buell at any point. Bragg's entire command in Kentucky 
was estimated at thirty-five to forty thousand. He antici- 
pated enlisting twenty thousand recruits, and took arms 
to Kentucky for that number of new troops. Buell's com- 
mand, with his losses and the ganison at Nashville was less 
than this, but at Louisville he received some twenty two 
thousand new troops. The number of infantry recruits for 
Bragg's army was veiy small, for he says in his first official 
report of the battle of Peri-yville— when he at that time was 
preparing to leave the State — " with ample means to arm 
twenty thousand men and a force with that to fully redeem 
the State, we have not yet issued half the arms left us by 
casualties incident to the campaign." 

General Buell waited for Sill to join him with his division, 
leaving Dumont at Frankfort. On the march Sill's advance 
was attacked by a portion of Kirby Smith's command, which 
he repulsed and arrived at Perry ville on the 11th. Buell 
then moved forward, expecting Bragg to give battle at Har- 
rodsburg, and throwing out a strong force to reconnoitre, 
discovered the enemy in force some three miles south of 
that place. During the day Bragg continued his march 
south, his rear guard being driven out of the place with 
the loss of considerable stores and about twelve hundred 
prisoners, in the main sick and wounded. On the next day 
Buell made a strong reconnoissance to the crossing of 



BATTLE OF PERRYVILLE. 7X 

Dick's River, and there ascertained that Bragg had crossed 
his entire army. 

Learning on the 13th that the enemy was retreating 
south, Buell ordered pursuit to be made immediately, for 
the pur^jose of overtaking Bragg, or of intercepting him if 
he should attempt to j^ass toward Somerset. Wood's divi- 
sion marched at midnight, and engaged the enemy at Stan- 
ford at daylight next morning. The rest of Crittenden's 
and McCook's corps followed on the same road ; Gilbert 
marching on the Lancaster road. The enemy was steadily 
pressed on the road to Cumberland Gap, but could not be 
brought to an engagement. McCook's and Gilbert's corps 
were halted at Crab Orchard, while Crittenden, with W. S. 
Smith's division, was sent in pursuit as far as London on the 
direct road to the Gap. It now appearing that Bragg did 
not intend to fight in the State, and the countiy beyond 
Crab Orchard being extremely barren and rough — no sup- 
plies existing in it — the pursuit was discontinued, and the 
Army of the Ohio was turned toward Bowling Green and 
Glasgow, preparatory' to the advance to Nashville. McCook's 
and Gilbert's corps were concentrated at the former i^lace, 
and Crittenden's at the latter. This movement of the troops 
was made by Buell, who was confident that Bragg would 
concentrate in the \'icinity of Nashville, and seek to recover 
that i^lace, and to fight his great battle for the possession 
of Kentucky. 

The militaiy affairs of the nation at this time were unfor- 
tunately in charge of General Halleck, who had been called 
to Washington as Commander-in-Chief. On the retreat of 
Bragg from Kentucky, Halleck insisted that Buell should 
make a campaign into East Tennessee, a distance of two 
hundred and forty miles, over mountain and river, without 
any communication to the rear, except by wagon train, over 



72 THE ARMY OP THE CUMBERLAND. 

almost impassable roads, tlie advance to be made in the face 
of tlio enemy, who, operating on his line of communications 
could move his entire command to defeat our advance in 
detail. Buell reported to the War Department that it was 
impossible to make the campaign as ordered, and knowing 
the necessity of protecting Nashville, he directed the con- 
centration of his troops on the line of the railroad to that 
place. That road had been repaired up to Bowling Green, 
after the destruction of two months before, and here the 
troops received their needed supplies. On the 30th of Oc- 
tober, Buell was relieved of the command of the Department 
of the Ohio, and Major-General "William S. Eosecrans was, 
by the direction of the General-in-Chief, assigned to the 
command of the troops. The designation of the command 
being changed to that of the Department of the Cumber- 
land. 

It is a somewhat singular fact, that the campaign in Ken- 
tucky should have caused the most intense feeling in the 
opposing armies against their respective commanders. In 
the Federal army, after Buell allowed Bragg to move north 
from Munfordsville without an engagement, the expressions 
of the troo^DS against their commanding general were open, 
bitter, and almost universal, from the lowest to the highest. 
However, there was one who never for a moment lost faith, 
soldierly tnast, and esteem for his commander, and he was 
of all persons in the command most competent to judge. 
This was General Thomas. He knew the great difficulties 
of Buell's position, how his plans had been interfered with 
by Halleck, under whose command it was his misfortune 
early in the year to be ; and later, how he was made to feel 
the power of this same man as a personal matter. Halleck, 
invested by the Administration with supreme powers, 
planned a campaign into East Tennessee, on paper in Wash- 



BATTLE OF PERRYVILLE. 73 

ington, and ordered Buell to execute it. This, the latter, 
with full knowledge of the situation, refused to do, and 
quietly ordering his troops to the line of the railroad from 
whence they could be moved with the least delay, as 
needed, waited for the order he knew was jiending for his 
removal. 

General Buell was right in refusing to attack Bragg at 
Munfords\dlle, or in fact at any time until he had placed 
his army north of the enemy, and received his own rein- 
forcements from Louisville. Then this point was safe, and 
Nashville could not be imperilled by the defeat of our 
army. Buell made three dispositions for an engagement 
during the Kentucky campaign, but each time Bragg drew 
off except at Penyville, and here there was no design of the 
latter to fight, beyond checking Buell's advance, and gain- 
ing time for his troops to make their retreat from the State 
with all stores and material. Bragg, from his closing re- 
marks in his first report of the battle of Perryville, cer- 
tainly did not consider — so far as the Confederacy was con- 
cerned — that the State was worth fighting for. Had he re- 
ceived the 20,000 new troops he was promised, instead of 
General Buell having his army increased by that number, 
then he would have struck quick and sharp. He left the 
State deeply disgusted with Kentucky, and took every occa- 
sion after that to show it. The account was even, however, 
as Bragg was not a favorite in that State. 

At Perryville Buell labored under the same disadvantage 
in the organization of his command that made itself felt on 
the first two great battlefields of the Army of the Cumber- 
land. That was the inefficiency of his corps commanders. 
Of Gilbert it is only necessary to say, that a worse appoint- 
ment as a corps commander was not made during the war. 
Fortunately, the battle of Perryville was his first and only 
VII. -4 



74 THE ARMY OF THE CUMBERLAND. 

appearance in that position. Biiell, after expressing his 
thanks for McCook's sei-viees on that field and in the cam- 
paign, in his official I'eport says : "It is true that only one 
serious battle has been fought, and that was incomplete, and 
less decisive than it might have been. That this was so is 
'due partly to unavoidable difficulties which prevented the 
troops, marching on difierent roads, from getting on the 
ground simultaneously, but more to the fact that I was not 
apprised early enough of the condition of afifairs on my left. 
I can find no fault with the former, nor am I disposed at this 
time to censure the latter, though it must be admitted to 
have been a grave ei-ror. I ascribe it to the too great confi- 
dence of the general commanding the left corps (Major-Gen- 
eral McCook), which made him believe that he could manage 
the difficulty without the aid or control of his commander." 
Buell was not notified of any attack by the enemy on his 
left until over two hours after the engagement was begun. 
He then hurried to the field, and sent the necessary sup- 
ports foi"«ard, at once checking the enemy, and made dispo- 
sition of his troops for battle. 

With a willingness to lay down command that character- 
ized all the commanders of the Army of the Cumberland 
when the authorities in Washington regarded the good of 
the service as requiring it, Buell placed the new com- 
mander in full possession of all plans and information that 
he possessed, and without a word left the troops that were 
to win undying fame on other battle-fields, largely by reason 
of the training he had given them during the period of his 
command, half a month less than one year. 

The Comte de Paris, in his " History of the Civil War in 
America," in writing on the battle of Shiloh, where he re- 
fers to the massing of the artillery by Grant's Chief of Staff, 
Colonel Webster, says : " The fate of the day depends upon 



BATTLE OF PERRYVILLE. 75 

the presei'vation of these heights, whence the enemy could 
have commanded Pittsburg Landing," and on the following 
page adds, " Nevertheless, at the sight of the enemy's bat- 
talions advancing in good order, the soldiers that have been 
grouped together in haste, to give an air of support to Web- 
ster's batteiy, become frightened and scatter. It is about 
to be can-ied, when a new body of troops deploying in the 
rear of the guns, with as much regularity as if they were on 
the parade-ground, receives the Confederates with a fire 
that drives them back in disorder into the ravine. This 
was the brigade of Ammen, belonging to Nelson's division, 
that i-ushed forward so opportunely." In sjieaking of the 
second day's fight he says : " At a signal given by Buell, his 
three divisions, under Nelson, Crittenden, and McCook, put 
themselves in motion at the same time. The soldiers of the 
Anny of the Ohio, constantly drilled for the year past by a 
rigid disciplinarian, and trained by their long marches 
across three States, are distinguished by their discipline 
and their fine bearing. The readiness with which they 
march against the enemy wins the admiration of generals 
who, like Sherman, have had to fight a whole day at the head 
of raw and inexperienced troops." 

The greatest service that General Buell rendered to his 
country was as the organizer and disciplinarian of the mass 
of the raw, undrilled troops that were humed to the front 
under the need of the hour, and who, unaccustomed to mili- 
tary or other restraint, had all the freedom that character- 
izes the American sovereign both in sj^eech and action. To 
take these troops by the thousands and make an army of 
fifty to seventy-five thousand trained skilled soldiers, who, 
in later days, were to do as splendid fighting as the world 
ever saw, was a stupendous undertaking. General Buell 
not only did this, but accomplished his task in time to bring 



76 THE ARMY OP THE CUMBERLAND. 

some of these soldiers that he was jiistly prond of to the 
field of Shiloh, where, uuder his eye, they met the enemy 
like veterans. Buell's military training and habits of life 
led him, however, into one error. He was so good a soldier 
himself, and so anxious that his ai-my should he thorough 
soldiers, that he failed to recognize the distinction between 
the regular soldier in garrison during times of peace and the 
thinking volunteer during the active campaigns of the re- 
bellion. The latter could not and would not be made the 
mere macliine the former becomes, and Buell's failure to 
appreciate this caused great ill-feeling against him at the 
T^ime in his army. Then, again, Buell's earlier military 
training in the bureau office he held so many years unfitted 
him for the handling, on the battle-field, of the large num- 
ber of troops which comjDOsed his command. But very few 
generals during the rebellion were able to successfully han- 
dle on the battle-field as large an army as was under Buell. 
In fact, the general who has sufficient talent as a good or- 
ganizer and drill-master to enter into the details necessary 
to bring an army out of raw troops, has not the military 
genius required to handle a large army in fighting and win- 
ning great battles. But Buell rendered many valuable ser- 
vices, in the camp and on the field, to his country. It was 
Buell who planned the Fort Heniy, Fort Donelson, and 
Nashville camj^aign, which Halleck put under his hat, and 
proceeded to cany out as his original idea, being careful to 
say nothing in regard to his plans until they were so far 
executed as to render any action on the part of Buell and 
his command simply that of a supporting column. Then to 
Buell is due the credit of the second day's fight at Shiloh. 
That day's battle was the fight of the Aimy of the Ohio with 
Lewis Wallace's division, General Grant giving Buell largely 
his discretion in the movements of the troops. Whitelaw 



BATTLE OF PERRYVILLE. 77 

Eeid says of him, in "Ohio in the War," "He came into 
that action when, without him, all was lost. He redeemed 
the fortunes of the field, and justly won the title of the 
' Hero of Pittsburg Landing.' " 

The order placing Eosecrans in command — General Order 
No. 168, War Department, of date October 24, 1862 — created 
the Department of the Cumberland, embracing that portion of 
the State of Tennessee lying east of the Tennessee Biver, and 
such portion of Georgia and Alabama as should be occupied 
by the Federal troops. The troojDs in the field were desig- 
nated in the same order as the " Fourteenth Ai-my Corj^s." 

General Eosecrans assumed command on October 30th at 
Louisville. On November 2d he arrived at Bowling Green, 
and on the 7th he announced, in General Orders, the di^^- 
sion of his army organization into "the Eight Wing." 
"the Centre," and "the Left Wing," under the command 
respectively of McCook, Thomas, and Crittenden, with five 
divisions in the centre and three in each wing. He in- 
structed Thomas to advance F17 and Dumont's divisions to 
Gallatin, and to push rajjidly forward the repairs of the rail- 
road to Nash\-ille. 

Up to this time the movements of Bragg's army remained 
undeveloped, and no disposition of the Federal forces could 
be safely made without the knowledge of what Bragg's plan 
of operations would be. That he would ultimately attempt 
the capture of Nashville or force a battl 3 for it there could 
be but little doubt. Not to fight for Nashville was the 
abandonment of Tennessee. Kentucky surrendered without 
a blow produced such demoralization in Bragg's command 
that to have given up Tennessee without a struggle would 
have either compelled a change in the commanding officer 
of that army or a disbandment of it, so far as the Kentucky 
and Tennessee troops were concerned. 



78 THE ARMY OF THE CUMBERLAND. 

General Halleck's brilliant paper campaign into East Ten- 
nessee again was produced and aired with a show of the 
most profound wisdom, based on the extreme of ignorance of 
the situation and surroundings. Buell's forethought in con- 
centrating the army within sui)i3orting distance of Nashville 
became apparent on the appearance of the advance of Bragg's 
army at Murfreesboro, reinforcing Breckinridge's command, 
wliich had been left in Tennessee to enforce the " blockade 
of Nashville." This was another grievance the Kentucky 
troops had against Bragg. All the Kentucky infantry troops 
under Bragg were in Breckinridge's command, and they were 
exceedingly anxious to return to the State with Bragg's 
army to visit their friends and relatives and aid in recruiting 
that army, Bragg's distrust of these troops was such that 
he refused to allow them this privilege, and his action in 
holding them in Tennessee, just out of Kentucky, did not 
materially increase his popularity with them. Breckinridge 
had established his headquarters at Mtirfreesboro and as- 
sumed chief command, with about ten thousand troops under 
him, over one-third of which were cavalry under Wheeler 
and Forrest. With this force Breckinridge endeavored to 
enforce the siege of Nashville, using his cavah-y to prevent 
the gathering of forage and supplies by our troops from the 
sun-ounding country. These foraging parties were con- 
stantly sent out, going as far at times as ten miles on these 
expeditions. The main deprivation the garrison suffered 
during the six weeks of the siege was in having nearly all 
communication cut off from their friends at the North, and 
while they received nothing, they embraced every opi^or- 
tunity of sending letters by citizens returning north. The 
garrison was not willing to remain entirely on the defensive. 
Besides the numerous raiding parties sent out for forage 
which were uniformly successful, on the night of the 6th 



BATTLE OF PERRYVILLE. 79 

of October, Negley sent Palmer with some twent^'-eiglit 
hundred troops to attack General S. R. Anderson, who had 
established his camp at Lavergne with some three thousand 
men, principally new recruits. Palmer with the artillery and 
about four hundred infantry to support it, moved directly 
on Lavergne, some fifteen miles from Nashville, while Col- 
onel John F. Miller with about twenty-four hundred men 
in his command moved on the road to the right to make the 
attack on the rear of the enemy. Miller marched his com- 
mand during the night, captured the enemy's pickets at day- 
light and moved on the encampment. Palmer opened with 
artillery as soon as he heard Miller's musketry firing and the 
latter, jsushing his troops rapidly forward, after an engage- 
ment lasting half an hour, had the enemy in full retreat on 
the road to Murfreesboro with a loss of 80 killed and 
wounded, and 175 prisoners. He also captured three pieces 
of artillery, aud the regimental colors of the Thirty-second 
Alabama. Palmer's command then returned to Nashville. 
During the siege of Nashville skirmishing between our 
pickets and the scouting parties of the enemy was constantly 
occurring, and the garrison of Nashville was indebted for its 
safety to the services of Lieutenant-Colonel Von Schrader of 
the Seventy-fourth Ohio, Inspector of Negley's division, as ' 
much as any one thing. Von Schrader was an educated 
Prussian officer and a thorough soldier. He established a 
system of pickets, strongly posted, with block houses for 
their protection, and then gave his personal attention to it 
that the pickets performed their entire duty. There was 
no determined assault on the place at any time during the 
siege. The only appearance of an attack in force was on the 
6th of November, by a body of some eight thousand troops, 
equally divided between cavalry and infantry, under General 
Roger Hanson. Forrest, knowing that the Federal force at 



80 THE ARMY OP THE CUMBERLAND. 

Nashville was not a very strong one and that by the pursuit 
of Bragg by Buell's army, Nash^'ille was completely cut ofl 
from any immediate support or relief, obtained General 
Breckinridge's permission to make an attack with his cav- 
alry, numbering over four thousand men, in concert with the 
infantry under Hanson, numbering a little less than Forrest's 
command. The enemy's cavalry moved in columns on the 
Charlotte, Franklin, and Nolinsville turnpikes from the 
south, while Forrest in person with 1,000 cavalry and Han- 
son's infantry, pushed rapidly forward on the Murfreesboro 
pike, arriving at the Lunatic Asylum, six miles from Nash- 
ville, by daylight. Our jjickets and cavalry were driven in, 
and Hanson was in readiness to make the attack with the 
infantry when a peremptory order from Breckinridge was 
received, directing further operations to cease, under ex- 
press orders from Bragg. After skirmishing with his cav- 
alry around the city at the different outposts, Forrest with- 
drew, greatly incensed at being ordered to desist from the 
attack when confident of success. 

Bragg in leaving a large number of men in middle Ten- 
nessee merely to watch the post of Nashville— thus crippling 
his army to that extent — committed a great mistake. Ht 
needed every available man in his army to make the Ken- 
tucky campaign a success. With these 10,000 troops, if 
Buell had left Negley's and Paine's divisions as garrisons at 
Nashville, Bragg's force would have outnumbered Buell's 
command before he reached Louisville three to two. With 
the defeat of Buell, Nashville would have been worse than 
worthless, proving an incumbrance instead of a benefit. 
On the other hand, with Bragg driven out of Kentucky, and 
opening the struggle for that State in Tennessee, the pos- 
session of Nashville as a second base of supplies for our 
army was an absolute necessity. Bragg, however, was cor- 



BATTLE OF PERRYVILLE. 81 

rect in refusing to allow the place to be attacked by For- 
rest, for even in the event of success the non-combatants 
and sympathizing friends of the South would have suffered 
in person and property to an extent far beyond what the 
temporary occupation of the city by the Southern forces 
would have compensated. 

Nashville was reinforced by the an'ival of the advance of 
the army concentrating there on the 17th of November, and 
a few days after Rosecrans arrived and established his 
headquarters in that city. The first thing that demanded 
the attention of the new commander was that which had 
given the most serious trouble to General Buell, viz. : the 
safety of his communications in the rear to his base of sup- 
plies. The repairs to the tunnel Just south of Mitchellville 
occuijied a large force several weeks to complete. During 
this time all supplies for troops at Nashville were with the 
greatest labor hauled thirty-five miles by wagon train. The 
railroad from Louisville to Nash\dlle was re-oi^ened on the 
26th of November, and for one month every effort was made 
to forward supplies, so the troops could have new clothing 
issued to them, and that they could be provided with am- 
munition. The depots at Nashville were filled with needful 
supplies to provide against the interruption of communica- 
tion arising from raids on the raih-oad by rebel cavalry. 
Since the middle of November Bragg had been concen- 
trating his forces at Murfreesboro, and anticipating that the 
Federal forces would go into winter quarters at Nashville, had 
placed his troojjs in quarters for the winter in the vicinity of 
the former place. He had sent nearly all of his cavalry to raid 
on the lines of the Federal communication — Morgan into Ken- 
tucky and Wheeler into West Tennessee. With this knowl- 
edge, Eosecrans, on the 26th of December, ordered his aimy 
to move out of Nashville to attack the enemy on his front. 
4* 



82 THE ARMY OF THE CUMBERLAND. 

"Wliile the army was being refitted at Nashville, Morgan's 
cavalry was raiding the surrounding country. On the 7th 
Morgan's command captured the Thirty-ninth Brigade under 
Colonel A. B. Moore, at Hartsville, where he had been posted 
by Thomas to guard the ford of the Cumberland Eiver, and 
to watch the enemy on the Lebanon road. The brigade 
consisted of three infantry regiments, a battalion of cavaliy, 
and a section of artillery, making a force of about two thou- 
sand effective men. The command was badly posted, and the 
commanding officers of the infantry regiments failed to co- 
operate, or to obey orders. It was, in the main, a repetition 
of the disgraceful affair at Murfreesboro, when Forrest cap- 
tured that place during the previous summer. Moore was 
surprised in his camp early in the morning. No warning 
■was given by the pickets, and before any disposition could 
be made of the troops, Morgan's men were upon them. 
Morgan's command consisted of his cavaliy, and two regi- 
ments of infantry. Moore threw out a skirmish line to 
resist the advance of Morgan's infantry and dismounted 
cavalry in line. The rebels pressed steadily forward to a 
ravine at the foot of the hill on which Moore had formed 
his line, and under shelter of this jDOured such a destructive 
fire upon the Federal troops, that he ordered a new line 
to be formed in the rear. In this movement the whole line 
was thrown into confusion, and being attacked on their right 
and rear by the rebel cavalry, who had, up to this time not 
been engaged, Moore's command was crowded one on the 
other into a narrow sjiace where the fire of the enemy proved 
terribly effective. Moore's troops being unable to return 
the fire, and he not being able to make another disposi- 
tion of them, the white flag was raised, and the entire com- 
mand suiTendered. Colonel Tafel, in command of the One 
Hundred and Sixth Ohio, becoming separated from the 



BATTLE OF PERRYVILLE. 83 

other troops, made some further resistance, but, being over- 
powered, he also surrendered. The contest only lasted a lit- 
tle over an hour. Moore's loss was 150 killed and wounded, 
his entire command captured, with all army and camp equip- 
ment, trains, and two pieces of artillery. Morgan's loss was 
125 killed and wounded. 

General D. S. Stanley, on reporting to Rosecrans from the 
Army of the Tennessee, had been assigned to the position 
of Chief of Cavalry to the Commanding General. On the 
12th he attacked and drove the enemy out of the town of 
Franklin, killing five and capturing twelve men, with a large 
number of horses and stores. He destroyed the mills at 
that place, with a great quantity of valuable ijroperty. 

After the capture of Hartsville by Morgan, his services 
were recognized by his superiors to the extent that Mr. 
Davis, who was on a visit to Murfreesboro shortly after this 
engagement, signed and handed him his commission as 
Brigadier-General. General Hardee urged that the ap- 
pointment be made as Major-General, but this was refused. 
Morgan's command had increased so that it was unwieldy as 
one body, and he decided to form it into two brigades. His 
command consisted now of seven regiments, — an aggre- 
gate force of over four thousand men. This he divided, 
placing three regiments under Colonel Basil W. Duke, in 
the first brigade, with a battery of four guns. The second 
brigade was placed in command of Colonel W. C. P. Breck- 
inridge, and was composed of four regiments, with one 
three-inch Parrot gun and the two mountain howitzers. 
This force, trained as it had been, had no superior for the 
work it was ordered to do — raiding in the rear, destroying 
bridges, trestleworks, and capturing bridge-guards. So ac- 
customed had they become to hardships of every nature, 
that it was almost incredible the amount of rough riding. 



84 THE ARMY OF THE CUMBERLAND. 

scant fare, and loss of sleep these men endured. Proud of 
their past success, and emboldened by it to the belief that 
they were able to defeat any force that could overtake them, 
they at last found the country south of the Ohio too con- 
fined for them, and, aiming at grander feats, they passed 
north of that river, and, entering upon an entirely diflferent 
kind of warfare, met with complete disaster. 

On the morning of the 22d the command of Morgan took 
the road again for Kentucky. Bragg ordered the railroad 
in Rosecrans's rear to be broken, and his communication 
with Louisville destroyed. Morgan and his men were in 
most excellent spirits at the prospect of another raid into 
that State. He had with him the pick of the youth of the 
State of Kentucky. On the 24:th Morgan's command had 
their first skirmish with a battalion of Michigan troops, 
which resulted in the loss to Morgan of seventeen of his 
men and two of his ofiicers. On the 25th Colonel Hobson 
had an engagement with Johnson's regiment near Mun- 
fords^dlle, in which the rebels suffered a loss of some fifty 
men killed and wounded. Morgan then attacked the stock- 
ade at Bacon Creek, held by a force of 100 men, who made 
a most stubborn and determined resistance, inflicting severe 
loss upon the attacking party, and demonstrating the worth 
of a stockade properly built and efficiently manned. These 
stockades were built with heavy upright timber ten or 
twelve feet high. They were surrounded by ditches and 
pierced for musketry. Assailants, when right at the base, 
were still far from taking them. It was supposed that they 
would not resist artillery, and, in fact, they were not built 
with the expectation of doing so. If the garrison of the 
stockade succeeded in driving off" the guerilla parties that 
swarmed through the country, it fully accomplished its pur- 
pose. This stockade successfully resisted the heavy artil- 



BATTLE OF PERRYVILLE. 85 

lery firing brought to bear upon it, even when a number of 
shells exploded within the work. After making such a brave 
defence, it is to be regretted that they did not hold out to 
the last, and refuse to surrender at all. The commanding 
officer had rejected a number of demands made on him to 
surrender ; when Morgan came up in person, and in his own 
name ofifering them liberal terms, they surrendered. Mor- 
gan then burnt the bridge across Bacon Creek, and pressed 
on to Nolin, fourteen miles beyond, where the stockade was 
surrendered without a fight. The bridge here also was de- 
stroyed. Morgan's division, on the 27th, captured Eliza- 
bethtown, after a severe engagement with the command of 
Lieutenant-Colonel Smith — a detachment of some six hun- 
di-ed infantiy. Smith sent Morgan a demand for him to 
surrender, which Morgan declined, and returned the com- 
pliment by making the same demand on Smith, who also 
declined. After an engagement lasting some six hours, 
Morgan's artillery rendered the building Smith's command 
was fighting in untenable, and he then surrendered. The 
next day Morgan, moving along the railroad, destroyed it 
thoroughly. The principal object of the expedition was the 
great trestleworks at Muldraugh's Hills, only a short distance 
apart. The garrison defending the lower trestle, 600 strong, 
was captured by the Second Brigade. The First Brigade 
captured the gandson at the upper trestle — 200 strong. 
These trestles were respectively 80 and 90 feet high, and 
each of them 500 feet long. They were thoroughly de- 
stroyed. Thus was accomplished the objects of the raid, 
but the destruction of these bridges — trestle and railroad — 
did not accomplish the design contemplated by Bragg. 
Bosecrans's prompt movement from Nashville on the rebels 
encamped at Miirfreesboro, and the result of that campaign, 
rendered Morgan's raid a failure in the main, as Bragg in- 



88 THE ARMY OF THE CUMBERLAND, 

two divisions and a brigade on McCook's right by the Frank- 
lin and Wilson pikes, threatening Hardee's left, and on his 
falling back was then to cross over on country roads and 
occupy Tfolinsville. Crittenden was ordered to move his 
command du-ect on the Mtirfreesboro pike. On the arrival 
of Thomas at Nolinsville, and being in a j)osition to support, 
McCook was to attack Hardee at Triune, and if the latter 
was reinforced and McCook's advance resisted, Thomas was 
to go to his aid. If Hardee fell back to Stewart's Creek, 
five miles south of Lavergne, and the enemy made a stand 
there, then Crittenden was to attack him at once, and 
Thomas was to come in on his left flank, while McCook 
was to bring his forces in supporting distance of Thomas 
and Crittenden as needed, after sending a division to watch 
Hardee and to pursue him if retreating. 

Davis took the advance of the Eight Wing with the First 
Division. He moved from camp at 6 a.m. on the Edmonson 
pike, on which he was ordered to move to Prim's black- 
smith shop, from whence he was to march direct on a coun- 
try road to Nolinsville. The Third Division under Sheri- 
dan moved on the Nolinsville pike, followed by the Second 
under Johnson. The advance of both these columns en- 
countered the cavalry pickets of the enemy, within two miles 
of the Federal picket line. As these commands advanced, 
there was constant skirmishing until the heads of each of 
these columns reached Nolinsville. About one mile south 
of the town the enemy made a determined stand in a defile, 
and upon the hills through which the pike ran at this place, 
known as Knob's Gap. This was a favorable position for the 
rebels, well guarded by their artillery, which opened fire at 
long range upon Carlin's lines. Davis then brought up two 
batteries and opened fire ui^on the enemy, while Carlin 
charged their position, cajituriug two guns and several prison- 



THE ADVANCE TO MURFREESBORO. 89 

ers. Davis's other brigades carried the enemy's position on 
the right and left. His division then bivouacked for the 
night. McCook's loss that day was about seventy-five killed 
and wounded. 

Early on the morning of the 27th, McCook's command 
pressing forward, encountered the enemy in force. A dense 
fog prevailed at the time, endering it hazardous in the ex- 
treme to open an engagement at that time, as McCook's 
troops could not distinguish friend from foe at one hundred 
and fifty yards, and his cavalry had been fired on by his in- 
fantry. On learning that Hardee was in position and had 
been in line of battle since the night before, McCook ordered 
a halt until the fog lifted. This it did about noon, when 
Johnson's division was pushed rapidly fonvard, followed by 
that of Sheridan. As the command approached Triune they 
found the enemy had burned the bridge across Wilson's 
Creek and retired, leaving a batteiy of six pieces with cav- 
alry supports to hold the crossing. As the skii-mishers of 
Johnson's command advanced, the battery withdrew, and 
with the cavalry moved off rapidly on the Eaglesville road. 
Johnson's division then repaired the bridge, crossed and went 
into camp beyond Wilson's Creek. 

On Sunday the 28th, there was no general movement of 
the troops. McCook, however, sent Willich's brigade out on 
a reconnoissance, to learn whether the enemy had retired to 
Murfreesboro or Shelbyville. Willich went several miles 
on the Shelbyville road and found that the force in his front 
had turned to the left and moved toward the former place. 
Stanley with the cavalry also made a reconnoissance, and re- 
ported that Hardee had retreated to Murfreesboro. 

On the 29th, McCook, leaving Baldwin's brigade at Triune 
to cover the extreme right, moved forward with the re- 
mainder of his command on a country road known as the 



90 THE ARMY OF THE CUMBERLAND. 

Bole Jack road toward Murfreesboro. The command did 
not reach their encampment until late in the evening, when 
from the movements of the enemy it was concluded that 
he intended to give battle at Murfreesboro, and every dis- 
position of the troops was made with reference to this. 
That night McCook's command was encamped in line of 
battle with two brigades of Johnson's division watching the 
right, Woodruflf's brigade guarding the bridge at Overall's 
Creek, Davis on the right of the Wilkinson pike, with 
Sheridan on the left of that road. The brigade that Mc- 
Cook had left at Triune was ordered up and assumed its 
position with the troops on the 30th. McCook's entire com- 
mand on the morning of that day advanced down the Wil- 
kinson turnpike until the head of the column encountered 
the enemy's pickets. The line of battle was at once formed 
with the divisions deployed in a line running to the right in 
a southeast direction with the left of Sheridan upon the Wil- 
kinson pike immediately on Negley's right. Davis's division 
was at once thrown into line of battle with his left resting on 
Sheridan's right, and Johnson's held in reserve. Covering 
the front with a strong line of skirmishers, McCook moved 
his line slowly forward, the enemy stubbornly contesting 
every foot of ground. McCook's skirmishers soon became 
sharply engaged with those of the rebels. The gi'ound was 
very favorable to the enemy, they being under cover of heavy 
woods and cedar thickets. At 12 o'clock part of the enemy's 
line of battle was determined, McCook's skirmishers being 
then about five hundred yards from it. The resistance to 
Davis's advance was especially stubborn, and the losses of 
the day footed up seventy-five in Sheridan's division and 
some two hundred in Davis's. Shortly before sunset the 
rebel position was plainly discernible from Davis's front, and 
was formed running diagonally across the old Murfreesboro 



THE ADVANCE TO MURFREESBORO. 91 

and Franklin road. In tlie afternoon, McCook learned from 
a citizen who had seen the enemy's line of battle and the 
position of his troops, that they were posted with the right 
of Cheatham's division resting on the Wilkinson jiike ; 
Withers's division on Cheatham's left, with his left resting 
on the Franklin road ; the entire of Hardee's corps to the left 
of that road extending toward the Salem pike.' This forma- 
tion of the enemy's line placed the right of McCook's line as 
then formed directly in front of the enemy's centre. In- 
formation was at once sent to Rosecrans, and McCook in- 
formed his three division commanders of this fact and then 
placed two brigades of the reserve division under Willich 
and Kirk — two of the best and most experienced brigade 
commanders in the army — on the right of Davis, to protect the 
right flank and guard against surprise — that of Kirk with 
his left resting on Davis's right, with his right refused, Wil- 
lich on Kirk's right and in a line nearly perjiendicular to the 
main line, thus covering the right flank. The third brigade 
of Johnson's division was held as resei^ve. McCook's line of 
battle as thus formed was broken in several points. The 
general direction of Sheridan's line was to the east and south, 
facing nearly at right angles with Negley, that of Davis was 
to the west, facing south, nearly at right angles to Sheridan, 
Kirk's brigade to Davis's right faced more to the east, while 
Willich's faced due south. The general direction of Mc- 
Cook's line, however, conformed to the line of the enemy in 
its front, except the latter had no breaks in the line and that 
its left division under McCown had its left extended due 
south. The main portion of the enemy's battle-line faced 
northwest. Breckinridge on the right of the line was facing 
nearly north while McCown on the left faced due west. The 
enemy awaiting attack — acting on the defensive — had as far 
as practicable located its line in the cedars, with open ground 



92 THE ARMY OF THE CUMBERLAND, 

in the front. McCook considered his line a strong one, with 
" open ground in the front for a short distance." Kosecrans, 
on being informed by McCook of the location of his line of 
battle, expressed himself against it, saying: "I don't like the 
facing so much to the east, but must confide that to you, who 
know the ground. If you don't think your present the best 
position, change it." At six o'clock in the evening McCook 
received an order from Kosecrans to have large and extended 
camp fires made on the right, extending far beyond the right 
of the line, to deceive the enemy and make him believe that 
troops were being massed there. Fires were built extending 
nearly a mile beyond the right of McCook's line. In this 
position the right wing rested in the cedars the night be- 
fore the battle. The troops, cutting cedar boughs for beds, 
and ofiicers and men, wrapping themselves in their blankets, 
slept in the frosty night air with the silent stars looking 
down. 

On the 26th, Thomas's command, " the Centre," with Neg- 
ley's division in the advance, moved out promptly to 
Brentwood on the Franklin pike, and from there turned to 
the left and advanced on the Wilson pike to Owen's store, 
\\here the troops were to encamj) for the night. But on 
arriving here, Negley left his train and pushed on at once 
with his troops to Nolinsville, from whence the sound of 
Davis's guns had reached him, to his support. Negley en- 
camped at Nolinsville, Eousseau at Owen's store, and 
Walker's brigade at Brentwood. A very heavy rain during 
the night rendered the country roads almost impassable, 
and it was not until the night of the 27th that Eousseati's 
command reached Nolinsville. On the morning of the 
27th, Negley's train coming up, his division moved to the 
east, over an extremely rough by-road, to the right of Crit- 
tenden on the Murfreesboro pike, taking position at 



THE ADVANCE TO MURFREESBORO. 93 

Stewartsboro. Walker was sent back by Thomas from 
Brentwood, to take the direct Nolinsville pike. On the 
28 th, Kousseau, under orders, marched to Stewartsboro, 
where he joined Negley's division. On the 29th Negley 
crossed Stewart's Creek at the ford southwest of, and two 
miles above the turnpike bridge, and marched in supjiorting 
distance of the head of Crittenden's command on the Mur- 
freesboro pike. Eousseau was ordered to remain in camp 
at Stewartsboro, detaching Starkweather's brigades with a 
section of artillery to the Jefferson pike, to watch the 
movements of the enemy. Negley's division moved eight 
miles that day and took position within three miles of 
Murfreesboro. Walker reached Stewartsboro from the 
Nolins\alle pike about dark. Early in the morning, Crit- 
tenden's command moved into line of battle on the left, 
under a brisk fii-e, while Negley's division, by an oblique 
movement to the right, took position on the right of Palmer's 
division, and was then advanced through a dense cedar 
thicket several hundi'ed yards in width to the Wilkinson 
cross roads, driving the enemy's skirmishers steadily, and 
with considerable loss. Rousseau's division, with the ex- 
ception of Starkweather's brigade, was ordered up from 
Stewartsboro, reached the front, and bivouacked on the 
Murfreesboro pike in the rear of the centre. Thomas dur- 
ing the night ordered Walker's brigade to take a strong 
position near the bridge over Stewart's Creek, and to de- 
fend it against any attempt of the enemy's cavalry to de- 
stroy it. Rousseau was ordered to take position in rear of 
Negley's division, with his left on the Murfreesboro pike, 
and his right extending into the cedar thicket through 
which Negley had marched to take position. The troops 
held every foot of ground that had been won from the ene- 
my, and remained in line of battle during the night. 



94 THE ARMY OF THE CUMBERLAND. 

The "Left Wing" under Crittenden advanced on the 
26th to Lavergne, Pakner's division in the front. He was 
engaged in a short time with heavy skirmishing, which in- 
creased as the command moved south. The advance of this 
column was over a rough country, intersected with forests 
and cedar thickets. Crittenden was ordered to delay his 
movements until McCook reached Triune, in order to de- 
termine the direction in which Thomas should move as 
support ; Crittenden's command encamped that night four 
miles north of Lavergne. On the 27th Wood's division was 
placed in the advance of Crittenden's column. Hascall's 
brigade drove the enemy from Lavergne with a loss of 
twenty men wounded, and pushing rapidly on, forced them 
south of Stewart's Creek, five miles beyond. At this place 
the enemy set fire to the bridge, which Hascall's advance 
reached in time to save. Hazen's brigade of Palmer's divi- 
sion was sent down the Jefferson pike to seize the bridge 
over Stewart's Creek at the crossing of that road. That 
night the "Left Wing" went into camp at Stewartsboro, 
and remained there over the next day, Sunday. On the 
29th, Crittenden's command crossed Stewart's Creek by the 
Smyrna bridge, and the main Murfreesboro pike, and ad- 
vanced that day — Palmer's division leading — to within two 
miles of Murfreesboro, driving back the enemy after several 
severe skirmishes, saving two bridges on the route, and 
forcing the enemy into his intrenchments. 

Kosecrans, about three o'clock in the afternoon, received a 
signal message from Palmer at the front, that he was in 
sight of Murfreesboro, and that the enemy was running. 
Kosecrans then sent an order to Crittenden to send a divi- 
sion to occupy Murfreesboro, camping the other two out- 
side. Crittenden received this order as he reached the 
head of his command, where Wood and Palmer were gather- 



THE ADVANCE TO MURFREESBOKO. 95 

ing up their troops preparatory to encamping for the night. 
These divisions were in line of battle, — Wood on the left 
and Palmer on the right, — with the rebels in sight in such 
heavy force that it was evident that they intended to dis- 
pute the passage of the river, and to fight a battle at or near 
Murfreesboro. On receipt of the order, Crittenden gave 
the command to advance. Wood was ordered to occupy 
the place, and Palmer to advance in line of battle until the 
passage of the river had been forced. Wood on receiving 
the order objected greatly to cariying it out, saying tliat 
it was hazarding a great deal for very little, to move over 
unknown ground in the night, instead of waiting for day- 
light, and that Crittenden oiight to take the responsibility 
of disobeying the order. This the latter refused to do. 
After Wood and Palmer had issued their orders to advance, 
they both insisted that the order should not be carried out. 
The order was then suspended for an hour, so that Rose- 
crans could be heard from. During this interval the gen- 
eral himself came to this portion of the front, and approved 
of the action of Crittenden, as the order had been issued on 
the report that the enemy had evacuated Murfreesboro. 
Under the order, before it was suspended, Harker with his 
brigade had crossed the river at a ford on his left, where he 
surprised a regiment of Breckinridge's division, and drove 
it back on its main lines, not more than five hundred yards 
distant, in considerable confusion. He held this position 
until it was dark, with Breckinridge in force on his front, 
when Crittenden ordered his return. Hascall's command 
was fording the river, advancing, when the order was sus- 
pended. Harker succeeded in recrossing the river in the 
face of this strong force of the enemy without any serious 
loss. Crittenden placed Van Cleve's division, which had re- 
ported marching from the Jeflferson turnpike to the Murfrees- 



96 THE ARMY OF THE CUMBERLAND. 

boro road, in reserve behind "Wood. During the 30th there 
■was but little change in the position of the Left Wing, while 
the other troops were moving into position on the line of 
battle. Palmer's division was advanced a short distance, the 
enemy contesting stubbornly. 

The pioneer brigade had prepared the banks at three 
places for the fording of the river. Wood's division cov- 
ered two, and the pioneer brigade, under Captain St. Clair 
Morton, covered the lower one. At night Crittenden's corps 
with Negley's division bivouacked in order of battle, being 
only seven hundred yards from the enemy's intrenchments. 
The left of Crittenden's command extended down the river 
some five hundred yards. 

The first movement of Kosecrans's advance was made 
known to Bragg as soon as it had reached a point two miles 
beyond the Federal picket-line, where the heads of the sev- 
eral columns encountered the rebel cavalry pickets. For 
all Bragg had placed his army in winter quarters, and i^re- 
sumed that Eosecrans had done the same, his experience in 
the matter of a surjDrise to an army led him to be well pre- 
pared to know and take advantage of the slightest change 
in his immediate front. By the night of the 26th Bragg 
knew that Eosecrans's entire army was moving out to force 
him to fight or compel his retreat. He at once selected his 
line of battle at Stone's Eiver, and directed his three cavalry 
brigades, under Wheeler, Wharton, and Pegram, supported 
by three brigades of infantry with artillery, to check the 
advance of the several columns until he could unite his 
army. He then gave the necessary orders for the concen- 
tration of his command and the formation of his line of 
battle. 

Murfreesboro is situated on the railroad to Chattanooga, 
thirty miles southeast of Nashville, in the midst of the great 



THE ADVANCE TO MUHFREESBORO. 97 

plain stretcliing from the base of the Cumberland Moun- 
tains toward the Cumberland River, and is surrounded by a 
gently undulating country, exceedingly fertile and highly 
cultivated. Leading in eveiy direction from the town are 
numerous excellent turnpikes. Stone's Eiver — named after 
an early settler — is formed here by the middle and south 
branches of the stream uniting, and flows in a northerly 
direction between low banks of limestone, generally steep 
and difficult to cross, emptying into the Cumberland. At the 
time of the battle the stream was so low that it could be 
crossed by infantry everywhere. The Nashville Railroad 
crosses the river about two hundred yards above the turn- 
pike bridge. At some five hundred yards beyond, it intersects 
the Nashville turnpike at a sharp angle, then runs some 
eight hundred yards between the pike and the river, when 
the stream turns abruptly to the east and passes to the north. 
Open fields surrounded the town, fringed with dense cedar 
brakes. These aftbrded excellent cover for approaching in- 
fantry, but were almost impervious to artillery. 

The centre of Bragg's army was at Murfreesboro, under 
Polk. The right was at Readyville, under McCown, and 
the left at Triune and Eaglesville, under Hardee. Polk's 
command consisted of Cheatham's and Withers's divisions. 
These divisions and three brigades of Breckinridge's divi- 
sion of Hardee's corps wei'e at Murfreesboro. Cleburne's 
division and Adams's brigade of Breckinridge's division 
were under the immediate command of Hardee, near Eagles- 
ville, about twenty miles west of Murfreesboro. McCown's 
division of Kirby Smith's corps was at Readyville, twelve 
miles east of Murfreesboro. Each of the two divisions 
of Hardee's corps consisted of four brigades of infantry. 
To this corps Wheeler's brigade of cavalry was attached. 
The brigade of T. R. Jackson — which was in the rear, guard- 
VII.— 5 



98 THE ARMY OF THE CUMBERLAND. 

ing the railroad from Bridgeport to the mountains — Bragg 
also ordered up. On Sunday, the 28th, Bragg formed his 
line of battle, placing Breckinridge's division on his ex- 
treme right, across Stone's Eiver, to protect that flank and 
cover the town. Adams's brigade rested on the Lebanon 
road, about a mile and a half from town. Breckinridge's 
division formed the first line, facing north, and was posted 
in the edge of the forest, with Cleburne's division in the 
second line, 800 yards to the rear. To the left of Adams the 
line was broken by an intervening field, about three hun- 
dred yards in width, which was apparently left unoccupied, 
but was covered by the Twentieth Tennessee and Wright's 
battery, of Preston's brigade, which swept it and the fields 
in front. The remainder of Preston's brigade rested with 
its right in the woods, and extended along the edge with its 
left toward the river. On the left of Preston, Palmer's bri- 
gade was formed, and on his left Hanson's completed that 
portion of the line. Jackson's brigade reported to Breckin- 
ridge, and was placed on the east side of the Lebanon road, 
on commanding ground, a little in the advance of the right 
of Adams. On the other side of the river the right of 
Withers's division rested at the bank, near the intersection 
of the turnpike with the railroad, and was slightly in ad- 
vance of Hanson's right. It extended southwardly across 
the Wilkinson pike to the Triune or Franklin road, in an 
irregular line adapted to the topography of the country. 
In the rear of Withers's division that of Cheatham was posted 
as a supporting force. McCown's division was placed in the 
rear of these divisions as the reserve. This was Bragg's 
first disposition of his troops for battle. On Monday, the 
29th, no change of importance was made, the troops remain- 
ing in line of battle. In the evening, when Harker's bri- 
gade crossed the river, Bragg thought this was a movement 



THE ADVANCE TO MURFREESBORO. 99 

to occupy a hill situated about six hundred yards in front of 
Hanson's centre. This commanded the ground sloping to 
the river south and west, and from it the right of "Withers's 
division across the river could be enfiladed. Hanson's bri- 
gade was sent out, and, on Harker's return, the hill was oc- 
cuj)ied by the batteries of the enemy. On Monday Bragg, 
finding that Kosecrans was extending his line on his right, 
— as Bragg supposed to operate on that flank — threw his re- 
sei-ve division under McCowu on Withers's left. Hardee was 
ordered to take command of McCown's division, and to move 
Cleburne from the second line in the rear of Breckinridge, 
and place him on the left as support to McCown. Cleburno 
was brought forward and placed five hundred yards in 
rear of the latter. Bragg's main line of battle was in the 
edge of the woods, with open ground to the front. His 
troops were formed in two lines, the first line protected 
by intrenchments, and his second line formed some six hun- 
dred yards to the rear. He awaited the attack of Bosecrans 
on the 30th, and not receiving it, on Tuesday made his ar- 
rangements for an advance and attack in force on the morn- 
ing of the 31st. His troojjs remained in line of battle, ready 
to move with the early dawn of the coming day. The two 
armies were now arrayed only some five hundred yards apart, 
facing each other, and eager for the conflict of the morrow. 

At nine o'clock on the evening of the 30th, the coq^s com- 
manders met at Bosecrans's headquarters, in the cedars near 
the Murfreesboro pike, to receive their final instructions 
and to leam the details of the plan of battle for the next 
day. McCook was directed with his three divisions to oc- 
cupy the most advantageous position, refusing his right as 
much as practicable and necessary to secure it, to await the 
attack of the enemy, and in the event of that not being 
made, to himself engage and hold the force on his front. 



98 THE ARMY OF THE CUMBERLAND. 

ing tlie railroad from Bridgeport to the mountains — Bragg 
also ordered up. On Sunday, the 28tli, Bragg formed liis 
line of battle, placing Breckinridge's division on liis ex- 
treme right, across Stone's Kiver, to protect that flank and 
cover the town. Adams's brigade rested on the Lebanon 
road, about a mile and a half from town. Breckinridge's 
division formed the first line, facing north, and was posted 
in the edge of the forest, with Cleburne's division in the 
second line, 800 yards to the rear. To the left of Adams the 
line was broken by an intervening field, about three hun- 
dred yards in width, wliich was apparently left unoccupied, 
but was covered by the Twentieth Tennessee and Wright's 
battery, of Preston's brigade, which swept it and the fields 
in front. The remainder of Preston's brigade rested with 
its right in the woods, and extended along the edge with its 
left toward the river. On the left of Preston, Palmer's bri- 
gade was formed, and on his left Hanson's completed that 
jiortion of the line. Jackson's brigade reported to Breckin- 
ridge, and was placed on the east side of the Lebanon road, 
on commanding gi'ound, a little in the advance of the right 
of Adams. On the other side of the river the right of 
Withers's division rested at the bank, near the intersection 
of the turnpike with the railroad, and was slightly in ad- 
vance of Hanson's right. It extended southwardly across 
the Wilkinson pike to the Triune or Franklin road, in an 
irregular line adapted to the topography of the country. 
In the rear of Withers's division that of Cheatham was posted 
as a supporting force. McCown's division was placed in the 
rear of these divisions as the reserve. This was Bragg's 
first disposition of his troops for battle. On Monday, the 
29th, no change of importance was made, the troops remain- 
ing in line of battle. In the evening, when Harker's bri- 
gade crossed the river, Bragg thought this was a movement 



THE ADVANCE TO MURFREESBORO. 99 

to occui;)y a hill sitiiatecT about six hundred yards in front of 
Hanson's centre. This commanded the ground sloping to 
the river south and west, and from it the right of Withers's 
division across the river could be enfiladed. Hanson's bri- 
gade was sent out, and, on Harker's return, the hill was oc- 
cupied by the batteries of the enemy. On Monday Bragg, 
finding that Rosecrans was extending his line on his right, 
— as Bragg supposed to operate on that flank — threw his re- 
sei-ve division under McCown on Withers's left. Hardee was 
ordered to take command of McCown's division, and to move 
Cleburne from the second line in the rear of Breckinridge, 
and place him on the left as support to McCown. Cleburno 
was brought forward and placed five hundred yards in 
rear of the latter. Bragg's main line of battle was in the 
edge of the woods, with open ground to the front. His 
troops were formed in two lines, the first line protected 
by intrenchments, and his second line formed some six hun- 
dred yards to the reai\ He awaited the attack of Rosecrans 
on the 30th, and not receiving it, on Tuesday made his ar- 
rangements for an advance and attack in force on the morn- 
ing of the 31st. His troops remained in line of battle, ready 
to move with the early dawn of the coming day. The two 
armies were now arrayed only some five hundred yards ajaart, 
facing each other, and eager for the conflict of the morrow. 

At nine o'clock on the evening of the 30th, the coqas com- 
manders met at Rosecrans's headquarters, in the cedars near 
the Murfreesboro pike, to receive their final instructions 
and to learn the details of the plan of battle for the next 
day. McCook was directed with his three divisions to oc- 
cupy the most advantageous position, refusing his right as 
much as practicable and necessary to secure it, to await the 
attack of the enemy, and in the event of that not being 
made, to himself engage and hold the force on his front. 



100 THE ARMY OF THE CUMBERLAND. 

Johnson's division held the extreme right of his line ; on 
Johnson's left was Davis's division, and on Davis's left 
Sheridan's was posted. Thomas was instructed to ojien with 
skirmishing and engage the enemy's centre with Negley's 
division of his command and Palmer's of Crittenden's coi-ps, 
Negley's right resting on Sheridan's left, and Palmer's right 
on the left of Negley, Rousseau being in reserve. Crittenden 
was ordered to move Van Cleve's division across the river at 
the lower ford, covered and sui^ported by the pioneer bri- 
gade and at once advance on Breckinridge. Wood's divi- 
sion was to follow — crossing at the upper ford and joining 
Van Cleve's right — -when they were to press everything before 
them into Murfreesboro. This gave a strong attack from 
two divisions of Federal troops on the one of Breckinridge's, 
which was known to be the only one of the enemy's on the 
east of the river. As soon as Breckinridge had been dis- 
lodged from his position, the ai-tillery of Wood's division 
was to take position on the heights east of the river and 
open fire on the enemy's lines on the other side, which could 
here be seen in reverse, and dislodge them, when Palmer 
was to drive them southward across the river or through 
the wood. Sustained by the advance of the Centre under 
Thomas crushing their right, Crittenden was to keep ad- 
vancing, take Murfreesboro, move rapidly westward on the 
Franklin pike, get on their flank and rear and drive them 
into the country toward Salem, with the jn-ospect of cutting 
off their retreat and probably destroying their army. Eose- 
crans called the attention of the corps commanders to the 
fact that this combination, which gave to him such a sujieri- 
ority on the left, depended for its success upon McCook's 
maintaining his position on the right for at least three 
hours, and if compelled to fall back that he should do so in 
the same manner he had advanced the day before, slowly 



THE ADVANCE TO MURFREESBORO. 101 

and steadily, refusing liis right. McCook was asked if he 
could hold his position for three hours, and replied that he 
thought he could. The importance of doing so was again 
impressed upon him, and the officers then separated. 

As will be seen, the plan of battle as formed by Rosecrans 
contemplated a feint attack by his right, which in the event 
of a repulse was to fall back slowly, contesting the gi-ound 
stubbornly, while the main attack was to be made by the 
forces on the left, followed up by the advance of the centre, 
the right to be temporarily sacrificed for the success of the 
general j^lan. Rosecrans knew that Bragg had weakened 
his right to support his left, looking to offensive movements 
on his part, and that the vital point in his own plan was th^ 
ability ox McCook to hold the enemy in check on his front. 

During the 30th, Bragg formed his plan of battle, which, 
singular as it ai3pears, was the exact counterj)art of that oi 
the Federal commander. Hardee on the left, with McCown'3 
and Cleburne's divisions, was to advance against the Federal 
right, which being forced back, Polk with "Withers's and 
Cheatham's di\'isions were then to j^ush the centre. The 
movement to be made by a steady wheel to the right on the 
right of Polk's command as a pivot. Bragg's plan was to 
drive our right and centre back against our left on Stone's 
Eiver, seize our line of communication with Nashville, thus 
cutting us off from our base of operations and supplies, and 
ultimately securing the objective of his campaign, Nashville. 
Bragg's plan was equally as bold as that of his opponent — 
whose command was slightly inferior in strength to the rebel 
force — and the success of either depended very largely on 
the degree of diligence in opening the engagement. Rose- 
crans's orders were for the troops to breakfast before day- 
light and attack at seven o'clock. Bragg issued orders to 
attack at daylight. 



CHAPTER Yin. 

THE BATTLE OF STONE'S RIVER. 

With early liglit, on the morning of the 31st, the move- 
ment in each army began. Eosecrans had established his 
lieadquarters in the rear of the left, in order to direct in per- 
son the forward movement of that portion of his army which 
was to cross Stone's Eiver, sweep all resistance before it, 
and swing into Murfreesboro. The command was given, 
and at once Van Cleve advanced two brigades, making the 
crossing of the river at the lower ford without opposition. 
"Wood's division had reached the river bank prepared to 
make the crossing and support Tan Cleve. Everything on 
the left appeared to be working satisfactorily, when the 
opening sounds of the enemy's attack on the right reached 
the left. This was as intended, and went to show that if 
Bragg's left was fully occuj)ied he then could give the less 
attention to his right, engaged by our army. With high 
hopes the troops then pressing forward continued to cross 
the river. Within an hour after the opening of the battle, 
one of McCook's staff officers rejiorted to Eosecrans that 
the Eight Wing was heavily pressed and needed assistance. 
Eosecrans was not told of the rout of Jolmson's division, nor 
of the rapid withdrawal of Davis, made necessary thereby. 
Eosecrans, sending word to McCook to make a stubborn 
fight, continued his own offensive movement. Everything 
was working well as far as he knew. His strong force on the 



THE BATTLE OF STONE'S RIVER. 



103 




Battle- Map Stone's Eiver. 



104 THE ARMY OF THE CUMBERLAND. 

left was not yet engaged. This he could hurl at the enemy's 
line of communications and strike on the flank Bragg's army 
that was flanking him. Soon after another stafi" officer from 
McCook arrived and reported that the entire Eight Wing was 
being driven, a fact that manifested itself by the troops from 
the broken divisions pouring forth from the cedars in alarm- 
ing numbers, and by the rapid movement of the noise of 
battle to the north. Then Eosecrans saw the necessity of 
abandoning his own movement, of recalling the left, and of 
proceeding at once to the right to save what was left of that 
corps as speedily as possible. He ordered back his left from 
across the river, and calling on his staff" to mount, rode full 
gallop over to the right to reform that command on a new 
line and save his army. Now that he was on the defensive, 
after McCook's disaster, it Avas impossible to carry out his 
original plan of battle. 

On the 30th, McCown in posting his division placed 
Ector's and Eains's brigades in the first line, and McNair's 
brigade in the second. Hardee ordered McCown at once to 
change this so as to bring McNair on the front line. This 
order was not obeyed until the morning of the 31st, when 
the movement was made, causing, however, some delay iu 
the advance of Hardee's command on our right. At half 
past six o'clock, McCown's division in the front line with 
Cleburne's division in the second swinging around by a con- 
tinuous change of direction to the right, advanced on to the 
right of McCook. McCown did not properly execute the 
movement as intended, and was carried so far to the west 
as to leave a large gap in the rebel front between Withers's 
left and McCown's right. Into this gap Cleburne immedi- 
ately threw his division, and advanced, filling the intei-val 
in the front line between McCown and Polk. This gave 
Hardee double the length of front originally contemplated, 



THE BATTLE OF STONE'S RIVER. 105 

and made it a single line instead of a double with divi- 
sion front. These two divisions thus fonned then struck 
McCook's right flank — Johnson's division. McCook's line 
was very weak and poorly posted. It was thin and light, 
without reserves, with neither the troo^is nor the command- 
ing officers in their places, as they should have been, under 
Eosecrans's ordei's of the evening before. 

Every soldier on that field knew when the sun went down 
on the 30th that on the following day he would be engaged 
in a stmggle unto death, and the air was full of tokens that 
one of the most desperate of battles was to be fought. In 
the face of all this, Johnson, the commander of the First 
Division on the right, was not on the line nor near enough 
to his troops to give orders to them, his headquarters being 
a mile and a half in the rear. General Willich, the cozn- 
mander of the Second Brigade, which had been posted for 
the express purpose of protecting the extreme right of our 
army, was absent from his command at division headquar- 
ters. His brigade was not even in line, as they had been 
ordered to get their breakfast. The batteries of the divi- 
sion were not properly posted, and in some cases the horses 
were away from the guns to the rear for water. All this 
was criminal negligence — a failure in the pierformance of 
duty — for which some one should have suffered. To the 
faulty position of the line and to the unprepared condition 
of the troops is to be attributed the almost overwhelming 
disaster that overtook our army on that day. As the two 
divisions of the enemy advanced, Kirk threw forward the 
Thirty-fourth Illinois to support the skirmish line, and called 
on Willich's brigade for help. This brigade being without 
an immediate commander, no efifort was made to support 
Kirk. The contest was too unequal to be maintained for 
any great length of time, and Johnson's division, after a sharp 



106 THE ARMY OF THE CUMBERLAND. 

and spirited but fruitless contest, crumbling to pieces, was 
driven back with a loss of eleven guns. Kirk was mortally 
■wounded and Willich was captured, returning to his com- 
mand as it was driven back. Kirk's brigade lost 473 killed 
and wounded, and had 3'1:2 captured. Willich's brigade had 
a few less killed and wounded, but more than twice that 
number captured. 

Baldwin in reserve near headquarters was too far from 
the front to aid in supporting either of the other brigades of 
Johnson's di\dsion. Stragglers from Kirk's and Willich's 
brigades gave the first infonnation to Baldwin of the dis- 
^ter on the right. Hastily forming his troops, he had barely 
time to post them in line of battle before the enemy in im- 
xnense masses appeared on his front at short range, their left 
extending far beyond the extreme right of his line. Open- 
ing at once a destmctive fire upon their dense masses with 
his infantry and artillery, Baldwin succeeded in checking 
their advance in his front, but their left continued to swing 
around on his right. Here four pieces of Simonson's battery 
posted near the woods in the rear of the first position opened 
with terrible effect. The enemy came on in such overwhelm- 
ing numbers, that after half an hour's stubborn resistance 
Baldwin was compelled to retire, not however until the 
enemy had flanked his right and were pouring in an enfilad- 
ing fire. As it was he barely made his escape, since in a 
moment longer his entire command would have been sur- 
rounded and captured. At the edge of the woods Baldwin 
endeavored to make another stand, but before he could 
form his line he was again forced back. Eetiring slowly, 
•with, several halts in the cedars, Baldwin with his brigade 
reached the railroad where the rest of the division was being 
refomied. 

The right flank being driven from its position by the left 



THE BATTLE OF STONE'S RIVER. 107 

of the enemy, Davis's division then felt the full force of 
the victorious sweep of the rebel troops, flushed with suc- 
cess and aided by the forces immediately in his front. 
Davis, as soon as the disaster on his right had fully de- 
veloped, at once changed front and formed a new line, with 
his right brigade under Post nearly at right angles to its 
former position, and made all necessary disposition of his 
troops to receive the attack. Baldwin's brigade had hastily 
taken position and had already felt the force of the enemy's 
concenti'ated attack. Still the advancing lines of the enemy 
greatly overlapped the extreme right of Baldwin. Hardly 
had the troops been placed in this position before the 
enemy swejit down in hea^y masses ujion both the flank and 
front, charging with the rebel yell. The two divisions of 
McCown's and Cleburne's troops which had driven John- 
son, hurled themselves upon Baldwin's and Post's brigades, 
while the fresh troops of Withers's division, composed of 
Manigault's and Loomis's brigades, rushed upon those of 
Davis, under Carlin and Woodruff, and upon that on the 
right of Sheridan's line under Sill. The change of posi- 
tion of Post's brigade gave to the two remaining brigades 
of Davis's division, and Sill's brigade of Sheridan's com- 
mand, the length of division front, and on this the enemy 
made a united attack. After Baldwin had been compelled 
to retire. Post repulsed the attack on his brigade, and Car- 
lin, Woodruff, and Sill in the front drove back the assaulting 
column of the rebels with heavy loss. The enemy then re- 
formed his lines, strengthened them with his reserves under 
Vaughan and Maney of Cheatham's division and once more 
pressed forward. Again these heavy lines struck Carlin, 
Woodruff, and Sill, and were again handsomely repulsed ; 
Sill gallantly charging the rebels and driving them into their 
line of intrenchmeuts. In this charge, General Sill was 



108 TMARMY OF THE CUMBERLAND. 

kilUtl. Hi» wade then slowly retired and formed anew 
in line of batti Cleburne at the same time charged down 
on Post's bri^'9, and he too was a second time repulsed. 

The fonnntii of the battle-front of Da\i8's two left bri- 
ffftiles uijtli>r C'4iu and Woodruff was almost perpendicular 
to tlmt of Sh^an's division, and the left of Woodruffs 
witli the riKht i Sill's brigade formed the apex of a right 
ttug]«». This jKltion was at once observed by the enemy, 
who Huw tliiitf ho could take this extreme point of the 
ungl« ho wouldhen bo in j»osition to enfilade both lines at 

«' • I'or tli^oHsession of this point every effort was 

niinln, and ii tlu attack wius ordered upon it with four 
biiKutl«'M, iiiidollbo inunodiato command of Cheatham, in 
iliiiiblo liii(«M iriltM' hud giitluMvd his command together 
HKiiin fur luiolli' ultacli on I'o.st's i)osition. Pressing for- 
wanl Willi I Im' vtori.iiiM troops of McCown's and Cleburne's 
divlMiniiM I III' linpM lliul liiiil swept .lolmsoM from the field 

liii eiivclopr.l s{\\ IIiinliN of Post's liriKU(l(>, and compelled 
I'ini l(. lull lMi.h\itli 111,' loss .. I' oil., f^'iui. to the Nashville 
|iil,r, wlirir lin uo r(«ronni'd Ilis conmiiiiid. 

On IliK w il liilAViii of Post's biiniidc, Ciirliii's li-^lit was 
Inl'l. (upoHed to l\ oiiomy, who with renowcil vigor pressed 
forward in overiu^liniiig numbers on converging lines, 
niiiMMiiig us (hey |vuiic(ul. Circling around on their right 
the lebels swept own on the roniuiniiig brigades of Davis's 
diviiiioii ill deiiseoohunns. In the ju'evious 
lui-K liMil liiMMi s(hoavy \\\Hni the angle 
miIV'm left uiid Sill riglit, that in the ne\^ 
tlie neemid n<piil»- the line at this pc 
lirnKeii, iitid ui'lttiSiirH death the ri 
r(»roriiied soiiiewlt to the rear of 
to support the biterv attueluMl to^ 
ing i>l" the nioniig the positioi 




T 



THE BATTLE OF STOXE-.S RFER. 109 

been more or less changed, and in several in^nces the com- 
manding oflBcer of each brigade considere Lis command 
as being without support on either flank, ti the third as- 
sault both Carlin and Woodruff thought thito be the case 
■with their commands, and in the attack tin made upon 
their brigades they became almost surrounde. Carlin stub- 
bornly resisted every effort to drive him fixn his position 
until by his remaining longer the loss of hi entire brigade 
became imminent. His regiment on the lei gave way and 
he then retreated across open fields in ts rear to the 
edge of the woods, where Da\-is was attemjing to reform 
hia Hne, having placed Hotchkiss's battery ast within the 
timber. Woodruff then fell back, but being losely i>ressed, 
turned and with a deteiToined charge sent thenemy beyond 
his original position. Being unsupported h«'as compelled 
to retire into the cedars. Before Woodruff nched the new 
lines that Davis was trying to form, Carlin's roops opened 
fire on the advancing enemy, when he waanformed that 
Davis had ordered a farther withdrawal He then fell 
back across the Wilkinson pike, where he tdied his men, 
who however, on the advance of the enemy, ted one volley 
and broke to the rear without orders. Cain then went 
with them through the lines of reserves, haltig at the rail- 
road, where he reformed his command. Afte rc-achiog the 
cedars Woodruff charged a second time, andompelled the 
enemy to fall back, but his ammunition ging out, his 
tr. 'ps passed to the rear, resisting every effoito rally them 
leached the Murfreesboro j)ike. 

had up to this time proteffid Sheridan's 
iWsions unitedly had resiste two assaults. 

jf the enemy that broke Drib's division 
le cedars, Sheridan waacomi>eUed to 
protect the right flank ohi-s command 




110 THE ARMY OF THE CUMBERLAND. 

from the enemy, now pressing that part of his position, as 
well as his front, in increasing numbers, as the line became 
shortened. Hastily withdrawing Sill's brigade, with the 
reserves sent it as support, he directed Roberts, with the 
left brigade, which had changed front and formed in column 
of regiments, to charge the enemy in the cedars from which 
he had withdi-awn Sill's brigade and the reserves. This 
charge was at once made by Eoberts, and the enemy's ad- 
vance checked sufficiently to give Sheridan time to form 
his troops on the new line, which he at once did by placing 
Sill's and Shafer's brigades on a line at right angles to hi3 
first one, and ordered Roberts to return and form his com- 
mand on this same line. Sheridan now attempted to form 
the broken troops of the other division on the right of his 
new line, but in this he was not successful. After mak- 
ing a gallant fight with his division, finding the right of his 
new line turned, Sheridan was directed by McCook to ad- 
vance to the front and reform his troops to the right of 
Negley's division of the Centre under Thomas. Thi'owing 
forward his left to join Negley's right, he placed Roberts's 
"brigade in position at right angles to Negley's line, facing 
south, and then placed his two other brigades in the rear, 
and at right angles to Eoberts, so as to face westward and to 
cover the rear of Negley's lines. In the angle of these lines 
on the right of Negley, he placed his artillery. Here he 
■was again fiercely assaulted by the enemy, and one of the 
fiercest and most sanguinary contests of the day ensued. 
Massing the four divisions of Hardee's and Polk's coii^s — • 
each of four brigades — Bragg hurled them against the di- 
visions of Sheridan and Negley, and at the same time the 
enemy opened fire from the intrenchments in the direction 
of Murfreesboro. Here the fighting was terrific. Five 
batteries were posted with these two divisions, the artil- 



THE BATTLE OF STONE'S RIVER. HI 

lery range of tlie respective forces being not to exceed two 
hundred yards. Three times in dense masses the enemy 
charged on these divisions, and three times were they re- 
pulsed. Here Colonel Eoberts was Idlled. Sheridan's 
troops having now exhausted their ammunition — Shafer's 
brigade being entii'ely out and nearly all his horses killed — 
then gave way, after over four hours of some of the hottest 
fighting of the day. Sheridan lost in falling back from this 
position eight guns. Nearly all the remainder of his artil- 
lery was drawn by his men through the cedars. On arriving 
at the Murfreesboro pike, Sheridan reformed his command 
in an open space near the right of Palmer. 

Before assisting in the gallant fight on the right of the 
centre with Sheridan in his new position, Negley's division, 
after rei^elling all assaults made on it, had been engaged in 
heavy fighting on its front since the middle of the morning. 
On the withdrawal of Sheridan, Negley's division found 
themselves surrounded by the enemy in swarms. Eous- 
seau's division in reserve, and Palmer's on the left, had re- 
tired to the rear of the cedars, to form a new line. Falling 
back through the cedar brakes in the rear of the division, 
under a concentrated fire of musketry and artillery at short 
range, the rebels were driven back in front and checked in 
the rear. Miller's and Stanley's brigades on reaching the 
woods reformed theii" lines, faced to the rear and fired sev- 
eral volleys into the enemy, then advanced over the ojjen 
fields across which these brigades had just retired. In pass- 
ing through the cedars the enemy pressed so closely on 
the division that in some parts of Miller's brigade the lines 
of the opposing armies seemed commingled. The division 
then reformed on the new line, as directed by Thomas, near 
the Nashville pike. 

Early in the day, with the breaking up and retreat of the 



112 THE ARMY OF THE CUMBERLAND. 

two fine divisions of McCook's corps, tlie extent of the dis- 
aster to tlie right was forced upon Rosecrans with terrible 
earnestness. Realizing at once that upon him devolved the 
task of making such disposition of his command as would 
ensure the safety of his army, he immediately gave the ne- 
cessary orders for the movement of the trooi^s. Hurriedly 
galloiaing to the centre, where he found Thomas, he at once 
ordered Rousseau's division — held as reserve heretofore — to 
be sent to the support of what was left of McCook's line into 
the cedar-bi'akes to the right and rear of Sheridan. Rose- 
crans then ordered Crittenden to suspend Van Cleve's move- 
ment across the river on the left, to cover the crossing with 
one brigade, and to move the other two brigades westward 
across the fields toward the raih'oad for a reserve. He also 
directed Wood to sus^jend his preparations for his crossing, 
and for him to move at once to the new line on the right 
and hold Hascall in reserve. Up to this time Rosecrana 
had hoped that McCook, notwithstanding the disaster to the 
right, might stay the onset with his own troojis. With the 
volume of stragglers and the detachments from the broken 
commands swarming to the rear tlu-ough the cedars Rose- 
crans soon became satisfied that McCook was routed. He 
then ordered Van Cleve to be sent in to the right of Rous- 
seau, and Wood to send Colonel Harker's brigade farther 
down the Murfreesboro pike with orders to go in and attack 
the enemy on the right of Van Cleve. The pioneer brigade 
had been posted on the knoll of ground west of the Nash- 
ville pike and about four or five hundi-ed yards in the rear of 
/palmer's centre, supporting Stokes's battery. On Negley's 
division being compelled to retii'e, Thomas ordered him with 
Rousseau to form their divisions along a dej^ression in the 
open ground in rear of the cedars, as a temporai-y line, until 
the artillery could be posted on the high ground near to and 



THE BATTLE OF STONE'S RIVER. 113 

west of tlie Murfreesboro jDike. Bousseau's division, cutting 
its way through the enemy in falling back from the cedars, 
took position on this temporary line with all its batteries 
posted on the knoll a short distance to the rear. Here the 
severest engagement of this day of heavy fighting was had, 
almost hand to hand. At this point the new line had oi^en 
ground in front of it for some four or five hundred yards. 
Eousseau, while his batteries were unlimbering, requested 
Van Clave to move with Colonel Samuel Beatty's brigade of 
his division tp form on his right, check the rebel advance and 
drive it back. Van Cleve instantly moved his troops on the 
double quick and reached the desired position in good sea- 
son. Upon these troops in this new line the rebels charged 
in dense masses, flushed with the victory of the early morn- 
ing and elate with the hope of continued success to the end. 
They had swept everything before them thus far, and felt 
that with renewed effort the successful issue of the battle 
was within their grasp. Emerging from the cedars with 
yell after yell, firing as they came, they rushed forward four 
lines deep in the attempt to cross the open field and drive 
back this new line that stood in their pathway to final 
\'ictory. At once Rousseau's division and Beatty's brigade 
opened fire iipon the advancing columns, while Guenther's 
and Loomis's batteries added effect to it by sending double 
shotted canister into their thick ranks. The rebels moved 
on for a time, but the fire proved too terrible and they were 
driven back with great slaughter. On reaching the cedars 
these troops were rallied by their oificers, and with fresh 
troops as suioisorts they advanced once more, with a deter- 
mined effort to carry our position at this point. But again 
they were, after a most desperate struggle, driven back. 
Again and again they returned to the assault, in four deliber- 
ate and fiercely sustained efforts, each time to meet with a 



114 THE ARMY OF THE CUMBERLAND. 

repulse. The brigade of regulars under the command of 
Colonel Shepherd sustained the heaviest blows of this as- 
sault. They had the eiEcient support of Seribner's and John 
Beatty's brigades, of Loomis's and Guenther's batteries, and 
of the pioneer brigade under Captain St. Clair Morton, with 
Stokes's battery. Sheppard's command lost in killed and 
wounded in this short and severe contest, 26 officers and 
611 enlisted men, making a total loss of 637 out of 1,566 
eflfectives. The centre succeeded in driving back the enemy 
from its front, gallantly holding its gi-ound against over- 
whelming odds, while the artillery concentrating its fire on 
the cedar thickets on their right drove the enemy far back 
under cover of the woods. 

While the right and centre had been thus actively en- 
gaged, the left had also borne its full share of the heavy 
fighting of the day. Palmer's division was j)osted in line of 
battle with his right resting on Negley's left. His line was 
formed with Cruft's brigade on the right, connecting with 
Negley, and his left extending across a j)oint of woods to 
the right of Hazen's brigade, which was formed in two lines 
with his left resting on the Nashville pike, while Grose's 
brigade was in reserve some two hundred yards to the rear, 
formed in two lines nearly opposite the interval between the 
brigades in line of battle. On the withdrawal of the troops 
of the left from across the river. Wood ordered Wagner with 
his brigade to hold his position in the woods on the left of 
the Murfreesboro pike at all hazards, this being an exceed- 
ingly imi^ortant point, i^rotecting our left front and flanks 
and securing command of the road leading to the rear. 
Hascall's and Barker's brigades were withdrawn, and the 
latter, under an order from Rosecrans, was moved to the 
right and rear. In the heavy fighting of the general move- 
ment on the right and centre, the left gradually became eu- 



THE BATTLE OF STONE'S RIVER. 115 

gaged, and with this Hascall was ordered by Wood to take 
jjosition between Wagner and Hazen on Wagner's right. 
With the general advance of the enemy, moving on the right 
of Polk's corjjs as a pivot, Palmer and the two brigades 
of Wood's division on the left became engaged. Cruffc 
early in the morning had been ordered by Palmer to ad- 
vance, keeping in line with Negley, the latter having sent 
word to Palmer that he intended to advance his division to 
attack the enemy. Cruft was advanced in two lines, two 
regiments in each line with Miller's brigade of Negley's di- 
vision on the right and Hazen's brigade on his left. After 
Cruft had advanced about a hundred yards. Palmer discov- 
ered that Negley had thrown back his right so that his line 
was almost pei-pendicular to Cnift's and to his rear. After 
Cruffc had driven the enemy's skirmishers in, the rebels 
advanced in great force in four ranks with double lines, 
Chalmers in the front line with Donelson's brigade follow- 
ing. This charge Cruft repulsed, inflicting severe loss on 
the enemy. Chalmers was so severely wounded by the burst- 
ing of a shell as to disqualify him for further duty on the 
field. Advancing once more, the rebels again attacked 
Craft's line, when a very severe engagement ensued, and 
after some thirty minutes' firing the enemy was again re- 
pulsed. When Negley's division went back through the 
cedars, Cruft was left without support on his right and he 
then withdrew to the wood, the enemy following him closely 
and pressing him hard. While Cruft was thus engaged on 
the front. Palmer found that the right and centre had been 
driven from the first line, and that the enemy in Negley's 
front was forcing his way into the open ground to his rear. 
He then changed Grose from front to rear, retired his new 
left so as to bring the rebels under the direct fire of his line, 
and opened on them with great efi'ect, holding his ground 



116 THE ARMY OF THE CUxMBERLAXD. 

until the enemy was driven back. Hazen was ordered to 
fall back from the advanced position he then held, and to 
occupy the crest of a low wooded hill between the pike and 
the railroad, and there resist the attack. This was about 
eleven o'clock, and all of Palmer's command was engaged 
with the enemy — Hazen on the railroad, one or two de- 
tached regiments to the right. Craft still farther to the 
right, actively engaged, while Grose to the rear was fight- 
ing heavy odds. Grose shortly after this changed to the 
front again, the enemy being driven back from his rear, and 
moved to the left to co-operate with Hazen. After aiding in 
the repulse of the troops that struck Graft's lines, Hazen 
with constant firing maintained his position on his left at 
the railroad, retiring his right to place his troops behind 
the embankment at that place. General Palmer had ordered 
Grose to co-operate with Hazen, and jjart of Grose's troops 
reporting to him, they were placed in position on the front. 
Here was held what was considered by the enemy to be the 
key to our position, known as the "Round Forest." This 
was attacked by the right of Donelson's brigade, but the at- 
tack was met with a &re that mowed down half its number, 
one regiment losing 207 out of 402. In another regiment 
the loss was 306 out of 425. Polk finding that his troops 
had been so severely punished that they were not able to 
renew the attack on the extreme left of our line, and that 
the new line on the right as formed by Rosecrans resisted 
every attack, applied for an order from Bragg directing four 
brigades from Breckinridge's^ command to be sent to him to 
drive our left from its line, and especially to dislodge us from 
our position in the " Eound Forest." These brigades were 
sent to him, arriving in two detachments of two brigades 
each. Adams and Jackson's brigades first reported, under 
Breckinridge in person. Those of Preston and Palmer re* 



THE BATTLE OF STONE'S RIVER. 117 

ported about two hours later. About two o'clock in the af- 
ternoon Adams and Jackson's brigades assailed our left 
with determined energy, but after a severe contest they 
were compelled to yield and fall back. They were rallied 
by Breckinridge, but were too badly cut up to renew the 
attack. About four o'clock, on the an-ival of the brigades 
of Preston and Palmer, the assault on the left was renewed 
and again repulsed, when the enemy withdrew and made no 
further attack upon that position. When this last attack 
was made, Eosecrans, anxious as to this vital point of his 
lines, hun-ied there with his staff to assist in the repulse. 
It was here that a shell grazing the person of Kosecrans 
carried off the head of his chief of staflp, the lamented 
Gareschd. 

The new line formed by Eosecrans to protect his com- 
munication extended from Hazen on the Murfreesboro pike 
in a northwesterly direction, Hascall supporting Hazen, 
Eousseau filling the inten^al to the pioneer brigade, Negley 
in resei-ve. Van Cleve west of the pioneer brigade, McCook's 
corps refused on his right and slightly to the rear on the 
Naslmlle pike, with the cavaliy at and beyond Overall's 
Creek. After the formation had been completed later in 
the afternoon, with a wild yell the enemy debouched fi-om 
the cedar thickets, and forming into line, advanced as if to 
charge once more. At once a terrific fire of artilleiy and 
infantry opened on them, and their broken ranks went back 
over the fields driven in great confusion ; the batteries Eose- 
crans had placed on the commanding ground near the rail- 
road inflicting a heavier loss on Polk's brigade than it had 
6ufi"ered in all the pre%dous fighting of the day. This attack 
was in the main repulsed by Van Cleve's division, aided by 
Barker's brigade, and the cavalry under General Stanley. 
This was the last assault on the right and centre, and with 



116 THE ARMY OF THE CUMBERLAXD. 

until the enemy vr&s driven back. Hazen was ordered to 
fall back from the advanced position he then held, and to 
occupy the crest of a low wooded hill between the pike and 
the raikoad, and there resist the attack. This was about 
eleven o'clock, and all of Palmer's command was engaged 
with the enemy — Hazen on the raih'oad, one or two de- 
tached regiments to the right, Cnift still farther to the 
right, actively engaged, while Grose to the rear was fight- 
ing heavy odds. Grose shortly after this changed to the 
front again, the enemy being driven back from his rear, and 
moved to the left to co-operate with Hazen. After aiding in 
the repulse of the troops that stnick Craft's lines, Hazen 
with constant tiring maintained his position on his left at 
the railroad, retiring his right to place his troops behind 
the embankment at that jjlace. General Palmer had ordered 
Grose to co-operate with Hazen, and part of Grose's troops 
reporting to him, they were placed in position on the front. 
Here was held what was considered by the enemy to be the 
key to our position, known as the "Eoiind Forest." This 
was attacked by the right of Donelson's brigade, Init the at- 
tack was met with a tii-e that mowed down half its number, 
one regiment losing 207 out of 402. In another regiment 
the loss was 30t> out of 425. Polk finding that his troops 
had been so severely punished that they were not able to 
renew the attack on the extreme left of our line, and that 
the new line on the right as formed by Rosecrans resisted 
every attack, applied for an order from Bi-agg directing four 
brigades from Breckim-idge's command to be sent to hini to 
drive our loft from its line, and especially to dislodge us from 
our position in tlio "Round Forest." These bngades were 
sent to him. arriving in two detachments of two brigrades 
each. Adams and .lacksou's brig5\des tii-st reported, imder 
Breckinridge in person. Those of Pi"estou and Palmer re* 



THE BATTLE OF STORES RIVER 117 

ported about bro hours later. About two o'clock in the af- 
ternoon Adams and Jackson's brigades assailed our left 
•with determined energv, but after a severe contest ther 
were compelled to rield and fall back. They -were rallied 
bv Breckinridge, but were too badlv cut up to renew the 
attack. About four o'clock, on the arrival of the brigades 
of Preston and Palmer, the assault on the left was renewed 
and again repulsed, when the enemr withdrew and made no 
further attack upon that position. When this last atta^'k 
was made, Rosecrans, anxious as to this -rital point of his 
lines, hurried there with his staff to assist in the repulse. 
It was here that a shell grazing the person of Rosecrans 
carried off the head of his chief of staff, the lamented 
Garesche. 

The new line formed by Rosecrans to protect his com- 
munication extended from Hazen on the Murfreesboro pike 
in a northwesterly direction, Hascall supporting Hazen, 
Rousseau filling the interval to the pioneer brigade, Ne^lev 
in reserve, Van Cleve west of the pioneer brigade, McCook's 
corps refused on his right and slightly to the rear on the 
Nashville pike, with the cavalry at and beyond Overall's 
Creek. After the formation had been completed later in 
the afternoon, with a wild yell the enemy debouched from 
the cedar thickets, and forming into line, advanced as if to 
charge once more. At once a terrific fire of artillery and 
infantry opened on them, and their broken ranks went back 
over the fields driven in great confusion ; the batteries Rose- 
crans had placed on the commanding ground near the rail- 
road inflicting a heavier loss on Polk's brigade than it had 
suffered in all the previous fighting of the day. This attack 
was in the main repulsed by Tan Cleve's division, aided by 
Barker's brigade, and the cavalry under General Stanley. 
This was the last assault on the right and centre, and with 



118 THE ARMY OF THE CUMBERLAND. 

the repulse of Breckinridge's command on the left, the 
fighting for the day was over ; and on the field where death 
had reaped such a heavy harvest, on the last day of 18G2, 
the troops slept on their arms, waiting for what the next 
day might bring forth. The night was clear and cold. The 
armies maintained their relative positions, with some picket 
firing occurring during the night. Eosecrans gave orders 
that all the spare ammunition should be issued, and it was 
found that there was enough for another battle, the main 
question being where the battle was to be fought. During 
the night Eosecrans, in order to complete the new formation 
of his lines, withdrew the left from the advanced position it 
occupied, and placed it in line some two hundred and fifty 
yards in the rear, on more advantageous ground, the extreme 
left resting on Stone's Eiver above the lower ford and extend- 
ing to the raih'oad. Late in the afternoon the brigades under 
Colonels Starkweather and Walker, that had been on duty in 
the rear, arrived at the front and were posted in reserve on 
the line of battle, the former in rear of McCook's left, and 
"Walker in rear of the left of Sheridan's division near the 
Mui'freesboro pike. On the morning of the 1st they were 
placed in the front line, relieving Van Cleve, who then re- 
turned to his position on the left. 

The extent of the disaster on the right was appalling and 
seemed at one time about to envelop the entire army. As 
the storm of battle passed down the line it reached Thomas, 
who cool, calm, and self-sustained, stood the test of one of 
the fiercest contests of the war. It was to him that Eose- 
crans first turned in the hour of disaster and in him he 
tmsted most. The commander of the army, too, was sorely 
tried. He had come to win victory, but in place of it defeat 
seemed almost inevitable. Eeforming his lines and bravely 
fighting, he had hurled back Bragg's army before it had 



THE BATTLE OF STONE'S RIVER. 119 

achieved any decisive success. Eosecrans knew that liis 
losses had been extremely heavy, but those of the enemy had 
been still more severe. He felt that on a question of endur- 
ance his army would come out first, although the dash and 
onset of the rebels had at the opening been able to sweep 
all before them. In the face of an earnest effort on the part 
of some of his general officers to persuade him to fall back 
to Nashville and then throw up works and wait for reinforce- 
ments, Kosecrans determined to await the attack of the 
enemy in the positions of his lines late Wednesday after- 
noon. He sent for the provision trains, ordered up fresh 
supplies of ammunition, and decided that if Bi'agg should 
not attack before these arrived, that he himself would theu 
resume offensive operations. 

During the morning of January 1, 1863, the rebels made 
rejieated attempts to advance on Thomas's front in the cen- 
tre, but were driven back before emerging from the woods. 
Crittenden was ordered to send Van Cleve's division across 
the river, to occupy the position opposite the ford on his left, 
his right resting on high ground near the river and his left 
thrown forward perpendicular to iL. The rebel right, under 
Polk, kept up a brisk skirmish fire on their front. Chal- 
mers's brigade was ordered to occupy the ground in front of 
the "Bound Forest." Bragg, anticijDating an attack on his 
right under Breckinridge on the morning of the 1st, during 
the night ordered two brigades of that division to recross to 
the east side of the river. But none was made. About two 
o'clock in the afternoon the enemy showed signs of move- 
ment, by massing large numbers of his troops on our right 
at the extremity of an oi^en field a mile and a half from the 
Murfreesboro pike. Here the rebels formed in lines six 
deep, and massed thus heavily, remained without advancing 
for over an hour. Gibson's brigade and a battery occupied 



120 THE ARMY OF THE CUMBERLAND. 

the woods near Overall's creek, -while Negley's was placed 
as suppoi-t on McCook's right. The evident design of Bragg 
during the day was simply to feel the lines of our army to 
find out if Eosecrans was retreating. Satisfied of this, ho 
felt that while he could maintain his position he was not ia 
condition to attack, after the hea-vy hammering his army had 
received the day before. 

At daylight the next day Bragg gave orders to his corps 
commanders to feel our lines and ascertain Eosecrans's posi- 
tion. Fire was opened from four batteries on the centre, 
and a demonstration in force was made by his infantry, fol- 
lowed by another on McCook ; but at all points meeting 
with a heavy artillery fii-e, he concluded that our army still 
occupied the battlefield in force. Bragg ordered Wharton's 
and Pegram's brigades of cavalry to cross to the right bank 
of Stone's Eiver immediately in Breckinridge's front. Soon 
after this a number of his staff officers discovered for tha 
first time that Yan Cleve's troops, sent over the day before, 
had quietly crossed unoi)j)Osed, and had established them- 
selves on and under cover of an eminence from which Polk's 
line was commanded and enfiladed. It was an evident ne- 
cessity either to withdraw Polk's line or to dislodge Van 
Cleve's. The first alternative was not to be entertained 
until the failure of an attempt to accomplish the latter. 
Polk was at once ordered to send over to Breckinridge tha 
remaining brigades belonging to his division still with 
Polk, and Breckinridge, reporting to Bragg, received his 
orders. The attack was to be made with the four brigades 
of Breckinridge's command, the cavalry protecting his right 
and co-operating with him. The crest of ground near the 
river, where Van Cleve's division was in position, was the 
point against which the main attack was to be directed. 
This taken, Breckinridge was to bring up his artillery and 



THE BATTLE OF STONE'S RIVER. 121 

establish it on the high ground, so as to enfilade our lines 
on the other side of the river. Polk was to open with a 
heavy fire on our left as Breckinridge commenced his ad- 
vance. The signal for the attack was to be one gun from, 
the centre, and four o'clock was the hour set for the filing 
of this gun. 

Breckinridge drew up his division in two lines, the first 
in a naiTow skirt of woods, the other some two hundred 
yards in rear. General Pillow, after the first day's fighting, 
reporting for duty, was assigned to the command of Palmer's 
brigade. Pillow's and Hanson's brigades formed the first 
line, Preston's and Adams's brigades the second. The artil- 
leiy was placed in rear of the second line, and in addition 
to that of his brigade, ten Napoleon guns — 12-pounders — ■ 
were sent to aid in the attack. 

Van Cleve's division was under the command of Colonel 
Samuel Beatty, with Price's brigade on the right next to 
the river, Fyife's brigade on the left. Grider's brigade 
formed Beatty's support, while a brigade of Palmer's divi- 
sion was placed in position on the extreme left to protect 
that flank. Drury's battery was posted in the rear. In front 
of Breckini-idge's line was an open space some six hundred 
and fifty yards in width, with a gentle ascent which it was 
necessary for his troops to cross before reaching our lines. 
Several hundred yards in the rear of the latter was the river, 
increasing the distance as it flowed beyond our left. 

General Eosecrans had ordered Crittenden to send Beatty's 
division across the river as protection to the troops on the 
left and centre, as from the high ground near the river the 
enemy, by an enfilading fire, could sweep these portions of 
our line. Duiing the morning of the 2d Negiey's division 
was ordered from the right, and placed in position on the 
west bank of the river, in the rear of Beatty's division, as 
VII.— 6 



122 THE ARMY OF THE CUMBERLAND. 

reserves, being here on the left of Hazen's and Cruft's bri- 
gades of Palmer's division. 

As soon as Breckinridge's command entered the open 
ground to his front, the artillery massed on the west bank 
of the river by order of Crittenden, consisting of all the 
guns of the left wing, together with the batteries belong- 
ing to Negley's division and Stokes's battery, making 58 
guns in j)osition, opened a heavy, accurate, and destructive 
fire. Large numbers of the enemy fell before they reached 
Beatty's infantry lines. Pressing forward without waiting 
to throw out a skirmish line, Breckinridge's command 
swept onward, reckless of the artillery fire and that of the 
infantry, and struck Price's and Grider's brigades, broke 
their lines, drove them from their position on to their suid- 
port in the rear, which also gave way, when the entire divi- 
sion retreated in broken ranks across the river, taking refuge 
behind the line of Negley's division, and there reforming. 
Breckinridge reports that he "after a brief but bloody con- 
flict routed both the oi)posing lines, took 400 prisoners and 
several flags, and drove their artillery and the great body of 
their infantiy across the river." His success, however, was 
exceedingly short-lived. Colonel John F. Miller, command- 
ing the right brigade of Negley's division, had, in the ab- 
sence of Negley in the rear, ordered the troops of his divi- 
sion to lie down under cover of the bluff of the river bank, 
and hold their fire until our troops from the other side 
crossed over and moved to the rear. As soon as the last of 
Beatty's men had passed through Miller's lines, he com- 
manded the division to rise and open fire on Breckinridge's 
troops. Miller's fire was so effectively given as to cause the 
enemy at once to recoil, Breckinridge's command being also 
under the artillery fire on the left, enfilading his ranks. His 
division soon wavered, and then began falling back. At 



THE BATTLE OF STOXE'S RIVER. 123 

tliis Miller — Xegley still not appearing — ordered the divi- 
sion to cliarge across the river, and to drive the enemy to 
their line of intrenchments, which they did. While cross- 
ing, Miller received word from Palmer not to cross his com- 
mand, but as the greater part of his troops were over the 
river driving the enemy, Miller pressed on in person, and 
hurried the troops last to cross, ui? to the support of those 
in the advance. He was then ordered by Palmer to recross 
the river, and to sujiport the artillery on the hill on the 
west bank. The troops under Miller were then advancing 
through the cornfield, driving the enemy, and as his right 
flank was fully protected, he had no inclination to turn 
back, and he ordered the trooj^s forward. One of the en- 
emy's batteries was posted in a wood just beyond the corn- 
field to the front. It was keeping up a brisk fire on Miller's 
advance, when he ordered his men to charge this battery, 
which they did, capturing three guns. At the time of the 
charge the Twenty-sixth Tennessee was supi^orting the bat- 
tery. This regiment Avas broken by the assault, a large 
number of them captured, with the colors of the command. 
Sending the prisoners, guns, and colors to the rear. Miller 
reformed his line so as to hold the ground until relieved by 
other troops. These being crossed over the river under 
Hazen, together with Davis's division, Miller's command re- 
turned to the west bank of the river and there reformed the 
division in line, and took position for the night. Negley 
himself was not across the river with the command during 
the engagement. 

Bragg was deeply chagrined at the failure of Breck- 
inridge's movement. In his report of the action he says, 
" The contest was short and severe, the enemy were driven 
back and the eminence gained, but the movement as a 
whole was a failure, and the position was again yielded. 



12i THE ARMY OF THE CUMBERLAND. 

Our forces were moved, unfortunately, to the left so far as to 
throw a portion of them into and over Stone's Kiver, where 
they encountered heavy masses of the enemy, while those 
against whom they were intended to operate had a destruc- 
tive enfilade on our whole line. Our reserve line was so 
close to the front as to receive the enemy's fire, and return- 
ing it took their friends in the rear. The cavali-y force was 
left entirely out of the action." Bragg immediately sent 
Anderson's brigade across the river, which formed in line on 
the front of Breckinridge's command, and remained there in 
position during the night. He also sent Cleburne's divi- 
sion over, and placed Hardee in command of that side of the 
river. Eosecrans ordered Davis to take and hold the line 
occupied by Beatty's division. Later, all the troops of Crit- 
tenden's C0113S crossed the river and occupied the crests, in- 
trenching themselves in this position. 

Dui'ing the morning of the 3d Bragg ordered a heavy and 
constant picket firing to be kept up on his front, to deter- 
mine whether our army still confronted him. At one point 
in the wood to the left of the Murfreesboro pike the rebel 
shai-pshooters had all day annoyed Rousseau, who requested 
permission to dislodge them and their supports, covering a 
ford at that place. About six o'clock in the evening two 
regiments from John Beatty's brigade of Rousseau's divi- 
sion, co-operating with two regiments of Spear's brigade of 
Negley's division, under cover of a brisk artillery fire, ad- 
vanced on the woods and drove the enemy not only from 
their cover, but also from their intrenchments a short dis- 
tance from the rear. 

At noon Bragg, on consultation with his generals, decided 
to retreat, leaving the field in possession of his opponent. 
At 12.15 of the night of the 2d, after Breckinridge's failure, 
Cleburne and Withers had sent a communication to Bragg'a 



THE BATTLE OP STONE'S RIVER. 125 

lieadquarters, tlirough Polk, stating that there were but 
"three brigades that are at all reliable, and even some of 
these are more or less demoralized from having some bri- 
gade commanders who do not possess the confidence of 
their commands." They expressed their fears of great dis- 
aster which should be avoided by retreat. This was en- 
dorsed by Polk at 12,30 a.m., January 3d, " I send you the 
enclosed papers as requested, and I am compelled to add 
that after seeing the effect of the operations of to-day, ad- 
ded to that produced upon the troops by the battle of the 
31st, I very greatly fear the consequences of another engagtj- 
ment at this place on the ensuing day. We could now per- 
haps get off with some safety, and with some credit if the 
affair was well managed; should we fail in the meditated 
attack, the consequences might be very disastrous." 

By 11 P.M. the whole of Bragg's army, except his cavalry, 
was in retreat in good order to a position behind Duck Eiver. 
His cavalry held the front at Murfreesboro until Monday 
morning, when they fell back and covered Bragg's imme- 
diate front. Sunday the 4th was spent in buiying the dead, 
and the cavaliy was sent to reconnoitre. On the 5th Thomas's 
entire command, preceded by Stanley's cavalry, marched into 
Murfreesboro, and encamped on the Manchester and Shelby- 
ville road. 

The cavaliy under Stanley rendered very efficient service 
on the advance from Nashville. Dividing these troops into 
three columns he sent the first brigade under Colonel 
Minty with Crittenden's coi*ps ; the second brigade under 
Colonel Zahm moved to the right, protecting McCook's 
right flank ; the reserve Stanley commanded in person, and 
moved with the head of McCook's command on the Nolins- 
ville pike. Colonel John Kennett, in command of the cav- 
alry division, commanded the cavalry on the Murfreesboro 



126 THE ARMY OF THE CUMBERLAND. 

pike. There was constant skirmishing between the enemy's 
cavalry and artillery and each of the columns np to the 
31st, as the army advanced, getting into position. At mid- 
night on the 30th, Stanley moved with part of his command 
to Lavergne, where the enemy's cavalry was interfering with 
the trains. At 9.30 he was ordered by General Rosecrans to 
Aasten to the right and cover McCook's flank. On reach- 
ing there he found McCook's new line formed on the Nash- 
ville road, when the enemy's skirmishers advanced and 
drove Stanley's dismounted cavalry out of the woods to the 
open field. Here he was reinforced, and charging the 
rebels routed them, driving them back to their lines. On 
the 1st Zahm's brigade was sent to Lavergne to protect the 
wagon trains being sent to Xashville. He had several skir- 
mishes with "Wlieeler, but finally secured the safety of the 
train and repulsed every attack of the rebel cavalry. 

On the 2d and 3d of January the cavalry was engaged in 
watching the flanks of our position. On the 4th Stanley dis- 
covered that the enemy had fled. Collecting his cavalry he 
moved to the fords of Stone's River, in readiness to cross, 
and on the 5th, preceding Thomas, they entered Murfrees- 
boro. Zahm's command went out on the Shelbyville pike 
six miles, meeting with no opposition. Stanley with the rest 
of his cavalry marched down the Manchester pike, encoun- 
tering the enemy's cavalry strongly posted at Lytle's Creek 
in heavy force. Fighting here until sundown, the rebels 
were driven from one cedar-brake to another until Spear's 
brigade came up, when they were driven from their last 
stand in disorder. The cavalry returned and camped at 
Lytle's Creek to recuperate, after nine days of active cam- 
paigning. During this time the saddles were only taken 
off" the horses to groom them, and were immediately re- 
placed. 



THE BATTLE OF STONE'S RIVER. 127 

Bragg in his retreat left in his hospitals all his wounded 
in Murfreesboro. By this some 2,500 prisoners fell into our 
hands to be cared for. 

Thus, after seven days' battle, the Army of the Cumberland 
rested in Murfreesboro. having achieved the object of the 
winter camiDaign. The final battle for Kentucky had been 
fought by Bragg and lost. Nashville, too, was now beyond 
his hopes, and for the great victory of the 31st, which he 
claimed, Bragg had but little to show. 

In the heavy skirmishing prior to the 31st, .success at- 
tended every movement of the Federal army. The heavy 
fighting of the early part of the Slst was all in Bragg's 
favor up to the time his advance was checked by our cen- 
tre and the new line on the right. From that time to the 
occupation of Murfreesboro every movement resulted in 
favor of the army under Rosecrans, and the retreat of Bragg 
after the defeat of Breckinridge gave the halo of victory to 
our army as the result of the campaign. In his retreat 
Bragg admitted that he had gained nothing but a victory 
barren of results, at the cost to him of 10,125 killed, 
wounded, and missing, 9,000 of whom were killed and 
wounded, over twenty per cent, of his command. Bragg's 
field return of December 10, 1862, shows an effective total 
of 51,036, composed of 39,304 infantry, 10,070 cavalry, and 
1,662 artillery. By reason of Morgan and Forrest being 
absent on their raids, Bragg's cavaliy was reduced to 5,638. 
This gave an effective force of 46,604, which was the strength 
of the army with which Bragg fought the battle. 

Eosecrans's force on the battle-field was : Infantry, 37,977 ; 
artillery, 2,223 ; cavalry, 3,200 ; total, 43,400. His loss was : 
killed, 1,553 ; wounded, 7,245. The enemy captured about 
2,800 men. Making his total loss about twenty-five per cent, 
of his force in action. Rosecrans lost twenty-eight pieces of 



128 THE ARMY OF THE CUMBERLAND. 

artillery and a large portion of his wagon train. Bragg lost 
three pieces of artillery. 

"Why did Eosecrans's plan of battle miscarry so fatally and 
Bragg's come so near absolute success ? The fault was not 
in the plan as conceived by the former. The near success of 
the latter proved a vindication of that. The originator of 
the plan was not at fault personally, for at no time during 
the battle did he falter or prove unequal to his command. 
"When called on to give up his plan of the offensive and as- 
sume the defensive to save his army, the wonderful power 
of Bosecrans as a general over troops was never displayed 
to a greater advantage. "With the blood from a slight 
wound on his cheek, in a light blue army overcoat, through 
the mud and rain of the battle-field, he rode along the line 
inspiring his troops with the confidence he felt as to the 
final result. To Bosecrans there was but one outcome to 
the battle at Stone's Biver, and that was victory. When 
some of his general officers advised retreat to Nashville, not 
for an instant did he falter in his determination to " fight or 
die right here." The demoralization of one of his division 
commanders was so gi'eat, that on Thursday afternoon, when 
the rebels were massing on Eosecrans's right, this general, 
commanding a division, announced to his brigade command- 
ers that in the event of the anticipated assault resulting dis- 
astrously, he proposed to take his division and cut his way 
through to Nashville. To his troops — the greater part of 
whom had never seen Bosecrans under the enemy's fire — when 
on their return from the cedars, they formed anew in front 
of the Nashville pike — seeing the Commanding General of the 
army riding fearlessly on the extreme front, in the heat of 
battle, cool and collected, giving orders and encouraging his 
men— his mere presence was an inspiration. His personal 
bravery was never more fully shown than when he rode 



THE BATTLE OP STONE'S RIVER. 129 

down to tlie " Eound Forest " with liis staff, under fire, at tlie 
time Garesche was killed by a shell that only missed the 
chief by a few inches. In this ride Kosecrans had three 
mounted orderlies shot dead while following him. When the 
entire extent of McCook's disaster in its crushing force was 
revealed to him, he felt the full burden of his resjjonsibility, 
and rising to the demands of the hour he was superb. Dash- 
ing from one point to another, quick to discern danger and 
ready to meet it, shrinking from no personal exposure, dis- 
patching his staff on the gallop, hurrying troops into posi- 
tion, massing the artillery and forming his new lines on 
grounds of his own choosing, confident of ultimate success, 
and showing his troops that he had all confidence in them, it 
was worth months of an ordinary life-time to have been with 
Kosecrans when by his own unconquered spirit he plucked 
victory from defeat and glory from disaster. 

But if the plan was not at fault, what was ? Kosecrans 
started from Nashville for an offensive cami^aign, and before 
his plan of battle had met the test, he was compelled to 
abandon it, and assume the defensive. Where was the fault 
and who was to blame ? The fault was McCook's defective 
line, and in part Kosecrans was responsible for it. He ought 
never to have trusted the formation of a line of battle so im- 
portant to the safety of his whole army to McCook alone, 
and he certainly knew this. Kosecrans gave his personal 
attention to the left, but he should at least have ordered the 
change his quick eye detected as necessary in McCook's line, 
and not trusted to chance and McCook's ability to withstand 
the attack with his faulty line. No one who saw him at 
Stone's Kiver the 31st of December will say aught against 
the personal bravery and courage of McCook under fire. 
All that he could do to aid in repairing the gi'eat disaster 
of that day he did to the best of his ability. He stayed with 



130 THE ARMY OF THE CUMBERLAND. 

Davis's division under fire as long as it held together, and 
then gave personal directions to Sheridan's troops, in the 
gallant fight they made against overwhelming odds. As 
Eosecrans himself says in his official report of McCook, " a 
tried, faithful, and loyal soldier, who bravely breasted the 
battle at Shiloh and Perryville, and as bravely on the bloody 
field of Stone's River." But there is something more than 
mere physical bravery required in a general officer in com- 
mand of as large a body of troops as a corps cVartnee. As an 
instructor at West Point, McCook maintained a high rank. 
As a brigade and division commander under Buell, there was 
none his superior in the care and attention he gave his troops 
on the march, in camp, or on the drill ground. His division 
at Shiloh as it marched to the front on the second day did 
him full credit, and in his handling of it on that field he did 
credit to it and to himself. What McCook lacked was the 
ability to handle large bodies of troops independently of a 
superior officer to give him commands. This was his expe- 
rience at PeiTyville, and it was repeated at Stone's Eiver. 
With the known results of Perryville, McCook ought never 
to have been placed in command of the " right wing." 
Eosecrans at Stone's Eiver, of necessity was on the left, and 
being there he should have had a general in command of the 
right with greater militaiy capacity than McCook. Eose- 
crans's confidence was so slight in his commander of the 
left that he felt his own presence was needed there in the 
movement of the troops in that part of the plan of battle. 

Eosecrans in his report repeatedly speaks of " the faulty 
line of McCook's formation on the right." But he knew of 
this on the 30th, and told McCook that it was improperly 
placed. McCook did not think so. Eosecrans told him 
that it faced too much to the east and not enough to the 
south, that it was too weak and long, and was liable to be 



THE BATTLE OF STONE'S RIVER. 131 

flanked. Knowing all this and knowing McCook's pride of 
opinion, for McCook told liim he " did not see how he coiild 
make a better line," or a " better disposition of my troops," 
it was the plain duty of Eosecrans to reform the line, to 
conform to what it should be in his judgment. The order 
to McCook to build camp fires for a mile beyond his right 
was another factor that brought about the combination 
that broke the line on the right. Eosecrans was correct in 
the conception of this, in order to mislead Bragg and cause 
him to strengthen his left at the expense of his right. Had 
Bragg awaited Eosecrans's attack, this building of fires was 
cforrect — if it took troops away from the right to reinforce 
xhe left ; but this it did not do. Bragg moved McCown and 
Cleburne's divisions from his right to his left on Tuesday, 
but after this Bragg brought none of his forces across the 
river until Wednesday afternoon. The building of the fires 
caused Bragg to prolong his lines, lengthening them to the 
extent that before Hardee struck Kirk's and Willich's bri- 
gades, he thought our line extended a division front to their 
right. Finding this not to be the case, he whirled his left 
with all the force of double numbers on to the right of Mc- 
Cook. The rebels then swinging around threw themselves in 
the rear of Johnson's division before they struck any troops 
on their front. Of course it is mere guess-work to say just 
what the outcome might have been of any other formation of 
the line, but it is safe to say that had the left instead of the 
centre of Hardee struck the right of McCook, there would 
have been a better chance for the troops on the extreme right 
of his line to have shown the spirit that was in them, before 
they were overpowered by mere superiority of numbers. 

Then there were some minor mistakes that aided in a 
great degree the bringing about of that mishap which im- 
perilled the safety of the entire army. Even granting that 



132 THE ARMY OF THE CUMBERLAND. 

Jolinson was not in any Avay responsible for the position oc« 
cupied by his troops on the front line of battle, still it is 
hard to find any excuse or even exjilanation for a general 
officer in command of a division who, knowing the enemy 
was in force on his front, and intending to attack his com- 
mand at daylight the next morning, would jjlace his head- 
quarters a mile and a half in the rear. This too, when he 
knew that the post of honor and responsibility for the safety 
of the entire army had been committed to his keeping. 
"What then shall be said for him when it appears by the 
report of the commanding oflficer of his reserve brigade 
that when it returned from the sujiport of a cavalry recon- 
noissance, the general commanding the division ordered 
this brigade, on the eve of battle, to take position in the 
woods, "near the headquarters of the division," instead of in 
supporting distance of the front line ? He could not have 
thought that the division headquarters needed the suj^porfc 
of the reserve more than the line of battle. It is safe to say 
that had the line of Johnson's di%dsion been properly formed, 
so as to give the most strength to the command — short and 
well centred, with a good brigade like that of Baldwin's in 
reserve, with all officers in their places — these troops would 
have given a very different account of themselves when the 
blow struck the right. There was no commanding officer in 
the front with Johnson's division, of gTeater command than 
a regiment — save General Kirk. The troops of Willicli's 
brigade on the right flank refused to come to his assistance, 
because there was no one to give them orders. Johnson 
says in his official report that " In consultation with Major- 
General McCook, late in the afternoon of December 30th, he 
informed me that he had reliable information to the effect 
that the centre of the rebel line of battle was opposite to 
our extreme right, and that we would probably be attacked 



THE BATTLE OF STONE'S RIVER. 133 

by the entire rebel army early on the following morning." 
Johnson then coolly adds: "His prediction proved time." 
Yet with these facts staring them in the face, McCook and 
Johnson made no other efforts to strengthen the right of the 
line, and Johnson, on the arrival of his resei-ve brigade later, 
posted it in the woods a mile and a half from his front "near 
his headquarters." General Kirk was mortally wounded in 
the attack on his command, but lived long enough after the 
battle to make a report of the part taken in the engagement 
by his brigade. He states in his report, that he suggested 
to Johnson to send his reserve brigade to suijport the main 
lines, and that Johnson declined to do so. 

The location of Johnson's headquarters, and Johnson be- 
ing there, makes him responsible for the caj)ture of Wil- 
lich, and the breaking up of that fine brigade. Willich had 
been on the line for an hour before daylight with his bri- 
gade under arms, and from what he heard of the movements 
of the enemy in his front, he was satisfied that a change 
should be made in the position of the division, and started 
to Johnson's headquarters to communicate with him. Be- 
fore he could return to his troops, the enemy was upon 
them, and drove them from the position they held, without 
their making a stand. Being without either division or 
brigade commander, they drifted to the rear. "Willich had 
a horse shot under him, and was capttired without giving an 
order, before he reached his command. 

When the artillery was posted in line of battle on the 
30th, roads were cut through the cedars to allow the bat- 
teries to reach the front line. The heavy loss of guns, re- 
ported by Eosecrans, was occasioned by these batteries being 
unable to reach the roads through the cedar thickets in the 
retreat, and in many instances guns were abandoned in the 
woods, through which it was impossible to haul them. 



134 THE ARMY OF THE CUMBERLAND. 

Bragg alleges in his official report that our troops were 
surprised, and cites the fact that his men passed through 
the camps where breakfast was being prepared. He was 
right as to his fact, but wrong in his deduction. Willich'.s 
brigade was the only one that was not through the morning 
meal, and this was by reason of his troops being imder arms 
for nearly two hours prior to this time, after which Willich 
gave them orders to prepare their meal. Kirk's brigade had 
been under ai-ms since five o'clock in the morning, ready for 
action an hour before the battle commenced, and in Post's 
brigade the men were in order of battle for an hour before 
the first dawn of light. The front of all these brigades was 
covered with heavy j)icket lines well thrown out. General 
Sill reported to General Sheridan at two o'clock in the morn- 
ing, " great activity on the jDart of the enemy immediately in 
his front, with movements of troops to their left," and from 
four o'clock in the morning until seven, Sheridan's trooj^s 
were standing under arms, and the cannoneers were at their 
places. 

It is difficult to determine which to admire the more, the 
hea-s"^', quick, decided onset of the rebels, as with ranks well 
closed up, without music, and almost noiselessly, they moved 
in the gray light of the early December morning, out of the 
cedars, across the open fields, hurling the full weight of 
their advancing columns upon our right, with all the dash 
of Southern troops, sweeping on with rapid stride, and wild 
yells of triumph, to what appeared to them an easy final vic- 
tory ; or, later in the afternoon, when our troops that had 
been driven from the field early in the morning, were re- 
formed under the eye of the commanding general, met and 
threw back from the point of the bayonet, and from the can- 
non mouth, the charge after charge of the same victorious 
troops of the earlier i^ortion of the day. One was like the 



THE BATTLE OF STONE'S RIVER. 135 

resistless sweep of a whirlwind in its onward course of de- 
struction, the other the grand sturdy resistance of the rocky 
coast, which the waves only rush upon to be dashed to 
pieces. In each of these, the two armies displayed their 
distinctive feature to the best. Under Thomas, the Centre 
of the army evinced, in a marked degree, the staying quali- 
ties of that commander, which afterward were shown so con- 
Bjiicuously at Chickamauga. 



CHAPTEE IX. 

IN MURPREESBORO. 

DuEiNG the first six months of 1863, the military opera- 
tions of the Army of the Cumberland were of a minor 
character. The exhaustion attending the severe fighting of 
the last week of the previous yeai-, kept that army in camp 
for some time to restore the losses of arms and material, to 
reclothe the army, to recruit the strength of the troops, to 
forward the needed supplies, and to build the necessaiy 
works to fortify Murfreesboro as a new base. The rebuild- 
ing of the Muldraughs Hills' trestleworks, and the heavy re- 
jjairs elsewhere needed on the railroad north of Nashville, 
together with ha\ang the road from Nashville to Murfrees- 
boro placed in proper order, all required time and were ne- 
cessary to be done, to supply the wants of the army in the 
immediate present. But the future was what demanded the 
gi-eatest thought and most careful i^lanning. The prob- 
lem that gave Buell the greatest trouble to solve — the i^ro- 
tection of his lines of communication and supplies — was now 
forced upon Rosecraus. The enemy with more than one- 
half his cavalry force absent during the battle of Stone's 
Eiver, under Morgan in Kentucky and Forrest in West 
Tennessee, outnumbered that arm of the service in the Ar- 
my of the Cumberland during the battle almost two to one. 
These troopers were nearly all old veterans, accustomed 
to the severest hardships of service, and it was wonder- 



IN MURFREESBORO. 137 

ful the rapidity with which they got over ground and the 
amount of fatigue they could undergo. To afi'ord perfect 
jjrotection to his line supplying the army from its base at 
Louisville, as against these raiding bands, if infantry was to 
be employed, Eosecrans's entire force was needed, posted 
by brigades at the vulnerable points. To make an advance 
and thus lengthen his lines, simply increased the present 
difficulties. Without making the necessary preparation to 
protect his line of supplies, Rosecrans would hamper his 
forward movement and retard and cripple his advance when 
commenced. The only proj^er force to meet the enemy's 
troopers was cavalry. In the early days of the Army of the 
Ohio, under Buell, a number of unsuccessful attempts were 
made to chase and fight cavalry with infantry, and in every 
instance the effort was crowned with failure, the only result 
being the discomfort and complete exhaustion of the march- 
ing troops. 

The repair of the most complete wrecking the Louisville 
road ever suffered, demanded Rosecrans's attention the first 
thing after the Battle of Stone's River. When the army 
left Nashville, on the advance to meet Bragg, the suiDplies 
in that city were very limited. With the disabling of the 
road it was impossible at that time to forward sufficient 
supplies to meet the wants of the command, and for the 
first few weeks while the army remained at Murfreesboro 
the trooi)s were on half rations, and many of the aiticles 
constituting the "ration" entirely dispensed with, leaving 
but three or four on the list. The surrounding country for 
miles was scoured for forage and i^rovisions. Everything of 
that kind was gathered in by raiding parties, not leaving suf- 
ficient for the actual necessities of the inhabitants. To 
such an extent did this go, that to the officers with means to 
purchase such provisions as were to be had, potatoes and 



138 THE ARMY OF THE CUMBERLAND. 

onions became luxuries. The whole army was threatened 
with scurvy. 

The number and extent of these raids, and the damage 
sustained by the Louisville and Nashville Eailroad during 
the year from July 1, 1862, is concisely set forth in the re- 
port of the superintendent of that road. His report shows 
that during this time " the road has been operated for its 
entire length only seven months and twelve days ; " " all the 
bridges and trestleworks on the main stem and branches, 
with the exception of the bridge over Barren River and 
four small bridges, were destroyed and rebuilt during the 
year. Some of the structures were destroyed twice and some 
three times. In addition to this, most of the water stations, 
several depots, and a large number of cars were burnt, a 
number of engines badly damaged, and a tunnel in Tennes- 
see nearly filled up for a distance of eight hundred feet." 

By reason of this condition of things, Eosecrans determined 
to increase the cavalry arm of his army, so that he could 
meet the ten or twelve thousand cavalry of the enemy in 
their detached raids on more of an equal footing. From the 
commencement of operations in Tennessee under Buell, the 
enemy's cavalry had been steadily increasing in numbers 
and in efficiency, until at this time it was a greater problem 
how to meet this arm of the enemy's force than his infantry. 
Bosecrans made repeated urgent applications to the De- 
partment at "Washington for additional cavalry ; for horses 
and improved arms for those already under his command. 
He detailed infantry to be mounted and armed as cavalry, 
organizing a brigade of " mounted infantry " under Colonel 
John T. Wilder. 

On Bragg's retreating from Murfreesboro, he took position 
with a portion of his army and established his headquarters 
at Shelby\dlle. He then ordered part of his command to 



IN MURFREESBORO. 139 

move to Tullahoma, and there intrench, throwing lap ex- 
tensive earthworks and fortifications. Later, he placed his 
troops in winter quarters. In addition to the cavahy that 
had formerly been under Bragg, Van Dorn in February re- 
ported to him with his command of three brigades of cav- 
alry, about five thousand effective troops. Bragg jilaced 
Van Dorn and Wheeler to protect the front and flanks of 
his army, assigning the former to the left, with his head- 
quarters at Columbia, and directing the latter to take posi- 
tion on the right, constituted each command a corps. To 
Wheeler's command he assigned Morgan's, Wharton's, and 
Martin's divisions. Forrest's command was assigned to Van 
Dorn. Some important events took place during the first 
six months of 1863, that had a bearing on the fortunes of 
the Army of the Cumberland. 

On January 9th, in recognition of the services of that 
army, by General Order No. 9 of War Department, that com- 
mand was reorganized, and the Centre, Right, and Left were 
constituted co7'ps d'armee, with the designation of Four- 
teenth, Twentieth, and Twenty-first Corps, under the same 
commanders, who were thus advanced to this higher com- 
mand. During this month, Steedman, in command of Fry's 
old division, was ordered from Gallatin to the front, and 
posted at Triune and La Vergne. Reynolds's division was 
ordered from Gallatin to Murfreesboro. A slight change 
was also made in the boundaries of the Department. On 
the 25th, by order of the War Department, the commands 
of Fort Henry and Fort Donelson were transferred from the 
department under Grant, to that under Rosecrans, and later 
Fort Heiman. To Rosecrans was then committed the care 
and control of the Cumberland River, his second and second- 
ary line of commimication and supplies connecting his two 
principal depots. 



140 THE ARMY OF THE CUMBERLAND. 

On January 26th, Bragg ordered Wheeler on an expedition 
to capture Fort Donelson. Wheeler directed Forrest to 
move his brigade with four guns on the river road, via the 
Cumberland Iron Works, to the vicinity of Dover, which 
was the real position occupied and fortified by the Federal 
forces, and not the old site of Fort Donelson, while Wheeler 
with Wharton's command of some twenty-five hundred 
men moved on a road to the left. Eosecrans, hearing from 
his scouts that this movement was contemjjlated, ordered 
Davis in command of his division and two brigades of cav- 
alry under Minty, to march by the Versailles road, and take 
Wheeler in the rear. Steedman was directed to watch 
Wheeler's movements by way of Triune. Davis despatched 
Minty to move with his cavalry around by way of Union- 
ville and Rover, while he moved with the infantry direct to 
Eaglesville. At Rover, Minty captured a regiment of some 
three hundred and fifty men. Davis and Steedman's forces 
united at Franklin, the latter marching by way of Nolins- 
ville. Wheeler, advancing rapidly, passed between the 
troops in pursuit, and, on Februaiy 3d, his entire force at- 
tacked the post at Dover, occupied by Colonel Harding with 
the Eighty-third Illinois, some six hundred men in the 
command. The rebels opened fire at once, and made a vig- 
orous assault in force ujjon Harding's position. His little 
command repulsed the enemy with heavy loss. Again they 
advanced, making a more determined assault than before, 
but again they were driven back with still greater loss. In 
this last repulse Harding ordered his men to charge beyond 
his works, which they did with great gallantry, capturing 
forty-two of the rebels. Wheeler then withdrew with a total 
loss of one hundred and fifty killed, four hundred wounded, 
and one hundred and fifty captured. Colonel Harding lost 
sixteen killed, sixty wounded, and fifty captured. Efforts 



IN MURFREESBORO. 141 

were made to cut oS the retreat of Wheeler's force by 
Davis's command, reinforced by five hundred cavahy, which 
went as far west as Kinderhook and Bon Aqua Springs, but 
Wheeler took the road through Centreville, where he crossed 
Duck Eiver. 

In the latter part of the engagement at Dover, Harding 
was aided by the fire from six gunboats which were acting 
as convoys for a fleet of transj)orts conveying reinforcements 
to Eosecrans's command, consisting of eighteen regiments 
of infantiy, M'ith four batteries of artillery that had been 
serving in Kentucky under the command of General Gordon 
Granger. The troops forming this column were under the 
immediate command of Crook, Baird, and Gilbert. After 
the danger at Dover had passed, the fleet steamed up to 
Nashville, and there the troops disembarked. During Feb- 
ruary Crook was sent with his command to take post at Car- 
thage, on the Cumberland Eiver, and watch the movements 
of the enemy from there to Eome, and Gilbert was ordered 
to proceed with his brigade to Franklin. 

On March 4th, Gilbert at Franklin ordered Colonel Coburn, 
with five regiments of infantry, foiir detachments of cavalry 
under Colonel Jordan, and Aleshire's battery, the whole 
command nearly three thousand strong, to proceed south 
from Franklin with a wagon-train of one hundred wagons, 
ostensibly on a foraging expedition, but also to reconnoitre 
the enemy's front toward Columbia. Coburn's command, 
some twelve miles south of Franklin, was to meet a force 
moving from Murfreesboro toward Columbia, and these com- 
mands were to co-operate and determine the position of the 
enemy. Unknown to Gilbert, Van Dorn, on assuming com- 
mand at Columbia, in February, determined to establish out- 
posts and picket-lines within sight of Franklin and Triune, 
and to move his headquarters north of Duck Eiver to Spring 



142 THE ARMY OF THE CUMBERLAND. 

Hill. Jordan's cavalry struck the enemy only three miles 
from town, formed in line of battle. Oiiening with artillery, 
Jordan advanced, and, after a sharp conflict, the enemy re- 
treated to Sirring Hill. That night Coburn notified Gilbert 
that he was confronted by a largely superior force, and sug- 
gested that he fall back. Gilbert, however, ordered him 
to advance. Proceeding next morning, the column met the 
enemy drawn up in line of battle a short distance from 
Thompson's Station. Forrest's command occupied the ex- 
treme right, with a battery of artillery on the left of this, 
and some j)aces retired was Armstrong's brigade. On the 
left of his command and in line with it was the Texan bri- 
gade under Whitfield, with two guns on each side of the 
Columbia turnpike, making a force of 10,000 men under 
Van Dorn. It was about half-past nine o'clock in the 
morning when Coburn struck these troojjs in line. He 
immediately deployed his infantry across the i^ike and to 
the right, and ordered his command to advance. The 
enemy's battery posted at the pike opening fire, Coburu'a 
troops charged on it handsomely, his entire command 
moving in line of battle down the f)ike. When withir. 
one hundred and fifty yards, Armstrong's and Whitfield'^i 
brigades sprang forward and opened a destructive fire. Co- 
burn's troops held their lines for over half an hour under 
heavy fire, replying with the same, when he ordered his 
command to fall back. Finding this large force in his 
front, he directed Jordan with his cavalry to cover his re- 
treat. Van Dorn now advanced his line, pressed forward 
his right and left to surround Coburn and capture the en- 
tire force. Jordan formed two detachments, dismounted 
behind a stone fence to check the advance of Forrest and 
enable the artillery to escape. Forrest made two sustained 
attempts to dislodge these detachments from their position, 



IN MURFREESBORO. 143 

but lie was repulsed each time; on a third attempt they 
were surrounded and captured. The regiment in charge of 
the train with the artillery and cavalry now moved oif rap- 
idly on the pike to Franklin, and Coburn, being suiTounded 
by the rebels in overwhelming numbers, and finding his 
ammunition exhausted, surrendered. His loss was 40 killed, 
and 150 wounded, and 2,200 prisoners, including his wound- 
ed. The enemy's loss was 35 killed and 140 wounded. The 
rebels lost heavily in officers, several of the most valued of 
Forrest's falling in the repulses of his command. 

The surrender of Coburn weakened the forces at Franklin, 
and revealed the enemy in such strong force on the imme- 
diate front, that Gordon Granger at once ordered Baird to 
proceed by rail to Franklin, and moving his own headquar- 
ters there, assumed the command in person. 

On the 7th, Sheridan's division was ordered to the front 
to reconnoitre the enemy's position. He reached Franklin, 
and the force at that place was further increased by the ar- 
rival of a brigade from Nashville. On the 9th, Minty's bri- 
gade of cavalry also reported, and on the day following, 
Granger with his troops advanced from there upon Van 
Dorn's encamijment at Spring Hill. In support of Gran- 
ger's movement on Van Dorn, Eosecrans ordered Davis to 
move with his division from Salem to Eaglesville, with R. S. 
Granger's brigade in supporting distance, posted at Ver- 
sailles. Gordon Granger drove Van Dom from Spring Hill, 
and the next day compelled his entire command to retire 
south of Rutherford's Creek. On account of the high water 
the pursuit was not continued farther. 

During March the rebel cavalry under Morgan met with 
one of the most decisive repulses yet experienced by that 
command. On the 18th of March Colonel Hall with his 
eommand, the second brigade of Reynolds's division, was 



144 THE ARMY OF THE CUMBERLAND. 

sent from Murfreesboro after Morgan. Starting nortlieast 
from that place lie advanced beyond Statesville, when hear- 
ing that Morgan was advancing on him he retired toward 
Milton, posted his command on some high ground near that 
place and awaited the attack. Morgan endeavored first to 
turn the right and then the left of Hall's command, but in 
each of these attempts he was driven off wdth heavy loss. 
He then dismounted the main portion of his command and 
ordered an attack to be made on the front. A vigorous as- 
sault was at once made with a heavy force, but this was also 
repulsed, Morgan losing a large number of men. After an 
'jngagement lasting some four hours, in which Hall's bri- 
gade fought with the utmost determination, Morgan's com- 
mand, being repulsed at all points and in every assault, with- 
drew from the field with a loss of some ninety-five killed, 
three hundred and fifty wounded, and twenty prisoners. 

Early in April, Morgan's troopers were defeated with great 
loss. On the 2d of April Stanley advanced with his cavalry 
to Liberty, where Morgan met them with his entire com- 
mand. The two forces encamped within two miles of each 
other. On the morning of the 3d, Stanley advanced, intend- 
ing to engage Morgan's command at once, but found that 
he had retreated to what he regarded as a very strong j^osi- 
tion at Snow Hill. Morgan, however, had left a strong force 
at Liberty to watch Stanley's movements. As Stanley ad- 
vanced, he struck this force and quickly drove them back on 
to their main body, and then dashed upon it with part of 
his command, sending a portion around to the right, which 
turned the enemy's left flank. Pressing Morgan's command 
from both positions, it soon gave way at all points, and was 
in full retreat. Morgan's officers tried to rally their men, 
but the latter were thoroughly demoralized and had no 
fight in them. The teamsters became panic-stricken and 



IN MURFREESBORO. 145 

added to the general rout. It was two weeks before Mor- 
gan succeeded in getting his men together again. 

Early in April, Eosecrans ordered Colonel Streight to the 
command of a brigade he had organized for the purpose of 
making a raid on the lines of communication of the rebels, 
and to move through the country south and southeast, de- 
stroying as he went all property of use to them. Streight's 
command started from Nashville, partially mounted, going 
by way of Clarksville to Fort Henry, at which place he took 
steamer for Eastport, Miss. En route to Fort Henry his 
command secured as many animals as they could, but only 
*our-fifths of the men were mounted, and they poorly. The 
animals were nearly all mules, and very few of them were 
fit for the service required. It was expected that the com- 
mand would capture enough good animals to carry the ex- 
pedition successfully through, but this was not realized. 
Leaving Eastport on the 21st, he passed through Tuscumbia 
three days later, and reached Moulton on the 26th. From 
here on the 28th he pressed forward through Day's Gap on 
Sand Mountain, in the direction of Blountsville. In the 
gap their rear guard was overtaken and attacked on the 
30th by the enemy's cavalry under Forrest, who had pressed 
forward, riding night and day. Selecting the best mounted 
of his men, he pushed at once to Streight's camp. Here com- 
ing upon the rear of Streight's force as it was leaving camp, 
Forrest opened with artillery firing. Dismounting his men, 
Streight formed his command on the crest of a hill on each 
$ide of the road and awaited the enemy's attack. As For- 
rest advanced, Streight ordered a charge to be made which 
drove the enemy at all points, capturing their two pieces 
of artilleiy. Forrest lost in killed and wounded seventy- 
five men, a large percentage of whom were killed. Streight's 
loss was twenty-one killed and wounded. A good many of 
VII.— 7 



146 THE ARMY OF THE CUMBERLAND. 

liorses were captured from the enemy, on which Streight 
mounted a number of his men. On the same afternoon the 
enemy attacked again, but was driven back with consider- 
able loss, after a severe engagement lasting from three o'clock 
until dark. On May 1st, the Federal forces reached Blounts- 
ville at noon. Here all the wagons save one were burned, 
and the ammunition placed on pack mules, after distribut- 
ing to the men all that they could carry. At three o'clock 
Streight started again, and skirmishing commenced at once 
on their rear. Pressing on, the command marched until 
twelve o'clock that night. Eesuming their march in the 
morning, the rear skirmished all the forenoon of the 2d with 
the rebels. Arriving at Gadsden, Streight remained long 
enough to destroy a large quantity of provisions in store 
there for the enemy. It was expected at this place that 
a small steamer would be found, upon which a detachment 
of men could be sent to cajDture Borne. In this Streight 
was disappointed. From this point Streight' s animals be- 
came much exhausted, and the men were falling to the rear 
and getting captured. To j^revent this the command had 
to go much slower. Forrest coming up about one o'clock 
on the 2d, attacked the command while the horses were 
being fed at Blount's farm. Here Colonel Hathaway fell, 
shot through the breast. Again the rebels were repulsed, 
but they constantly pressed upon the rear of Streight's com- 
mand, keeping up a brisk skirmish fire. The enemy were 
kept in check at Blount's farm until after dark. In the 
meantime the main command had crossed the Coosa. Here 
the river was so high that the ammimition was damaged by 
being wet. From this jilace Streight sent a detachment to 
burn the Round Mountain iron works, one of the principal 
manufactories of munition of war in the South. It was 
burned to the ground and all the machinery destroyed. On 



IN MURFREESBORO. 147 

arriving at the other branch of the Coosa a bridge was found, 
and, as soon as the command had crossed, it was destroyed. 
On the morning of the 3d, as the men were preparing their 
breakfast, the enemy again attacked. Shortly afterward 
Forrest sent in a flag of truce, demanding the surrender of 
the entire command. This was at first refused, but on con- 
sultation with his officers, and considering the damaged con- 
dition of his ammunition and the comj^lete exhaustion of 
his command, Streight, after making a personal inspection 
of Forrest's artillery, finally yielded, and the entire force 
of 1,466 officers and men was surrendered. 

On April 20th, Thomas sent J. J. Reynolds with three bri- 
gades of infantry and Minty's brigades of cavalry, together 
with Wilder's brigade of mounted infantry, to proceed to 
McMinnville, capture what force was there, destroy the 
railroad from Manchester to McMinnville, and co-oj)erate 
with a force to move from Carthage against Morgan. Rey- 
nolds made a successful raid on the railroad and nearly de- 
stroyed it ; burned all the bridges, trestle-work, cars, and 
locomotives on the road, also the depot in McMinnville, 
and several cotton mills. A large amount of supplies was 
captured, some one hundred and eighty jn-isouers taken, 
and over six hundred animals picked up. The command 
from Carthage failed to aid in the expedition, and Morgan's 
command in the main efi'ected their escape. 

Colonel Lewis D. Watkins on the 27th made a gallant 
charge on the Texas Legion, encamiaed close to Van Dorn's 
main command near Spring Hill. Dashing in upon the en- 
emy early in the morning, he was among them before they 
could rally for defence, capturing one hundred and twenty- 
eight prisoners, over three hundred animals, and their camp 
equipage without the loss of a man. 

It was during the six months waiting at Murfreesboro 



148 THE ARMY OF THE CUMBERLAND. 

that tlie unfortunate controversy arose between Eosecrans 
and the authorities at Washington, reijresented by General 
Halleck, as Commander-in-Chief, and Mr. Secretary Stanton 
of the War Department. The Ai-my of the Cumberland, dur- 
ing the period of the active movements of that command, 
congratulated itself that the field of operations was so far 
removed from Washington City, that it did not come under 
the influence of the authority that seemed to paralyze eveiy 
effort of the commands immediately around the seat of war 
at the East. But in this they were mistaken. The future 
student of the history of the war, in the light of the full of- 
ficial records, will wonder most at the fact that, under the 
orders from Washington, the commanders in the field were 
at all able finally to crush the rebellion. It was only when 
the armies at the East were j^laced under a general who was 
practically untrammelled in the exercise of his j^ower, and 
who conducted his campaigns upon military principles, and 
not as the result of orders from Washington that the begin- 
ning of the end of the rebellion in the East began to dawn. 
In Tennessee we have seen how Halleck gave Buell orders, 
and then attached such conditions to them as to ren- 
der their jDroper execution absolutely impossible. There 
was nothing to prevent Buell from occupying Chattanooga 
in June, 18G2, as he was directed, while Bragg with his 
command was in Northern Mississippi, except the utterly 
useless condition attached to his orders, that he should re- 
pair the Memphis and Charleston Railroad as he moved east. 
Buell urged, in forcible terms, the foolishness and even im- 
propriety of this delay, but Halleck, who knew much of the 
theory of war as learned from books, and in a general way 
wished to apply these principles to the jwactical movements 
of troops, overruled Buell. The latter knew that the enemy 
in his front always resolutely refused to be bound in his 



IN MURFREESBORO. 149 

operations by sucli rules in conducting campaigns. The 
result of Halleck's wisdom soon became manifest when 
Bragg started for Kentucky, after the waste of Buell's time 
in repairing this railroad, which, when completed, was at 
once turned over to the enemy in good condition for imme- 
diate use against our own forces. On Buell fell the force of 
the blow that some one had to bear for this failure to take 
advantage of patent opportunity. Buell's obedience to Hal- 
leck's orders rendered Bragg's advance into Kentucky pos- 
sible, while Buell's failure to bring Bragg to a decisive 
action in Kentucky, and his refusal to follow Bragg into the 
mountains of Eastern Kentucky and Tennessee, was deemed 
sufficient cause by Halleck to issue the order removing him 
from his command. If Halleck's order to Buell to repair 
this railroad had never been issued, Bragg's campaign iu 
Kentucky would never have been made. Halleck's removal 
of Buell was the direct result of the latter's obedience to 
orders received from the former. On Eosecrans assuming 
command, almost the first order he received from Halleck 
was one directing him to advance into East Tennessee after 
Bragg. With a full knowledge of the military situation ob- 
tained from Buell, Eosecrans proceeded at once to protect 
the line established by Buell, and await the advance of 
Bragg in the vicinity of Nashville. The battle of Stone's 
Kiver was for the time sufficient to prove, even to Halleck, 
that Buell and Rosecrans were coiTect, and Eosecrans was 
allowed for the time to attend to his command without 
being interfered with. During the encami^ment at Mur- 
freesboro, the first object of Eosecrans was to properly 
mount and equip his cavalry. In this he received at first 
faint encouragement, which soon ceased altogether. 

On March 1st Halleck, as Commander-in-Chief of the 
Armies of the United States, wrote a letter, sending a copy 



150 THE ARMY OF THE CUMBERLAND. 

to Rosecrans and Grant, oflferiug the position of the then 
vacant major-generalship in the regular army, to the general 
in the field who should first achieve an important and decisive 
victory. Grant very quietly folded up the letter, put it by 
for future reference, and proceeded with the plans of his 
campaign, saying nothing. To Eosecrans's open, impulsive, 
and honorable nature, engaged with all his powers in fur- 
thering the interests of the Government and the general wel- 
fare of his command, this letter was an insult, and he treated 
it accordingly. On March 6th he prepared his reply, and 
forwarded it to Washington. In this letter he informs the 
General-in-Chief that, " as an officer and as a citizen," he 
felt "degraded at such an auctioneering of honors," and 
then adds : " Have we a general who would fight for his 
own personal benefit when he would not for honor and for 
his country ? He would come by his commission basely in 
that case, and deserve to be despised by men of honor. But 
are all the brave and honorable generals on an equality as to 
chances? If not, it is unjust to those who probably deseiTe 
most." 

The effect of this letter was to widen the breach between 
the authorities at Washington and Eosecrans. Halleck's 
letter and Eosecrans's rejily were both characteristic of the 
men. Halleck, fresh from the results of a large law practice 
in California — principally devoted to the establishment of 
the validity of land grants in favor of his clients, in the 
success of which large contingent fees were gained — saw 
nothing improper in such an offer to an officer of sufficient 
ability and standing to be in command of one of the armies 
of the United States. With Eosecrans, all the honest, gen- 
erous impulses of a high-jDrincipled, honorable gentleman, 
who had imperilled his life on many a battlefield, fighting 
solely from a sense of duty to his country, led to the ex- 



IN MURFREESBORO. 151 

pression of liis contempt for the author of such an oflfer. 
The mistake that Halleck made was in thinking that 
what ■would prove a tempting offer to a man like him- 
self, woiTld be so to Eosecrans. No one will attempt to 
maintain the wisdom of Kosecrans's course as a matter of 
policy, however much they may sympathize "nith and ad- 
mire the spirit of his letter. It was an impolitic letter, 
and one that aided in drawing the ill-will and resentment 
of Halleck and Stanton upon him in full force later. 

From this time forward, all the requests of Rosecrans for 
the imjirovement of the efficiency of his army were treated 
with great coolness, and in many instances it was only after 
the greatest importunity that he was able to secure the 
least attention to his recommendations for the increased 
usefulness of his command. His repeated applications for 
more cavalry, and that they be armed with revolving rifles, 
were treated with little attention. In the meantime nearly 
every communication from Washington intimated that he 
was unnecessarily delaying his advance upon Bragg in his 
works at Shelbyville and Tullahoma. Grant, on his Vicks- 
burg campaign, became very anxious for the advance of 
the Army of the Cumberland, to engage Bragg and pre- 
vent reinforcements being sent from him to Pemberton 
or Johnston, operating on his front and rear ; and urged 
Kosecrans to move, and wrote to Halleck, requesting him 
to direct an advance of the Army of the Cumberland on 
Bragg's position. Eosecrans regarded it for the best in- 
terests of the country for his army to remain constantly 
threatening Bragg, in order to hold the entire army of the 
latter in his immediate front, and also in the event of the 
defeat of Grant, and a concentration of the enemy on Kose- 
crans's position, that he should be close to his base, his 
army being then the reserve. If an advance succeeded in 



152 THE ARMY OF THE CUMBERLAND. 

driving Bragg froni TuUalioma, a greater danger than his 
remaining inactive on our front might ensue. To Bragg, 
the occupancy of Middle Tennessee was of suificient im- 
portance to justify him in remaining inactive with his en- 
tire command, waiting for the advance of Rosecrans some 
six months. If driven from Tennessee, his troops were 
ready to unite with the command in Mississippi and defeat 
Grant's movements. If Bragg could be held in Tennessee 
until after Grant's success was assured, then, by waiting at 
Murfreesboro with his army quiet, Rosecrans could render 
better service than by moving on the enemy. This was 
a matter of military judgment, on one side espoused by 
Rosecrans and all his corps and division commanders, who 
were on tlie ground, and on the other by Halleck, Stanton, 
and Grant ; and this question served to increase the feeling 
against Rosecrans in those quarters. Bragg also considered 
that his presence on the front of the Federal army would pre- 
vent any troops from it being sent to aid Grant. And thus 
the year wore away until early summer. Still another con- 
sideration with Rosecrans, was the character of the soil in 
Tennessee from a short distance south of Murfreesboro to 
the foot of the Cumberland Mountains. This was a light 
sandy loam, that in winter and sjmng, during the rains of 
those seasons, became like quicksand, allowing the artillery 
and wagon to sink almost to the hub, and rendering the 
rapid movement of a large army absolutely imjaossible. 

During the early part of June, Rosecrans commenced 
placing his troops in position, preparatory to a general ad- 
vance. He ordered the brigade that had been encamped at 
Gallatin, under General Ward, to Lavergne, and despatched 
Gordon Granger to take post at Triune, moving his com- 
mand from Franklin up to that j^lace. Crook was ordered 
from Carthage to rei)ort to Murfreesboro, and on his ar- 



IN MURFREESBORO. 153 

rival, was placed in Eeynolds's division. Eosecrans organ- 
ized a reserve corps, consisting of tkree divisions designated 
as First, Second, and Third, under Baird, J. D. Morgan, and 
K. S. Granger, respectively, and he assigned Gordon Gran- 
ger to the command of this coi-ps. 

Early in June, Garfield, then Chief-of-Staff of the General 
commanding, urged Eosecrans to make an a'dvance move- 
ment, both as a militaiy and political measure with reference 
to the sentiment of the North. General Eosecrans had 
matured his plans for an advance, but decided to refer the 
question to his general officers in command of corps and 
divisions. The matter being submitted to them, the uni- 
versal sentiment of these officers was that the movement 
should be further delayed. However, on the 23d of June, 
Eosecrans having made all necessaiy arrangements for his 
command, according to his plans, and learning of the favor- 
able prospects at Vicksburg, and of the movement of the 
force under Burnside into East Tennessee to take and hold 
Knoxville, issued the necessary orders for the advance of 
his army on that of the enemy, 
7* 



CHAPTER X. 

THE ADVANCE ON TULLAHOMA. 

At the time of the advance of the Army of the Cumber- 
land, Polk's corps of Bragg's army occupied the main 
position at Shelbyville, strongly intrenched behind heavy 
works thrown up during the six months of waiting. These 
added to the natural strength of the position, and extended 
from Horse Mountain on the east, to Duck River on the west, 
and were covered by a line of abattis. The town was noted 
for the strong Union sentiment of its inhabitants, of which 
fact the rebels took full advantage to the loss and distress 
of the people. It is situated aboiit twenty-five miles south 
of Murfreesboro, and some twenty miles north of Tullahoma, 
on a branch railroad from the main Nashville line, starting 
west from Wartrace. Bragg's right was posted at War- 
trace, with Hardee's corps occupying the passes at Liberty, 
Hoover, and Bellbuckle Gai)s. These gaps were all held 
by strong forces of the enemy, supported by the main com- 
mand. Polk had an advance in Guy's Gaji with his entii-e 
command in supporting distance. Bragg's extreme right 
was protected by cavalry with headquarters at McMinnville, 
while his cavalry on the left, under Forrest, had headquar- 
ters at Columbia, threatening Franklin. 

At this time the main base of supplies of the enemy was 
at Chattanooga, to which the entire country south of Duck 
Biver had been made tributary. From Duck Eiver, south, 



THE ADA^ANCB ON TULLAHOMA. 155 

the country is rongli, with rocky ranges of hills, which divide 
the " barrens " from the fertile parts of Middle Tennessee. 
These " barrens " constitute a high rolling plateau of gi-ound 
between the ranges of hills at Duck Eiver and the Cumber- 
land Mountains. It is here that the soil during a rainy sea- 
son offers the greatest obstacle to active campaigning. Situ- 
ated on the "barrens," at the junction of the McMinnville 
branch with the Nashville and Chattanooga Eailroad, was 
TuUahoma, a small straggling village, where Bragg had es- 
tablished his main depot and made a large intrenched 
camp. The defiles of Duck Eiver, a deep, naiTow stream 
with but few fords or bridges, covered its front, with a rough 
rocky range of hills immediately south of the river. The 
principal roads as they passed through these hills bore 
southwardly toward the line of the enemy's communica- 
tions and Tullahoma. The Manchester pike passed through 
Hoover's Gap and reached the "barrens" by ascending 
a long, difficult canon called Matt's Hollow. The War- 
trace road passed through Liberty Gap, and from there it 
ran into the road along the railroad through Bellbuckle 
Gap. The direct road to Shelbyville goes through Guy's 
Gap. 

Eosecrans was satisfied from the information he had re- 
ceived that Bragg intended to fight in his intrenchments at 
Shelbyville, in the event of the army advancing in that di- 
rection. The " efiective total present," as reported by Bragg 
as the strength of his army on June 20, 1863, at Shelbyville, 
was 43,089, of all arms. If he were attacked at Shelbyville 
and beaten, he would then be in good position to retreat to 
his strong intrenchments at Tullahoma, and on his retreat 
could so retard Eosecrans's advance through the narrow 
winding roads leading up to the " ban-ens," as to fully 
protect his own line of retreat and inflict severe loss on the 



156 THE ARMY OF THE CUMBERLAND. 

advancing force without exj^osing liis own troops. Eose- 
crans's jalan of campaign was to render useless Bragg's in- 
treucliments by turning his right, and then if possible secure 
his line of retreat by moving on the railroad bridge at Elk 
Biver. Bragg by this Laeans would either be forced to 
accept battle on ground chosen by Rosecrans, or be com- 
pelled to beat a retreat on a disadvantageous line, neither 
as direct nor by as good roads as he would have from Shel- 
byville and Tullahoma due south. To cany out this plan it 
was necessary to impress Bragg with the idea that our ad- 
vance would be in force on Shelbyville, and, if possible, 
to keep xii> this impression until the main body of our 
army reached Manchester. The success of this would keep 
Bragg's attention on the movement on his front at Shelby- 
ville, and enable our army to pass through the dangerous 
defile of Hoover's Gap, a narrow passage-way three miles 
long, between high hills, and so on through Matt's Hollow, 
an equally dangerous defile, being a gorge two miles long 
with hardly room anywhere for wagons to pass each other. 
These passes were only eight miles from Hardee's head- 
quarters and sixteen from Shelbyville. 

The plan then of Rosecrans in the advance on Tullahoma, 
was to make a feint with Granger's corps and the main jDor- 
tion of the cavalry, on Polk's command in his strong position 
at Shelbyville, and to mass the three main coi-ps on Bragg's 
right at Wartrace. The army being all ready for the open- 
ing campaign, on the 23d of June General K. B. Mitchell 
with his command — the First Cavalry Division — commenced 
the advance from Triune on the Eaglesville and Shelbyville 
pike, in the feint on Polk's command, made a furious attack 
on Bragg's cavalry and drove in his infantry guards on their 
main force, pressing the whole line on that front. Granger, 
with the three divisions of his corps and Brannan's division 



THE ADVANCE ON TULLAHOxMA. 157 

of Thomas's corps, on that day moved with three days' rations 
from Triune to Salem. 

On the same day, Palmer's division and a brigade of cav- 
alry marched to the vicinity of Bradyville, for the purpose of 
seizing with his advance the head of the defile leading over 
an obscure road by Lumley's Station to Manchester, and so 
up to the "barrens." All the other troops were supplied 
with twelve days' rations of bread, coflfee, sugar, and salt, 
with six days' pork and bacon, and six days' meat on hoof, 
and were held in readiness to move southward. These 
movements being made, the next day the entire army pressed 
forward on the advance. 

In the evening of the 23d, the corps commanders met at 
army headquarters. The plan of the campaign was fully ex- 
plained to them, and each one received in writing his orders 
as to his part in the movement. 



" Major-General McCooks' corps to advance on the Shelby ville 
road, turn to the left, move two divisions by Millersburg, and advan- 
cing on the Wartrace road seize and hold Liberty Gap. The Third Di- 
vision to advance on Fosterville and cover the crossing of General 
Granger's command from the Middleton road, and then move by Chris- 
tiana to join the rest of the corps. 

" General Granger to advance on the Middleton road, threatening 
that place, and cover the passing of General Brannan's division of the 
Fourteenth Corps, which was to pass by Christiana and bivouac with 
the rear division of the Twentieth Corps. 

" The Fourteenth Corps, Major-General Thomas, to advance on 
the Manchester pike, seize and hold with its advance, if practicable, 
Hoover's Gap, and bivouac so as to command and cover that and the 
Millersburg road, so that McCook and himself could be within support- 
ing distance of each other. 

"Major-General Crittenden to leave Van Cleve's division of the 
Twenty-first Army Corps at Murfreesboro, concentrate at Bradyville 
with the other two, and await orders." 



158 THE ARMY OF THE CUMBERLAND. 

One brigade of cavaliy under Turcliin was sent "witli Crit- 
tenden to establish a lookout toward McMinnville, All the 
remaining cavahy under Stanley was to meet Mitchell as he 
came in from Versailles and at once attack the rebel cavahy 
at Middleton. 

These movements were all promptly executed in the midst 
of heavy drenching rains, as it only could rain in the moun- 
tains and hills of Tennessee, whenever the Army of the Cum- 
berland made a forward movement. The gi-ound was so 
softened on all the dirt roads as to render them next to im- 
passable. 

The Twentieth Coi^ps, consisting of Jolinson's, Davis's, and 
Sheridan's divisions, started on the Shelbyville pike, and by 
different cross roads moved to the left to Millersburg, where 
Da\ds's and Sheridan's divisions encamped for the night. 
ilTohnson's division was advanced up to Liberty Gap, with the 
Thirty-ninth Indiana, under Colonel Harrison, thrown for- 
ward to skirmish. Hamson developed the enemy in front 
of the Gap. Willich's brigade was moved forward, and drove 
the skirmishers in the rebel front back upon their main line, 
placed on the crest of the hills, on each side of the entrance 
to the gap. Here the enemy was too strongly posted to at- 
tack his front. Another brigade under Colonel John F. 
Miller, who had been transferred from Negley's division to 
Johnson's, was then brought forward. These two brigades 
were at once deployed in line, making a front of such length 
as to envelop both flanks of the enemy's line, and advan- 
cing, these brigades gallantly drove the rebels through the 
defile, a distance of two miles. After clearing the gap, the 
troops returned to the north end of it and there bivouacked. 
On the following day, late in the afternoon, an attack was 
made on Willich's and Miller's brigades, to drive them out 
of the north end of the gap. Johnson's failure to hold the 



THE ADVANCE ON TULLAHOMA. 159 

southern entrance enabled the enemy again to enter it, and 
to secure it entirely they made this attack. The engage- 
ment opened with a heavy fire on the centre of the com- 
mand, the enemy attacking in force. They were handsome- 
ly repulsed. Kenewing the attack, Hardee then endeav- 
ored to secure positions on the hills to the right and left, so 
as to command Johnson's flanks with his fire, but each move- 
ment was met by Johnson's troops, supported by Carlin's 
brigade of Davis's division, and eveiy attack was repulsed. 
Beaten at eveiy point, late in the evening the enemy with- 
drew entirely, taking i^osition at Bellbuckle. The fighting 
at Liberty Gap was the most sevei'e of the campaign, and in 
this attack Johnson's command, including Carlin's brigade, 
lost two hundred and thirty-one killed and wounded. The 
-enemy's loss was still greater. It was in repelling one of 
the attacks on the left that Colonel Miller fell severely 
wounded with a minie ball tlirough his left eye while 
leading his brigade. 

On the 24th, General Thomas moved direct on the Manches- 
ter pike from Murfreesboro, Reynolds's division in advance, 
starting at 4 o'clock in the morning, under orders, if pos- 
sible, to seize and hold Hoover's Gaj?. At 7 a.m., Rousseau's 
division followed in support of Reynolds's division, which 
encountered the mounted \'idettes of the enemy a few miles 
beyond our picket station, forced them upon their reserve, 
and then resolutely pressing on drove the entire force on 
the run, through Hoover's Gap and beyond McBride's Creek. 
Wilder, finding the enemy about to attack him with two bri- 
gades from the direction of Fairfield, occupied a strong 
position on the hills at the southern entrance of the gap. 
Reynolds at once moved his two infantry brigades forward 
and occupied the gap in the rear of Wilder's command, pre- 
pared to resist the enemy on the front. Wilder's brigade 



160 THE ARMY OF THE CUMBERLAND. 

■was immediately attacked by the enemy's force. Beynolds 
supported liim at once with his other brigades, which were 
posted on the ridge of woods on the extreme right to pre- 
vent the enemy turning our right flank, then heavily engaged 
by a superior force. "With these reinforcements the enemy 
was driven back oiit of the woods, and three regiments were 
posted on the right, making that position secure. Major 
Coolidge, commanding the brigade of regulars of Rousseau's 
division, was ordered to reinforce Eeynolds, and every prepa- 
ration was made for an attack on the following morning. 
The other brigades of Rousseau's command, with Negley's 
di\dsion, occupied the gap in the rear of Reynolds during 
the night. Early on the morning of the 25th, Scribner was 
ordered with his brigade to the front, in supi^ort of the bat- 
teries and to form jjicket line on the extreme left. 

On the 24th, Crittenden, with "Wood's and Palmer's divi- 
sions, marched to Bradyville, leaving Van Cleve's division to 
garrison Murfreesboro. Granger, with his three divisions 
and Brannan's, advanced from Salem to Christiana. Tur- 
chin's division of cavalry under Stanley moved on the 
Woodbury pike to Cripple Creek, and thence thi'ough 
Salem. During the day Mitchell advanced from Rover 
through Versailles to Middletou, where he had a shai-p 
engagement with the enemy's cavalry. 

The plans of the enemy not being yet fully developed, and 
in view of the uncertainty that existed whether he would fall 
on McCook's front, or mass on Thomas near Fairfield, Rose- 
crans issued the following orders for the 25th : 

"Major-General Crittenden to advance to Lannon's Stand, six miles 
east of Beech Grove, and open communications with General Thomas. 

"General Thomas to attack the rebels on the flank of his advance 
position at the forks of the road, and drive the rebels toward Fair- 
field. 



THE ADVANCE ON TULLAHOMA. 161 

"General McCook to feign and advance, as if in force, on the War- 
trace road by the Liberty Gap passes. 

"General Stanley, with his cavalry, to occupy their attention at 
Forsterville, and General Granger to support him with his infantry at 
Christiana." 

In the event that Thomas succeeded in his attack and 
drove the enemy toward Wartrace, he was then to cover that 
road with a division, and taking the remainder of his troops 
was to move rapidly on Manchester. McCook was then to 
move in and take Thomas's jolace at Beech Grove, holding 
Liberty Gap with a division, and was finally to withdraw 
that and follow Thomas with his entire command to Man- 
chester. 

The same day that Crittenden's command marched to Holly 
Springs, Brannan's division reached the main command of 
Thomas, and went into camp with Rousseau at Hoover's Mills. 
Reynolds had a slight skirmish with the enemy on his front. 
On the night of the 25th, Rousseau was ordered up with his 
division to take position immediately in the rear of Rey- 
nolds, preparatory to an attack on the enemy's jsosition at 
Beech Grove the next morning. Minty's brigade of cavalry 
pressed forward at all points and drove the enemy to Guy's 
Gap. Long took position at Lumley's Station. The re- 
mainder of Turchin's division moved in the advance with 
General Crittenden. 

The incessant rains that had fallen since the opening of the 
campaign delayed the advance, by preventing Brannan join- 
ing the Fourteenth Corps as soon as was expected. During 
the night of the 25th it rained so continuously that it was 
almost impossible for the troops to move, but by extraordi- 
nary exertions the divisions were all in position by 10.30 a.m. 
At 4 o'clock in the morning Brannan's division moved up to 
take part in the attack. At 8 a.m. Negley's division took 



162 THE ABMY OF THE CUMBERLAND. 

position to support the attack of tlie other divisions. If the 
enemy's position at Beech Grove was carried, then Rousseau 
and Brannan were to push on to Manchester that night if 
possible. At 10.30 a.m. the advance was ordered. Moving 
forward on the rebels in force on the heights north of Gar- 
rison Creek, our army drove them steadily and rajndly 
toward Fairfield, Rousseau and Brannan operating on their 
left flank from the hills north of the Fairfield road, while 
Reynolds advanced against their front and right. The enemy 
had prepared for an obstinate resistance, and attempted to 
enfilade Thomas's troops from the high gi-ound on his right. 
This was effectually prevented by a gallant charge of Walk- 
er's brigade and the regulars under Major Coolidge, who 
drove the enemy from this position. Thomas pushed for- 
ward his troops, driving the rebels in the direction of Fair- 
field, who covered their retreat with two batteries of artil- 
lery, occupying positions behind strong lines of skirmishers 
flanked by heavy cavalry force. The rebels thus retired to 
Fairfield, near to which j^lace our pickets were advanced. 
Reynolds's division and the baggage moved forward dui'ing 
the night toward Manchester. Late in the afternoon Wil- 
der's brigade seized Matt's Hollow, and thus secured that 
passage. Thomas placed his divisions in line of battle ex- 
tending from the Fairfield road to within five miles of Man- 
chester. McCook remained in camp at Liberty Gap during 
the day, while Granger rested at Christiana. Crittenden's 
command pressed forward as rapidly as possible on toward 
Manchester, struggling over almost impassable roads. 

Rosecrans's headquarters, on the 27th, reached Manches- 
ter. The advanced position secured by Thomas's command 
rendered the concentration of the whole army on the en- 
emy's left, through Hoover's Gap, at this time an easy mat- 
ter. With this done, Bragg would either be forced to fight, 



THE ADVANCE ON TULLAHOMA. 163 

in resisting the furtlier advance of the army under Rosecrans, 
or abandon Middle Tennessee altogether. Early on the 
morning of the 27th, Eeynolds's advance brigade— Wilder's 
mounted infantry— took possession of Manchester, capturing 
forty prisoners, a guard at the railroad depot, and taking 
the town completely by suii^rise. Reynolds's entire division 
reached Manchester during the morning. General Thomas 
then moved Rousseau's and Brannan's divisions in pursuit 
of the enemy, driving him as far as Fairfield, and ascertained 
at that place that the rebels had retreated entirely. These 
two divisions then turned into the Fairfield and Manchester 
road, Brannan's reaching the latter place at 10 p.m. and 
Rousseau's at midnight. Negley's division had, during the 
day, been moving in support of these two divisions toward 
the Fairfield road, by way of Noale Fork, and arrived at 
Manchester at 8 p.m. Thomas's corps being now together, 
it was manifest that the enemy must leave his intrenchment 
at Shelbyville, and that our army must be prepared to meet 
him at TuUahoma, only twelve miles distant. Rosecrans 
gave the necessary orders at once to the other coii)s com- 
manders to close up their columns on Manchester, and be 
prepared for the contest. 

On the extreme right our cavaliy, on the 27th, did bril- 
liant work. Supported by the reserve corps under Gran- 
ger, Stanley advanced from Christiana to Guy's Gap, where 
the advance of the rebel army under Wheeler, with Martin's 
and a portion of Wharton's divisions, was encountered. 
Charging down on them with Minty's brigade, closely fol- 
lowed by Mitchell's division, Stanley routed and drove 
them out of the gap into their intrenchments just north of 
Shelbyville. Here they again made a stand. Dashing 
ahead, Minty encountered them in their works, and drove 
them in disorder from their intrenchments into Shelbyville. 



164 THE ARMY OF THE CUMBERLAND. 

While Minty was pushing them on the front, Mitchell came 
up, turned their right, cutting off their direct line of retreat, 
and both forces united in driving them beyond the town, 
comjiletely defeated. Wheeler lost all his artilleiy and 
some five hundred prisoners. A large number of the rebels 
were driven into Duck Eiver and drowned while attempting 
to cross. The flight was so hurried that Wheeler himself 
only escaped by swimming the river. This successful move- 
ment established the fact that Bragg had abandoned his 
strong line of defence at Shelbyville, and the question now 
to be answered was whether he would accept battle at Tul- 
lahoma, or retire with his entire command across the Cum- 
berland Mountains and the Tennessee Eiver, fighting as he 
fell back. 

W^hile the concentration of his command at Manchester 
was being effected, Eosecrans determined to break the line 
of railroad in the rear of Bragg's army, if possible. On the 
morning of the 28th Wilder, with his brigade of mounted 
infantry, started at reveillS by way of Hillsboro, to burn 
Elk Eiver bridge, and to destroy the raih'oad between De- 
chard and Cowan. John Beatty, with his brigade of infantiy 
marched to Hillsboro for the jiurj^ose of covering and sup- 
porting Wilder's movement. The latter reached Elk Eiver 
and crossed his command, floating his mountain howitzers 
on a raft made of an old saw-mill. He then moved on to 
Dechard, where, after a slight skirmish with a detachment 
of the enemy, he destroyed the depot full of commissary 
goods, the water tanks, the railroad bridge over the Win- 
chester road, and tore up some three hundred yards of the 
railroad. Earlier in the day Wilder sent part of his com- 
mand, under Colonel Munroe, to destroy the railroad bridge 
over Elk Eiver. Withers's division of Bragg's army reached 
this point only a few moments ahead of Munroe, and pre- 



THE ADVANCE ON TULLAHOMA. 165 

vented the burning of the bridge. Finding that the enemy 
was in jrarsuit of him at all i^oints, Wilder next moved to 
Tantalon and Anderson with detachments of his command, 
but was compelled to retire, as these points were strongly 
guarded by heavy forces of the enemy's infantry. Crossing 
the mountains that night on his return over the Tracy City 
road, and so on to Pelham, the troops slept at the foot of 
the mountains, and started the next morning just in time 
to escape Forrest, who was in pursuit with ten regiments 
of cavalry. Wilder reached Manchester at 1 p.m. of the 
30th. 

Sheridan's division of McCook's corps reached Manches- 
ter on the 29th. The command — troops and animals — suf- 
fered severely on their march over the heavy roads. Crit- 
tenden's command, which had been on the road since the 
26tli, reached Manchester ^Iso on the 29th, after marching 
with all speed, badly worn, by reason of the ten-ible rains 
and fearful roads. The condition of the latter may be in- 
ferred from the fact that it required four days of incessant 
labor for Crittenden to advance the distance of twenty-one 
miles. The concentration of the entire army being effected, 
orders were given for the final movement on the 30th, as 
follows : 

" The Fourteenth Corps to occupy the centre at Concord Church and 
Bobo Cross Roads, with a division in reserve. 

"The Twentieth Corps to take the right on Crumpton's Creek, two 
divisions in echelon retired, one in reserve. 

" The Twenty-first Corps to come up on the left near Hall's Chapel, 
one division in front and one in reserve." 

The rain had rendered the roads over which this move- 
ment was to be made as soft and spongy as a swamji, into 
which the wagons cut to the hubs, and even horses could 
only pass over with the greatest exertion. The troops on the 



166 THE ARMY OF THE CUMBERLAND. 

SOtli were compelled to drag along the artillery througli the 
imid into position. While the orders for the movements of 
the troops were being executed on the 30th, Thomas sent 
Steedman's brigade of Brannan's division, and two regi- 
ments of Negley's division on separate roads to reconnoitre 
the enemy's position, and Sheridan sent Bradley's brigade 
of his own division on another road, for the same pui-pose. 
These reconnoissances all returned, and rejDorted having 
found the enemy in force within a mile or two of Tulla- 
homa, on all roads excej^t the one leading to Estill Springs. 
Scouts coming in confirmed this, adding that it was the gen- 
eral belief that Bragg would not leave his intrenchments at 
Tullahoma without a fight. 

On the same day Rosecrans ordered his topogi'aphical 
engineers to ascertain the nature of the ground, in order 
to detennine the jjracticability of moving by columns in 
mass in line of battle from the jjosition in front, to gain 
the rear of the rebel j)osition. Their report being favor- 
able, all aiTangements were completed, and the second divi- 
sion of Crittenden's corjis was moved into position. 

On July 1st, Thomas, hearing from a citizen that the ene- 
my were evacuating Tullahoma, ordered Steedman witli his 
brigade, supported by two regiments of Beynolds's divi- 
sion on the left, to advance cautiously and ascertain if the 
report was true. Pushing forward his advance, Steedman, 
meeting with no ojiposition, entered the place at noon, cap- 
turing a few prisoners. Eosecrans being at once notified of 
this, immediately ordered Bousseau's and Negley's divi- 
sions in pursuit. Pressing forward with all possible haste 
by Spring Creek, these divisions overtook the rear guard 
of the enemy late in the afternoon at Heth-page Bridge, 
two miles above the railroad crossing, where, after a sharp 
skirmish, in which a good many of our men were wounded, 



THE ADVANCE ON TULLAHOMA. 167 

the rebels were driven steadily back, until darkness pre- 
vented further pursuit. The enemy, occupying the heights 
south of the river, commanded the bridge with their artil- 
lery, which they had placed behind epaulements. 

On the 2d, the ammunition was brought forward, and 
McCook, with Sheridan's and Davis's divisions, was ordered 
in pursuit on the roads west of the railroad. Sheridan, on 
aniving at Kock Creek Ford, found Elk Eiver so swollen 
■with the heavy rains of the i^ast week as to be barely forda- 
ble for cavalry. On the south bank of the river the enemy 
had posted a force of cavalry to resist the crossing. Sheri- 
dan opened fire at once on them, drove them away, and 
occupied the ford. During the night the enemy burned 
the bridge on the line of advance of Thomas, who found 
equal difficulty in crossing. Here the idver was very deep, 
and he ordered Kousseau's, Brannan's, and Reynolds's divi- 
sions up the river to Jones's Ford. Hambright's brigade 
was thrown across the river, and the other troops went into 
camp on the north bank. Hambright captured several rebel 
prisoners, who told him that Bragg's army was in full 
retreat by way of Pelham and Cowan, across the Cumber- 
land Mountains. Turchin, with a small brigade of cavalry, 
moved forward from Hillsboro on the Dechard road. On 
reaching the fords of Elk Eiver at Morris Feny he found 
the rebel cavalry strongly posted. He attacked them at 
once, reinforced by Mitchell's command, and forced a pas- 
sage of the river after a sharp fight. Night closed the pur- 
suit. 

On the 3d, Sheridan succeeded in crossing Elk River, 
supported by Davis's division, and jiursued the enemy to 
Cowan, where he learned that Bragg had crossed the moun- 
tains with part of his artilleiy and infantry by the University 
and Sweden's Cove, sending Hardee's corps into Sequatchie 



168 THE ARMY OF THE CUMBERLAND. 

Valley, and covering liis retreat with his cavalry. Thomas 
crossed Rousseau's and Brannan's divisions at Jones's Ford 
and ordered them to take position on the Winchester and 
Hillsboro road. He directed Negley and Reynolds to 
cross their divisions at the ford on the Winchester and 
Manchester jiike. On the 4th, Rousseau was ordered to 
march to the Dechard and Pelham roads, and to take up 
position at Brackenfield's Point toward the University. 
Reynolds encamped at Penningtown, and Brannan's divi- 
sion at Taite's. The cavalry sent from Sheridan's position, 
and by Stanley from the main column, developed the fact 
that the enemy was entirely across the mountains, and the 
troops were now ordered into camp to await supplies from 
the dej)ot at Murfreesboro. 

Bragg's army reached Chattanooga the first week in July. 
Here he established his headquarters with Polk's cor^DS re- 
tained in and around town for the purposes of observation, 
with the exception of Anderson's brigade of Withers's divi- 
sion, which was ordered to Bridgeport, at the crossing of 
the Nashville and Chattanooga Railroad over the Tennessee 
Biver. Hardee's corps was distributed along the line of 
the Knoxville Railroad, with Tyner's Station as the centre. 
At Chattanooga Bragg at once commenced fortifying his 
position, which work he steadily prosecuted for some weeks, 
awaiting the development of Rosecrans's j)lans. He also 
threw up defensive works at each of the crossings of the 
Tennessee as far north as Blyth's Ferry. Forrest was sent 
to Kingston, on the north bank of the Tennessee River, with 
orders to picket the approaches to the river from Sequat- 
chie Valley, as well as the various crossings of the river, and 
to maintain a watchful observation of Burnside's movements 
in East Tennessee. 

The Tullahoma campaign, with the exception of the one 



THE ADVANCE ON TULLAHOMA. 169 

immediately following, wliich placed the army of the Cum- 
berland across the Tennessee and terminated in the battle 
of Chickamauga, was the most brilliant of the great strategic 
campaigns carried to a successful issue by General Eose- 
crans. The movements of the army occupied nine days, dur- 
ing which time the enemy was driven from two strongly for- 
tified positions, with a loss in prisoners captured of 1.634, 
eleven pieces of artiller}% and a large amount of stores and 
supplies. The result of this campaign gave to Eosecrans 
possession of Middle Tennessee, and placed the armies back 
in the relative i^ositions occupied by them jjrior to Bragg's 
advance into Kentucky, a little less than one year previous. 
The campaign was conducted throughout, in one of the most 
extraordinary series of rain-storms ever known in Tennessee 
at that season of the year. This, with the resistance inter- 
posed by Bragg to our advance at Hoover's Gap, retarded 
operations thirty-six hours, and in front of Manchester a 
detention of sixty hours occurred. These delays and the 
storms prevented us getting possession of Bragg's communi- 
cation and forcing him to a very disastrous battle. General 
Eosecrans in his official report of this campaign says : 
" These results were far more successful than were antici- 
pated, and could only have been obtained by a surprise as 
to the direction and force of our movements." 

Bragg made no official report of the Tullahoma campaign, 
but in a statement to General J. E. Johnston of his opera- 
tions at that time, he says that he offered battle behind his 
works at Shelbyville to Eosecrans, which was refused ; that 
the latter passed to his, Bragg's, right on two occasions, 
threatening his rear. He being not able to coi^e with the 
Federal army retreated to the Tennessee. Bragg adds : 
"The Tennessee will be taken as our line." 

Duiing these nine days of active campaigning the Army 
VIL-8 



170 THE ARMY OF THE CUMBERLAND. 

of the Cumberland, numbering less than sixty thousand 
effective men, with a loss of 560 killed, wounded, and miss- 
ing, compelled the army under Bragg, numbering some- 
thing less than forty -five thousand effective men, to retreat 
a greater distance and out of far stronger positions than the 
united armies under Sherman were able to compel the same 
army with but slight additional strength under General 
Joe Johnston, to fall back, in four months of active field 
campaigning, with a very much larger relative loss. The 
proportion of the forces of the opposing armies during the 
Tullahoma campaign was far nearer equal than that on to 
Atlanta, while the natural and military obstacles to be over- 
come were largely the greater iu the Tullahoma campaign. 
To Bragg the forward movement of the Federal army in full 
strength was a surprise, but to find that army so far in his 
rear and so near to cutting his line of communications was a 
much greater surprise. These might not have been guarded 
against, but nothing displayed the marked superiority of 
Bosecrans over his oj)ponent, as a great strategist, so much 
as the grand success of the final movement of the campaign, 
from Manchester south. The general who — as even the 
rebels, in their worship of their leader General Lee, admitted 
— was able in Western Virginia to completely outgeneral 
Lee, on the Tullahoma campaign again demonstrated his 
ability as the greatest strategic general of the war. 

Brilliant campaigns, however, without battles, do not ac- 
complish the destruction of an army. A campaign like that 
of Tullahoma always means a battle at some other point. 
This was true after the Atlanta campaign, where Sherman 
got the glory and Thomas did the fighting. This was equally 
true as to the Tullahoma, and the fact that these two armies 
were yet somewhere to meet and engage in deadly strife, was 
apparent to the commanders of both armies. Where and 



THE ADVANCE ON TULLAHOMA. 171 

•when that meeting was to be was the problem that engaged 
the minds of both these commanders. In the Tullahoma cam- 
jjaign the elements were on the side of Bragg's army, both 
in i^reventing the rapid movements of the Federal army, and 
in furnishing a perfect ban-ier to a successful j)ursuit when 
the retreat was under way, by the high water in the swollen 
streams, the bridges over which Bragg destroyed as he fell 
back. 

The concluding line of Bragg's letter to Johnston, that 
" The Tennessee will be taken as our line," demonstrated 
that, to his mind at least, his Kentucky movement of the 
jear before did not meet with the success he anticipated. 
Here now he was waiting his opportunity to contest his last 
foothold on the State of Tennessee at the far corner in Chat- 
tanooga. "With Eosecrans, his army required after these days 
of hard campaigning a rest to repair the wear and tear of the 
heavy marching, and the resupplying of his entire command. 
The railroads in his rear required his attention first. These 
were placed in order up to his army, and the repairs on the 
road to the front were then to be pushed to the Tennessee 
Eiver. In three weeks time these were completed, and on 
the 25th, the first supply train was jjushed through to the 
Tennessee Eiver. Then Eosecrans established his new depot 
of supplies at Stevenson, Alabama, and hastened, as rapidly 
as he could, the accumulatiou of supi^lies at that point. 



CHAPTER XI. 

THE MOVEMENT TO CHICKAMAUGA. 

The withdrawal of the army under Bragg to Chattanooga 
again made that point the objective of a campaign. Biit 
several things had to be taken into consideration before this 
was entered into. Burnside had been ordered from Cincin- 
nati to East Tennessee through Kentucky, and it was neces- 
sary to know the force and position of his command. If 
Knox\ille and Cumberland Gap were under his control, then 
it would be reasonably safe to follow out a plan of operations 
looking to flank Bragg's left by a movement across the Ten- 
nessee over the ranges of mountains of Northern Georgia. 
But to do this, part of the force under Grant, now inactive 
after Vicksburg, should be ordered up at least as far east as 
the Tennessee, to protect the line of supplies and prevent 
any movement of the enemy to the rear on that flank of 
Eosecrans's army. Another weighty consideration was that 
of forage for the animals of the command. By the middle 
of August, corn in the valleys of Southern Tennessee and 
Northern Alabama would be ripe, and subject to the wants 
of the army. It was General Eosecrans's plan to wait until 
these movements could be accomplished and until the corn 
had ripened, and knowing the difficulties in the way at the 
best, of his successfully accomplishing his plans for the cam- 
paign, he wished at least to have that best in his favor. 
In making his final preparations for his operations against 



174 THE ARMY OF THE CUMBERLAND. 

Chattanooga, General Rosecrans considered two plans. One 
was to aiDj^eai" on the front of Chattanooga and attempt a 
direct attack on the town and reduce it by a lengthy siege. 
The other was to flank Bragg out of Chattanooga, as he had 
been compelled by the movement on the Tullahoma cam- 
paign to abandon his strongholds one by one. 

The first plan could hardly be entertained, as Bragg was 
at his base, with but short lines to all important points under 
control of the rebel government, and at a place where in a 
very short time heavy reinforcements could be sent him, 
while Rosecrans in front of Chattanooga would be in a 
rough, sterile cotintry, far away from his base of supplies, 
with a long wagon-haul over rocky mountain ranges from 
his nearest depot. To attempt the movement on the left, or 
through Sequatchie Valley, would concentrate Bragg's entire 
army at the contemplated point of crossing the Tennessee. 
This plan Bragg was prepared for, and was resting, quietly 
awaiting the movements of our army cai-rying it into effect. 
But it was not the purjjose of Rosecrans to meet this expec- 
tation of his opponent. The genius of Rosecrans contem- 
plated one of the most brilliant military movements of the 
war to obtain possession of this great stronghold of Natui'e, 
the gateway to East Tennessee' and Northern Georgia, 
Chattanooga. At that time this place was of the utmost 
importance to each of the contending forces, and the highest 
prize in a military jjoint of view that the Army of the Cum- 
berland ever contended for. 

To properly understand the magnitude and imi^ortance of 
the campaign that Rosecrans was now entering on, it is 
necessary that the topography of the country should be con- 
sidered. The position of our army after the Tullahoma 
campaign was on the northwestern base of the Cumberland 
range, in camp occupying McMinnville, Tullahoma, De- 



THE MOVEMENT TO CHICKAMAUGA. 175 

charfl, and Winchester, with Chattanooga south of east. Im- 
mediately in front was the first gi-eat ban-ier in the advance 
movement — the Cumberland Mountains — a lofty range of 
rocks dividing the waters flowing into the Cumberland and 
Tennessee Rivers. The range rises far to the north and 
extends to the southwest into Alabama. North of Chatta- 
nooga the mountains are m^^ch bolder, more difficult to 
cross, with almost sheer declivities on each of the sides. 

Beyond the main range, in the direct road to Chattanooga, 
running south, flows the Sequatchie Biver through the valley 
of that name, formed by another range jutting off slightly 
to the east from the main range, and between it and the 
Tennessee River. This spur is known by the name of Wal- 
ling's Ridge, after an early settler and Indian hunter. It 
abuts close on the Tennessee in precipitous rocky bluffs. 

South of the Tennessee, and separated from the mountain 
ranges north by this river, are the two ranges known as 
Sand and Lookout Mountains. The northern extremity of 
the former is called Raccoon Mountain. Here the river cuts 
its channel as a great chasm through these mountain ranges, 
so shar^Dly defined that the masses abut directly upon thj» 
water in heavy palisades of rock. 

The tops of all these mountain ranges are of poor soil but 
generally with considerable timber; rough, with but few 
roads, and these almost imj^assable for wagons and nearly 
destitute of water. The western slope of Sand Mountain 
reaches nearly to the Tennessee River. Between this latter 
range and Lookout Mountain is Lookout Valley with the 
creek of that name flowing through it into the Tennessee a 
short distance below Chattanooga. This valley is also 
known as Wills Valley, and at that time was traversed by a 
railroad branching from the Nashville road at Wauhatchie, 
terminating at Trenton. 



176 THE ARMY OF THE CUMBERLAND. 

Beyond tliis was Lookout range, 2,400 feet above tlie sea, 
witli almost perpendicular sides, heavily wooded and with 
little water, abutting abruptly on the Tennessee, some two 
miles south of the town, with only three j^ractical wagon 
roads over it — one close to the river, one at Johnson's Crook, 
and the third at Winston's Ga^i, twenty-six and forty-two 
miles respectively south of Chattanooga. 

To the east of Lookout Mountain is Chattanooga Valley 
with the town at the head of it and the creek of that name 
flowing through, with Dry Creek as a branch emptying its 
waters into the Tennessee just south of the town. Beyond 
this to the east is Missionary Eidge, and parallel to it and 
just beyond is Chickamauga Yalle}^, with the creek of that 
name running through it emptying into the river above 
Chattanooga, formed by East, Middle, and West Chickamauga 
Creeks, uniting with Pea Vine Creek between the latter two 
as a tributary. Chattanooga and West Chickamauga Creeks 
have a common source in McLemore's Cove, which is formed 
by Pigeon Mountain on the east, jutting to the north as a 
spur of Lookout Mountain, with the latter on the west, Mis- 
sionary Kidge running out as it enters this cove. The 
wagon road from Chattanooga to Eome, known as the La 
Fayette road, crosses Missionary Bidge into Chickamauga 
Valley at Bossville and j^roceeds thence nearly due south, 
crossing Chickamauga Creek at Lee and Gordon mills, 
thence to the east of Pigeon Mountain, passing through La 
Fayette some twenty-two miles south of Chattanooga ; it 
then continues on to Summerville, within twenty-five miles 
of Eome, and so on to the latter place. 

Beyond these ranges is Taylor's ridge, with a number of 
lesser ranges between it and the Atlanta Eailroad, running 
through Dalton. Both Pigeon Mountain and Taylor's Eidge 
are very rough mountain ranges, with but few roads, and 



THE MOVEMENT TO CHICKAMAUGA. 177 

these only througli gaps. At Dalton is the junction of the 
East Tennessee with the Atlanta Railroad, in the valley of the 
liead waters of the Coosa River, which valley is here some 
ten miles wide and is the great natural passage-way into 
East Tennessee from the south. 

To follow Bragg to Chattanooga and to cross the Tennes- 
see above that jilace involved mo\dng the army either to the 
north of the Sequatchie Valley by Dunlai) or by Therman and 
Walling's Ridge, some sixty-five to seventy miles through a 
country f)Oorly supplied with water, with no forage, and by 
narrow and difficult wagon roads. This route would take 
Rosecrans further away from his base of supplies and line of 
communication than that south of the river. It was over 
this northern route that Bragg anticipated the onward move- 
ment of the Army of the Cumberland. This would enable 
him to make a protracted defence of the town and retard the 
advance for weeks, if not months. But Rosecrans's plan of 
the campaign contemplated a much more hazardous move- 
ment and a far speedier one for the possession of Chatta- 
nooga. To accomplish this, however, it was necessary to 
cross the Cumberland Mountains with subsistence, ammu- 
nition, a limited su^jply of forage, and a bridge train ; then 
to cross his army over the Tennessee River, after that over 
Sand or Raccoon Mountain into Lookout Valley, and from 
there to cross Lookout Mountain, and finally the lesser 
ranges — Missionary Ridge — if he went directly to Chatta- 
nooga, or to cross Missionary Ridge, Pigeon Mountain, and 
Taylor's Ridge, if he struck the railroad at Dalton or south 
of it. This involved the carrying by his army of ammuni- 
tion for two gi-eat battles and twenty-five days' subsistence. 

As soon as the repairs were made on the main line to 
Stevenson, Rosecrans ordered Sheridan's division to make 
an advance movement with two brigades to Bridgej)ort and 
8* 



178 THE ARMY OF THE CUMBERLA>rD. 

one to Stevenson. Tan Cleve had been ordered up ^vitli lois 
division from Murfi-eesboro and was posted at McMinnville. 
On August 8th, stores being accumulated at the fi'ont, or- 
dei-s were issued to coi-ps commanders to supplv their troops, 
as soon as possible, with rations and foi-age sufficient for the 
general advance. 

The movement over the Cumberland Mountains began on 
August 16th, and the troops were ordered to move as follows : 

"Crittenden's corps in three columns to move through the Sequatchie 
Yalley. ilinty's cavalry to move on the left by Sparta, and after cover- 
ing the left flank of Van Cleve to proceed to PikeviUe. 

"Thomas to move Reynolds and Brannan from University by way 
of Battle Creek, where they were to take post, concealed near its mouth. 
Negley and Baird to go by way of Tantallon and halt on Crow Creek 
between Anderson and Stevenson. 

" ilcCook to move Johnson by Salem and Larkin's Ford to Belief ont. 
Davis by Mount Top and Crow Creek to near Stevenson. The three 
brigades of cavalry by Fayetteville and Athens to cover the line of the 
Tennessee from ^Vhitesburg up.'' 

These orders were all complied with, and the movements 
completed by the evening of August 20th. Crittenden sent 
Hazen's brigade on a reeonnoissance to Harrison's Landing, 
where he found the enemy throwing up works. On the next 
day Hazen took post at Poe's cross-roads. "Wilder was sent 
to reconnoitre from Harrison's Landing to Chattanooga. On 
reaching Chattanooga, he was supported by Wagner s bri- 
gade, and both commands opened fire on the next day, shell- 
ing the town from across the river. This bombardment of 
the place caused it to be evacuated by the rebel troops, to 
points beyond range outside, and the withdrawal by Bragg 
of his stores to points of convenience on the railroad to the 
rear. Bragg then ordered Anderson's brigade to withdraw 
from Bridgeport. 



THE MOVEMENT TO CHICKAilAUGA. 179 

The feint tinder Crittenden was so well timed that Bragg 
concentrated Lis immediate command at and above Chatta- 
nooga, leaving the crossing of the river by the main portion 
of our army later, nnobstnicted. Eosecrans had posted 
his army so that demonsti-ations were made simultaneonsly 
from "SMiitesburg to Blythe's Ferry, a distance of one hun- 
dred and fifty miles, and Bragg did not know just where 
to look for his real advance, but definitely concluded that 
it would not be made anywhere in the vicinity of Bridge- 
port. On the 26th, five days after the suii^rise at Chatta- 
nooga, Bumside's advance into East Tennessee was an- 
nounced by the presence of his cavalry in the ^dcinity of 
Knoxville. Bragg then ordered Buckner to evacuate Knox- 
ville, and occupy Loudon. The demonstration at Blythe's 
Ferry on the Tennessee, opposite the mouth of the Hiawasse, 
caused Bragg to order him to retire to Charleston, and soon 
thereafter to Chattanooga. On the 30th, information was 
given General Thomas that Johnston, with 1-5,000 men from 
IVIississippi, had reinforced Bragg. 

Under cover of the apparent activity of the left of oiu* 
army in front of and above Chattanooga, Rosecrans eflfected 
safely the crossing of the first gi-eat barrier to the objective 
point, and reached the banks of the Tennessee opposite the 
enemy, concealing as far as he could the movements of his 
troops, and the position of his pontoons and trains. He 
then had the river reconnoitred, that the best points might 
be selected and the means at once provided for the cross- 
ing. As soon as the crossings had been determined on, the 
proper dispositions were made to begin the movement. 

The Tennessee River, at the various points where oui- army 
was to cross, is very wide ; and, swollen by recent rains, was 
quite high for that season of the year. The troops crossed 
the river at four points. As there were not enough pon- 



180 THE ARMY OF THE CUMBERLAND. 

toons foi' two bridges, Slieridan liad commenced trestlework 
for part of one at Bridgeport. Reynolds advanced to Sliell- 
motind, seizing the place. Here lie captured a number of 
boats, and with these and other material picked up, he was 
enabled to cross at that point, w^hile Brannan crossed his 
division from the mouth of Battle Creek on rafts. The main 
crossing of McCook's corps was at Caperton's Ferry, about 
forty miles below Chattanooga, where the jiontoon bridge 
was laid by Davis's division, after driving a detachment of 
rebel cavalry from the oj^posite side. 

The movement across the river was commenced on Au- 
gust 29th, and comj^leted on SejDtember 4th. Baird, in 
command of a division of Thomas's corps, crossed the river 
at Bridgeport after the repairs were completed to the bridge. 
Ifegley's division crossed at Caperton's Ferry. The four 
aivisions of Thomas's corps with great difficulty crossed 
b'and Mountain, and concentrated near Trenton in Will's 
Valley, east of Sand Mountain. On September 6th Negley's 
division, being in the advance, reached Johnson's Crook, 
vliere Beatty's brigade was sent at once up the mountain 
to seize Stevens's Gap. Before proceeding far he met 
the enemy's pickets, and, night coming on, he went into 
camp just west of the ga.'p. The Eighteenth Ohio went a 
short distance on the road to the top of Lookout Mountain, 
met the enemy's pickets and withdrew. The next day, 
Baird's division supporting Negley, the latter with two bri- 
gades, moved forward, and with his advance gained jiosses- 
sion of the top of the mountain, and secured the forks of the 
road. The entire of Negley's di\asion reached this point on 
the 9th, at the head of Johnson's Crook, and with one bri- 
gade held the pass while another was sent a short distance 
north on the mountain to seize Cooper's Gap, with a regi- 
ment in the advance to occupy and hold the entrance on the 



THE MOVEMENT TO CHICKAMAUGA. 181 

east. Anotlier regiment was sent forward to hold Stevens'* 
Gap, which was found heavily obstructed with fallen tim- 
ber. Negley still being in the advance, moved the day fol- 
lowing across Missionary Eidge, and took up a position iu 
McLemore's Cove on the road through Dug Gap. Here ho 
found the enemy's cavalry drawn up in line, and learned 
from citizens that the rebels were in strong force concen- 
trated in his front in Dug Gap, with infantiy, artillery, and 
cavalry. Baird's division was in supporting distance of 
Negley. 

Early in the morning of the 9th Reynolds sent the Ninety- 
aecond Illinois (mounted infantry) to make a reconnoissance 
ilong the toi3 of Lookout Mountain, to discover the enemy's 
movements and to determine the iiimors in regard to tho 
evacuation of Chattanooga. At 11 a.m. the regiment entered 
the town as the rear of the enemy's column was leaving the 
place. The next day the four divisions of the Fourteenth 
Corps were in supporting distance of each other, with Negley 
wtill in front of Dug Gap, the enemy holding the east en- 
trance with a heavy force, and the Gap full of obstructions. 
Negley discovered early on the following day that the rebels 
were advancing on him in such supei'ior force that his situa- 
tion was critical, and that he was in danger of losing his 
train. He determined to fall back to a strong position in 
front of Stevens's Gap, which movement he proceeded to 
execute, and succeeded in the face of the enemy by his en- 
ergy and skill, with the prompt co-operation of Baird, in se- 
curing his position in front of the gap without the loss of a 
single wagon. The next day the location of Bragg's army 
at La Fayette with Johnston's reinforcements was fully de- 
termined, and Thomas's corps now awaited the movements 
of the other troops with reference to the concentration of the 
army. 



182 THE ARMY OF THE CUMBERLAND. 

In the meantime Davis's and Johnson's divisions of Mc- 
Cook's corps, crossing the river at Caperton's Ferry, moved 
over Sand Mountain into Will's Valley, and thence — Davis 
being in the advance — moved into and seized Winston's Gap, 
some twenty -five miles from Caperton's Ferry, and about 
forty-two from Chattanooga. Sheridan's division crossed 
the river at the railroad bridge, moved through Trenton, 
and on the 6th encamped twelve miles from Winston's Gap. 
McCook sent several detachments on the Stli and 9th to 
different points, reconnoitring the enemy. One went to 
Alpine and two into Broomtown Valley, but nothing was 
discovered of Bragg's whereabouts. On the evening of the 
9th Kosecrans sent orders to McCook, stating that the en- 
emy had evacuated Chattanooga and were retreating south- 
ward, and directing him to move rajaidly upon Aljiine and 
Summerville in pursuit, to intercejst his line of retreat, and 
to attack on his flank. The day following McCook reached 
Alpine, where he discovered the situation. The enemy had 
not retreated very far from Chattanooga, the exact location 
as yet unknown. McCook learned that he could not commu- 
nicate with Thomas, as his couriers could not pass through 
the valley, occupied as it was by the enemy in force, and 
that his corps was entirely isolated at Alpine. That, had 
he gone to Summerville, he would have been exposed to an 
attack from the entire rebel army, which his reconnoissance 
later determined was concentrated in force near La Fayette. 
On the following day McCook remained in camp waiting 
for Thomas to move up on him. He, however, sent his 
wagon-train back to the summit of Lookout Mountain. On 
the 12th McCook waited in camp for reports from the cav- 
alry as to the position and movements of the enemy. 

Crittenden's corps had during the time moved down the 
Sequatchie Valley, in readiness for an active campaign. He 



THE MOVEMENT TO CHICKAMAUGA. 183 

tlien crossed the river at Bridgeport, Sliell Mound, and Bat- 
tle Creek, and on September ith his entire corps was across 
the river. He was ordered to move up the valley of Running 
Water Creek and Whiteside, leaving one division on the line 
of the Nashville and Chattanooga Eailroad, and to i)ush for- 
ward as near as possible to Chattanooga, threatening the en- 
emy in that direction. At G a.m. on the 9th Crittenden was 
informed by a despatch from Rosecrans that Chattanooga 
had been abandoned by the enemy, and that he was to push 
forward at once with five days' rations and make a vigorous 
pursuit. During the morning Crittenden with Wood's divi- 
sion occupied the town, and Wood was placed in command. 
Palmer's and Van Cleve's were turned off south after they 
passed the spur of Lookout Mountain, and encamped at 
Rossville, five miles soiith of Chattanooga. In the afternoon 
of the same day Crittenden was ordered to leave a brigade at 
Chattanooga, and with the balance of his command to pur- 
sue the enemy with the utmost vigor, the line of march to 
be through Einggold and on to Dalton. The next day Crit- 
tenden left Wagner — who had crossed the river from the front 
of the town during the night — in command, and ordered for- 
ward Palmer's, Van Cleve's, and the two brigades of Wood's 
division in pursuit, marching on the Eossville and Einggold 
road. During the afternoon Palmer reported the enemy's 
cavaliy strong on his front, that he had only been able to 
march six miles, had encami^ed at Chickamauga Creek, and 
that his advance had been checked by a charge of the rebel 
cavalry. That night Crittenden received several reports 
from his front that the enemy was in force near La Fayette, 
and threatening to retake Chattanooga. 

During the 11th, Wood, with his two brigades, was on a 
reconnoissance at Gordon's Mills, and Crittenden was ordered 
to occupy Einggold and report. These movements deter. 



184 THE ARMY OF THE CUMBERLAND. 

mined to Eosecrans's satisfaction the position of tlie enemy 
in force in the vicinity of La Fayette. He immediately 
ordered Crittenden to close his entire command uj^on Wood, 
crossing as quickly as possible to the Kossville and La Fay- 
ette road, to some point near Lee and Gordon's Mills. Early 
on the morning of the 12th, Wilder was ordered back to 
Einggold and directed to follow on the line of march of the 
infantry, covering the left flank. Crittenden succeeded dur- 
ing the day in efi'ecting a concentration of his command at 
Lee and Gordon's Mills, which point Wilder's brigade reached 
after a severe skirmish during the day near Leet's tanyard, 
where he lost thii'ty men killed and wounded. With the 
knowledge that Bragg was concentrating his forces awaiting 
reinforcements behind Pigeon Mountain, in the vicinity of 
La Fayette, and that his own army was scattered a distance 
of thirty miles from flank to flank — from Lee and Gordon's 
Mills to Alpine — Rosecrans felt that it was a matter of life 
and death to effect the concentration of his army in the short- 
est possible space of time. 

During tliese movements of the army under Eosecrans, 
what was Bragg doing? On August 20th, the movement of 
our army over the Cumberland Mountains Mas reported to 
Bragg, and he then knew that he might look for an immedi- 
ate advance. The movement of our army across the Tennes- 
see was also reported to Bragg by his scouts, but was re- 
garded by him as incredible. These reports were soon after 
confirmed by the news that our cavalry had occupied Trenton 
and had advanced up the W^ill's Valley Eailroad as far as Wau- 
hatchie, within seven miles of Chattanooga, as a covering force 
under which Rosecrans's columns of infantry were advanc- 
ing. Our army was now as near the line of communication 
of the rebel army, as the latter was to the line to Nashville, 
and with less risk in its advance movements should Bragg 



THE MOVEMENT TO CHICKAMAUGA. 185 

commence operations to the north. Bringing his cavalry 
forward at once, Bragg soon ascertained that the general 
movement of our army was toward his left and rear in the 
direction of Dalton and Rome, keeping Lookout Mountain 
between the armies. He then determined to meet our army 
as its columns debouched from the defiles of the mountains. 
To hold Chattanooga would require at least two strong divi- 
sions, and he felt that his force would not permit this and 
make a successful attack also. Bragg put his army in motion 
on September 7th and 8th, and took up position from Leo 
and Gordon's Mills to La Fayette, on the road running south 
from Chattanooga, with front to the east side of Lookout 
Mountain, and on the east bank of Chickamauga Creek, es- 
tablishing his headquarters at the former place. 

The positions of our detached corps was fully known to 
Bragg on the 8th. Leamirig of Negley's movement of the 
9th into McLemore's cove, Bragg rightly interpreted it to 
mean that a hurried pursuit was being made after his force, 
tinder the idea that he was in full retreat. "With his own 
force concentrated in front of the centre, Bragg at once saw 
how Eosecrans had exjDosed the corps of his army to be 
attacked and defeated in detail, and that evening he gave 
orders to Hindman to prejDare his division to move against 
Negley, and ordered Hill to send or take Cleburne's division, 
join Hindman, and immediately move upon Negley. On re- 
ceipt of these orders. Hill replied that his part of the move- 
ment was impracticable, as Cleburne was sick, and that both 
gaps — Dug and Catlett's — had been closed by felling timber, 
which would require twenty-four hours to remove. Hindman 
having marched during the night of the 9th some ten miles, 
was now in position, some three miles from Negley in the 
cove. Bragg not wishing to lose so favorable an opportu- 
nity of striking his opioonent's force, ordered Buckner with 



186 THE ARMY OF THE CUMBERLAND. 

his command to move from ABclerson and join Hindman in 
the cove, which he did during the afternoon of the 10th. 
After these commands had united, the commanders held a 
consultation and determined that a change in the plan of 
operations should be made. Bragg having removed his head- 
quarters to La Fayette, "so as to secure more prompt and 
decided action in the movements ordered against the enemy's 
centre," now directed Polk to send his remaining division to 
support Hindman during the operations in the cove. De- 
spatching an officer to Bragg with a report as to this change 
of plans, Hindman and Cleburne waited his return. Bragg 
refused to make any change, and sent a verbal order to Hind- 
man to proceed at once to carry out his previous instruction. 
Bragg at the same time sent written orders by courier to 
Hindman, notifying him of the movements of our forces, 
that Polk had been directed to cover his rear, and ordered 
him to attack and force his way through Negley to La Fay- 
ette at the earliest hour in the morning, and adds " Cleburne 
will attack in front the moment your guns are heard." 
Walker's reserve corps was also ordered to move promptly, 
join Cleburne's division at Dug Gaj) and unite in the attack. 
All obstnictions were removed from Dug and Catlett's Gaps, 
and Breckinridge's division of Hill's coi^ds was kept in posi- 
tion south of La Fayette to check any movement of our 
troops from that direction, thus putting 30,000 troops in 
position to crush Negley and Baird. Bragg shortly after 
daylight joined Cleburne, where they waited nearly all day 
for Hindman's guns to open — when Cleburne was to attack — 
on the flank and rear of Negley and Baird's divisions. After 
waiting long j^ast noon in great anxiety for Hindman's attack, 
about the middle of the afternoon his first gun was heard. 
Cleburne at once pressed forward and discovered that Negley 
had fallen back to Stevens's Gap. 



THE MOVEMENT TO CHICKAMAUGA. 187 

Bragg, finding his attempt against Thomas's corps a fail- 
ure, tlien determined to hurl his columns upon Crittenden's 
divided corps, apisroaching from Chattanooga, by withdraw- 
ing the troops engaged in the movement on Thomas's com- 
mand to La Fayette, and directing Polk's and Walker's corjjs 
to move immediately in the direction of Lee and Gordon's 
Mills. Bragg knew Crittenden's corps was divided, but sup- 
posed only one division had been sent to Einggold. At six 
o'clock on the evening of the 12th, Bragg wrote again to 
Polk, notifying him of Crittenden's position of the 11th, 
and stated : " This presents you a fine opj)ortunity of strik- 
ing Crittenden in detail, and I hope you wull avail yourself 
of it at daylight to-moiTow. This division crushed, and tho • 
others are yours. We can then turn on the force in the cove. 
Whfeeler's cavalry will move on Wilder so as to cover your 
right. I shall be delighted to hear of your success." Later 
in the evening two additional orders were issued to Polk, 
urging him to attack promptly at "day-dawn," on the 13th ; 
that our army was concentrating, and that it was "highly 
important that your attack in the morning should be quick 
and decided." At eleven o'clock that night Polk sent a dis- 
patch stating that he had taken a strong position for defense 
and asked that he be hea\'ily reinforced. Bragg sent him 
an immediate order not to defer his attack, as his command 
■was numerically superior to the opposing force, and told 
him that to secure success, prompt and rapid movements on 
his part were necessary. Early on the morning of the 13th, 
Bragg, at the head of Buckner's command, went to the front, 
and found no advance had been made by Polk as ordered, 
and that Crittenden had united his forces and recrossed the 
Chickamauga. 

Again the attempt to strike our army in detail had failed, 
and now Bragg gave orders to his commanders to concen- 



188 THE ARMY OF THE CUMBERLAND. 

trate along the east bank of Cliickamauga in position for 
battle, and as soon as liis reinforcements nnder Longstreet 
from Virginia were up to attack with the entire command. 
"Wheeler, with two divisions of cavaliy on the extreme left, was 
ordered to engage the attention of Thomas in McLeraore's 
Cove, covering the main movement of the rebel army ; For- 
rest with his own and Pegram's divisions of cavalry covered 
the right and front. Bragg ordered B. E. Johnson's brigade 
from Einggold, where he had been stationed protecting the 
railroad, to take position near Eeed's bridge on the extreme 
right of his line. Walker's corijs was then formed on John- 
son's left, opposite Alexander's Bridge. Buckner's corps was 
formed on the left of Walker, near Ledford's Ford. Polk's 
coiTDS was placed in line opposite Lee and Gordon's Mills 
on Buclmer's left, with Hill on the extreme left. Two bri- 
gades that had just arrived from Mississippi were jjlaced 
under Johnson on the right, making his command a division 
of thi-ee brigades strong. To this division in the earlier 
movements three brigades of Longstreet's corps from Vir- 
ginia were temporarily attached. On the 18th, Hood report- 
ing, was placed in command of this column on the right. 

The rebel army on the 17th were in position, and that 
evening Bragg issued his orders for his forces to cross the 
Chickamauga, commencing the movement at six o'clock on 
the morning of the 18th. Bragg's plan of battle for the 
18th was for the column under Johnson — later under Hood — 
to cross in force at Eeed's Bridge, rajjidly turn to the left by 
the most practicable route, and sweep up the Chickamauga 
toward Lee and Gordon's Mills. Walker's corps next on the 
left, crossing at Alexandria Bridge, was to unite in the 
movement, pressing our army vigorously on flank and rear, 
in the same direction. Buckner, crossing at Ledford's Ford, 
was to join in the movement to the left, pressing our armj 




cy^^-^^^/^ 



T? — Z> 



THE MOVEMENT TO CHICKAMAUGA. 189 

back up the stream from Polk's front. The latter to push 
forward to the front at Lee and Gordon's Mills, and if not 
able to cross there, to bear to the right and cross at Dalton's 
Ford or Alexander's Bridge, and unite in the attack wlier- 
ever he could find an opposing force. Hill, to cover the 
left flank of the rebel army from an advance by our forces in 
the cove, to ascertain by pressing his cavalry to the front if 
we were reinforcing our corps at Lee and Gordon's Mills, 
and if so to attack en the flank. This plan contemplated 
the destruction of the left of our army, the seizing of the 
La Fayette road, and, if possible, occupying and holding the 
roads in Chattanooga Valley, cutting ofl' all access from Chat- 
tanooga. These movements were not executed as rapidly as 
was contemplated by Bragg, owing to the resistance made by 
our cavalry and ^Yilder's mounted infantry, and the difficulties 
arising from bad and narrow roads. Johnson was repeatedly 
urged to commence the movement on the right, but he de- 
layed his advance until late in the afternoon, when Hood ar- 
rived and efiected the crossing. Walker moved up to Alex- 
ander's Bridge, at which point Wilder hotly contested his 
crossing, and finally broke up the bridge. Walker moved 
down the creek to Byi-on's Ford, where he crossed and joined 
Hood on the right during the night. On Walker's crossing, 
Wilder was compelled to fall back. 

The concentration of our army continued on the 13th, 
Thomas held his position of the 12th, with Negley's, Baird's, 
and Brannan's divisions remaining in camp, waiting the ar- 
rival of McCook, who had been ordered to close uj) to the 
left. Keynolds's division was concentrated on the road from 
Cooper's or Frick's Gap to Catlett's Gap, and the next day 
moved forward and took position at Pond Spring, with his 
two infantry brigades, and was joined here by Wilder. Rey- 
nolds sent Turchin to make a reconnoissance with the Ninety- 



190 THE ARMY OF THE CUMBERLAND. 

second Illinois mounted infantiy, to the month of Catlett's 
Gap, driving the rebel cavalry pickets from Chickamanga 
Creek to the gap, where he found the enemy posted with 
strong reserves. Brannan on the same day reconnoitred the 
position of the enemy toward Dug Gaj?, sending a brigade to 
Chickamanga Creek, east of Lee's Mills, one mile to the right 
and south of Reynolds, at Pond Spring. Turchin made an- 
other reconnoissance on the 16th toward Catlett's Gaj^, and 
found the enemy strongly posted there with infantry and ar- 
tillery. The next day Thomas moved his entire corps and 
closed up on Crittenden's right along Chickamanga Creek, 
and was joined at night by McCook on his right. The four 
divisions of Thomas's command on the afternoon of the 18th 
moved to the left to Crawfish Springs. Here Kosecrans, anti- 
cipating the movement of Bragg to secure the road to Chatta- 
•Qooga, and recognizing the imj^ortance of holding it, ordered 
'Thomas with his corps to march on the cross-road leading 
by the Widow Glenn's to the Chattanooga and La Fayette 
road, and take position on that road near Kelly's farm, con- 
necting with Crittenden's corps on his right at Gordon's 
Mills. During the entire night of the 18th the troops of 
Thomas's corps were moving to the left, and at daylight on 
the 19th the head of the column reached Kelly's farm ; 
Baird's division in the advance, taking position at the forks 
of the road, facing toward Eeed's and Alexander's Bridges 
over the Chickamanga. Wilder had been driven across the 
State road to the heights east, of Widow Glenn's house the 
evening before, by the advance in force of the enemy over 
these bridges, and Baird's right rested close to Wilder's 
brigade. Baird's division was closely followed by Brannan, 
who was placed in position on the left of Baird, on the two 
roads leading to the bridges. 

Orders were received by McCook at midnight on the 13th, 



THE MOVEMENT TO CHICKAMAUGA. 191 

directing two divisions of his corps to move to Thomas's sup- 
port, and that he send his train back under guard of his re- 
maining division. McCook moved his command, by way of 
Valley Head, up the mountain at Alpine on the night of the 
13th, and down on the 14th into Lookout Valley, except one 
brigade from each division forming his train guard under 
command of Lytle, encamped at Little Eiver in the moun- 
tains. Sheridan's marched down Lookout Valley to Johnson's 
Crook, while Johnson's and Davis's divisions were sent from 
Valley Head on the direct road to Stevens's Ga^:). General 
Lytle was ordered to make a reconnoissance with two bri- 
gades toward Dougherty's Gai^ at the head of McLemore's 
Cove. McCook's corps was concentrated on the 17th at Mc- 
Lemore's Cove, and on the night of the 18th General Lytle 
joining the corps with two of his brigades, McCook's com- 
mand was closed up on the Fourteenth Corps, except Post's 
brigade of Davis's division, ordered by General Kosecrans 
to hold Stevens's Gap at all hazards. 

Crittenden on the 13th, under orders from headquarters, 
posted Wood's division in a strong position at Lee and Goi'- 
don's Mills, under orders to resist any advance of the enemy 
to the last, and in case of extremity, if Granger was not in 
position to su^Dport, then to fall back to some point where he 
could guard the road to Chattanooga and the one around the 
point of Lookout Mountain, and hold both roads, as long as 
he had a man under him. The next day Crittenden moved 
the two remaining divisions of his corps to a position on the 
southern spur of Missionaiy Eidge, his right communicating 
with Thomas, where he was to remain, covering the road in 
Chattanooga Valley. Finding no movement of the enemy on 
his front, on the 15th Crittenden was ordered to retiirn with 
his command and take position near Crawfish Spring, with 
Van Cleve on the left and Palmer on the right. During the 



192 THE ARMY OF THE CUMBERLAND. 

dav Mintywith the cavalry made an extended reconnoissance 
on the front, finding the enemy in force at all points. Wood, 
holding position on Chickamauga Creek, at Lee and Gordon's 
Mills, on the morning of the 18th reported the enemy ad- 
vancing with strong line of skirmishers on his left and asked 
for supports. Van Cleve was placed on Wood's left and Pal- 
mer then took Van Cleve's position on Wood's right. Wilder 
in the afternoon reported Minty's cavaliy driven back after 
being reinforced with two of his regiments ; that the enemy 
was flanking him and that he would fall back on Wood. 
Palmer later in the day was placed on the left of Van Cleve's 
new position on the line of Chickamauga Creek, his last bri- 
gade reaching its position at four o'clock on the morning of 
the 19th ; Wood holding his position on the creek at Lee and 
Gordon's Mills, which at this point runs between steej^ rocky 
bluffs in an eastwardly course, with the road to Chattanooga 
Tia Rossville crossing it at right angles ; Van Cleve on his 
left and Palmer on the left of Van Cleve ; the general course 
of the line being northeasterly along the Chickamauga and 
BossviUe road. 



CHAPTER XIL 

THE BATTLE OP CHICKAMAUGA. 

Coi/)NEL D.vN. McCooK, of Granger's reserve coi-ps, who 
had been posted on the road leading toEeed's Bridge, on the 
jvening of the 18th, made a reconnoissance to Chickamanga 
Creek as far as Eeed's Bridge, which he burned. On the 19th, 
meeting Thomas, he reported that an isolated brigade of the 
enemy was on the west side of the creek, and as the bridge 
was destroyed a prompt movement in that direction might 
succeed in capturing the entire force. Thomas ordered 
Brannan to post a brigade on the road to Alexander's Bridge 
as support to Baird, and with his other brigades to recon- 
noitre the road to Reed's Bridge in search of this brigade of 
the enemy. Brannan moved at nine o'clock a.m., and Baird, 
under orders from Thomas, threw forward his right wing so 
as to get into line with Brannan. Baird was also ordered to 
keep a sharp outlook on his right flank and watch the move- 
ments of the enemy in that quarter. Shortly after these 
movements a part of Palmer's , division reported to Thomas 
and was placed in position on the right of Baird. Eosecrans, 
when he sent Thomas to the left — the critical point — told 
him that he was to hold the road to Rossville, and if hard 
pressed, that he should be reinforced with the entire army. 

Under Bragg's orders, Walker's corps on the 18th crossed 
to the west side of Chickamauga a little below Alexander's 
Bridge and then moved up the stream opposite this point. 
VII.— 9 



194 



THE ARMY O*' THE CUMBERLAND. 




THE BATTLE OF CHICKAMAUGA. 195 

Bushrod Johnson's command tlie same day crossed at Reed's 
bridge, and then marclied up the stream some three miles 
and took position on the morning of the 19th. Walker re- 
sumed his movement to his left up the stream, under the im- 
pression that our centre was still at Lee and Gordon's Mills, 
Bragg s plan being to mass Walker's and Johnson's com- 
mands and attack our left flank. The advance movement of 
Brannan's division, Croxton's brigade in front, about ten 
o'clock encountered the enemy, being the cavalry under 
Forrest with Wilson's and Ector's brigades of infantry, and 
drove them nearly half a mile, when it met with obstinate 
resistance. This reconnoissance of Brannan in pursuit of 
the brigade reported by Dan. McCook developed the relative 
position of the opposing contending forces, which up to this 
time was unknown to the respective commanders of each. 
It gave to Bragg the knowledge that his right was greatly 
overlapped by Thomas on our left, and that his flank was in 
danger of being turned. It compelled him at once to halt 
Walker's command on its march, and to direct it to retrace 
its steps and reinforce Forrest, now engaged with Croxton, 
whose movement brought on the battle of Chickamauga be- 
fore Bragg had his troops in the position ordered. 

Thomas then ordered Baird's division forward to Crox- 
ton's supi^ort. Moving at once with two brigades on the 
front, with Starkweather's in reserve, Baird and Croxton 
drove the enemy steadily for some distance with great loss, 
capturing many prisoners. Croxton's brigade having ex- 
hausted its ammunition in the severe fighting of over an 
hour, was then moved to the rear, and Brannan's and Baird's 
divisions with united forces drove the enemy from their im- 
mediate front. Here the line was halted and readjusted. 
Baird learning from his prisoners that the rebel army was in 
heavy force on his immediate front, gathering for an attack 



198 THE ARMY OF THE CUMBERLAND. 

heavy masses, assaulting furiously Eeynolds's and Van Cleve's 
divisions. Here they met with fearful loss from the heavy 
infantry and artillery fire, portions of six batteries open- 
ing with canister on their advancing columns, but still on 
they came. Soon the roar of battle was heard approach- 
ing near to the Widow Glenn's house, where Eosecrans's 
headquarters were. Our right centre now was pierced and 
the enemy was on the La Fayette road. Negley, from the 
right under McCook, was immediately ordered up with his 
division, Brannan from Thomas's left joining him. These 
two divisions were at once sent in to the fight. Moving 
rapidly forward to the attack, with cheer on cheer, they 
hurled back Hood and Johnson, steadily driving them until 
darkness ended the combat, our troops re-occup^-ing their 
old positions. 

Thomas, wishing to reform his lines— which had become 
greatly extended in driving the rebels — and concentrate 
them on more commanding ground in the rear preparatory 
to the engagement to be renewed on the morrow, selected a 
new position for Baird's and Johnson's divisions, the former 
on the extreme left. These jiositions were designated to 
them and were occupied at once. Palmer and Eeynolds 
were ordered into position in line on the right of John- 
son, with Brannan to the rear and right of Eeynolds as re- 
serve. "While these movements were being made, Cleburne 
with his fresh division of Hill's corps, who had been ordered 
to the extreme right by Bragg, under orders to attack im- 
mediately, advancing in full force, supported by Cheatham, 
assaulted Johnson first and then Baird with tremendous 
force. The onset was so determined that some confusion in 
the line resulted, but in a few minutes our troops rallied 
and the enemy was repulsed in fine style. This conflict 
lasted for some time after dark with heavy losses on both 



THE BATTLE OF CHICKAMAUGA. 199 

Bides, tlic liea-v-y firing ligliting up tlie struggle. At this 
point our artillery was again used with good effect. "WiL 
der's brigade had occupied a position during the day on tlio 
La Fayette road about a mile north of Lee and Gordon's 
Mills, with Minty close by. The latter was now ordered to 
rejjort to Granger at Eossville, to hold in check the enemy's 
cavalry operating on their right. Granger, with his reserves, 
protected the roads to the rear toward Eossville and cov- 
ered our left flank. 

"With night the fighting ceased, and the troops, worn out 
after the marching of the night before — moving from tho 
right to the extreme left— and the heavy fighting of the day, 
slept on their arms, awaiting the heavier conflict of the 
morrow. Though weary, the troops were in most excel- 
lent spii-its, and confident of final victory. It was known 
throughout the army that we had been fighting during 
the day largely superior forces. That Bragg had been 
heavily reinforced from Mississipjn and East Tennessee, 
and by Longstreet's command from Virginia, and that tho 
enemy was fighting most desperately. Bragg's gi-eat ainx 
had been to conceal his main attack on our left by the 
feint on the centre, and supposed that our centre on the 
morning of the 19th was still at Lee and Gordon's Mills. 
Presuming this to be the case, Bragg had massed heavily 
on our left, intending to repeat his movement made on our 
right at Murfreesboro. His jilan contemplated the break- 
ing our left, sweeping it before him in broken masses, 
crashing our centre, and destroying our right, and then 
occupying the road to Chattanooga in force he would have 
the Federal army completely in his jjower. Tho move- 
ment made by Croxton comiaelled Bragg to open the battle 
in hea\'y force on the left, before his troops had secured 
the positions assigned them, and then, to his surprise. 



200 THE ARMY OF THE CUMBERLAND. 

lie found tLat diii'ing the niglit our left had been greatly 
prolonged, and that Kosecrans was in force, occupying 
a position far to the north of what he had been led to 
expect. During the night Bragg ordered up by forced 
marches all reinforcements arriving by railroad. Three 
brigades of fresh troops reached the enemy during the 
night, and were placed in line early in the morniiag of the 
20th. These, with the troojDS ordered late the day before 
from the east bank of the Chickamauga, gave Bragg a large 
number of fresh troops, which he placed in line of battle 
on the 20th. During the night Bragg summoned his 
generals to meet him at his camp fire, and there gave them 
orders for the following day. He divided his entire force 
into two commands, to which he assigned his senior Lieu- 
tenant-Generals Longstreet and Polk. The former — who 
had reported during the night — to the left, comjDosed of six 
divisions where his own troops were stationed, and the 
latter continuing in his command of five divisions on the 
right. Bragg's plan of battle for the 20th was for Polk to 
assault in force, with Breckinridge's division on his extreme 
right at day-dawn, when the attack was to be taken up rap- 
idly in succession by the divisions to his left. The left 
wing was to await the movement on the right, and when 
the attack was made there to take it up j^romptly. "When 
the entire line became engaged it was to move forward 
vigorously and persistently throughout its entire length, the 
whole army wheeling on Longstreet's left as a pivot, but 
constantly pressing our left to get possession of the road 
to Chattanooga. 

The battle of the 1 9th was a series of brilliant charges and 
counter-charges, in favor of first one side and then the 
other. During the day our troops, at times broken and 
driven by the enemy, always promptly rallied and drove 



THE BATTLE OP CHICKAMAUGA. 201 

the rebels in disorder to their lines by brilliant and effec- 
tive dashes, moving to the attack with vigor and determina- 
tion. In the main the results of the day were in our favor. 
Bragg had been forced to fight before he was in i^osition, 
and had been foiled in his attempt to secure the roads, 
which on the evening of the 19th remained even more se- 
curely in our possession than before, fully protected on both 
flanks by our cavalry. As this was the object of the severe 
conflict of the 19th, that day's fighting was a success for 
our arms, both the Rossville and the Dry Valley roads being 
firmly held by oiir troops that night. 

But the battle was not yet over. During the night Rose- 
crans assembled his corjjs commanders at his headquarters 
at the Widow Glenn's house, and after a consultation with 
them on the state and condition of their commands, gave 
orders for the disposition and movements of the troops for 
the next day. Tho divisions of Thomas's corps, with those 
which had reinforced him, to hold the road to Rossville, in 
the same position as then occupied by them in line of battle, 
with Brannan in reseiTe. McCook, with Sheridan's and 
Davis's divisions was to maintain his picket line until it was 
attacked and driven back. His left division — Davis's — was 
to close on Thomas, and to have his right refused covering 
the position at Widow Glenn's house. Crittenden was to 
hold two divisions, Wood's and Van Cleve's, in resei-ve near 
where the line of McCook and Thomas joined to reinforce 
the front line as needed. 

During the night Thomas received word from Baird on the 
extreme left, that the left of his division did not reach the 
road to Reed's Bridge, as had been anticipated. Thomas 
immediately requested that Negley's division be ordered to 
report to him to take position on Baird's left and rear, se- 
curing this flank from assault. At daylight Rosecrans, rid- 



202 THE ARMY OP THE CUMBERLAND. 

ing the line, ordered Negley to join Thomas at once, and 
directed McCook to relieve Negley, who was on the front 
line. He also ordered McCook to adjust his right, as it 
was too far out on the crest, and to move Davis's division 
to the left, and close it uj) compactly. Crittenden was also 
directed to move his two divisions to the left and Palmer, 
on Thomas's line, was instructed to close up his front. On 
reaching the left Eosecrans was convinced that the first 
attack would be made on that flank, and returned at once 
to the right to huiiy Negley over to Thomas. Arriving 
there he found that this division had not moved, and that 
McCook's troops were not ready to relieve him. Negley 
was then ordered to send his reserve brigade under John 
Beatty, and to follow with the other two when relieved 
from the front. Imimtient at McCook's delay in reliev- 
ing Negley, and anticipating momentarily the attack of 
the enemy on our left, Eosecrans ordered Crittenden to 
move Wood's division to the front, to fill the jiosition oc- 
cupied by Negley of which McCook was notified by Eose- 
crans in person. Eosecrans, when first at McCook's line, was 
greatly dissatisfied with McCook's i)osition. He now called 
McCook's attention to the defects in his line, that it was 
too light, and that it was weakened by being too much 
strung out, and charged him to keep well closed up on the 
left at all hazards. Leaving McCook, Eosecrans then re- 
turned to Negley, and found to his surprise that the bri- 
gades in front had not yet been relieved and started to 
Thomas after his repeated orders, as Wood's division had 
only reached the position of Negley's reserve. Greatly 
irritated at this, Eosecrans gave peremptory orders and 
Wood's division was at once placed in front, closed uj) on 
the right of Brannan. 

A heavy fog hung over the battlefield during the early 



THE BATTLE OF CHICKAMAUGA, 203 

morning. Bragg, before dayliglit ■witli his staff, took posi- 
tion immediately in the rear of the centre of his line, and 
waited for Polk to begin the attack, waiting until after sun- 
rise with increasing anxiety and disappointment. Bragg 
then sent a staff officer to Polk to ascertain and report as to 
the cause of the delay, with orders urging him to a promi:)t 
and speedy attack. Polk was not found with his troops, and 
the staff officer learning that he had spent the night on the 
east side of ChickamaiTga Creek, rode over there and deliv- 
ered his message. Bragg, im^jatient at the delay, proceeded 
in person to his right wing and there found the troops wholly 
unpreimred for the movement. Messengers were sent for 
Polk in hot haste, and on his reporting he was urged to a 
prompt execution of his orders and to make a vigorous attack 
at once. 

During the night our trooi:>s threw up temi^oraiy breast- 
works of logs and rails. Behind these Thomas's command 
awaited the attack. After Bragg had sent for Polk, he or- 
dered a reconnoissance in his front on the extreme left of 
our line, and crossing the main road to Chattanooga devel- 
oped the fact that this i^osition so gTeatly desired by him 
was thus feebly held. At half jjast eight o'clock the rebel 
attack Oldened on our left with skirmish firing. Pushing 
foiTvard with a heavy line of skirmishers to develop Baird's 
position, with Breckinridge's division on the right and 
Cleburne to his left, the rebels made, about an hour later, 
a tremendous assault. Beatty's brigade of Negley's division 
being now in line on Baird's left, received the full force of 
the blow from the brigades of Adams and Stovall on the 
right of Breckinridge's division, and was driven back in 
disorder. Helm's brigade and Cleburne's division, advan- 
cing on the front of Baird, encountered the troops behind 
their breastworks but were here met with a terrific fire of 



204 THE ARMY OF THE CUMBERLAND. 

canister and mtisketry, and tlieir advance checked so tlior 
ouglily that it was not regarded as safe to send the two bri- 
gades now overlapping Baird to attack his rear. These 
brigades, however, had reached and crossed the La Fayette 
road. Beatty in falling back was relieved by several regi- 
ments of Johnson's division, which were placed in jDOsition 
by Baird. These regiments were joined by Vanderveer's 
brigade of Brannau's division and a portion of Stanley's bri- 
gade of Negley's division, which had been hurried to the left 
and thrown into action. These forces advancing checked 
the assault of the enemy and then drove him entirely from 
Baird's left and rear. Immediately following the attack on 
Baird, the enemy's assault, being taken up by the divisions 
on Breckinridge's left, i^ressed on and struck Johnson, then 
Palmer and Eeynolds successively with equal fierceness, 
maintaining the attack for two hours, the enemy in repeated 
assaults bringing fresh trooj^s constantly to the front was 
each time met and hurled back by the splendid fighting of 
our troops. Here Bragg exhausted his utmost energies to 
di'ive in the centre and to dislodge Thomas's right, and fail- 
ing in this after re^Deated attacks fell back and occupied his 
old position. 

McCook, early in the morning, on going to the front found 
that Wood's division, not having the battle-front of Neglej^'s, 
did not occupy the entire of the rude barricade thrown up 
by Negley's troops, and that a portion of it on Wood's right 
was not occupied by any of our forces. Wood, on meeting 
McCook, explained to him that his left was well protected, 
resting on Brannan's right, and that his orders were to keep 
well closed up on Brannan. On the right of this gap to the 
right of Wood, McCook had posted Wilder with his bri- 
gade, who had been ordered to report to McCook and receive 
orders from him. McCook then directed Sheridan to bring 



THE BATTLE OP CHICKAMAUGA. 205 

forward one of his brigades and occuidj with it the space 
between Wood's right and Wilder. As McCook started to 
leave this portion of the line, he met Davis's division march- 
ing toward this vacant siDacc. Davis was directed at once to 
post one of his brigades in this part of the line, holding the 
other in reserve. When the brigade Sheridan sent arrived, 
McCook placed it in column as support to Davis on his 
right and rear. At this time Thomas again reporting that 
he needed reinforcements and the right as yet not being 
actively engaged, Eosecrans concluded that Bragg's efforts 
were still looking to the possession of the roads on our left, 
and that he was massing his troops on his right, thus j^ro- 
longing his line on that flank. He then, at 10.10 a.m., 
ordered McCook to withdraw as far as possible the force 
on the right and reinforce Thomas, stating that "the left 
must be held at all hazards, even if the right is withdrawn 
wholly back to the j^resent left." Five minutes after the 
receipt of this order McCook received one dated 10.30 a.m., 
directing him to send two brigades of Sheridan's division 
at once with all iDOssible dispatch to support Thomas and 
to send the third brigade as soon as it could safely be 
withdrawn. McCook immediately sent Lytle's and Wal- 
worth's brigades of Sheridan's division on the double quick 
to the support of Thomas. 

The battle increasing in fury and volume was gi-adually 
approaching the centre from the left, but Thomas still sus- 
taining the brunt of the fight was compelled to send again 
and again for reinforcements. Beatty's and Stanley's bri- 
gades of Negley's division had been sent from the right. 
Vanderveer with his brigade of Brannan's division also re- 
ported. Barnes's brigade of Van Cleve's division had also 
been ordered to Thomas, and now the two of Sheridan's di- 
vision were under orders to proceed to the left. About this 



206 THE ARMY OF THE CUMBERLAND. 

time Lietitenant-Colonel Von Soliradcr of Thomas's staif, 
who had been riding the lines, reported to Thomas that 
there were no troops on Beynolds's right, and a long gap 
existed between Reynolds and Wood ; not aware that Bran- 
nan's division although not in front line was still in i^osition, 
retired in the woods a short distance back, but not out of 
line. This information was at once sent by Thomas to 
Bosecrans, who immediately directed Wood to close up 
the line on Beynolds and supi^ort him, and sent word to 
Thomas that he would be supported if it required all of 
McCook's and Crittenden's corps to do so. 

On receipt of this order — impossible for him to execute 
literally — Wood undertook to carry it out by withdrawing 
his entire command from the front, leaving a gap of two 
brigades in the line of battle, moving to the rear j^ast Bran- 
nan's division, to where Beynolds was posted in line. Into 
the gap thus made by Wood, Davis attempted to throw suf- 
ficient force to hold that portion of the line thus vacated, by 
j)Osting his reserve brigade. 

Just at this time the order of battle on the enemy's lino 
had reached Longstreet's command, who, seeing this gap, 
ordered his troojis, formed in heavy columns, to advance. 
Into this gaj) there poured Stewart's, Hood's, Kershaw's, 
Johnson's, and Hindman's divisions, dashing impetuously 
forward, with Preston's large division as supports. Our 
right, disabled as it was, was speedily turned, the line of 
battle on the enemy's front extending nearly from Bran- 
nan's centre to a point far to the right of the Widow Glenn's 
house, and from the front of that portion of the line Sheri- 
dan's brigades had just been taken. McCook, to resist this 
fierce assault, had only Carlin's and Heg's brigades of Davis's 
division and Laibold's brigade of Sheridan's division. On 
finding the rebel troojDS i^ressing through the space vacated 



THE BATTLE OF CHICKAMAUGA. 207 

by Wood, McCook ordered Lytle and Walworth to cliange 
front and return to assist in repelling the enemy. Wilder 
and Harrison closed in on Sheridan with their commands as 
speedily as jiossible, and aided in resisting the enemy's at- 
tack. Davis, being overpowered by the immense numbers 
of the rebels, was compelled to retire to save his command. 
Laibold was in turn driven back in confusion, and the tide 
of battle then struck Lytle and Walworth, who contended 
nobly against the overpowering columns, and for a time 
checked the advance of the enemy on their immediate front. 
The rebel troops swarming in, turned the left of these bri- 
gades, and they were compelled to withdraw to escape being 
surrounded. At this point the gallant Lytle was killed. 
Here our army lost several thousand iirisoners, forty guns, 
and a large niamber of wagon-trains. 

Once more the right of the army was broken all to pieces, 
and five brigades of that wing cut off entirely from the rest 
of the command. In the meantime Bragg, determined to 
turn Thomas's left, and cut him off from Chattanooga, was 
making his preparations for a second assault on his right in 
heavier force. Bragg directed this movement in person. 
Extending his right by moving Breckinridge's division be- 
yond its former position, he ordered Walker's corps in line 
on Breckinridge's left, and connected Cleburne's right on the 
left of Walker. Bragg's plan was for Breckinridge to ad- 
vance, wheeling to the left, and thus envelop Thomas's ex- 
posed left flank, striking it in the rear. Breckinridge, ad- 
vancing, was soon in position on the Chattanooga road, 
partly in rear of Thomas. But he was now detached from 
the main body of the rebel troops engaged in the movement, 
and, making a bold assault on the rear, he was here met by 
the three reserve brigades under Vandeveer, Willich, and 
Grose, and hurled in rout back on his original line. On 



208 THE ARMY OP THE CUMBERLAND. 

reacliiug it lie tliere found the other troops that had taken 
part in this charge, and that they had been repulsed at every 
point by Baird's, Johnson's, and Palmer's divisions. 

Beatty, just prior to the repulse of the enemy on the left 
by Thomas, applied in person to the latter for at least a bri- 
gade to support him in the attack of the rebels he was then 
exi^ecting. Thomas sent an aid to hurry Sheridan up. This 
officer returned soon afterward, and reported that he had 
encountered a heav'y force of the enemy in the rear of Rey- 
nolds's position, which was advancing slowly, with a strong 
line of skirmishers thrown out ; that he had met Harker, 
who, with his brigade jiosted on a ridge a short distance to 
Beynolds's rear, was watching this force approaching, and 
was of the opinion that these troops were Sheridan's coming 
to Thomas's assistance. Thomas then rode forward to de- 
termine the character of the advancing troops, which he 
soon did, and ordered Harker to open fire upon them, re- 
sisting their farther advance. Thomas then selected the crest 
of a commanding ridge, known as " Horseshoe Bidge," on 
which to place Brannan's division in line, which — on Long- 
street's sweeping McCook's lines from the right — had been 
struck in the flank on the line of battle. On the si:)urs to 
the rear he posted his artillery. On Thomas leaving Har- 
ker, the latter opening fire with his skirmishers, then j^osted 
his right to connect with Brannan's division and portions of 
Beatty's and Stanley's brigades of Negley's division, which 
had been ordered over to this point from the extreme left. 
Thomas then went to the crest of the hill on the front, 
where he met Wood with his division, who confirmed him in 
the opinion that the troops advancing were those of the 
enemy. Thomas was not aware at that time of the extent 
of the disaster to the right. He ordered Wood to i^lace 
his division in line with Brannan's, and to resist as long as 



THE BATTLE OF CHICKAMAUGA. 209 

possible the advance of tlie enemy. On receipt of his order 
Wood immediately threw his troops on the left of Brannan, 
and had barely time to form his lines when the enemy was 
upon then in a heavy, fierce assault like those early in the 
day. This, however, was handsomely repulsed, the enemy 
charging again and again with fresh troops, but their efforts 
were successfully resisted. These were Bushrod Johnson's 
men, with Patton Anderson's brigade on his right, which 
had been formed on the brow of the secondary spur of the 
ridge, and at about two o'clock moved forward, making a 
most determined assault on our forces. Part of his line 
reached the crest held by Wood, but was hurled back to its 
original position under as determined a counter-charge. 

Away off at Eossville Gordon Granger with three brigades 
of the reserve corps was stationed. He had heard during 
the morning heavy firing from the front, in the direction of 
Thomas, and as the firing increased in volume and intensity 
on the right, he judged that the enemy were pressing him 
hard. He then determined, although contrary to his orders, 
to gather what troops he could and go to Thomas's assist- 
ance. Ordering Whittaker's and Mitchell's brigades under 
the immediate command of Steedman to move to his front, 
he placed Dan McCook's brigade at the Mc Afee church, to 
cover the Einggold road. Thomas was at this time heavily 
engaged on "Horseshoe Eidge," between the La Fayette 
and the Dry Valley roads, about three miles and a half from 
Granger's headquarters. Pushing forward his troops rapidly, 
Granger moved past a detachment of the enemy some two 
miles out, and ordered Dan McCook forward to watch the 
movements of the rebels, to keep open the La Fayette road, 
and to cover the open fields on the right of the road inter- 
vening between this point and Thomas's position. McCJook 
brought up his brigade as rapidly as possible, took and held 



210 THE ARMY OP THE CUMBERLAND. 

his position until late tliat night. Granger moving to the 
front arrived with his command ahout three o'clock, and re- 
ported at once to Thomas, who was then with this part of his 
command on " Horseshoe Eidge," where the enemy was 
pressing him hard on front and endeavoring to turn both of 
his flanks. To the right of this position was a ridge ninning 
east and west nearly at right angles with it. On this Bush- 
rod Johnson had reformed his command, so severely re- 
IDulsed by Wood. Longstreet now strengthened it with 
Hindman's division and that of Kershaw, all under the com- 
mand of Hindman, who formed it in heavy columns for an 
attack on the right flank and rear of Thomas's troops. 
Kershaw's division had jjossession of a gorge in this ridge 
through which his division was moving in heavy masses, 
with the design of making an attack in the rear. This was 
the most critical hour of this eventful day. Granger promptly 
ordered Whittaker and Mitchell to hurl themselves against 
this threatening force. Steedman gallantly seizing the 
colors of a regiment, led his command to the charge. Rush- 
ing uijon the enemy with loud cheers, after a terrific con- 
flict, only of some twenty minutes' duration, with a hot in- 
fantry and artillery fire, Steedman drove them from their 
l^osition and occupied both the ridge and gorge. Here the 
slaughter was frightful. The victory was won at a fearful 
cost, but the army was saved. After Hindman was driven 
back, Longstreet about four o'clock, determined to re-take 
the ridge. Asking Bragg for reinforcements from the right, 
he was informed by him " that they had been beaten back 
so badly that they could be of no sei'vice to me." Long- 
street then ordered up his reserve division of fresh troops 
under Preston, four brigades strong, supported by Stewart's 
corps, and directed him to attack the troops on the ridge. 
Advancing with wild yells, confident of success, Preston 



THE BATTLE OF CHICKAMAUGA. 211 

dashed boldly uj) the hill, supported by Kershaw's troops, 
with Johnson's — part of Hindman's — and later on by those 
of Stewart's. But once more the enemy was driven back 
with frightful slaughter, and thus with charge and counter- 
charge at this part of the field, lasting for nearly two hours, 
the day wore away until darkness settled down, night find- 
ing Thomas's command — the troops under Brannan, Wood, 
and Granger — still holding the ridge. Some unauthorized 
person had ordered Thomas's ammunition train back to 
Chattanooga, and the supply with the troops on the field was 
running very low. The ammunition that Granger brought 
up with him was divided with the troops on that part of the 
field where his command fought — Brannan's and Wood's di- 
visions — but this supply was soon exhausted. The trooj^s 
then gathered what coiild be found in the cartridge-boxes 
of the slain, friend and foe being alike examined. With 
the fresh charges of the enemy, the troops were ordered to 
use their bayonets and give the rebels cold steel, and in the 
final charges the enemy was met and rej^ulsed in this way. 

In the breaking up of our right, two brigades of Davis's 
di^dsion, one of Van Cleve's, and the entire of Sheridan's di- 
vision was caught in the whiii and sent adrift from the 
main command, the enemy in heavy columns comjdetely 
controlling all access to Thomas and the remaining divisions 
with him, except by way of the Dry Valley road across the 
ridge and on to Rossville, thence back on the La Fayette 
road to Thomas's left. The troops of Sheridan's and Davis's 
divisions were rallied a short distance in the rear of the line, 
and taking the Dry Valley road, endeavored to unite with 
Thomas's command. They were i^laced in position on the 
Bossville road leading to the battlefield. 

Eosecrans was watching on the rear of Davis's right for 
McCook to close up his line to the left when Longstreet's 



212 THE ARMY OF THE CUMBERLAND. 

men i3oured tlirougli the gap left by Wood's "withdrawal. 
Seeing that some disaster had occurred, Rosecrans hurried 
in person to the extreme right, to direct Sheridan's move- 
ments on the flank of the advancing rebels. But it was 
simijly impossible to stem the tide and our men were di-iven 
back as the enemy advanced. Leaving orders for the troojjs 
to be rallied behind the ridges west of the Dry Valley road, 
Rosecrans endeavored with Garfield, his chief of staff, and a 
few others of his staif, to rejoin Thomas by passing to the 
rear of the broken portions of the right. Riding down in 
this direction, some two or three hundred yards under a heavy 
fire, he found the troops that had been driven from the right 
far over toward the left, and from all indications it appeared 
doubtful if the left had been able to maintain its position. 
He then concluded to go to Rossville and there determine 
whether to join Thomas on the battlefield or whether his 
duty called him to Chattanooga, to prepare for his broken 
army if his worst fears should be realized. On reaching 
Rossville it was determined that Garfield should go to the 
front to Thomas and report, and that Rosecrans should go 
to Chattanooga and make the necessary dispositions for the 
troops as they came back in rout. 

Rosecrans on arriving at Chattanooga at once sent out or- 
ders to Thomas to assirme command of all the troops at the 
front, and with Crittenden and McCook to take a strong po- 
sition and assume a threatening attitude at Rossville, where 
ammunition and rations would be sent to meet him. Tho^ 
mas determined to hold his position until nightfall, if posi 
sible, before withdrawing. He then distributed ammuni- 
tion to the commands and ordered the division commanders 
to hold themselves in readiness to fall back as soon as or- 
dered. Reynolds at half-past five was notified to commence 



THE BATTLE OF CHICKAMAUGA. 213 

tlie movement. LeaAdng the position he had hekl near 
Wood, Thomas started to meet Reynolds and show him the 
position he wanted him to occupy, forming the line covering 
the retirement of the trooj)s on the La Fayette road on the 
left. Just before meeting Eeynolds, Thomas was informed 
of a large rebel force in the woods ahead of him, drawn up 
in line and advancing toward him. This was Liddell's divi- 
sion on the extreme rebel right, under orders from Bragg, 
moving to a third attack on Thomas's left. Eeynolds arriv- 
ing at this time, Thomas ordered him to at once change the 
head of the column to the left, foi-m line perpendicular to the 
road and to charge the enemy then in his immediate front, 
while the artillery opened a converging fire from the right 
and left. Turchin charged with his brigade upon the rebel 
force and di'ove them in complete rout far beyond Baird's 
left. Eobinson's command — King's brigade — closely sup- 
porting Turchin, was posted on the road leading through the 
ridge to hold the ground, while the troops on our right and 
left retired. 

Shortly after this Willich with his brigade was jalaced in po- 
sition on commanding ground to the right of the ridge road, 
and assisted in covering the withdrawal of our troops. Tur- 
cliin's brigade, having cleared the front, returned and took 
position on this road with Eobinson and "Willich. 

Thomas having made this disposition of the troops, or- 
dered Wood, Brannan, and Granger, to fall back from their 
positions. These troops were not molested, but Baird and 
Johnson as they were retiring were attacked. By the exer- 
cise of care and foresight they retired without confusion and 
with but slight loss. This attack was led by L. E. Polk's 
brigade, but the rebel lines had become so changed that they 
formed an acute angle and their troops were firing into each 



214 THE ARMY OF THE CUMBERLAND. 

other in the dark. So quietly was the army withdrawn that 
it was not until after sunrise on the 21st that Bragg discov- 
ered that Thomas had retired. Having effected the with- 
drawal of his troops, General Thomas, accompanied by 
Granger and Garfield, proceeded to Eossville and placed the 
command in j)osition at that place, ordering one brigade of 
Negley's division to hold the gaj) on the Einggold road with 
the other two brigades posted on the top of the ridge to tho 
right, joining on the brigades in the road, with Dan Mc- 
Cook's brigade in reserve. On the right of Negley Ecy- 
nolds's division took position, reaching to the Dry Valley 
road, with Brannan's division as a reserve in rear of Rey- 
nolds's right. On the right of the Dry Valley road, extending 
to the west, McCook's corps was i^laced, his right extending 
to Chattanooga' Creek. Upon the high gi-ound to the left 
of the Einggold road the entire of Crittenden's coi^ss was 
placed. As a reserve Steedman's division of Granger's corps 
was posted on his left, while Baird's division was also in re- 
serve and in support of the brigade of Negley's division 
holding the gajj. Thrown out on the Einggold road, a mile 
and a half in advance of the gap, Minty's brigade of cavalry 
held the road at that point during the night. Here the 
weary troops rested undisturbed the night after the heavy 
fighting and nothing was seen of the enemy until about nine 
o'clock of the 21st, when their advance appeared in heavy 
force of infantry and cavalry on Minty's front. Thomas, 
withdi-awing Miuty through the gap, iiosted his command on 
our left flank and directed him to throw out strong recon- 
noitring parties across the ridge, watching the enemy's 
movements on our left and front. There was no object 
in attempting to hold the position at Eossville Gap, be- 
yond the gaining of a day to select the final position for the 
troops at Chattanooga on their retirement to that place, 



THE BATTLE OF CHICKAMAUGA. 215 

the location of tlie lines, and the prejDaration for throw 
ing up earthworks. This was all accomplished on the 21st 
and preparations made to fall back. All wagons, ambu- 
lances, and surplus artillery-carriages were sent to the 
rear before night and the troops were held in readiness 
to move at a moment's notice. The orders to withdraw 
reached Thomas aboiat six o'clock p.m., and the movement 
commenced about nine p.m. 

Brannan's division was posted at six p.m. on the road 
about half way from Eossville to Chattanooga, covering the 
movement. Orders were sent by Thomas for each division 
commander to throw out a strong skirmish line, to be with- 
drawn at daylight, concealing the movement to the rear. 
This line was to be supportod by Baird's division and 
Minty's brigade of cavalry, which was to retire after the 
skirmishers were withdiawn. During the night the move- 
ment was completed without the loss of a single man, and 
at seven o'clock on the morning of the 22d, the Army of the 
Cumberland, again united, was in position, holding the cov- 
eted prize, still strong enough to prevent the enemy from at- 
tempting further to dispute our possession of the town. 
The temporary works were strengthened from day to day 
until all apprehension of an attack from the enemy on the 
front was at an end. 

Taking all the surroundings into consideration, the cam- 
paign from the western slopes of the Cumberland Mountains, 
ending in the battle of Chickamauga, was the most brilliant 
one of the war, made as it was, in the face of the strong 
column of the enemy, whose business it was to watch every 
movement, and as far as possible to retard and cri^jple the 
advance. Eosecrans, with his masterly manoeuvi'ing, in every 
instance deceived his opponent down to the withdrawal of 
Bragg from Chattanooga. While recognizing the genius of 



216 THE ARMY OF THE CUMBERLAND. 

the military leader who could plan the campaign that was 
made from the time of the crossing of the Cumberland 
Mountains, Bragg regarded the obstacles to be overcome on 
such a campaign so stupendous that he was incredulous that 
any movement south of the Tennessee was contemjilated by 
the Federal leader. Eveiy preparation was made by Bragg 
to meet the crossing of our army over the Tennessee north 
of Chattanooga, watching all the fords with strong detach- 
ments of infantry and artillery, holding the main portion of 
his command ready to move to the north at any moment, he 
watched the movement of our troops through the Sequatchie 
Valley and so on to the Tennessee. Withdrawing his only 
brigade that was south and west of Chattanooga on the ad- 
vance of Crittenden, he threw open the gateway for Kose- 
crans's advance. When the full scope of the movement 
dawned upon him, Bragg abandoned Chattanooga and 
gathered his troops wherever he could reach them from all 
quarters to concentrate for the destruction of our army. 
Bragg never intended his withdrawal from Chattanooga to 
be permanent ; all the indications he left behind him pointed 
that way. None of the bridges were destroyed as he retired. 
All storehouses, hospitals, and other btiildings used by his 
army were left standing, and Rosecrans's mistake was in con- 
struing Bragg's withdrawal to be a demoralized retreat and 
in ordering his army to pursue before this was definitely 
determined. However, all advices that Eosecrans had were 
to the eifect that the rebels were in hasty flight and would 
not stop anywhere north of Dalton, and that their probable 
destination was Rome. This information was sent to him 
from Washington, and Bragg aided in confirming this belief 
by sending numbers of his soldiers as " deserters " into the 
Federal lines with the same report. 

As late as the 11th, Halleck telegi'aphed Eosecrans that 



THE BATTLE OF CHICKAMAUGA. 217 

after he occupied " tlie mountain passes to tlie west of Dal- 
ton" it would be determined what his future movements 
would be ; and on the 13th, Halleck telegraphed Eosecrans 
that if Bragg should go to Alabama he must not be al- 
lowed to re-enter Middle Tennessee. On the 13th, Foster, at 
Fortress Monroe, telegraphed Halleck that trains of cars had 
been ninning day and night southward for the past tlm-ty-six 
hours. On the following day Foster sent Halleck another 
despatch, that Longstreet's corps was reported going south, 
which Meade on the same day confirmed. Then Halleck 
sent urgent messages to Hurlbut and Burnside to move to 
Bosecrans's support. But it was too late. These commands 
were many days' marches away, and at that moment the 
Army of the Cumberland was engaged in the earlier move- 
ments of the life and death struggle it was peremptorily 
ordered by Halleck to encounter alone with its old enemy, 
under Bragg, heavily re-enforced, while large numbers of 
Federal troops which might have been within helping dis- 
tance, had orders been given in due season, as asked for by 
Koseci'aus, remained inactive. 

It was not until McCook had received and partly exe- 
cuted his orders to occupy Ali^ine that the actual facts as to 
Bragg's movements were developed, and that he was concen- 
trated at La Fayette, there waiting for reinforcements, but 
strong enough without them to crush the Army of the 
Cumberland in detail. Eosecrans, when aware of Bragg's 
movements, grasped the situation at once. Bending every 
energy to the concentration of his army before Bragg should 
strike, on the 12th he issued orders for McCook's immediate 
return, and despatched the same in all haste by courier. 
Hearing nothing definite from McCook, on the next day 
Eosecrans repeated his orders and dtii^licated them in the 
afternoon of that day. Still learning nothing positive as to 
VII.— 10 



218 THE ARMY OF THE CUMBERLAND. 

McCook's movements, on the 14th repeated orders wero 
sent to him urging him to consummate his rearward move- 
ment with all possible haste. After a sleepless night, Kose- 
crans on the 15th left Chattanooga for the front, to hasten, if 
^possible, McCook's movements. After another sleepless 
might, information was had from McCook as to the position 
of his command, and on the 17th the concentration of the 
army was effected in McLemore's Cove, five days after Mc- 
Cook's first orders were dated. 

The delay attending McCook's movements was almost fatal 
to the Army of the Cumberland. Had Bragg received his 
promised reinforcements at the date he expected them, our 
army would in all probability have been completely annihil- 
ated in detail. McCook claims that his delay was only inci- 
dent to the route he was compelled to take to join Thomas. 
This took him back over Lookout Mountain, to Valley Head, 
then down that valley, crossing the mountain again at Coop- 
er's Gap, and then up and down Missionary Eidge into Mc- 
Lemore's Cove, a long, diflficult road, nearly all of it over 
rough mountains. This route, McCook from the information 
received, regarded as the better one to take, as between it 
and the one on which he was ordered to move, which was a 
road on the mountain into the head of McLemore's Cove, 
through Dougherty's Gaj). 

The battle for Chattanooga would never have been fought 
at Chickamauga had not the safety of McCook's corps de- 
manded it. Could the Ai'my of the Cumberland have been 
withdi-awn in safety to Chattanooga and there concentrated 
behind earthworks, as it was later, while Bragg doubtless 
would have made his attack there, yet the sixrroundings 
would have been far more favorable for our army, especially 
as the troops afterward sent might have reached Kosecrans 
in time to have defeated Bragg, as he was later at the battle 



THE BATTLE OF CHICKAMAUGA. 219 

of Missionary Bidge. But tlie reinforcements tliat were 
hurried from all ijoints after tlie disaster, by the officials at 
Washington were not to benefit Bosecrans. 

While the battle of the 19th was severe at times, and some 
slight advantages were gained by the enemy, still nothing had 
been accomplished to mark that day's fighting as a gi-eat, dis- 
tinctive battle. The delay on the part of Negley in report- 
ing as ordered, to Thomas on the left, placed that position 
in extreme peril, had Polk made his attack as ordered at day- 
dawn on the 20th. Fortunately, Polk slept outside of his 
lines that night — not as he was accustomed to — and was not 
awakened as early as he would have been had he remained 
in camp. For this reason the attack, was not made until 
after Beatty's brigade had reached Baird's left. While this 
was too weak to successfully resist the attack, still with this 
command rallied after it was driven back and aided by the 
troops sent to its support, Thomas was able to repulse 
Breckinridge's first charge of the morning. The delay from 
sis o'clock until after nine was of great service to the Army 
of the Cumbeiland. Negley's delay in reporting at an early 
hoiar with his entire division was owing to Wood's failure to 
relieve him. Sheridan had at an earlier hour been ordered 
to Negley's position on his front, but Thomas representing 
the urgency of the movement, Crittenden was ordered to 
send Wood, who was only a short distance from Negley. 
Wood, on receiving his orders to relieve Negley, simply 
moved forward and occupied the position that had been 
vacated by Negley's reserve brigade, already started for 
Thomas's left. On Bosecrans's return from the extreme 
right, he found that Negley had not yet reported to Thomas, 
although more than an hour had elasped since he was so 
ordered, and then discovered that Wood had failed to re- 
lieve him on the front. Bepeating his orders in such i^lain 



220 THE ARMY OF THE CUMBERLAND. 

English tliat tliere could be no further misapprehension of 
them, Eosecrans moved Wood's division into position, re- 
lieved Negley at once, and started him in all haste to 
Thomas. Negley did not reach the left until after ten 
o'clock. Eosecrans, impatient at the delay that occurred in 
the execution of this order, expressed himself veiy forcibly 
to Wood, much to the dissatisfaction of the latter. After 
seeing Negley at last en route to Thomas, Eosecrans then 
went to the right and was watching the movements of the 
troops when the word reached him of the supposed gap to 
the right of Eeynolds, on the left of Wood. Eosecrans's 
plan of battle being to keep his line well closed up on the 
Jeft, he directed an aid to send Wood an order to close up 
on Eeynolds, which he did as follows. 

Headquarters or the Army of the Cumberland. 
JBrigadier- General Wood, C'oniniaruUng Division : 

The General Commanding directs that you close up on Reynolds aa 
fast as possible, and support him, 

Respectfully, etc., 

FRANK S. BOND, 
Major and Aid-de-Camp. 

This order was ^VTitten by an officer who had no military 
exj)erience prior to the war, and, as the order shows on its 
face, embraced much more than the General Commanding 
intended it should. The orderly who carried this order 
to Wood reported on his return that "General Wood on 
receipt of the order remarked that he * was glad the order 
was in writing, as it was a good thing to have for future 
reference.' That he carefully took out his note-book, safely 
deposited the order in it, and then proceeded to execute it." 
Wood's official report contains the order written out in full. 
He says that it was eleven o'clock when it reached him. 



THE BATTLE OF CHICKAMAUGA. 221 

" General McCook was witli me when I received it. I in- 
formed him that I would immediately carry it into execu- 
tiou, and suggested to him that he should close up his 
command rapidly on my right, to prevent the occurrence 
of a gap in the Une. He said he would do so, and imme- 
diately rode away." 

McCook says, in reference to the movement of Sheridan 
to the aid of Thomas, which he had just ordered, " Simul- 
taneously with this movement, and much to my surprise, 
Wood's division left the position it had in line of battle on 
Davis's left, marching by the left flank, leaving a wide gap 
in the line." Wood also says in his official report that 
when he started to execute the order he met Thomas, and 
told him of his order. He says, " I exhibited my order to 
him, and asked him whether he would take the responsi- 
bility of changing it. He replied he would, and I then 
informed him that I would move my command to the sup- 
port of General Baird." The first mention Thomas makes 
in his official report of seeing Wood is when in riding 
"toward the crest of the hill," coming from the left, he 
met Wood on the way, and directed him to take position 
on Brannan's right. Later, he says, "About the time that 
Wood took up his position. General Gordon Granger ap- 
peared," etc. This was over three hours after what Gen- 
eral Wood styles " the disastrous event of the right " oc- 
curred. It seems strange, if Wood was properly executing 
an order from the Commanding General, that he should try 
so hard to shield his action by the authority of these two 
corps commanders, especially when he was under the direct 
command of neither of them. 

General Wood was a graduate of West Point, had been 
in the army all his life, and knew the full meaning of all 
technical terms used to describe military movements. The 



222 THE ARMY OF THE CUMBERLAND. 

order bore on its face a dii-ection to him to make a move- 
ment with his front in line of battle, and at the same time 
to occupy a jDOsition in the rear of the division, on which 
he was ordered to join his left in line on the immediate 
battle-front. He knew he could not execute the order lit- 
erally as given, and from the wording of it must have 
known that there was some mistake about it. Instead of 
sending a short distance to the rear, or going himself to 
Eosecrans and finding out just what was meant by the 
order, he chose to give it a meaning that it was never in- 
tended to convey, and moved to the rear from the front of 
wattle, when he knew, as he says in his report, " although I 
had not been seriously engaged at any time during the 
morning, I was well satisfied the enemy was in considerable 
force in my immediate front." Wood says in his official 
report, " Eeynolds's division was posted on the left of Bran- 
nan's division, which in turn was on the left of the position 
I was just quitting ; I had consequently to pass my command 
in the rear of Brannan's division to close up on and go 
into the support of Eeynolds." If " Eeynolds's, division was 
posted on the left of Brannan's division," then there was 
no gap, and no place for Wood to place his division as 
ordered, and he knew it. He could sui:)port Eeynolds, but 
to do this he was compelled to disobey the first part of 
his order, which in its spirit and intent was to keep Jiim on 
the line of battle, simply moving his division to the left. 
This space by his own official report he shows was occupied 
by Brannan's division, and with this knowledge he under- 
took to execute an order that directed him to make an 
impossible movement rather than ask an explanation of it 
from his commanding officer. No wonder he wanted to 
keep his order safe where he could produce it if occasion 
required. Wood, irritated at the reprimand of Eosecrans 



THE BATTLE OF CHICKAMAUGA. 223 

earlier in the day, intent on maintaining his dignity, chose 
rather to undertake to cany out an order in the execution 
of which he felt safe, so long as he had it in wi'iting and 
where he could produce it if occasion demanded it, than to 
suspend its execution long enough to ride a short distance 
to the rear, and find out just what the order meant ; and to 
this extent he is responsible for the gi-eat disaster which swept 
the right wing of the Army of the Cumberland from the 
field of battle on the 20th. That Wood must have known 
that there was a mistake in regard to the order is plain, from 
the fact that he himself says that his troops had not been 
seriously engaged that morning. It was hardly possible that 
Beynolds's division, which was only a division front from his, 
could be so hardly pressed as to need supports, and that his 
division should "not be seriously engaged." In fact, when 
Wood undertook to cany out this order, he says he met 
Thomas and was told by him that Beynolds did not need 
supports, and that he, Wood, " had better move to the 
support of General Baird, posted on the extreme left, who 
needed assistance," showing that the conflict had as yet 
not reached down the line to Beynolds. The spirit in 
which General Wood fought the battle of Chickamauga is 
shown by the following extract from his official report, 
where, in speaking of Garfield's anival on the battlefield 
later iu the afternoon of the 20th, he says, " After the dis- 
astrous event of the right, General Garfield made his way 
back to the battlefield, showing thereby that the road was 
open to all who might choose to follow it where duty called." 
After Wood reported to Thomas there was no more splendid 
fighting done on that field of terrific conflict on the 20th than 
was done by Thomas J. Wood and his division. To the last 
he aided Thomas in holding Horseshoe Bidge, and was one 
of the last di\'isions to retire. 



224 THE ARMY OP THE CUMBERLAND. 

In the tide that swept down the Dry Valley road, Rose- 
crans was caught with the members of his staff. He breasted 
this for a while, and endeavored to join his left and cen- 
tre under Thomas by a direct route. After riding along a 
short distance, under the heavy fire of the rebels with both 
artillery and musketry, he discovered that that road was 
effectually closed by the enemy in strong force. He then 
started over the ridge to the Dry Valley road, and made 
his way as rapidly as possible through the swarming 
masses of broken troops from the right of the battlefield to 
Eossville, with the intention of joining Thomas from that 
place down the La Fayette road if the left and centre were 
not also in rout, and on the road to Chattanooga. On 
reaching Rossville, Eosecrans and Garfield halted in the 
midst of the driving masses of teamsters, stragglers, and 
fugitives from Thomas's command, all striving in hot haste 
to be among the first to reach Chattanooga. Making in- 
quiry of these men as to the condition of affairs at the 
front, they were informed " that the entire army was de- 
feated, and in retreat to Chattanooga." " That Eosecrans 
and Thomas were both killed, and that McCook and Crit- 
tenden were prisoners." Asking a small detachment of 
troojis the command they belonged to, Eosecrans was in- 
formed Negley's division. He then asked as to the where- 
abouts of Negley. He was informed that he was a short 
distance from Eossville, though some distance from the 
battlefield, "rallying stragglers," and that the entire divi- 
sion "was knocked all to pieces." Knowing that one of 
the last orders he had given on the battlefield was for 
Negley's division to report to Thomas to take position on 
his extreme left, Eosecrans was satisfied that if these 
soldiers reported truly the left and centre were routed and 
that the whole army as a broken mass would be back in 



THE BATTLE OF CHICKAMAUGA. 225 

Chattanooga very shortly. At this time there was a lull in 
the firing at the front. Dismounting from their horses, 
Eosecrans and Garfield placing their ears to the ground, 
endeavored to determine from the sound as it reached 
them the truth of the reported rout. Hearing no artillery 
firing, and detecting only what appeared to be a scattering 
fire of musketry, the conclusion was forced on Eosecrans that 
his army was entii-ely broken. His information prior to 
the battle led him to believe that the rebels outnumbered 
him two to one, and if this proved time, the disaster in part 
could be accounted for. Confening with Garfield as to 
what was the best thing to be done under the circum- 
stances, Garfield told him that if these reports were true 
that then his, Eosecrans's, place was in Chattanooga, where 
he could receive and reorganize, if possible, his army on 
its reaching that place. That he, of all persons, had more 
influence with the army, and if it was broken that his duty 
was to go to that place and make such disposition of the 
troops as might possibly save the army from complete de- 
struction. That he, Garfield, would ride to the front, try 
and find Thomas, if alive, and would report immediately 
to Eosecrans at Chattanooga as to the condition of affairs at 
the front. Unfortunately, this plan was earned out. The 
reverse of this should have been done. Eosecrans should 
at once have gone to the front, and by his presence there 
aided, as he did at Stone's Eiver, more than any other thing 
to retrieve the fortunes of the day, and pluck victory from 
disaster. Had Eosecrans gone to the front, and discovered 
from a personal observation the true condition of affairs, and 
the spirit and morale of the troops there, the chances are 
that he never would have ordered their retirement to Eoss- 
ville the night of the 20th. That was the turning-point, and 
his hour had arrived. 
10* 



226 THE ARMY OF THE CUMBERLAND. 

On reacliing Chattanooga, General Eosecrans rode up to 
Department Headquarters there, and was helped from his 
horse into the house. He had the appearance of one broken 
in spirit, and as if he were bearing up as best he could under 
terrible blow, the full force and effect of which he himself 
did not at that time clearly perceive and only partly felt. 
This was about four o'clock in the afternoon. He had been 
in the saddle all day from before daylight, with nothing to 
eat since then. Earely has mortal man been called on to 
undergo the terrible mental strain that had been on him 
during the week just past, of which for two nights in succes- 
sion his anxiety for McCook was so great as to prevent his 
•sleeping. During the jDast week the peril of his army 
had weighed on him to the extent that his nervous system 
was stretched to its utmost tension. When he saw the 
rout of his right, supposing that it extended to his entire 
army, the blow was so strong that it staggered him. A short 
time after Eosecrans arrived, McCook and Crittenden, also 
caught in the drift from the right, reached headquarters, 
"wi^hile seated in the adjutant-general's office comparing notes 
with each other as to the events of the day, Eosecrans re- 
ceived a despatch from Garfield, who had reached the front. 
Hastily reading it over he exclaimed, " Thank God ! " and read 
the despatch aloud. In it Garfield announced his safe arrival 
at the front, that he was then with Thomas, who had seven 
divisions intact with a number of detachments, that Thomas 
had just repulsed a heavy assault of the rebels, and felt con- 
fident that he could successfully resist all attacks against 
his position. Waving this over his head Eosecrans said, 
" This is good enough, the day isn't lost yet." Turning to 
McCook and Crittenden he said, " Gentlemen, this is no place 
for you. Go at once to your commands at the front." He 
then directed Wagner, in command of the post, to take his 



THE BATTLE OF CHICKAMAUGA. 227 

entii-e brigade, stop the stragglers and all others from the 
front on the edge of the town, and ordered rations and am- 
munition for his troops to be at once sent out to meet them 
at Rossville. 

During the heavy fighting of the 20th, Thomas was the 
only general officer on the field of rank above a division com- 
mander. Learning some time later in the day of the disas- 
ter on our right, he gathered his troops together from all 
parts of the field to the position selected by himself after 
the break on the right. Here in a more marked degree even 
than at Stone's Eiver, he displayed his great staying quali- 
ties. Posting his troops on the lines he designated, he, so to 
speak, placed himself with his back against a rock and re- 
fused to be driven from the field. Here he stayed, despite 
the fierce and prolonged assaults of the enemy, repulsing 
every attack. And when the sun went down he was still 
there. Well was he called the "Eock of Chickamauga,'» 
and trebly well for the army of the Cumberland that George 
H. Thomas was in command of the left at that battle. On 
the 20th, when the hour of supreme trial came and he was 
left on the field with less than one half of the strength of 
the army that the day before had been barely able to hold 
its own against the rebel assaults, he formed his 25,000 
troops on "Horseshoe Ridge," and successfully resisted for 
nearly six long hours the repeated attacks of that same rebel 
army, largely reinforced until it numbered twice his com- 
mand, when it was flushed with victory and determined on 
his utter destniction. There is nothing finer in history than 
Thomas at Chickamauga. 

All things considered, the battle of Chickamauga for the 
forces engaged was the hardest fought and the bloodiest 
battle of the Rebellion. Hindman, who fought our right 
at Horseshoe Ridge, says in his official rej)ort that he had 



228 THE ARMY OF THE CUMBERLAND. 

" never known Federal troops to fight so well," and that he 
"never saw Confederate soldiers fight better." The largest 
number of troops Eosecrans had of all arms on the field 
during the two days' fighting was 55,000 efi^ective men. 
"While the return of the Army of the Cumberland for Sep- 
tember 20, 1863, shows 67,548 "present for duty equipped," 
still, taking out the troops guarding important i^oints within 
the Department, the actual force was reduced to the figures 
just given. Of Gordon Granger's nine brigades, only two 
were on the battlefield. Wagner, of Wood's division, was in 
Chattanooga, and Dan McCook was holding Eossville. Post's 
brigade was guarding the wagon trains and was not in the 
action. Eosecrans losses aggregated killed, 1,687 ; wounded, 
9,394; missing, 5,255. Total loss, 16,336. Bragg, during the 
battle, when his entire five coi-ps were engaged, had about 
70,000 efiective troops in line. Among Bragg's trooj^s were 
large numbers of jsrisoners of war captured at Vicksburg 
and Port Hudson, who had been falsely declared by the 
rebel authorities as exchanged and released from their 
parole, and in violation of the cartel were again placed in 
battle. His losses, in jDart estimated, were 2,673 killed, 
16,274 wounded, and 2,003 missing, a total of 20,950. A 
full report of the rebel losses was never made. 

To the enemy the results of the engagement proved a 
victory barren of any lasting benefits, and produced no ade- 
quate results to the immense drain on the resources of his 
army. In a number of jjlaces Bragg's ofiicial report shows 
that his army was so crippled that he was not able to 
strengthen one jjortion of his line, when needed, with troops 
from another part of the field, and after the conflict was 
over his army was so cut up that it was impossible for him 
to follow up his aj^parent success and secure possession of 
the objective point of the campaign — Chattanooga. This 



THE BATTLE OF CHICKAMAUGA. 



229 



great gateway of the mountains remaining in possession of 
the Ai-my of the Cumberland, after Bragg had paid the heavy 
price he did at Chickamauga, proves that his battle was a 
victory only in name, and a careful examination of the re- 
sults and theii- cost will show how exceedingly small it was 
to the enemy. 



CHAPTER Xm. 

THE SIEGE OF CHATTANOOGA. 

On taking position at Chattanooga, after the battle, the 
Army of the Cumberland, between the rebel troops in front 
and the forces of Nature in the rear, was practically in a 
state of siege. The lines around the town were held by our 
troops behind extensive rifle-pits, strengthened with heavy 
earthworks covering all ajiproaches on the front. Bragg's 
army moved up immediately, and invested our lines, throw- 
ing up rifle-pits within a short distance of those of our army. 
To the rear of these Bragg threw up two other lines of in- 
trenchments and on the right of his command erected a more 
permanent line of earthworks on the crest of Missionaiy 
Eidge, massing however, the bulk of his troops in Chatta- 
nooga Valley on our immediate front. As our army retired 
within its works at Chattanooga, the troops holding the road 
over Lookout Mountain were withdrawn, and this point was 
immediately occupied by the enemy and strengthened by 
extensive works, Bragg sending Longstreet's coi*ps into 
Lookout Valley to occupy the extreme left of the besieging 
line, and to cut off all communication with Bridgeport, on 
the south bank of the Tennessee Kiver. The lines were now 
fully occupied from the river on the north to the bank south 
of the town, and the rebel army in force on our front. To 
the rear the only road that was open was over Walling's 
Bidge, through Sequatchie Valley, down to Bridgeport, a die- 



THE SIEGE OF CHATTANOOGA. 231 

tance of sixty miles ; the short road on the north side down 
to Bridgeport being closed by the rebel batteries and sharp- 
shooters, while their troops holding the road to the south of 
the river compelled all suiDplies of every kind to be hauled 
over these sixty miles of road. To thus supply the army 
during good weather was a very great undertaking, even 
with the teams of the various commands in good condition, 
but with the rainy season that soon set in, and the incessant 
hauling wearing out the mules, the daily rations for the 
army were constantly growing less and less. On October 
1st, Wheeler crossing the Tennessee with Martin's and 
Wharton's divisions of cavalry moved up the Sequatchie 
Valley upon our line of supplies at Anderson cross-roads. 
Here he captured a large number of trains loaded with ra- 
tions for the front, burned over three hundred wagons, and 
killed a large number of animals. Colonel E. M. McCook 
with his cavaliy division, moving rapidly from Bridge- 
port, overtook Wheeler on the 2d, and drove him with great 
loss in a sabre charge from the trains, recapturing some 
eight hundred mules. After this Wheeler was driven from 
Shelbysdlle on the 6th by Mitchell's cavalry, and on the 8th 
from Farmington by Crook, and from here he re-crossed the 
Tennessee with a small poi'tion of his command, the rest hav- 
ing been killed or captured. This loss in wagons, with the 
roads becoming almost imjiassable by reason of the hea\^ 
rains and the growing weakness of the animals, lessened 
daily the amount of siipplies brought into the town, so that 
our troops were suffering for food and were in danger of 
being starved out of Chattanooga. This was what Bragg 
was quietly waiting for. To supply an army some forty 
thousand strong, by wagon transiiortation over rough moun- 
tain roads a distance of sixty miles, Bragg knew was an im- 
possibility, and that unless other lines were opened up, the 



232 THE ARMY OF THE CUMBERLAND. 

evacuation of the place was only a question of time, and he 
could then walk in and take undisturbed possession. As 
the forage became reduced, the artillery horses, for which 
there was no immediate need, had their rations cut oflf, and 
they died in large numbers, starved to death. The sujiijlies 
grew so small that parts of crackers and corn dropped in 
handling the packages were eagerly seized and eaten to stay 
the demands of hunger, and still the pressure was growing 
daily, and no one knew how it would ultimately end. How- 
ever, not for an instant was the idea entertained of abandon- 
ing the town, to say nothing of the extreme hazard of at- 
tempting that, in the face of the strong force of the enemy 
on our front. The Army of the Cumberland had won Chat- 
tanooga and there they proposed remaining. 

Immediately after the battle of Chickamauga, the authori- 
ties at Washington sent hurried orders to Burnside, Hurl- 
but and Sherman to move fon\'ard without delay to Kose- 
crans's assistance, and on September 24th the latter was 
informed that " Hooker, with some fifteen thoiasand men," 
was en route from the East as fast as rail 5 could take him, 
and that he would be in Nashville in about seven days. 
"While reinforcements were the thing needed before the bat- 
tle, now the pressing demand of the hour was the opening 
of the line of communication to the rear, over which ade- 
quate supplies could be forwarded to the troops at the front. 
To add to the number of men there simply increased the 
difficulties of the situation. 

On the arrival of Hooker with the Eleventh and Twelfth 
Army Corps at Nashville, Eosecrans directed him to take 
position on the line of the Chattanooga Railroad, securing 
that road from the attacks of the rebel cavalry while sup- 
plies were being accumulated at Stevenson awaiting the 
opening of communication with the army at Chattanooga. 



THE SIEGE OP' CHATTANOOGA. 233 

"Without driving back tlie entire of Bragg's army in Lookout 
and Chattanooga Valleys, it was impossible to use the rail- 
road from Bridgeport east in bringing up suj^plies. The 
wagon-trains could no longer be depended on, and, under 
the sjiur of necessity, Rosecrans was preparing a plan to 
utilize the river with boats. A new one had been built at 
Bridgeport and another captured at Chattanooga had been 
rei^aired. By thus using the river he could secure his sui> 
l)lies over a wagon-road of only eight miles from Kelley's 
Feny, ria Brown's Feny. The course of the Tennessee 
Eiver at Chattanooga is due west ; after passing the town it 
flows south to the foot of Lookout Mountain, from which 
point it then sweeiDS, after a short curve to the northwest, 
due north, forming here what is known as "Moccasin Point." 
Crossing the river at the town, a road leads southwest across 
this point on to the other side, where the river, as it sweeps 
north, is reached at Brown's Feny. Shortly after jiassing 
Brown's Ferry, the river again makes a sharp bend to the 
south, forming another point of land running northwardly. 
Across this point on the east bank, as the river passes south, 
is Kelley's Ferry. At the extreme angle of this bend the 
river rushes through the mountains, which here crowd down 
closely, forming a narrow channel through which the waters 
rush headlong. This chasm is known as the " Suck." The 
velocity of the water is so great that steamers in high water 
cannot stem the current at this point, which necessitated 
the landing of supplies at Kelley's Ferry, and then hauling 
them over land across the bridge at Brown's Ferry to Chat- 
tanooga. 

Immediately after the battle, under orders from the War 
Department, the Twentieth and Twenty-first Army Corps 
were consolidated and designated the Fourth Ai-my Corps 
and Gordon Granger was placed in command. McCook and 



234 THE ARMY OF THE CUMBERLAND. 

Crittenden were relieved from tlie command of these coi-ps, 
and ordered North to await a "Court of Inquiry," "ujiou 
their conduct on September 19th and 20th." 

By War Department order of October 16th, the Deijart- 
ments of the Ohio, the Cumberland, and the Tennessee wero 
constituted " The Military Division of the Mississippi," under 
the command of Grant. By the same order Eosecrans was re- 
lieved of the command of the Department and Ai'my of the 
Cumberland, and Thomas was assigned to that command. 
Halleck, in his report of operations for the year 1863, says 
this change was made on the recommendation of General 
Grant. These orders were promulgated on the 19th. 

On Eosecrans's return from a visit to Brown's Ferry and 
Williams's Island on the 19tli, where he had been with Wil- 
liam F. Smith, his chief engineer, making his plans for 
bringing supplies to that point, he found the order awaiting 
him relieving him of his command. Qiiietly making his 
preparations for his departure that night over the mountains 
to Stevenson, he wrote out his farewell order, to be printed 
and issued the next day, and, without even bidding his staff 
good-bye, placed Thomas in command and started for his 
home in Cincinnati. Eosecrans, in the summer of 1862, was 
under Grant at luka and Corinth. Here some hasty criti- 
cism made by him brought him into collision with Gi'ant, 
which now bore fruit. 

When it was known that Eosecrans had been relieved, and 
that he had left the army for the north, there was universal 
regret that the troops that had loved and tmsted him should 
no longer follow his skilful leadership. Every soldier in his 
army felt that he had a personal friend in " Old Eosy." His 
troops never for a moment faltered in their devotion to him 
or confidence in him. They felt that he had been made the 
victim of a foolish interpretation of an order that brought 



THE SIEGE OF CHATTANOOGA. 235 

ruin and disaster upon his army, for wliicli he was not re- 
sponsible, but for which he was made to suffer. 

General Bosecrans, to his subordinates, was one of the 
most genial of men. Kind and good-natured, he at times 
failed to act as decisively as occasion required, deterred by 
the fact that, should he do so, some of his subordinates 
would suffer. His restless activity led him to give attention 
to details that he should have been entirely relieved of by 
his subordinates. But no amount of work daunted him. 
He lived almost without rest and sleep, and would wear out 
two sets of staff officers nightly, and then, if occasion re- 
quired it, be up and out before daylight. To his superiors 
he unfortunately allowed his high spirit to get the better of 
his judgment, and many times when he was in the right he 
ruined his position by his hasty temper. His fame, despite 
his enemies— and no general in the field had stronger nor 
more unscrupulous ones — as the gi-eatest strategist of the 
war, is permanently fixed in histoiy. What it might have 
been had he not been hampered, annoyed, and insulted as 
no other commanding general was at any time by both the 
Secretary of War and the General-in-Chief, is merely prob- 
lematical. Personally, he regarded all this as mere "inci- 
dents of the service," and strove to the best of his ability 
to do his whole duty to his country. His combination 
with Thomas — Bosecrans to plan brilliant campaigns, with 
Thomas's great abilities to aid him in carrying them out — 
made the Army of the Cumberland the great aggressive force 
moving on the centre, gaining territory after each campaign. 
But it was as well for Bosecrans and the service that he was 
relieved when he was, with the combination of the armies 
under Grant. He had faithfully jierformed his duty ujj to 
this time, but now the sun-oundings were so changed that 
both for his sake and the good of the service the change was 



236 THE AEMY OF THE CUMBERLAND. 

a fitting one to be made. Eosecrans could never again serve 
as a subordinate, and as the change was determined on, 
when Grant ai-rived it was as well for Eosecrans to retire. 

When Anderson in 1861 applied for George H. Thomas to 
be one of the brigadier-generals to accompany him to Ken- 
tucky, to help him in the task he was set to accomplish 
there, Mr. Lincoln told him he was afraid to give the order 
for Thomas, as he was a Southerner, and from Vii'ginia. 
Anderson and Sherman, who were present, both responded 
in the strongest terms, vouching for Thomas's earnest pa- 
triotism and deej) devotion to the Union, and the order was 
given. And now it bore full fruit. The quiet, patient sol- 
dier, who from his first day's service in Kentucky had never 
swerved a line from the strict performance of his duty to 
his Government, according to his oath, without reference 
to self, had now met his reward. His fame had steadily 
grown and rounded from the time he gained the first Fed- 
eral \actory in the West, at Mill Si^riugs, up to the battle of 
Chickamauga, where he saved the Army of the Cumberland 
to the nation. He had always been the main stay of that 
army, holding the command of the centre — either nominally 
or actually the second in command. Upon his judgment 
and military skill every commander of that army depended, 
and no movement was made without his approbation. Yet 
so modest was he that his face would color with blushes 
when his troops cheered him, which they did at eveiy 
opportunity ; and so diffident, that, prior to the battle of 
Chickamauga, he doubted his ability to handle large bod- 
ies of troops upon the battlefield, and for this reason 
refused to accept the command of that army, just prior to 
Perryville, when tendered him. His kind consideration for 
the feelings of others was one of his marked characteris- 
tics. With a pure mind and large heart, his noble soul 



THE SIEGE OP CHATTANOOGA. 237 

made him one of the greatest of Nature's noblemen — a true 
gentleman. The experience of Chickamauga ripened his 
l)owers and developed him to his full height. As the Gen- 
eral who won the first victory in the West, who saved an 
army by his skill and valor, and who was the only General 
of the war on either side able to crush an army on the bat- 
tlefield, George H. Thomas, "the true soldier, the pnident 
and undaunted commander, the modest and incorraptible 
l^atriot," stands as the model American soldier, the grandest 
figure of the War of the Eebellion. 

One of Grant's first acts on taking command was to tele- 
graph Thomas to hold Chattanooga at all hazards. The 
commander who had seen his troops on less than half rations 
for nearly a month, with steadily approaching signs of star- 
vation, hardly needed an intimation that what had been 
gained by the saci-ifice on Chickamauga's field was not to 
be yielded up without a struggle. Thomas replied "We 
will hold the town till we stai-ve." On the 24th, Grant, in 
company with Thomas and W. F. Smith, made a personal 
inspection across the river of the situation, with reference to 
carrying out the plan of Eosecrans for the opening of the 
road by Brown's Ferry, and, api^roving of it, Thomas was 
directed to proceed to execute it. This plan required the 
greatest secrecy of movement, otherwise Long-street's entire 
command would resist the landing, and contemplated the 
co-operation of Hooker's moving uj) from Bridgeport, hold- 
ing the road to Kelley's Ferry. The latter was to meet a force 
sent from the town down the river in pontoons under cover 
of night, which was to seize the landing on the left bank of 
the river, driving back the rebel pickets and fortifying their 
jjosition, and then swinging the bridge across the river. 
Thomas says in his official report of the battle of W^auhat- 
chie, tliat " preliminary steps had already been taken to ex- 



238 THE ARMY OF THE CUMBERLAND. 

ecute this vitally important movement before the command 
of the Department devolved on me." Thomas on the 23d 
ordered Hooker to concentrate the Eleventh Corps^ and 
Geary's division of the Twelfth Corps at Bridgeport and 
sent him instructions as to his movements, and directed hinj 
to advance as soon as possible, co-operating with the force 
from Chattanooga. Hooker was also ordered to move into 
Lookout Valley, and to i^rotect the bridge when laid from 
any attack by Longstreet in that direction. Thomas also 
sent two brigades under Palmer to co-operate with Hooker. 
Palmer moved across the river to Brown's FeiTy, and then 
took the road through Whitesides to Rankin's Ferry, estab- 
lishing himself securely at these points, protecting the river 
communication from attack from the south. Thomas placed 
W. F. Smith in charge of the exi^edition, and detached Tur- 
chin's and Hazen's brigades, with three batteries under Major 
John Mendenhall. Smith was directed to organize a picked 
force, armed from these brigades, to be divided into fifty 
squads of twenty-four men each, under the command of an 
officer, who were to float down the river in pontoons that 
night — a distance by the bends of the river of some nine 
miles. The boats were placed under the charge of Colonel 
T. E. Stanley of the Eighteenth Ohio, the bridge to be 
23laced in position under direction of Captain P. V. Fox, 
First Michigan Engineers. The troops under Hazen were to 
take the gorge and hills to the left, and Turchin was to ex- 
tend from the gorge down the river. Turchin in command 
of the remainder of the troojjs marched across Moccasin 
Point to the ferry, where they were to cross in the same 
boats, supporting the troops already landed, when the jDosi- 
tion was to be strongly fortified and held by them until the 
arrival of Hooker, 

At midnight the troops who were to take part in the ex- 



THE SIEGE OF CHATTANOOGA. 239 

peclition were marcliecl to the river and jjlacecl in the boats 
manned by crews with oars, and on two flat boats. The force 
that marched tinder Turchin moved out under cover of dense 
woods over the point to the feny, where they remained in 
readiness to cover the landing of the troops coming down 
the liver. The artillery accomijanied this part of the com- 
mand and remained under cover. 

At 3 o'clock A.M. of the 27th, the boats moved out into the 
stream under cover of a slight fog. On aniving at a point 
some two miles below the town, these troops reached the 
rebel picket line posted on the left bank of the river. The 
boats passed on unobserved by keeping close to the right 
hand shore until just at the landing, when the troops in the 
first boat were greeted with a volley from the rebel pickets, 
a station being at this landing. In perfect order, as previ- 
ously planned, the troops hastily disembarked, moved for- 
ward, occupying the crest of the hill immediately in front 
and commenced the work of intrenching. Before this was 
comj)leted the enemy, heavily reinforced, just beyond this 
crest, moved forward to drive Hazen back. Here a stubborn 
little fight was had, the rebels making a gallant charge with 
partial success en the right of Hazen, when they were met 
with the remainder of the brigade under Colonel Langdou, 
who charged at once on their lines and after a short en- 
gagement drove them fi'om the hill into the valley beyond. 
Turchin's brigade having crossed the river was placed in 
position on Hazen's right, when the enemy moved from the 
front up the valley. The rebel force here was a thousand 
infantiy, three i^ieces of artilleiy, and a squadron of cavalry. 

As soon as the last of the troops were over, work on the 
bridge was commenced and finished at a little after four 
o'clock in the afternoon. For an hour or so in the morning 
the work jirogressed under an artillery fire from the rebel 



240 THE ARMY OF THE CUMBERLAND. 

batteries on Lookout Mountain. Our losses were six killed, 
twenty-tliree wounded, and nine missing. The rebels lost 
six men captured and six of their dead were buried by our 
men. Our forces cajjtured twenty beeves, sis pontoons and 
some two thousand bushels of corn. The bridge was com 
pleted and the position held until the 28th, when Hooker's 
command arrived. No attempt was made by Bragg to dis- 
lodge this force or to destroy the bridge. Hooker moved 
on the road by the base of Eaccoon Mountain into Lookout 
Valley, driving the rebel inckets before him, and occui:)ied 
the roads to Kelley's and Brown's Ferries through the valley. 
Later in the afternoon of the 28th, as Hooker's troops jiushed 
down the valley, Howard's corps in the advance was met 
with a sharp volley of musketry from a wooded ridge near 
the Wills Valley Eailroad. Two brigades of Howard's com- 
mand were deployed, and advancing, di'ove the rebels from 
their cover with the loss of a few of our men. As the enemy 
retreated they burned the railroad bridge over Lookoiit 
Creek. Hooker then went into camp with Howard's corps 
at six o'clock in the afternoon about a mile up the valley 
from Brown's Ferry. Here he learned of the movement to 
this jjlace and of the building of the bridge. 

With the object of holding the road to Kelley's Feriy, 
Geary's division was ordered to encamp near Wauhatchie, 
some three miles up the valley from Howard's jaosition. 
This created two camps — the latter holding the Brown Ferry 
road — each camjj separate and picketed by its own command, 
as the numbers of the troops would not admit of communi- 
cation being kept up between them or of their forming one 
line. 

About midnight a regiment that had been ordered by 
Howard to hold the Chattanooga road across Lookout Creek, 
had a slight skirmish with the advance of the enemy. This 



THE SIEGE OF CHATTANOOGA. 241 

was a portion of Longstreet's corps getting into position for 
a night attack on the two encampments. Dividing his com- 
mand into two detachments, Longstreet, about an hour later, 
with his strong one on his left, assaulted Geary's camj) with 
a fierce attack, driving in his pickets and then charging on 
the main command. Geary immediately formed his men in 
line, and for three hours with heavy fighting maintained his 
position, although enveloped on three sides by the enemy, 
repelling every attack, and finally charged on the rebels and 
drove them from beyond his front. The enemy here at- 
tacked in gi'eatly superior numbers, and were only defeated 
by the skill and coolness of Geary, aided by the bravery of 
his troops. As the sound of the heavy fire which the enemy 
opened on Geary rolled down the valley. Hooker ordered 
Howard to double-quick his nearest division, Schurz's, to 
Geary's assistance. The division was started at once, but 
before it had proceeded far it encountered the other detach- 
ment of Longstreet's command, which opened on our troops 
with a volley of musketry. Hooker now determined that he 
had two fights on his hands. At once detaching Tyndale's 
brigade, Howard charged the rebel lines on the hill to the left 
with it, pushing on the other brigade to Geary. By this time 
Steinwehr's division of Hov.'ard's corjDs had an-ived on the 
ground, and it was then discovered that the rebels were try- 
ing to surround Howard's camp and that they occupied a 
hill to the rear of Tyndale's brigade. Hooker ordered Col- 
onel Orland Smith with his brigade to charge this hill, which 
he did uj) the steep side, almost inaccessible by daylight, 
reached the rebel intrenchments under a heavy fire and 
drove the troops with the bayonet, after a severe engage- 
ment, in rout from the hill and capturing a number of 
prisoners. Here General Greene and Colonel Underwood 
were severely wounded. Tyndale also pressing forward oc- 
VOL. VII.— 11 



242 THE ARMY OF THE CUMBERLAND. 

cupied the rebel line in his front and drove their forces be- 
yond his lines. The attack on Howard was intended to hold 
that command from reinforcing Geary until he was routed, 
and then in turn Howard was to be driven from the field. 
( During the engagement the enemy opened wilh artillery 
fire in the valley, aided by that from the batteries on Look- 
out Mountain, sending the shells crashing among our troops. 
Their forces in the valley were repulsed in eveiy charge and 
our troops occupied the field at all points. Our losses in 
the attack were 76 killed, 339 wounded, and 22 missing, mak- 
inga total of 437. The rebel loss is unknown. Geary buried 
153 of the enemy on his front alone. One hundred prisoners 
were caj)tured, with a large number of small arms. Thomas 
congratulated Hooker's troops for the gallant reijulse given 
to their old enemy, Longs treet, and adds : " The bayonet 
charge of Howard's troops, made up the side of a steep and 
difficult hill over two hundred feet high, completely routing 
the enemy from his barricades on its top, and the repulse by 
Geary of greatly sui^erior numbers who attempted to sur- 
IDrise him, will rank among the most distinguished feats of 
arms of this war." Beinforcements were sent Hooker by 
Thomas from Chattanooga of two brigades under Whittaker 
and John G. Mitchell, but the fighting was over before they 
reached the valley. 

Work was now pushed rapidly forward on the road from 
Brown's to Kelleys Ferry, and this being successfully ac- 
complished by the 1st of November, the forces of Nature 
w^ere overcome and the siege of Chattanooga was at an end 
as to them. It now remained to raise it on the front, driv- 
ing Bragg from his strongholds. Lookout Mountain, Chatta- 
nooga Valley, and Missionary Eidge. 



CHAPTEK XIV 

CHATTAN(30GA, LOOKOUT MOUNTAIN, AND MISSIONARY 
RIDGE BATTLES. 

These three detached actions, fought by different jDortions 
of our troops, were parts of a series of operations for secur- 
ing our front and diiving the enemy from his position, and 
are known properly as the Battle of Chattanooga. Grant, 
late in October, ordered Sherman with the Fifteenth Army 
Corjis to press forward to the Tennessee Biver, cross at 
Bridgeport and push rapidly on to Chattanooga. Early in 
November, learning that Bragg had weakened his forces on our 
front by sending Longstreet's command into East Tennessee 
to attack Bumside, Grant was very desirous of making an 
attack at once on the rebel forces on Lookout and Missionary 
Eidge, but examining the strong position occupied by Bragg 
at these points and the length of his lines, Grant became 
convinced that to successfully operate against the enemy it 
was necessary to wait until Sherman with his command came 
up. While this force moved eastward, Grant was maturing 
his plans for the engagement. He directed Sherman to re- 
port in person, which he did on the 15th, and on consultation 
with him and Thomas the general plan of battle was sub- 
mitted to them. The main attack was to be made on the 21st, 
at daylight, by Sherman's troops, on the north end of Mis- 
sionary Eidge. To accomplish this his command was to be 
reinforced with one division of the Army of the Cumberland 



214 THE ARMY OF THE CUMBERLAND. 

Tinder Jeff C. Davis. Slierman's troops — four divisions- 
were to move fi"om Brown's Feny tlirougli the woods to the 
noiih of the town np to the Tennessee Biver, opposite the 
mouth of Chickamauga Creek, where they were to cross on a 
pontoon bridge to be swung there under the supervision of 
"W. F. Smith, and the crossing of the troops to be i^rotected 
by batteries under Brannan, Thomas's Chief of Ai'tillery. 
After crossing the i-iver, Sherman was to move rapidly for- 
ward, canying the heights on the north end of Missionaiy 
Eidge as far as the tunnel, if possible, before the enemy 
could concentrate on his front, Thomas was to concentrate 
all his trooj^s in Chattanooga Valley on his left flank, leav- 
ing only the necessary force to defend the fortifications on 
his right and centre and to hold a movable column of one 
division to move wherever needed. This division was to 
make a show of threatening Bragg's forces up the valley. 
Thomas was then to effect a junction with Sherman, co-oper- 
ate with him, advancing his left and moving foi-ward as 
nearly simultaneously as jDossible, and support him. Hooker 
on the right in Lookout Valley, was to hold that position 
with Geaiy's division and two brigades under Cruft from the 
Fourth Army Coi"ps, ordei'ed to report to him. Howard, on 
Friday, the 20th, was ordered with his coi-j^s to take position 
on the north side of the Tennessee, opposite Chattanooga, 
near the pontoon bridge, and hold himself in readiness to 
move to Thomas's front or to co-operate with Sherman, as 
needed. Colonel Eli Long with his brigade of cavalry was 
dii'ected to report by noon on Saturday, the 21st, at Chatta- 
nooga, to cover Sherman's left flank, and if not further re- 
quii'ed by Sherman he was then to cross the Chickamauga, 
make a raid on the enemy's line of communication in the 
rear, doing as much damage as he could, 

Sherman made his movement with his troops from Bridge- 



POSITIONS OF ARMIES BEFORE THE BATTLES. 
Union Army j uhen Gen.GrarU 
• do. Picket ) took cotttmand,Oct.23.lS63. 
Rebel Army 
, do. Picket Li 

Position of Gen.Hooker't Corpt 
Gen.SherULan^ s first position 

MONDAY NOV. 23. 
Line developed by Recconnoieaance 
in force under Gen.Thomat 
TUESDAY NOV "4 

Pos tton of Genera! Hooker a Corpt ^,- ^_^ 

Ponttvn of Gen Shern an a Corps in the morning V^^ 
I If 1 t , eientng % 



WEDNESDAY N0V.2B. 
= Rebel Line in 
"•'• Routta taken by Hooker 
•" ■" Ground covered by a charge of th^ 
Army of tit Cumberland in the 
afternoon 
aa Lints of Rebel retreat 
• — — Lines of advance by the Army of 
the Cumberland 




246 THE ARMY OF THE CUMBERLAND. 

poii through Whitesides. Sencliog his leading division under 
Ewing up Lookout Valley, to make a feint on the left flank 
of the rebel army in the direction of Trenton, he crossed his 
others at Brown's Feriy and marched up the north bank of 
the river to the mouth of South Chickamaiiga Creek. Here 
they kept concealed in the woods from the enemy until they 
were ready to effect their crossing. Owing to heavy rains 
and the state of the roads, Sherman was able to have but 
one division, under John E. Smith, in position by the 21st, 
and Grant delayed his plans of battle to give him additional 
time. Sherman on the 21st moved his second division under 
Jlorgan L. Smith over the bridge at Brown's Ferry, and on 
the 23d, after many repairs to the bridge, rendered necessary 
by the swollen stream and the raft of logs sent down the 
river by the rebels, Ewing's division also got safely across. 
Sherman's fourth division under Osterhaus was not able on 
the 23d to cross, and this division was then ordered, in the 
event of not being able to cross by eight a.m. the 24th, to 
report to Hooker on the south bank of the Tennessee. Davis 
had reported with his division to Sherman, and on the 23d, 
the boats of the pontoon bridge were used to eifect a land- 
ing at the mouth of South Chickamauga Creek by Giles A. 
Smith's brigade, who captured the rebel pickets at this place, 
landed his entire brigade, and then sent the boats back for 
additional troops. By daylight of the 24:th, Sherman with 
two divisions of some 8,000 men was intrenched on the east 
bank of the Tennessee. A pontoon bridge, 1,350 feet long, 
was then built over this river, and another over Chickamauga 
Creek under the direction of W. F. Smith. 

Thomas, learning that Shernian's movements across Look- 
out Valley had been discovered by Bragg, on Sunday, the 
22d, directed Howard to cross into Chattanooga to give 
Bragg the idea that these were Sherman's troops coming to 



CHATTANOOGA, LOOKOUT MT. MISSIONARY RIDGE. 247 

reinforce Chattanooga. Howard made tlie crossing on Sun- 
day and took iwsition in rear of our front line in full view 
of tlie enemy. On the 20th, Bragg notified Grant that it 
would be Avell for him to withdraw all non-combatants from 
Chattanooga, This the latter regarded as a cover for Bragg's 
withdrawal of his own command, which he was confirmed in 
by deserters and spies reporting a large number of Bragg's 
troops as marching to the north. These were two divisions 
of Buckner's corps sent to strengthen Longstreet in East Ten- 
nessee ; that last sent, however, was recalled. To determine 
the tnith of these reports, early on the morning of the 23d, 
Grant dii-ected Thomas to develop the enemy's lines, driving 
in his pickets, and determine if he still held his force on our 
front. Thomas ordered Granger in command of the Fourth 
Corjas to form with Sheridan's and "Wood's divisions — Sheri- 
dan on the right, Wood on the left — with his left extended 
nearly to Citico Creek, and advance directly in front of Fort 
Wood, and make this movement. Palmer, commanding the 
Fourteenth Corps with Baird's division refused, was to sup- 
jDort Granger's right and was to hold Johnson's division 
under arms in the intrenchments in readiness to move as 
occasion might require. The troops were all in position at 
2 P.M. They moved out on the plain as if on parade, and in 
plain sight of Bragg and his army on Lookout and Mission- 
ary Kidge, formed their lines as if in review and moved for- 
ward to attack the enemy. Eapidly advancing " in the most 
gallant style " our troops steadily j)ushed in the rebel line. 
They first stnick the pickets, drove these on the reserve and 
then sweeping eveiything before them they hurled the rebels 
out of their first line of rifle-pits and sent them on the full 
run in retreat to the rear, except over two hundred of them 
captured. Here Granger's troops made themselves secure by 
throwing uj) temporary breastworks, while he sent a strong 



248 THE ARMY OF THE CUMBERLAND. 

picket line to the front to protect liis new line. In tliis 
charge Granger's line secured " Orchard Knob " which was 
then occtipied by Bridges' battery. Howard's corj)s was 
placed in position on the left of the line to Granger's left 
and also ordered to throw up breastworks. 

Sherman after crossing the river on the 23d, about 1 p.m., 
placed his command in three columns, following in his ad- 
vance the general direction of Chickamauga Creek, with his 
left under Morgan L. Smith resting on the creek. His 
centre was under John E. Smith and his right under Ewing, 
all under the command of Frank P. Blair, Corps Com- 
mander. In support of these, Davis's division also moved 
to the attack. Grant and Sherman had supposed that Mis- 
sionary Ridge was one prolonged even range. "When Sher- 
man left the river he passed over the foothills and then 
pressed up what he supposed was the main jDortion of the 
ridge. When he reached the tojj of this, after a lively 
skirmish with the rebel pickets, he found a deep depres- 
sion intei'vening between this hill and the next, which was 
the one the tunnel ran through, where the rebels were 
heavily intrenched, and which he had been ordered to 
take. On the top of this first hill, finding he could not 
take the hill beyond where the tunnel ran through, he 
threw up intrenchments and prepared to hold the ground 
he had thus far gained. Here about 4 p.m. he had a heavy 
engagement. The enemy's advance with sharp ai*tillery and 
musketry fii'e was gallantly met and repulsed. Sherman 
then made preiiarations for the night, posting his command 
to hold all positions. Howard had reported with three regi- 
ments to him, as he crossed the bridge wliich connected 
him with the main Army of the Cumberland. Howard leav- 
ing these troops with Sherman, then returned to his corj^s. 
When his command was placed on the front to Granger's 



CHATTANOOGA, LOOKOUT MT. MISSIONARY RIDGE. 249 

left in tlie afternoon, he connected with Sherman's right. 
Here Sherman rested all night, and about midnight received 
orders from Grant to "attack the enemy at dawn of day," 
"that General Thomas would attack in force early in the 
day." 

While the main attack was progressing under Sherman on 
the left, Hooker on the right had been pressing the enemy. 
On the 23d, Osterhaus, finding that he could not cross the 
Tennessee in time to engage in the movement with Sherman, 
reported with his division to Hooker, who was then ordered 
to take these troops, with Geary's division and Whittaker's 
and Grose's brigades of the First Division of the Fourth 
Coips under Cruft, and make a strong demonstration on the 
northern sloj^e of Lookout Mountain, drawing Bragg's at- 
tention to this i^oint and away from Sherman while crossing 
the river and getting into position. Thomas instructed 
Hooker if he found he was able to carry the enemy's posi- 
tion here, to do so. 

At 4 A.M. of the 24th, Hooker reported his troops in readi- 
ness to begin the movement. As he advanced he found 
Lookout Creek so swollen with recent rains that he could 
not cross without building a temporary bridge at the main 
road. He then sent Geaiy with two divisions and Whit- 
taker's brigade of Craft's command up the creek to eifect a 
crossing at Wauhatchie. Geary was then to sweep down 
the right bank, driving the rebels before him. The enemy, 
watching the construction of the bridge under Hooker, 
failed to observe the movement of the troops under Geaiy, 
by reason of a heavy mist which overhung the mountain, 
until he was on their flank and threatening their rear. The 
enemy's force here and on the top of the mountain was under 
Stevenson, with a command of six brigades posted mainly 
on the Northern slojje midway between the Palisades and 



250 THE ARMY OF THE CUMBERLAND. 

the Tennessee Eiver, on a belt of cultivated land. A con 
tinuous line of earthworks had been constructed, with re- 
doubts, redans, and pits, lower down the slope, with refer- 
erence to an assault from the direction of the river. On 
each flank were rifle-jjits, epaulements for batteries, walls of 
stone and abatis, as against attack from either Chattanooga 
or Lookout Valley. In these valleys were still more exten- 
sive earthworks. 

As Geary moved down on the right bank of the creek, he 
soon encountered the enemy's pickets. These gave the 
alarm at once, when their troops formed in the breastworks 
and rifle-pits. All these positions were soon covered by 
artillery planted by Hooker's orders. He then sent "Wood's 
brigade of Osterhaus's division about eight hundred yards 
Tip the creek to build another bridge, and directed Cnift to 
leave a small command at the first bridge, to attract the at- 
tention of the enemy, and ordered the rest of Grose's brigade 
to cross with Wood's. This bridge was completed at 11 
o'clock, when the troops under Wood and Grose crossed, and 
Joined Geary on the right bank, who had driven the enemy 
wo to this point. Under cover of the heavy artillery fire, 
the entire line advanced, pressing the enemy steadily back. 
At noon Geai-y's advance drove the rebels around the peak 
of the mountain. Here Geaiy was ordered to halt and re- 
form his command, but having the rebels on the run he jsressed 
forward and drove them in a fleeing, panic-stricken crowd. 
Cobham's and Ireland's brigades on the high ground on the 
right, near the Palisades, pressed on, rolling their line up on 
the flank, closely supported by Whittaker's and Creighton's 
brigades. The enemy had been reinforced, but he was not 
able to resist the sweep of Hooker's troo^js as they rounded 
the crest of the mountain at Craven's house, where the 
enemy made his last stand, and from here, with his line all 
11* 



CHATTANOOGA, LOOKOUT MT. MISSIONARY RIDGE. 251 

broken and in rout, lie was driven over tlie rocks and preci- 
pices into Chattanooga Valley. At this time the mist that 
had been hanging round the mountain all the day settled 
still lower down. It was now about 2 o'clock, and Hooker 
in the mist, unable to see beyond his immediate front, placed 
his troops in position, threw up temporary breastworks, with 
his line on the east side of the mountain, the right resting 
at the Palisades and the left near the mouth of Chattanooga 
Creek. He then reported to Thomas, who ordered Carlin 
with his brigade to report to him, when he was placed on 
the extreme right, relieving Geary's troops. During the 
night the rebels opened a heavy fire on our right as if in- 
tending to break our lines. This was handsomely repulsed, 
Carliu's brigade taking an active part. Early in the morn- 
ing, before daylight, several parties were sent xip the moun- 
tain, in anticipation of the retreat of the enemy during the 
night, to scale the heights. One from the Eighth Kentucky 
w^as the first that reached the summit, and here at sunrise 
the stars and stripes wei-e unfurled at the extreme point 
amid the cheers of the entire army. During the night 
Stevenson abandoned the top of the mountain, while the 
Summertown road remained open, leaving his cami) and 
garrison equipage. This gave to our army fiill possession 
and control of the river and railroad ui? to Chattanooga. 

The mist still clung to the mountain in heavy folds early 
on the 25th, when Hooker was ordered to press forward on 
the road to Eossville, carry the pass, and operate on Bragg's 
left and rear. Advancing down into the valley, he found 
the rebel pickets still holding the right bank of Chatta- 
nooga Creek. Arriving at the creek at about ten o'clock 
he found the bridges on the Eossville road destroyed. Here 
Hooker was delayed for some three hours, when Osterhaus 
in the advance crossed the infantry on the stringers and 



252 THE ARMY OF THE CUMBERLAND. 

pressed forward, driving the enemy's pickets over to Ross« 
ville. Hooker found the rebels at this place loading tip 
their stores. Leaving a force on their front, he sent 
Wood's brigade to take the ridge on the right, and William- 
son's on the left. After a severe skirmish the enemy hastily 
retreated, abandoning large quantities of stores, wagons, 
and ambulances. The gap now being under our control, 
Hooker ordered the advance of our entire line, Osterhaus 
with his division on the east of the ridge, Cruft on the 
ridge, and Geary in the valley west of the ridge. This line 
advancing soon encountered the rebels under Stewart, oc- 
cupying the line of breastworks thrown \ip by our troops 
after Chickamauga. Cruft charged on them, drove them in 
all directions out of these works in fiill retreat. Part of 
them ran into Osterhaus's men and were caj^tured. Others 
were captured by Geary in the valle3^ The mass of them 
fell back to their second line, from which they were like- 
wise speedily driven, w'hen the fight became a running one, 
continuing until sunset. Part of the enemy in their en- 
deavors to escape ran into Johnson's division of the Four- 
teenth Corj^s, thrown forward to join the pursuit, and were 
captured. Hooker's command then went into camp. 

Early on the morning of the 25th Sherman made his dis- 
position for his main attack. Holding his centre with 
three brigades, he was then to move along the east and 
west base of Missionary Ridge with his right and left 
flanks. Corse advancing from the right centre moved for- 
ward, supported by Lightburn on the left and Morgan L. 
Smith on his right, and occupied a crest in the woods about 
eighty yards from the intrenched line of the enemy. From 
this point Corse assaulted the main rebel line, and for over 
an hour maintained a heavy contest, driving the enemy, 
and at times being driven back, but still holding his crest as 



CHATTANOOGA, LOOKOUT MT. MISSIONARY RIDGE. 253 

first secured. Here Corse, Loomis, and Morgan L. Smith 
fought the rebels under Hardee with Cleburne's, Gist's, 
Cheatham's, and Stevenson's divisions in a stubborn strug- 
gle all dav up to three o'clock, holding their own, but mak- 
ing little headway. About two o'clock John E. Smith's 
two brigades, while moving to the support of Ewing, were 
driven in some disorder by a charge of the enemy, heavily 
massed. They were quickly reformed and, aided by Corse's 
troops taking the rebels in the flank with a hot musketry- 
fire, the enemy was soon driven back into his line of works. 

Here Sherman was fighting the heavy column of the ene- 
my on our left, and the main j^art of the battle had been 
his share. Grant was waiting for Hooker to reach the rebel 
left at Kossville, in the hope that this would afford some 
relief to the stubborn fighting Sherman had encountered. 
Finding that Hooker had been delayed by the destraction 
of the bridge longer than was anticij)ated, and that the 
diversion was not to come from that quarter, Grant ordered 
Thomas to move out the four di^dsions constituting the 
centre — Baird on the left, then Wood with Sheridan on his 
right, and Johnson on the extreme right of the line — with a 
double line of skirmishers to the front, supported by the 
entire force, press forward to carry the first line of rifle- 
pits and there halt and await orders, the movement to 
commence at three o'clock, at a signal of six guns fired in 
rapid succession from Orchard Knob. 

There was some little delay attending the preliminaries 
of the movement, and it was not until after half- past three 
that the commands ha^dng moved out and taken the align- 
ment were in position for the advance, when the guns 
sounded one, two, three, four, five, six. With this the 
troops, impatient all the day with being kept in the breast- 
works while Sherman's men were hard at work, eagerly 



254 THE ARMY OF THE CUMBERLAND. 

pressed onward, divisions, brigades, and regiments striving 
each with the other for the advance. "With the first move- 
ment Bragg at once hurried reinforcements from his right 
and left to strengthen his troops in his works to resist the 
advance on his centre. Here his line was under the com- 
mand of Breckinridge, who had his own division under 
Lewis, Stewart's division, and part of those of Buckner and 
Hindman under Patton Anderson. The enemy had origin- 
ally four lines of breastworks. The first one on our front 
was captured by Thomas on the 23d, when Orchard Knob 
was taken. This left three lines of rifle-pits remaining. 
The second one was about half a mile to the rear of the 
first, near the foot of the ridge. From here to the top was 
a steej) ascent of some five hundred yards, covered with 
large rocks and fallen timber. About half way up the ridge 
a small line of works had been thrown up. On the crest of 
the hill Bragg's men had constructed their heaviest breast- 
works, protected on oui* front by some fifty pieces of artil- 
lery in position. As our troops advanced, each command 
cheering and answering back the cheer of the others, the 
men broke into a double-quick, all striving to be the first to 
reach the rifle-pits at the foot of the ridge, held by a strong 
line of the enemy's troops. The rebels opened fire with 
shot and shell from their batteries, as our troops advanced, 
changing it soon to grape and canister, which with the fire 
from the infantry made it terrifically hot. Dashing through 
this over the open plain, the soldiers of the Army of the Cum- 
berland swept on, driving the enemy's skinnishers, charging 
down on the line of works at the foot of the ridge, captur- 
ing it at the point of the bayonet, and routing the rebels, 
sending them at full speed up the ridge, killing and captur- 
ing them in large numbers. These rifle-i^its were reached 
nearly simultaneously by the several commands, when the 



CHATTANOOGA, LOOKOUT MT. MISSIONARY KIDGE. 255 

troops, in compliance with their instnictions, laid down at the 
foot of the ridge awaiting further orders. Here they were 
under a hot, plunging, galling fire from the enemy in their 
works on the crest of the ridge. Without further waiting, 
and under no orders from their officers, first one regiment, 
then another started with its colors up the ascent, until with 
loud hurrahs the entire line, cheered by their officers, ad- 
vanced over and around rocks, under and through the fallen 
timber, charged up the ridge, each determined to reach 
the summit first. The centre part of Sheridan's division 
reached the top first, as they were the nearest to the crest, 
and crossed it to the right of Bragg's headquarters. The 
rest of the line was soon up, and almost simultaneously the 
ridge was carried in six places. Here the enemy making a 
fight for a short time was routed from the last of his lines, 
and his centre, panic-stricken, broke in full retreat. Kegi- 
ments were captured almost entire, battery after battery 
along the ridge was taken. In some cases the rebels were 
bayonetted at their guns, and the cannon that but a moment 
■before was firing on oui- troops, were by them captured, 
turned, and used against the rebels as they were driven in 
masses to the rear. The charge occuj^ied about one hour from 
the time of the firing of the guns on Orchard Knob until 
the troops occupied the rebel lines on the ridge. Sheridan's 
division reached the ridge a few minutes too late to capture 
Bragg, Breckinridge, and a number of the rebel generals, 
who left Bragg's headquarters on the charge of our men up 
the ridge. 

Sheridan advanced with his division, skirmishing with the 
enemy's rear-guard, but driving them steadily for about a 
mile on the Chickamauga station road. Here this road runs 
over a high ridge on which the en^my had jiosted eight 
pieces of artillery supported by a strong force to cover their 



256 THE ARMY OF THE CUMBERLAND. 

retreat. At tliis point Sheridan, with Harker's and "Wagner's 
brigades, had an engagement with these troops, but after a 
movement flanking the rebel's right and left, they hurriedly 
retreated, leaving two pieces of artillery and a large num- 
ber of wagons. After this ridge was captured, Sheridan's 
troops went into bivouac. During the night the full moon 
flooded the surrounding country with its bright light. At 
midnight, on Granger's suggestion, Sheridan in the advance 
was again ordered with his division to press the enemy. He 
at once advanced his command to Chickamauga Creek, cap- 
turing a large number of prisoners and quantities of mater- 
ial and stores. 

Wood, on reaching the top of the ridge, with Baird on his 
left, met with heavy opposition. The enemy was sujiported 
by a division from Hardee on the right, advancing just as 
Baird was getting into jiosition. Here these two divisions 
were engaged in a sharp contest until after dark. Turchin, 
with his brigade, which was the left wing of Baird, had 
taken possession of a small work constructed by the enemy 
on the ridge when he was attacked by the rebels in a most 
furious charge, but gallantly repulsed them, when they drew 
oflf in the direction of Tunnel Hill. Missionary Ridge was 
now entirely within our control, with the excejotion of the 
point, where Sherman's advance had been so stoutly resisted. 
During the night, Bragg drew off Hardee's troops from the 
front of Sherman, where the latter at once placed his com- 
mand in position for the pursuit the next day. 

During the night of the 25th, Thomas was directed to 
send Granger with his corps, and additional troops to make 
his command up to 20,000, to march to Burnside's relief at 
Knoxville, and the other portion of Thomas's command with 
Sherman's troops to pursue the enemy on the 26th. The 
latter, on the morning of that day advanced by the road 



CHATTANOOGA, LOOKOUT MT. MISSIO]SrAR"X RIDGE. 257 

through Chickamauga Station, while Thomas ordered the 
command under Hooker and Palmer to push on by way of 
the Greysville and Ringgold road. At the former place the 
rearguard of the rebels was surprised after night, and three 
cannon and a large number of jjrisoners captured. On the 
next day another piece of artillery was captured at Greys- 
ville, and later in the day Hooker's advance again struck 
the enemy, strongly jiosted in a pass in Taylor's Ridge. Here, 
after a heavy fight of over an hour, they were driven from 
the pass with considerable loss on both sides. The pursuit 
was discontinued on the 28th. Hooker remained for a few 
days at Ringgold, while Palmer returned to his camp at 
Chattanooga. 

Sherman's troops, with Davis's division in the advance, 
pressed through Chickamauga Station, and at about dark 
struck the rear of the enemy's column, and had a sharp fight. 
After leaving Greysville, Sherman turned his command to 
the left, to strike the railroad between Dalton and Cleve- 
land. Howard was sent to destroy this road, which he did 
in a most thorough manner. On the following day the Fif- 
teenth Corps destroyed the Atlanta Railroad from below 
Greysville back to the State line. On the 28th, Sherman was 
ordered to make a reconnoissance to the Hiawassee with his 
own coii^s, together with Davis's and Howard's troops of 
Thomas's command. On reaching Charleston, Sherman re- 
ceived orders to take command of Granger's column, moving 
to Burnside's relief, and to press forward with all the troops 
under him in all haste to Knoxville, eighty-four miles distant. 
Advancing rapidly with his command, Sherman reached 
Knoxville on the 6th. Longstreet, however, retreated on the 
4th of December to Virginia. Leaving Granger's corps to 
aid in the pursuit of Longstreet, Shemian by easy marches 
returned to Chattanooga on the 16th of the month, where he 



258 THE ARMY OF THE CUMBERLAND, 

ordered Howard and Davis to report with tlieir commands, 
while he marched west w'ith his own corps to Northern 
Alabama and placed them in winter quarters. 

Sherman with his two days' fighting reports the losses of 
his command, including Howard's command, but not that of 
Davis, whose loss he says was small, at 295 killed, 1,402 
wounded, and 292 missing — making a total of 1,989. This, 
however, includes the losses in his first division — Oster- 
haus's, which fought under Hooker on the right — of 87 killed, 
34-4 wounded, and 66 missing, making 497 to be deducted, 
which leaves Sherman's loss proper, 208 killed, 1,058 
wounded, and 226 missing — a total of 1,492. Thomas's 
loss in the part taken by his troops, also including How- 
ard's command and not including Davis's division, was 
529 killed, 2,281 wounded, and 141 missing — an aggregate of 
3,951. The large bulk of the losses under Thomas were in 
Sheridan's and Wood's divisions. That of the former was 
135 killed, 1,151 wounded, missing, none — aggregate 1,256 ; 
that of the latter, 150 killed, 851 wounded, missing, none — 
aggregate 1,001. These two divisions in their one hour's 
work storming Missionary Eidge met with a loss of 2,287 
men, showing hot work. There was captured by the army 
of the Cumberland 40 pieces of artilleiy, 58 artillery car- 
riages and caissons, 6,175 stand of small arms, principally 
English Enfield, and 5,471 prisoners. 

During the winter there were nothing but minor move- 
ments of the troops. The railroads up to Chattanooga were 
repaired, and the first "cracker train" that entered the 
place was greated with many hearty cheers by our troojis in 
the town, as the shrill scream of its whistle woke the echoes 
among the surrounding mountains, so long silent to this 
music. The roads into and through East Tennessee were 
repaired to Knoxville and beyond. 



CHATTANOOGA, LOOKOUT MT. MISSIONARY RIDGE. 259 

In the early spring the organization of the Army of the 
Cumberland was changed by Granger being relieved of the 
command of the Fourth Corps, when Howard was assigned 
to that command. Palmer was retained in command of the 
Fourteenth Corps, and the Eleventh and Twelfth Corps were 
consolidated into the Twentieth Corps, with Hooker in com- 
mand. The cavalry was organized in four divisions, under 
the command of W. L. Elliott. The army in the field con- 
sisted of 60,773 effective men. 

General Thomas ordered the Fourth Corps to Cleveland. 
The Fourteenth Corjjs in front of Chattanooga was well 
thrown forward toward the enemy's front at Dalton, i^repar- 
atory to the spring campaign to Atlanta, under General 
Sherman. The Twentieth Corps was stationed in Lookout 
Valley. 

In the general engagement Grant's plan of battle had 
been for Sherman with five divisions to make the main attack, 
sweep everything before him down the lidge, and when ho 
had the rebels in full retreat, the Army of the Cumberland 
was then to aid in the pursuit, after jjatiently waiting until 
the fighting was over. Hooker, under Grant's original 
plan, was to simply hold Lookout Valley secure, and when 
the enemy was driven by Sherman, he too was to join in 
the x)ursuit. All the fighting of the battle was to be done 
by Sherman and all the glory thereof was to be his. In 
Sherman's memoirs we are favored with Grant's views of the 
Army of the Cumberland when Sherman first reported in 
person to Grant at Chattanooga, to learn of his jilan and the 
part he, Sherman, was to take. Sherman says that Grant 
told him " that the men of Thomas's army had been so de- 
moralized by the battle of Chickamauga that he feared they 
could not be got out of their trenches to assume the offen- 
sive," and -that " the Army of the Cumberland had so long 



260 THE ARMY OF THE CUMBERLAND. 

been in the trenches that he -wanted my troops to hnny up 
to take the offensive first, after which he had no doubt the 
Cumberland Army would fight well." So, under Grant's 
plan, the Army of the Cumberland was to stand by and be 
taught a gi-and object lesson how to fight, as given by Sher- 
man. During the course of the engagement the plan was 
modified twice. Under the original plan, Sherman was to 
make a demonstration up Lookout Valley, in the expectation 
that Bragg would strengthen his left at the expense of his 
right, thereby making Sherman's part of the j^lan so much 
the lighter as the line on his battle front was weakened. 
To cany this out Hugh Ewing's division was sent to Trenton, 
but this accomplished nothing. Grant fearing that Bragg's 
right might be too strong for Sherman to give his lesson to 
the Army of the Cumberland properly, finding Osterhaus's 
division cut ofi" from Sherman, ordered it to report to 
Hooker, who was directed to take it and Geaiy's division 
with Cruft's division of the Fourth Corps and make a de- 
monstration on the rebel left at Lookout Mountain, to at- 
tract the attention of Bragg while Shemian was getting into 
position to take " the end of Missionary Eidge as far as the 
tunnel." Hooker, on the day i^revious, learning that How- 
ard's corps was going into Chattanooga, and probably into 
the fight, asked to be allowed his right to be with his troops 
under fire. Under his original order he was simj^ly to hold 
Lookout Valley, which he did not relish if part of his com- 
mand should engage the enemy. When his orders came to 
"make a demonstration" he determined he would take 
Lookout Mountain and drive Bragg's left out of his works. 
With less than ten thousand trooijs. over two-thirds of whom 
were the Army of the Cumberland, Hooker fought his " Bat- 
tle above the Clouds," that will last in history forever, and 
gi'ow in fancy and song as the years roll on. Hooker took 



CHATTANOOGA, LOOKOUT MT. MISSIONARY RIDGE. 261 

Lookout Mountain and drove tlie rebel left to Kossville, over 
five miles, before Sherman reached the tunnel. He made 
Sherman's task none the easier, however, because Bragg 
then threw the two divisions Hooker had whipj^ed ^^l-)ou 
Sherman's front. 

Then, when Sherman had been fighting for nearly two days, 
and had failed to make the headway Grant's jjlan contem- 
plated, the jilan underwent another modification. On the 
25th, Grant ordered Thomas to move out his troojjs from the 
centre, to make another " demonstration " in Sherman's be- 
half, so he could take the tunnel in accordance with the 
original plan.' Thomas was ordered to take the first line of 
rifle-pits and hold his command there, while Bragg was ex- 
pected to draw off part of his troops from Sherman's front 
and strengthen his line in front of the "demonstration." 
Thomas's orders to his corps and division generals were given 
in accordance with Grant's instructions, and as the orders 
reached the brigade and regimental commanders, as far as 
the officers were concerned the movement was only to be a 
" demonstration." When the troops reached the rebel line, 
captured it, and then found themselves under the heav;^' fire 
from the enemy's lines on the heights above, without orders, 
and even against orders, the soldiers of the Army of the 
Cumberland, who were " so demoralized that they would not 
fight," pressed up the face of the ridge under the deadly 
musketry fire that greeted them, with cannon in front, to the 
right and the left, raking with converging fire, and won for 
General Grant the battle of Missionary Kidge, driving Bragg 
away from Sherman's front and thus enabling him to take 
the tunnel as ordered. Whenever the victory of Missionary 
Kidge shall be narrated on histoiy's page, this gallant 
charge of the brave men of Wood's and Sheridan's divisions, 
with those of Baird and Johnson on their left and right, will 



262 THE ARMY OF THE CUMBERLAND. 

always be the prominent feature of tlie engagement as told 
in the coming years, and will be the last to lose its glory and 
renown. 

No wonder that General Grant failed to ai^preciate this 
movement at the time, not understanding the troops who 
had it in charge. "When he found these commands ascending 
the ridge to capture it when he ordered a " demonstration '* 
to be made to the foot of the hill and there to wait, he 
turned sharply to General Thomas and asked, "By whose 
orders are those troops going up the hill ? " General Thomas, 
taking in the situation at once, suggested that it was prob- 
ably by their own. General Grant remarked that " it was all 
right if it turned out all right," and added, " if not, some 
one would suffer." But it turned out " all right," and Grant 
in his official report compliments the troops for " following 
closely the retreating enemy without further orders." Gen- 
eral Thomas, in his official report, after narrating the events 
of the 23d, 21th, and 25th of November, quietly says: "It 
will be seen by the above report that the original j^lan of 
operations was somewhat modified to meet and take the 
best advantage of emergencies which necessitated material 
modifications of that plan. It is believed, however, that the 
original plan had it been caiTied out could not possibly have 
led to more successful results." 



APPENDIX A. 

ORGANIZATION OF THE FOURTEENTH ARMY 
CORPS, DEPT. OF THE CUMBERLAND. 

Major-Geneeal W. S. ROSECRANS, Commanding. 

December 20, 1863. 

CENTRE. 

Major-General Geo. H. THOMAS. 

FIRST DIVISION. 

Brigadier-General S. S. FRY. 

FirM, BrJsrac^e.— Col. M.B. Walker, 82i Ind., 12th Ky., irth O., 3lRt O., 
88tli O. Second Bjiqade. --Co\. J. M. Harlan, 10th Ind., r4th Iud.,4th 
Ky., 10th Ky., 14tli 6. rhird Bi-irjadc. —Bng.-Gcneml J. B. Steedman, 
67th Ind., 2d Minn., 9th O., 3.5th O., Isth IT. S. Artillery.— ithMich. Battery, 
1st O. Battery •' C," 4th U. S. Battery '• 1." 

THIRD DIVISION. 

Brigadier-General L. H. ROUSSEAU, 

Ninth Brigade.— Co]. B. F. Scribner, .S^Blh Ind., 2d O., 33d O., 94th O., 
10th Wis. Sfvmteenfh Brigad".— Co]. J. G. Jones. 42d Ind., 88th Ind., 15th 
Ky.. 3d O., 10th O. Twenty- Eiqhth Brigade.— Co\ . H . A. Hambf.ight, 24th 
111., r9th Penn., 1st Wis.. 21st Wi*. Artillery.— 4th Ind. Battery, 5th Ind. 
Battery, 1st Ky., 1st Mich. Baitery " A." Cavalry.— 2d Ky. (Battalion), 11th 
Ky. (Detachment), 4th Ind. (Detachment). 

EIGHTH DIVISION. 

Brigadier-General J. S. NEGLEY. 

Seventh Brigade.— Col. John F. Miller, 37lh Ind., 78th Penn., 21st O. 
74tli O., Independent Battalion, Capt. Casey. Tiventy-Ninth Brigade. — 
Col. T. R. Stanley, 19th 111.. 11th Mich., 18th O., 69th O. ArtUlery.—Ut 
Ky. Battery '• B.," 1st O. Battei-y " G.," Ist O. Battery " M." Cavalry.— 1!t\ 
Penn., Ist Tetin. 

SEVENTH DIVISION. 

Brigadier-General J. M. PALMER. 

First Br/gade.-Co]. G. W. Roberts. 22d 111, STth 111, 43d 111., 51st 111. 
Second Brigade.— Bng.-Gerievnl J. D. Morgan, 10th 111., 16th III., 60th 111., 
10th Mich. , 14th Mich. Ariillery.—Ut 111. Battery " C," 10th Wis. Battery. 
Cavalry.— 7t]i 111. Co. " C." 

263 



264 APPENDIX A. 



TWELFTH DIVISION. 

Brigadier-General E. DUMONT. 

Fortieth Brigade. —Co\. A. O. Miller, 98th 111., 72d Ind., 75th Ind 
Biiffade.— Gen. Vf.'V. Ward, Wid 111., lUoth 111., rOth Ind., 79th O. 



Arlillery. —ISth Ind. Battery. Cavalry.— 4th Ind. (.Detachment), Uh Ky 
11th Ky. (Detachment) 



RIGHT WING. 
Major-General a. McD. McCOOK. 

SECOND DIVISION. 

Briqadxeb-Geneeal J. W. SILL. 

Fmtrth Brigade.— Co\. Buckley, 6th Ind., 5th Ky.. l?t 0., 93d O.. 16th U. 
S., 19th U. S. Fifth Brigade.— Co\. E. N. Kirk, 34th 111., 79th III., 29th 
lud., 30th Ind., 77th Penu. Sixth B?i,gade.—Brig.-GenQTn\ Willich, 89th 111., 
32d liid., 39th Ind., 15th O., 49th O. Artillery.— lat O. Battery "A.," Ist O. 
Battery "E.," 5th U. S. Battery "I." Cavalry.— 20. Ky. (,2 Cos). 

NINTH DIVISION. 

Brigadier-General J. C. DA\nS. 

Thirtieth Brigade.*— 5fith 111., 74th 111., 75th 111., 22d Ind. Thirty-First 
Brir/ad€.*—2\»t III., 38th 111., lOlst O., 15th Wis. Thirty-Second Brigade.* 
—25th 111., 35th 111., 81st Ind., 8th Kan. Artillery.— 2d Minn. Battery, 5th 
Wis. Battery, 8th Wis. Battery. 

ELEVENTH DIVISION. 

Brigadier-General P. H. SHERIDAN. 

Thirty-Fifth Brigade.— Col. F. Schaefer, 44th 111., 7.3d 111., 2d Mo., 15th 
Mo. Thirty- Sixth Brigade.— Co]. Moore, 85th 111., 8(5th 111., 12oth 111.. 52d O. 
Thirtv-Seventh Brigade.— Co). N. Grensel, 36th 111., 88th 111., 21st Mich., 
24th Wis. Artillery.— 2d 111. Battery " I.," 1st Mo. Battery " G." Cavali-y.— 
Sd Ky. Co. "L." 



LEFT WING. 
Majoe-Gexeeal T. L. CRITTENDEN. 

FOURTH DIVISION. 

Brigadier-General W. S. SMITH. 

Tenth Brigade.— Col. W. Grose, 84th 111., 36th Ind., 23d Kv., 6th O., 24th 
O. Nineteenth Brigade.— Col. W. B. Hazen, 110th 111., 9th "Ind., 6th Ky., 
41st O. Tiventy-Second Brigade.— Col. Entart, 31st Ind., let Ky., 2d Ky., 
20th Ky., 90th O. Artillei-y.i—C&^it. Standart. 

♦Brigade commanders not indicated on return, 
t Batteries not indicated ou return. 



APPENDIX A. 265 

FIFTH DIVISION. 

Brigadiek-General H. P. VAN CLEVE. 

Eleventh Brigade.— Co\. Sam'l Beatty, r9th Ind., 9th Ky., 19th O.. 59th O. 
Fourteenth Bngade.—Co\. J. P. Fypfe. 44th Ind., Stith Iiid., lirh Kv., 13th 
O. r Li' enty- Third Brigade.— Cq\. S. Matthews, 35th Ind., 8th Ky., 21st 
Ky., 5l6t O., 99th O. Artillenj. *—Capt. G. R. Swallow. 

SIXTH DWISION. 

Brigadier-General M. S. HASCALL. 

Fifteenth Brigade— Col. G. P. Buell, 100th 111., 17th Ind., .58th Ind., 3d 
?2'u' ^^- ,^- Tiventieth Brigade.-Col. C G. Harker, 51st Ind., 7.3d Ind., 
i'^^u T^i'^'"''^''^ 0.,65thO. Twenhj. First B/igade.-Co]. G. D. Wagnbk, 
15th lud., 40th lud., 57th Ind., 97th O. Artillery.*— M&j. S. Race. 



CAVALRY. 
Brigadier-General STANLEY. 

FIRST DIVISION. 

Colonel KENNETT. 

First Brigade.— Col. E. H. Murray, 2d Ind., 1st Ky., 3d Ky., 4th Ky 4th 
Mich., 7th Peiin. Seco7id Brigade.-Col. L. Zahm, 5th Ky., let O., 3d O ' 4th 
C, IstO. Artillery, Battery "D.'' 

UNATTACHED FORCES. 

1st Mich. Engineers, 9th Mich. (Detach.), .3d E. Tenn., 6th E. Tenn 15th 
Penu. Cavalry, 4th U. S. Cavalry (Detach.;, Signal Corps, Stokes' 111. Battery. 

GARRISONS. 

Bmcling Green, ^y.—Brig.-Gen. Granger, 129th 111., 26th Ky., 23d Mich., 
102d O., 111th O., 4th Ky. Cavalry. Naxhville, re«».— Brig.-Gen. R. B. 
Mitchell, Ist Mid. Tenn., 11th Ind. Battery, 12th Ind. Battery. Ist Mich. 
Artillery, 5th Battery. 3d Ind. Cavalry (1 Co.) 

* Batteries not indicated on return. 



APPENDIX B. 

OKCtAXIZATIOX of TEOOPS IX THE DEPT. 
OF THE CUMBEELAXD, COMMANDED BY 
^lAJOR GEXERAL GEOEGE H. THOMAS. 
CHATTAXOOGA, TEXX., OCT. 20th, 1863. 

FOURTH ARMY CORPS. 
Maj.-Gex'l G. granger. 

FIRST DIYISIOX. 
Maj -Ges'l J. JJ. PAL3IEK. 
First Brig-2df—Bng. Genl Chas. Cbctt. 21?t 111., 38th HI., 2!nh Ind., 
31st Ind.. 81?t led.. 1st Kv.. 2d Kv., 90th O.. 101st O. Second Bngade.^ 
Bre. G«nl W. C. Whitakiir. 96th HI.. 115th 111.. ,3oih Ind.. 84th Ind., 
8lh"Kv.. 40th O., 51st O.. 99th O. Third Brigade.— C6\. Wm. Gbose, 
59th fll., 75th Hi., gllh m., 9th Ind., 30th Ind.. .36th Ind.. 24th O.. 77th 
Penn. ArtVlery .—^X^ Ind. Banerr, 4th U. S. Art., Co. "H ; " 4th U. S. 
Art-, Co. "il.' 

SECOND DIVISION. 
Maj.-Gixl p. H. SHEPJDAN. 

Tirft Brigade.— ^fig.-Gfti^'\ J. B. Stezdsiax. 36th LI.. 44thni.. T3d HI.. r4th 
HI .. ssth 111 .. 22d Ind.. 21#t Mich.. 2d Mo., 1.5th Mo.. 24th Wis. Second Brigade. 
— Brig.-Gen'l G. D. Wagxer. 100th HI.. 15th Ind.. 40th Ind.. 57th Ind.. oSth 
Ind.. 13lh ilich., 2t)th O.. 97th O. Third Brigade— CoL C. G. Hakker, 
SJdlU.. 27th 111.. 42d HI.. 51st HI.. 79th HI... 3d Kv., &4th O.. 65th O.. 12oth O. 
AraUery.— 1st liL Art., Co." M," 10th Ind. Battery, 1st Miss. Art., Co. " G." 

THIRD DITISIOX. 

Beig.-Gex'l T. J. WOOD. 

First Brigade.— "Briz. -Gen \ A. WnxiCH. 25th HI.. 35th HI. 89th HI.. 32d 
Ind.. 6Sth Ind., 8th Kan., 15th O.. 4&th O., loth Wis. Second Briande.— 
Bris.-Gen'l W. B. Hazex. 6th Ind.. 5th Kv.. 6th Kv.. 23d Kv.. Ist 0.. 6rh 
0.."41st O.. 93d O.. 124th O. Third Brigade.— Bnz'.-Gen'\ S. Beatty. 44th 
Ind.. 79th Ind., 86th Ind.. 9th Kv.. 17th Kv., 13th O'. 19th O., 59rh O. Artil' 
fery.— Bridge's Battery 111. Art.. 6th O. Battery, 26ih Penn. Battery. 

ELEVENTH ARMY CORPS.* 
Maj.-Ge-vl 0. 0. HOWARD. 

SECOND DR'ISION. 
Bris.-Gex'l A. Tox STEIXWEHR. 
First Brigade.— ^A N. J.. 1.34th X. T.. 154th N. Y.. 27th Penn., 73d Penn. 
Second Brigade.— ^id. Mass.. 136th N. Y., 55th O., 73d O. 

• Brigade Commanders not given. 

266 



APPENDIX B. 267 

THIRD DIVISION. 
Maj.-Gen'l C. SCHURZ. 
First Brigade.— 82A 111., 45tli N. Y., 143d N. Y., 61st O., 82d O. S-cond 
Briffade.—mh N. Y., 68ih N. Y., 119th N. Y., 141st N. Y., 75tli Penn., 26th 
Wis. A?iUle?-y.—Ut New York Art., Co. " I," 13th New York Battery. Indt. 
Co. 8th N. Y. Vol. lufty., 1st Ohio Art., Co. "I," 1st Ohio Art., Co. " K," 
4th U. 8., Co. "G." 

TWELFTH ARMY CORPS.* 
Maj.-Genl H. W. SLOCUM. 

FIRST DIVISION. 
Brig.-Gen'l a. S. WILLIAMS. 
Mrst Brigade.— 5th Conn., 20th Conn., 3d Md.. 123d N. Y., 14.5th N. Y., 46th 
Penn. SrCond Briga(U.-2.:th Ind., 2a Mass., 13th N. J., lOrth N. Y., 150th 
N. Y., 3d Wis. 

SECOND DIVISION. 
Brig.-Gen'l JOHN W. GEARY. 
First B7-igade.— 5th O., 7th O. 29th O., 66th O., 28th Penn., 147th Penn. 
Second Bngade.—'^th Penn., 109th Penn., 111th Penn. Tkird Brigade.— 
60th N. Y., 78th N. Y., 102d N. Y., 137th N. Y., 149th N. Y. Artillery.— Xat 
Batt'n 10th Maine Vol. Infty., 1st New York Art., Co. "M," Pennsylvania 
Batt'y, Co. " E," 4th U. S. Art., Co. " F," 5th U. S. Art., Co. " K." 

(Maj.-Gen'l JOSEPH HOOKER, Com'g 11th and 12th Army 
Corps.) 
Lieut. -Col. Hiinton, Unassigned Artillert. 
2d Ky. Batt'v, 1st Mich. E. and M., 20th Ind. Batfy., 1st Ky. Batt'y., Ist 
O. Art., Co. "E," 10th Wis. Batt'y. 

FOURTEENTH ARMY CORPS. 
Maj.-Gen'l. GEORGE H. THOMAS. 

FIRST DIVISION. 
Brig.-Gen'l. W. P. CARLIN. 
First Brigade.— Col O. F. Moore: 104Lh 111., .38th Ind.,42d Ind., 88th Ind., 
15th Ky., 2d C, 83d O.. 94th 0., 10th Wis. Seco?id Brigade.— Col. M. F. 
Moore: 19th 111., 11th Mich., 18th O., 69th O., 15th U. S. Infty., 1st and 2d 
Batt., 16th U. S. Infty., 1st Batt., 18th U. S Infty., 1st and 2d Batt., 19th U. S. 
Infty., Isr Batt. Third Brirjade.—Co\. W. Sirwell: 24th 111., 37th Ind., 2l8t 
0.,74th O., 78th Penn.. 79th Penn., 1st Wis., 21st Wis. Artillery.— 1st 111. 
Art., Co. "C," 1st. Mich. Art., Co. "A.," 5th U. S. Art., Co. '• H." 

SECOND DmSION. 
Brig.-Gen'l. JEFF. C. DA^aS. 

First Brigade.— Brig.-Gen'\. J. D. Morgan: 10th 111., 16th 111., 60th HI., 
10th Mich., 14th Mich. Second Rrigade. — Brig.-Gen'l J. Beatty : 3d 
East Tenn., 5th East Tenn., 6ih East Tenn., 78th 111., 98th O., 118th O., 
121st O. Third Brigade.— Col. D. McCook: 85th HI., 86th HI., 110th 111., 
125th 111., 52d O., 22d Mich. Artiltery.—2d 111. Art., Co. " I," 'M Mian. Batt'y., 
5th Wis. B:itt'y. 

* Brigade Commanders not given. 



2G8 APPENDIX B. 



THIRD DIVISION. 
Brig.-Gen'l a. BAIRD. 
Firxr Brigade.— 'Bi\g.-C:m'\ J. B. Tuechin: 82d Ind., 11th O., 17fh O., 31st 
O., 36th O., 89th O., 92d O. Second Biir/ade.—Coi. Jas. George : T5ih 
Ind., 87th Ind., 101st Ind.. 2d Mhin., 9th 6., 35th O.. lO.'ith O. Third Bri- 
gade— Cq\. E. H. Phelps: 10th Ind., r4th Ind., 4th Ky., 10th Ky., 18th Ky., 
14th O., 38th 0. AriiUet-!/. —7th Ind. Batt'y., 19th Ind. Batt'y., 4th U. 8. 
Art., Co. "I." 

ARTILLERY RESERVE. 
Brig.-Gen'l J. M. BRANNAN, Chf. of Art. 

FIRST DIVISION. 

Col. J. BARNETT. 
First Brigade.— Ut O. Art., Co. " A.," 1st O. Art., Co. " B.," let. O. Art., 
Co ■' C," 1st O. Art., Co. " F." Second Brigade.— \ai O. Art., Co. " G.," Ist 
O. Art., Co. "M.," 18th O. Batt'j'-, 20th O. Batfy. 

SECOND DIVISION. 
First Brigade.— C&^t. Sutermeister: 4th Ind. Batt'y., 8th Ind. Batt'y., 
11th Ind. Batt'y., 21st Ind. Batt'v. Second Briqude.—Q&\>t. Church: 1st 
Mich Art., Co. " D.," 1st M. Tenn. Art., Co. "A.," 3d Wis. Batt'y. 8th 
Wis. Batt'y. Cobvrn's Brigade.— SZd Ind.. 85th Ind., 19th Mich., 22d Wis., 
9th O. Batt'y. U. S. Farces, Gallatin, Tenn.— Brig.-Gen'l. E. A. Paine: 
91st Ind. (1st Batt.j, 50th O. (1st Batt.), rist O., 106th O., 13tli Ind. Batt'y. 



NASHVILLE, TENN. 
Brig.-Gen'l R. S. GRANGER, Comdg. Post. 
Ward's Brigade.— Brig.-Genl W. T. Ward : 105th 111., 1291h 111., 70th 
Ind., 79th O, l.«t Mich. Art.. Co. " E." Una.'<si(/md.— 18th Mich. Vol. 
Inft'v-, 12th. Ind Batt'y. ClarLttille, Tenn.— Co\. A. A. Smith, Comd^ Post: 
83d I'll. {U\ Batt.), 2d 111. Art., Co. " H." Chattanooga, Ttnu.-l'^th O. Vol. 
Inft'y, 1st Batt. O. S. S. 

FIRST DIVISION CAVALRY. 
Brig.-Gen'l R. B. MITCHELL. 
First Brigade.— Col. A. P. Campbell : 1st E. Tenn. Cav., 2d Mich. Cav., 
9th Penn. Cav. Second Brigade.— Co\. E. McCook: 2d E. Tenn. Cav., 3d E. 
Tenn. Cav., 2d Ind. Cav., 4th Ind. Cav., 1st Wis. Cav. Third Brigade.— 
Col. L. D. Watkins : 4th Ky. Cav., 5th Ky. Cav., 6th Ky. Cav., 7th Ky. Cav. 
—Artillery. Sec. 1, O. Art., Co. "D." 

SECOND DIVISION CAVALRY. 
Brig.-Gen'l GEO. CROOK. 

First Brigade.— Cq\. R. L Minty : 3d Ind. Cav. (Detachm't), 4th Mich. 
Cav.. 7th Penn. Cav., 4th LT. S. Cav. Second Brigade.— Co\. E. Long: 2d 
Ky. Cav., 1st O. Cav., 3d O. Cav., 4th O. Cav. Third Brigade.— Col. W. W. 
Lowe : 5th la. Cav., 1st Mid. Tenn. Cav., 10th O. Cav , Capt. Stokes' 111. 
Batt'y, 15th Pa. Vol. Cav., Col. W. J. Palmer. Miller's Brig. Mtd. Infty. 
—Col. A. O. Miller: 92d 111., 98th IlL, 123d 111., 17th Ind., 72d Ind.. 18th 
Ind. Batt'y. IT. S. Forces. Ft. Donelson.— Lt.-Col. E. C. Brott : 83d HI. 
(Detachm't.), 2d 111. Art., Co. "C." 

Unassigned Difantri/.-Uth 111.. 8mh 111., 102d 111., .39th Ind., 51st Ind., 
73d Ind., 21st Ky., 38th Ky., 3d U., 102d O., 108th O., 10th Tenn., 31st Wis. 



APPENDIX C. 

ORGANIZATION OF THE CONFEDERATE 
ARMY AT THE BATTLE OP CHICKA- 
MAUGA, GA. 

EIGHT WING. 
Lieut .-Gen'l. LEONIDAS POLK. 

CHEATHAM'S DIVISION. 

Maj.-Gen'l B. F. Cheatham. 

Jaclcso7i's Brigade.— TiT'ig.-Gan'l J. K. Jackson : 1st Corfecl. Bat., 5th Ga., 
2d Ga. Bat., 5th Miss., 8th Miss , Scogiii's (Ga.) Batt'y. Manei/s Brigade.— 
Brig.-Gen'l Geo. Maney : 1st Tenn., 27th Teun., 4th Tenn., 6th Tenu., 9tli 
Tenn.. Maney s (Teim.) Batt., Smith'.s (Miss.) Batt'y. Smith's Brigade.— 
Brig.-Gen'l Pheston Smit.i, Col. A. J. Vauqhan : 11th Tenn., 12th Tenn , 
4Tth Tenn., 13th Tenn., 29th Tenn., 154th Tenn., Scott's (Tenn.) Batt'y. 
Wnghl's Brigade.~^xig.-G&i\'\ M. J. Wkight : 8th Tenn., 16th Tenn., 2sth 
Tenn.. 3Sth Tenn., 51st Tenn., 52d Tenn., Caraes' (Tenn.) Batt'y. StrahVs 
.Br/'r/Mt^e.— Brig-Gen'l O. F. Strahl: 4th Tenn., 5th Tenn., 19th Tenn., 24th 
Tenn., 3l8t Tenn., 33d Tenu., Stanford's (Miss.) Batt'y. 

HILL'S CORPS. 
Lieut. -Gen'l. D. H. HILL. 

CLEBURNE'S DIVISION. 

Maj-Gen'l p. E. CLEBURNE. 

PoWs 5ngfac?«.— Brig-Gen'l L. E. Polk : 1st Ark., 3d Confed., 5th Confed., 
2d Tenn., 35th Tenn., 48th Tenn.. Calvert's (Tenn.) Batt'y, Wood's Brigade 
— Brig-Gen'l S. A. M. Wood : 16th Ala., .33d Ala.. 4oth Ala., 32d Miss.. 45th 
Miss., Hinkin's Batt., Semple's (Ala.) Batt'y. Deshler' s Brigade.— Rrig.-Gen'i 
James Desuler, Col. R. Q. Mills : 19th Ark., 24th Ark., 6th Tex.. 10th 
Tex., 15th Tex., 17th Tex., 18th Tex., Silth Tex., 25th Tex., Douglas' (Tex.) 
Batt'y. . £. V / 

BRECKINRIDGE'S DmSION. 

Maj.-Gen'l JOHN C. BRECKINRIDGE. 

Belni's Brigade.— 'Qrig.-Qun'i B. H. Helm, Col. J. II. Lewis, 41st Ala., 2itl 
Ky.,4thKy., 6th Ky., 9th Ky., Cobb's (Kv.) Battery. Adams' Brigade.— 
Brig.-Gen'l Dan'l Adams, Col. R. L. Gibso.^:, 32d Ala., 13th La., 2Uth La., 
16th La., 25th La., 19th La., Anstin's (La.) Batt., Slocomh's (La.) Battery. 
StovaJVs Brigade.— Bng.-Gii\V\ M. A. Stovall, 1st Fla., 3d Fla., 4th Fla., 
47th Ga., 60th No. Car., Mebane's (Teun.) Battery. 

269 



270 APPENDIX C. 

WALKER'S DmSION.* 

Maj.-Gen'l W. H, T. walker. 

Brig.-Gen'l S. E. gist. 

Gixf\i B7-igade.—BT\g.-Genn S. R. Gist, Col. P. H. Colquitt, 46th Ga., 8th 
Ga. Batt., 16ih Sd. Car., 24th So. Ca., Ferguson's (So. Ciir.) Battery. Ecior's 
Prigade.—hng.-Qen'\ M. D. Ect r, Ala. Batt. (Stone's),Mii<s. Batt't Pound's), 
•Jth Tex., lOth Tex. Cav..t ]4th Tex. Cav.,t 32d T.x. Cav.,t Battery. i Wil- 
son's Brigade.— Co\. C. C. Wilson, 35th Ga.,29th Ga.,30th Ga., 1st Ga. Batt., 
4th La. Batt., Batterj'.J 

LIDDELL'S DWISION.* 

Brig.-Gen'l S. J. R. LIDDELL. 

LiddelPs Brigade.~Co\. D. C. Govan, 2d Ark., 15th Ark., 5th Ark., 13th 
Ark., 6th Ark., 7th Ark., 8th Ark., 1st La., Swett's (Miss.) Batt. WaUhnWs 
Brigade.— "Eing.-Qew'l E. C. Walthall, 24th Miss., 27th Miss., 29th Miss., 
30th Miss., 34th Miss., Fowler's (Ala.) Battery. 

LEFT WING. 
Lieut. -Gen'l JAMES LONGSTREET. 

McLAW'S DIVISION.§ 

Maj.-Gen'l LAFAYETTE McLAW. 

Brig.-Gen'l J. B. KERSHAW. 

Kershaw''s Brigade.— T&\\g.-GeTi'\ J. B. Kershaw, 2d So. Car, 3d So. Car., 
7th So. Car., 8th So. Car., 15th So. Car , 3d So. Car. Batt. Woford's Brigade. 
—Brig.-Gen'l W. T. Wofpord, 16th Ga.. 18th Ga., 24th Ga., 3d Ga. Bait., 
Cobb's (Ga.) Legion, Phillip's (Ga.) Legion. Humphreys'' Brigade.— Brig.- 
Gen'l B. G. Humphreys. l:Jth Miss., 17th Miss., 18th Miss., 21st Miss. iJr?/- 
aii's Bngade.\\—Bng.-Gen''l Goode Bryan, 10th Ga., 50th Ga., 51st Ga.,53d 
Ga. 

HOOD'S DIVISION.§ 

Maj.-Gen'l J. B. HOOD. 

Brig.-Gen'l E. M. LAW. 

Latv^s Brigade.— Brig.-Gen'l E. M. Law, Col. Sheffield, 4th Ala., 15th 
Ala., 44th Ala., 47th Ala., 48th Ala. Bohertson'-i Brigade.— Btig. Gen'l J. B. 
Robertson, 3d Ark., 18th Tex., 4th Tex., 5th Te.x. Anderson's Brigade.— 
Brig. Gen"l Geo. T. Anderson, 7th Ga., 8th Ga„ 9th Ga., lllh Ga., 59th Ga. 
Benning's Brigade.— Br\g.-Gen'\ H. L. Benning, 2d Ga., 15th Ga., 17th Ga., 
20th Ga. Artillery. '^t—'Uni. Frank IIuger, Fickling's (Va.) Bat., Jordan's 
(Va.) Bat., Moody's (La.) Bat., Parker's (Va.) Bat., Taylors (Va.) Bat., Wool- 
folk's (Va.) Bat. 

* Walker's and Liddell's divisions constituted a "reserve corps" under 
Walker's command. Gist commanding Walker's division. 

+ Dismounted. 

X Gen'l Walker reports five batteries, hut tho.se of Ector's and Wilson's 
brigades are not named in reports. 

§ Longstreet's corps, organization of these divisions, and of the artillery 
battalion taken from Return of the Army of Northern Virginia, for August 
31. 1863; the artillery is not mentioned in the reports. 

II Longstreet's report indicates that these brigades were not engaged. 

11 Served in Johnson's division. 



APPENDIX C. 271 

HINDMAN'S DIVISION.* 

Maj.-Gen'l T. C. HINDMAN. 

Brig.-Gen'l PATTON ANDERSON. 

Anderson's Brigade— Brier. -Genn Patton Anderson, Col. J. H. Sharp, 

rth Miss., Hth Miss., 10th Miss., 41st Miss., 44th Miss., 9th Miss. Batt., Gar- 

nty's (Ala.) Bat. Deas' Jii igade. —Brig.-Genn Z. C. Deas, 19th Ala., 22d 

Ala., 25th Ala.. 39th Ala.. 50th Ala,, irih Ala. Batt., Dent's (Aln.i Bat. Mani- 

gault's Bri:iade.—BT\s.-Gen'\ A. M. Manigault, 24th Ala , 28th Ala., 34ih 

Ala., 10th So. Car. and 19th So. Car. cousol.. Water's (,AIa.) Bat. 

BUCKNER'S CORPS. 

Maj-Gen'l S. B. BUCKNER. 

STEWART'S DIVISION. 

Ma.t.-Gen'l A. P. STEWART. 

Johnson's 2?n(7affe.1-— Brig.-Gen'l B. R.Johnson. Col. J. 8. Fdxton 17th 

Tenn., 23d Teim., 2.5th Tenn., 44th Tenii., 9th Ga. Art., Bat. " E." Brown's 

Brigade. —Br-ig.-Qnii'X J. C. Brown, 18th Tenn., Sfith Tenn . 32d Tenn 45th 

Tenn., Newman's (Tenn.) Batt., Dawson's (Ga.) Bat. Bate's Brigade — 

Bng.-Genl W. B. Bate, 58th Ala.. 37th Ga., 4th Ga. Batt., 15th Tenn , 

37th Tenn., 20th Tenn., Oliver's (Ala.) Art. Olayfou's Bi-igade.-Bri'r-Genn 

H. D. Clayton, 18th Ala., 36th Ala., 38th Ala., Humphrey's (Ark.) Bat. 

PRESTON'S DmSION. 
Brao.-GENL WILLIAM PRESTON. 
Grade's Brigade.— Biig.-Gen'\ A. Gracie, Jr., 43d Ala., 1st Ala. Batt.,± 
2d Ala. Batt.,+ 3d Ala. Batt.,t H3d Tenn., Battery.ll Trigg's Brigad'^.~Co\ 
R. C. Trigo, Ibt Fla. Cav.,§ 6th Fla., 7th Fla., 54tli Va., Peeple's (Ga ) Bat 
Kelli/'s Brigade.— Col. J. H. Kelly, 65th Ga., 5th Ky., 58th No. Car , 63d 
Va., Battery.!! 

JOHNSON'S DIVISION.ir 
Brig.-Gen'l B. R. JOHNSON. 
Gregg's Brigade.— Brifr.-Gen'] John Gregg, Col. C. A. Sttgy, 3d Tenn., 
10th Tenn., .30th Tenn., 41st Tenn .,50th Tenn., 1st [20th] Tenn. Batt., 7th 
Texas, Bledsoe's (Mo.) Bat. McNair's Brigade.— Brig. Gen'l E. McNair, 
Col. D. Coleman-, 1st Ark. Rifles, 2d Ark. Rifles, 4th Ark., 25th Ark., 35th 
Ark., Culpeper's (S. C.) Bat. 

CAVALRY. 
Maj. -Gen'l JOSEPH WHEELER.** 

WHARTON'S DIVISION. 

Brig.-Gen'l JOHN A. WHARTON. 

First Brigade.— Co]. C. C. Crews, 7th Ala., 2d Ga., 3d Ga.,4th Ga. Si>concl 

Brigade.— C(A. T. Harrison, 3d Confederates, 1st Ky., 4th Tenn., 8th Texas 

11th Texas, White's (Ga.) Battery. ' 

* Of Polk's corps, t See Johnson's Division, following. 

} Hilliard's Legion. § Dismounted. 

II It appears that Baxter's (Tenn.) and Jeffress' (Va.) Batteries belonged to 
this division, but their assignment is not clearly indicated. 

t This was a temporary organization, embracing Benning's, Johnson's 
Law's, and Robertson's brigades, as well as Gregg's and McNair's. 

** This organization taken from retiira for August 31st. 1863. 



273 APPENDIX C. 

MARTIN'S DIVISION. 

Brig.-Gen'l W. T. martin. 

First Brk/ade.—CoX. J. T. Morgan, 1st Ala., .3d Ala., 5l8t Ala., 8th Con. 
federate. Second Brigade.— Col. A. A. Russell, 4th AJa.,* 1st Confederate, 
Wiggins' (Ark.) Battery. 

RODDEY'S BRIGADE. 

Brig.-Gen'l p. D. RODDEY. 

4th Ala.,* 5th Ala., 53d Ala., Forrest's (Tenu.) Regiment, Ferrell's (Ga.) 
Battery. 

FORREST'S CORPS. 
Maj.-Gen'l N. B. FORREST. 

ARMSTRONG'S DmSION.t 

Brig.-Gen'l F. C. ARMSTRONG. 

Armstrong's Brigade.— Z^Ar'k., IstTenn., SdTenn., McDonald's Battalion. 

■ Brigade.— ith Tenn., 8th Tenn., 9th Tenn., 10th Tenu., 11th Tenn., 

Freeman's (Tenu.) Battery, Marion's (Tenu.) Battery. 

PEGRAM'S DIVISION.t 

Brig.-Gen'l JOHN PEGRAM. 

Davidson's Brigade.— Brig. -Gen'l H. B. Davidson, 1st Ga., 6th Ga., 6,5th 
North Carolina, Rucker's Legion, Huvvald's (Tenn.) Battery. Scott's 
Brigade.— Col. ,1. L. Scott, 10th Confederate, let La., 5th Tenn., 12th Tenn. 
Battalion, 16th Tenn. Battalion, Louisiana Battery (1 section). 

RESERVE ARTILLERY.g 

Barret's (Mo.) Battery, Darden's (Miss.) Battery. Havis' (Ala.) Battery, 
Le Gardevvi's (La.) Battery, Lumsden's (Ala.) Battery, Massenburg's (Ga.) 
Battery. 

* Two regiments of the same designation. Lt.-Col. Johnson commanded 
that in Roddey's hrigade. 

t Taken from return for August .31, 1863, and Forrest's report. 

t T;iken from Pegram's and Scott's reports and assignments ; but the 
composition of this division is uncertain. 

§ With exception of Darden's battery taken from return for August 31, 1863; 
on that return that battery appears as of Johnson's Brigade. 



Ij^DEX. 



Note. — Regiments, batteries, etc., are indexed under the names of 
their States, exce2:>ti?ig batteries called by their captaiti's or by some 
other special name. These are indexed under Batteries. 



Abbott's Creek, 7 et seq. 

Abington, Va. , 8 

Adams, General, brigade of, 33, 
97 et seq., 116 et seq., 121, 203 

Alabama, regimeut of : Thirty- 
Becond, 79 

Aleshire, battery of, 141 

Alexander's Bridge, 188, 190, 193 

Alpine, Ga., 182, 184, 191, 217 

Altamont, 49 et seq. 

Ammen, brigade of, 30, 5(5, 75 

Anderson, 165, 178, 186, 231 

Anderson, General, given com- 
mand in Kentucky, 1 et seq.; 
relinquishes command, 4, 236 

Andeison, General S. R., division 
under Hardee, 65, 67 ; at La- 
vergne, 79 ; at Stone's Riv- 
er, 124, 168; ordered to with- 
draw from Bridgeport, 178 

Anderson, Patton, brigade of, 
209, 254 

Armstrong, brigade of , 143 

Athens, Ala. , 33, 42, 178 

Atlanta, Ga., 170, 176 et seq., 257, 
259 

12* 



Bacon Creek, 84 et seq. 

Baird, General, 141, 143, 153; 
movements of, 178, 180 et seq., 
186; at Chickamauga, 189 efc 
seq., 193 ; ordered to Crox- 
ton's support, 195 et seq., 198, 
201 et seq., 208, 213 et seq., 
219, 221.223, 247, 253, 250; 
gallant charge of, 261 

Baldwin, brigade of, 89, 106, 132 

Barbour sville, Ky., 3, 52 

Bardstown, Ky., 59, 61 et seq., 86 

Barnes, brigade of, 205 

Barren River, Ky. , 138 

Barton, General, 34 

Batteries : Aleshire's, 141 ; Brid- 
ges's, 248 ; Bush's, 66 ; Cot- 
ter's, 24 ; Drury's, 121 ; Gun- 
ther's, 113 et seq.; Hewitt's, 
12, 45; Hotchkiss's, 109; 
Kinney's, 13 et seq., 17 ; Kon- 
kle's, 4 et seq. ; Loomis's, 65, 
113 et seq. ; McClung's, 16 ; 
Mendenhall's, 238; Rutledge's, 
10 ; Simonson's, 31, 65, 106 ; 
Sloan's, 67 ; Standart's, 11, 



274 



INDEX. 



14; Stokes's, 113, 114, 132; 
Stone's, 66 ; Webster's, 74 et 
seq.; Wetmore's, 14; Wright's, 
98 

Battle Creek, 48, 178, 180, 183 

Battle, regiment of, 17 

Beatty, Colonel Samuel, brigade 
of, 113, 131,124, 180 

Beatty, General John, brigade of, 
114, 124, 164, 302 et seq., 205, 
208, 219 

Beauregard, General, 41 

Beech Grove, Ky., 4, 9, 18, 160 

jBellbuckle Gap, 154 et seq., 159 

Bellefonte, Ala., 178 

Bethpage Bridge, 166 

Big Creek Gap, 34 

Big Hill, 53 

jBig Sandy Valley, 6 et seq. 

Blair, Prank P., 248 

Bledsoe, cavalry of, 16 

Bloomfield, Ky., 61, 63 

Blount's Farm, 146 

B'ountsville, Ala., 145 et seq. 

Elyth's Perry, 168, 179 

Bobo Cross Roads, 165 

Bole Jack, 90 

Bolles, Col., 7 

Bon Aqua Springs, Tenn., 141 

Bond, Major, Frank S. , 230 

Boone, Colonel, 46 

Boonville, 42 

Bowling Green, Ky., 3 et seq., 9 
et seq. , 13, 20, 23 et seq., 57, 
73, 77 

Brackenfield's Point, 168 

Bradley, brigade of, 166, 197 

Bradyville, 157, 160 

Bragg, General, 36 ; succeeds John- 
ston, 41 et seq., 46 ; theories 
about his movements, 48 et 
seq. ; in Kentucky, 55 et seq. ; 



at Perryville, 61 et seq. ; re- 
tires in good order, 68 ; official 
report of, 69 ; force of, 70 et 
seq. ; feeling against, 72 ; po- 
sition in Kentucky, 73 ; his 
iinpopularity in Kentucky, 77 
et Bcq. ; mistake of, 80 ; at 
Murfreesboro, 81, 84; designs 
of. 85 ; position of, 87 ; move- 
ments of, 96 et seq. ; plan 
of battle of, 101 et seq. ; at 
Stone's River, 104, 110; or- 
ders reinforcements to Polk, 
116, 118 et seq.; report of, 
123 ; decides to retreat, 124 ; 
in retreat, 125 ; losses of, 127, 
131 ; official report of, 134, 
137 et seq. ; in Northern Mis- 
sissippi, 148 et seq., 151 et 
seq. ; at ShelbyviUe, 1.54. 162 ; 
abandons Shelbyville, 164 ; at 
Tullahoma, 166 ; in retreat, 
167 et seq., 169 et seq. ; at 
Chattanooga, 173 et seq., 177 
et seq. ; location of his army 
determined, 181 ; near La Pay- 
ette, 184 et seq. ; his letter to 
Polk, 187 et seq., 189 et seq., 
193 ; plans of, 195 et seq., 301 ; 
position of, 303 et seq., 207, 
210, 213 et seq., 217 et seq. ; 
effective force of, 228 et seq. ; 
before Chattanooga, 230 et 
seq., 233, 242 et seq., 246 et 
seq. , 251 ; reinforces his cen- 
tre, 254 ; leaves his headquar- 
ters. 355 et seq., 360 et seq. 

Bramlette, Colonel. 11 

Brannan, General, 156 et seq., 160 
etseq., 163; division of, 166 et 
seq. ; movements of, 178, 180 ; 
at Chickamauga, 189 et seq. ; 



INDEX. 



275 



ordered to support Baird, 193, 
195 et seq. ; joins Negley, 198, 
201 et seq., 204 et seq., 208 et 
seq., 211, 21o et seq., 221 et 
seq., 244 
Brauner, cavalry of, 16 
Breckinridge, Colonel W. C. P., 

under Morgan, 83, 
Breckinridge, General John C, 25 ; 
blockades Nashville, 78, 80, 
91, 95, 97 et seq. ; at Stone's 
River, 116 et seq. ; defeat of, 
127, 200, 203 et seq., 186, 207, 
219, 254 
Brentwood, 93 et seq. 
Bridges, battery of, 248 
Bridgeport Ala., 32, 98, 168, 177 
et seq., 183, 230 et seq., 233, 
237 et seq. , 243 
Broomtown Valley, 182 
Brown's Ferry, Tenn., 233 et seq., 

237 et seq., 240, 242. 244, 246 
Bryantsville. Ky.,63, 69 
Buckner, General, occupies Bowl- 
ing Green, 2 et seq., 9, 65 ; or- 
dered to occupy Loudon, 179, 
187, 188 et seq. ; reinforces 
Longstreet, 247, 254 
Buell, General D. C given com- 
mand of Department of Ohio, 
5 et seq., 8 ; orders to Thomas, 
13 et seq., 30 ; sketch of, 21 ; 
his organization of the army, 
22 et seq. ; his correspondence 
with Halleck, 27 et seq. ; force 
of. 29 et seq. ; orders to Mor- 
gan, 34 ; plans of, 40 et seq. ; 
organizes against guerillas, 
46 ; his orders to Nelson, 48 ; 
preparations for a conflict with 
Bragg, 49 et seq. , 53 ; pursues 
Bragg, 55 et seq. ; at Perry- 



villc, 61 et eeq. ; report of, 68 
et seq., orders a pursuit of 
Bragg, 71 ; relieved of com- 
mand of Department of Ohio, 
73 et seq. ; as an organizer 
and disciplinarian, 74 et seq. ; 
army of, 78, 80 et seq., 130, 
136 et seq. ; Halleck's orders 
to, 148 ; removed by Halleck, 
148 

Buena Vista, Mexico, 6 

Buford, General, 55 

Burbridge, Colonel, 25 

Burnside, 152, 168, 173 ; in East 
'Tennessee, 179, 217; ordered 
to reinforce Rosecrans, 232, 
243 ; reinforced by Granger, 
256 et seq. 

Bush, battery of, 66 

Byron's Ford, 189 

Cairo, IU., 27 

Camp Boone, Tenn. , 2 

Camp Dick Robinson, 3 et seq. 

Camp Joe Holt, 2 

Camp Kenton, Ky. , 4 

Camp Nevin, 22 

Camp Wickliffe, 25 

Camp Wildcat, 3 

Caperton Ferry, 180, 183 

Carlin, brigade of, 67 88; re- 
pulses the enemy at Stone's 
River, 107 et seq.. 1.59,306; 
reports to Hooker, 251 

Carroll, General, 16 

Carter, General, 11 et seq., 17, 86 

Carter's Station, 86 

Carthage, Tenn., 51, 141, 147, 153 

Cary, battalion of, 16 

Catlettsburg, Ky., 6 

Catlett's Gap, Ga., 185, 189 

Cave City, 35 



276 



INDEX. 



Celina, Tenn., 37 

Centreville, Tenn., 141 

Chalmers, General, 30, 57 et seq. ; 
severely wounded, 115, 119 

Chaplin River, 65 

Charleston, Railroad, 179, 257 

Charleston, S. C, 28, 33, 148 

Charlotte, Tenn., 80 

Chattanooga, Tenn. , 32etseq., 36, 
40 et seq., 48 et seq., 53, 96, 
148, 154 et seq., 168, 171, 173 
et seq., 181 et seq., 185, 187, 
189 et seq., 197, 199 et seq., 
203, 207, 211 et seq., 214 et 
seq., 218, 224 et seq., 228, 
230 et seq., 233, 237 et seq., 
240, 242 et seq., 246 et seq., 
250, et seq., 252, 257 et seq. 

Cheatham, division of, 63, 65, 91, 
97, 101, 107, 196, 253 

Chestnut Mound, 19 

Chickamauga, Ga., 135, 169, 176, 
183, 185, 187 et seq., 190, 192 
et seq., 197, 200, 203, 215, 2.23, 
227, 229, 2;J2, 236 et seq., 244, 
246, 248, 255 et seq., 257, 
259 

Child, Colonel, 53 

Christiana, 157, 160 et seq., 163 

Cincinnati, Ohio, 6, 23, 38, 51, 55, 
173, 2;u 

Citico Creek, 247 

Clarksville, Tenn., 28, 143 

Cleburne, brigade of, 52 ; division 
of, 97 et seq., 101, 104, 107 et 
seq., 124, 131, 185 et seq., 198, 
203, 207, 253 

Cleveland, Tenn., 257, 259 

Cobham, brigade of, 250 

Coburn, Colonel, 12, 141 et seq. ; 
losses of, 143 

Columbia, Ky., 86 



Columbia, Tenn., 11 et seq., 33, 
35,48, 139, 141 et seq., 154 

Columbus, Ky. , 3, 9 

Concord Church, 165 

Connell, Colonel, 11 et seq. 

Coolidge, Major, 160, 162 

Cooper's Gap, Ga., 180, 189, 218 

Coosa River, 146 et seq. 

Corinth Miss. , 27, 28 et seq. , 33, 
i 42, 234 

Corse, General, 252 et seq. 

Cotter, battery of, 24 

Covington, Ky., .55 

Cowan, 33, 164, 167 
I Crab Orchard, 12, 39, 71 
' Cranor, Colonel, 7 

Craven's House, 250 

Crawfish Springs, Ga., 190, 196 

Creighton, brigade of, 250 
j Cripple Creek, 160 
I Crittenden, General George B. , 
[ sketch of, 10, 14 ; retreat of, 18 

Crittenden, General Thomas L., 
given command of Fifth Divi- 
sion of Army of Ohio, 23, 25 
et seq., 29 et seq., 42 ; at Bat- 
tle Creek, 48 et seq., .56, 61 et 
seq. , 65 ; corps of, 68 ; at Glas- 
gow, 71, 75 ; under Rosecrans, 
77 ; disposition of, 87 et seq. ; 
before Murfreesboro, 92 et 
seq., 100, 112, 119, 121 et seq., 
124 eteeq. ; at Brady ville, 157 ; 
Rosecrans's orders to, 160 et 
seq. ; at Manchester, 165 et 
seq. ; movements of, 178 et 
seq. , 182 et seq. ; attacked by 
BrHgg, 187, 190 et seq. ; posi- 
tion of, 201 et seq. ; 206, 212, 
214, 216, 219 ; reports concern- 
ing, 224, 226 ; relieved from 
his command, 234 



INDEX. 



277 



Crittenden. General T. T., 43 
Crittenden, John J., 23 
Crook, General, 141, 152, 231 
Crow Creek, 178 
Croxton, brigade of, 195, 199 
Cruft, General Charles, 25, 29, 53 
et saq., 114 et seq., 122 ; bri- 
gade of, 244, 249, 253, 260 
Crumpton's Creek, 165 
Cumberland, Army of, 21 et seq. , 
72 et seq.; extent of, 77, 127, 
136, 139, 148, 151, 154, 158, 169 
et .seq., 177, 215, 217 et seq., 
219, 223, 237 et seq., 232, 235 
etseq., 243, 248,2.54, 2.58 
Cumberland, Department of, 234 
Cumberland Ford, 3, 29, 34, 52 
Cumberland Gap, Ky., 3, 9, 29, 34, 

50 etseq., 71, 86, 173 
Cumberland Mountains, 215 
Cumberland River, 139, 141 
Cynthiana, Ky., 46 



Dalton, Ga., 176 et seq., 183 et 
seq., 189, 216 et seq., 257, 2.59 

Danville, Ky., 61 

Davis, General J. C, division of, 
at Mnrfree.sboro, 50 ; under 
McCook, 87 et seq., 100, 102, 
107 et seq., 123 et seq., 130, 
140 et seq., 143, 158 et seq.; 
ordered in pursuit, 167 ; move- 
ments of, 178 ; division of, 180, 
182, 191, 196 et seq., 201 et 
seq., 205 et seq., 211, 221, 244 ; 
reports to Sherman, 246, 257 

Davis, Jefferson, 83 

Day's Gap, 145 

Decatur, Ala., 28, 32, 42, 48 

Dechard, Tenn., 43, 49, 164, 167 
et seq., 174 et seq. 



Dillon, Captain, incompetency of, 

11 et seq. 
Donelson, brigade of, 115 et seq. 
Donelson Fort, see Fort Donelson 
Dougherty's Gap, Ga., 191, 218 
Dover, Tenn., 27, 140, 141 
Drury, battery of, 121 
Dry Creek, 176 
Dry Valley, 201, 209, 211 et seq., 

214, :334- 
Duck River, 29, 125, 141, 154 et 

seq., 164 
Duffield, Colonel, 29, 31, 3.5, 43 
Dug Gap, ISl, 185 et seq., 190 
Duke, Colonel Basil W., under 

Morgan, 83 
Duke, General, his history, 26, 33 ; 

his opinion of Johnson, 47 
Dumont, General E., placed in 

command at Nashville, 29, 35, 

70, 77 
Dunham, Colonel, at Munfords- 

ville, 58 
Dunlap, 49, 177 

Eaglesville, 87, 89, 97, 140, 143, 

1.56 
Eastport, Miss., 145 
Ector, brigade of, 104, 195 
Edgefield, 25 
Edmonson pike, 88 
Elizabeth to\vn, Ky., 2, 85 
Elk River, 167 
Elliott, General W. L., 259 
Estill Springs, 166 
Ewing, General Hugh, division of, 

246, 248, 253, 260 

Fairfield, Ky., 61, 159, 163 
Farmington, 2ol 
Fayetteville, Tenn., 33, 178 
Fishing Creek, 12 et seq. , 19 



278 



INDEX. 



Florence, Ala., 28, 42 

Forrest, raids of, 43 et seq., 48; 
cavalry of, 78 et seq., 127, 13rt ; 
his command assigned to V^an 
Dorn, 139, 142 et seq., 145 et 
seq. ; demands a surrender of 
Streight, 147 ; at Columbia, 
154, 105, 168, 188, 195 

Fort Donelson, Tenn., 24 et seq., 
76, 139 et seq. 

Fort Heiman, 139 

Fort Henry, Tenn., 20, 25 et seq., 
76, 139, 145 

Fortress Monroe, 217 

Fort Wood, 247 

Foster telegraphs Halleck, 217 

Foster ville, 157, 161 

Fox, Captain P. V., 238 

Frankfort, Ky., 38, 55, 61, 63, 69 

Franklin, Tenn., 80, 83, 87 et seq., 
91 et seq., 98, 100, 140 et seq., 
143, 152, 154 et seq. 

Trick's Gap, Ga., 189 et seq. 

Fry, Colonel Speed S., 16 et seq.; 
division of, 77, 87, 139 

Fyflfe, brigade of, 121 



Gainesville, 57 

Gallatin, Tenn., 46, 77, 87, 139, 
152 

Gano, Captain R. M , 36 et seq. 

Garesche, death of, 117, 129 

Garfield, General James A., placed 
in command of a brigade of the 
Army of Ohio, 6 et seq. ; suc- 
oesses of, 8 ; urges Rosecrans 
to make an advance, 153, 311, 
214, 223 et seq.; despatch from, 
226 

Garrard, Colonel T. T., 3 

Garrison Creek, 163 



Grcary, division of, 238, 240 et seq. , 
244, 249 et seq., 253 

Georgetown, Ky., 38 

Georgia, regiment of. Second, 43 

Gibson, brigade of, 119 

Gilbert, General, at Louisville, 58, 
60; commands Third Corps, 
61 ; at Perryville, 62, 64, 06 
et seq. ; at Bowling Green, 71 ; 
inefficienc}' of, 73, 141 et seq. 

Gist, division of, 253 

Glasgow, Ky.,37, 51, 71 

Gooding, Colonel, brigade of, 67 

Gordon's Mills, Ga., 176, 183 et 
seq., 187, 190,195, 197, 199 

Granger, General Gordon, 141, 143, 
152 et seq., 157, 161 et seq.; 
at Chickamauga, 209 et seq.,. 
213 et seq., 221, 228; placed 
in command of Fourth Army 
Corps, 333, 247 et seq. , 256 ; 
superseded by Palmer, 259 

Granger, R. S., 143, 1.53, 156, 100, 
163, 191, 193 ; at Rossville, 199 

Grant, General U. S., 25, 29 et 
seq., 42, 74, 76, 139, 150 et 
seq., 173; given command of 
the Military Division of the 
Mississippi, 334 et seq.; orders 
Sherman to Chattanooga, 243, 
246 et seq. , 253 ; his plan of 
battle, 259 et seq. 

Greene, General, 241 

Greenville, 25 

Greysville, 257 

Grider, brigade of, 121 et seq. 

Grose, brigade of, 114 et seq. , 207, 
249 et seq. 

Guenther, battery of, 113 et seq. 

Guy's Gap, 154 et seq., 161, 163 

Hall, Colonel, 143 et seq. 



INDEX. 



279 



Halleck, General, 26 et seq. ; placed 
in command of Department of 
Mississippi, 28 et seq. ; at 
Pittsburg Landing, 31 ; plans 
of, 40 et seq. , GO ; comman- 
der-in-chief, 71 et seq., 76; 
paper campaign of, 78 ; con- 
troversy with Rosecrans, 148 
et seq. ; letter to Rosecrans, 
153 et seq. ; telegraphs Rose- 
crans, 216 et seq. ; his report 
of year 1863, 234 et seq. 

Hall's Chapel, 165 

Ham bright, Colonel, brigade of, 
167 

Hanson, General Roger, 79 etseq., 
9Setseq., 121 

Hardee, General, with Bragg, 51, 
6i) ; urges Morgan's promotion, 
83 ; position of, 87 et .seq., 91 ; 
at Murfreesboro, 97, 99, 101 ; 
attacks Post, 108, 110; at 
Stone's River, 124, 131, 1.54, 
1.56, 159 et seq., 167 et seq., 
253, 256 

Harding, Colonel, attacked by 
Wheeler, 140 et seq. 

Harker, Colonel, brigade of, 95, 
98 etseq.. 112, 114, 208, 2.56 

Harlan, Colonel, 18, 86 

Harris, Colonel L. A., 4 et seq. ; 
brigade of, 67 

Harrison, Colonel, 158, 207 

Harrison's Landing, 178 

Harrodsburg, Ky., 38, 61, 68, 70 

Hartsville, Tenn., 82 etseq. 

Hascall, brigade of, at Murfrees- 
boro, 94 et seq. ; at Stone's 
River, 112, 114 etseq., 117 

Hathaway, Colonel, 146 

Hazel Green, Ala., 5 

Hazen, brigade of, 94, 114 et 



seq., 122 et seq., 178, 238 et 
seq. 

Heiman, Fort, see Fort Heiman 

Henry, Fort, see Fort Heniy 

Helm, brigade of, 203 

Heth, General, at Covington, 55 

Hewitt, battery of, 12, 45 

Heg, brigade of, 206 

Hiawassee River, 2.57 

Hill, ordered to join Hindman, 
185; with Polk, 188, 197 

Hillsboro, 164, 167 et seq. 

Hindman, General, 13, 23 et seq., 
185 et ,seq., 206, 210 et seq.; 
official report of, 227, 254 

Hobson, Colonel, 84 

Holly Springs, 161 

Hood, General J. B., 188 et seq., 
197 etseq., 2.6 

Hooker, General Jos., reinforces 
Rosecnins, 232, 237 et .seq. ; at 
Brown's Ferry, 340 et seq., 
244, 246, 249 et seq., 2.53; 
strikas the enemy at Tajdor's 
Ridge, 257 et seq. ; in command 
of Twentieth Corps, 259 et seq. 

Hoover's Gap, 1.54 et seq., 157, 
159, 162, 169 

Hoover's Mills, 161 

Horse Mountain, 154 

Horseshoe Ridge, 208, 324, 227 

Hoskins, Colonel, 11. 18, 86 

Hotchkiss, battery of, 109 

Howard, at Brown's Ferry, 240 et 
seq. ; ordered to Chattanooga, 
244, 346 et seq. ; destroys rail- 
road, 257 et seq. ; supersedes 
Granger, 3.59 et seq. 

Huftman, John, 36 

Humboldt, Tenn., 28 

Hunt, Colonel, of Georgia, 36 

Hunter. General, placed in com' 



280 



INDEX. 



mand of one department of 

Mississippi, 28 
Huntsville, Ala., 31 et seq., 42 
Harlbut, 217 ; ordered to reinforce 

Rosecrans, 232 

Illinois, regiments of: Thirtj'- 
fourth, 105 ; Eighty-third, 
140; Ninety-second, 181, 190 

Indiana, regiments of : Second, 
46 ; Tenth, 14, 16 et seq. ; 
Thirty-second, 23 et seq. ; 
Thirty-third, 12 ; Thirty- 
ninth, 23, 158; battery of. 
Eighth, 197 

Ireland, brigade of, 250 

Ivy Mountain, 5 

luka, Miss., 234 

Jackson, General J. S., 53; di- 
vision of, 64 et seq. ; killed, 66 

Jackson, Tenn., 38 

Jackson, T. R., brigade of, 97 et 
seq. ; 116 et .seq. 

Jasper, Tenn., 83 

Jefferson, Tenn., 93 et seq. 

Jenny's Creek, 7 

Johnson, B. R., Bragg orders his 
brigade from Ringgold, 188 

Johnson, Bushrod, 195, 197 et seq., 
206, 209 et seq. 

Johnson, division under MeCook, 
87 et seq., 100, 102; negli- 
gence of, 105 et seq., 131 et 
seq., 158 et seq. ; movements 
of, 178, 182, 191, 196 et seq., 
204, 208, 213, 247, 252 et seq. ; 
gallant charge of, 281 

Johnson, General R. \V., of Third 
Kentucky Cavalry, 2 ; occu- 
pies Mumfordsville, 23 ; forces 
a fight with Morgan, 46, 84 



Johnson, Lieutenant-Colonel, of 
the Twenty-eighth Ky., 37 

Johnson's Crook, Ga., 180, 191 

Johnston, General Albert Sidney, 
2 et seq. ; resigns from Second 
United States Cavalry, 9 et 
Beq. ; orders to Hindman, 13 
et seq. ; on Crittenden, 19 et 
seq. ; orders to Hindman, 23 
et seq. ; his force and plans, 
26 et seq., 31 ; death of, 41, 
51, 151 

Johnston, General J. E., 169 et 
seq., 179, 181 

Jones, Lieutenant-Colonel, of the 
Thirty-ninth Indiana, 23 

Jones's Ford, 167 et seq. 

Jordan, Colonel, 37, 141 

Kelley's Ferrt, Tenn., 233, 237, 
240, 242 

Kelly's farm, 190 

Kennett, Colonel John, cavalry 
of, 31, 125 

Kenton, Simon, 4 

Kentucky, regiments of : First, 
35; Second, 45; Third Cav- 
alry, 2; Fourth, 14, 16 et seq., 
46; Fifth, 46; Seventh, 3, 
53; Eighth, 251; Tenth, 14, 
18; Twelfth, 14; Fourteenth, 
C et seq.; Eighteenth, 39; 
Twenty-second, 6 et seq. ; 
Twenty-eighth, 38 

Kershaw, division of, 206, 210 

Kinderhook, Tenn., 141 

King, brigade of, 196, 213 

Kingston, on Tenn. River, 168 

Kinney, battery of, 13 et seq., 17 

Kirk, General, brigade of, 91, 105 
et seq., 131 et seq. 

Knob'.s Gap, Tenn., 88 



INDEX. 



281 



Knoxville, Tenn., 3, 9 ct seq., 36 
et seq., 40, 48, 153, 168, 173, 
179, 256, 257 et seq. 

Konkle, Captain, battery of, 4 

La Fayette, Ga., 176, 181 et seq., 
185 et seq., 189 et seq., 198, 
204, 209, 211, 213, 217, 2M 

Laibold, brigade of, 206 et seq. 

Lancaster, Ky., 71 

Landrum, ColonelJolm J., 39 

Langdou, Colonel, 239 

Lannon's Stand, 100 

Larkin's Ford, Ala., 178 

Lavergne, Tenn., 29, 79, 87 et 
seq., 94, 126, 139, 152 

Lebanon Junction, Ky., 2, 13, 20, 
35 et seq., 45 et seq., 01 et 
seq., 82, 86, 98 

Ledford's Ford, 188 

Lee, General Robert E. , 170 

Leet's tanyard, 184 

Lester, Colonel, 43 et seq. 

Letcher, Lieutenant-Colonel, 7 

Lewis, General, 2.54 

Lexington, Ky., 38, 50, .53, 63 

Liberty Gap, 144, 1.54 et seq., 
157, 1.59, 161 et seq. 

Liddell, division of, 213 

Lightburn, General, 2.52 

Lincoln, President Abraham, 19 ; 
war order of, 38, 236 

Lindsay, Colonel, 6 

Livingston, Tenn., 40 

Logan's Cross Roads, 13, 19 

London, Ky., 11 et seq., 71 

Long, Colonel Eli, at Lumley's 
Station, 161, 244 

Longstreet ; reinforces Bragg, 188, 
197, 19y ; assigned command of 
half Bragg's force, 200, 206, 
208 ; reinforced, 210 et seq., ' 



317, 2.00, 337 et seq.; assaults 
Geary's camp, 241, repulse 
of, 242; in East Tenn., 243; 
reinforced by Buckner, 247, 
257 

Lookout Mountain, 17.5, 177, 180 
et seq., 18.5, 191, 218, 230, 
233, 238, 340, 243 et seq., 
246, 247, 349 et seq., 259 

Loomis, battery of, 6.5, 113 

Loomis, brigade of, 107 

Loudon, Tenn., 179 

Louisa, Ky., 7 

Louisville, Ky., 3, 5 et seq., 8, 
30, 33, 27, 35, 37, 39, 45 et 
seq., 49, 51, 53 et seq.,. 58 et 
seq., 61, 63, 70, 73, 77, 80 et 
sc q , 84, 87, 137 et seq. 

Lumley's Station, Tenn., 157, 161 

Lytle, Colonel, 33, brigade of, 67, 
191, 197, 205 ; killed, 207 

Lytle' s Creekj Tenn., 126 



McAfee CnuucH, 209 

McBride's Creek, 1.59 

McClellan, cavalry of, 16 

McClernand, General J. A., at 
Pittsburg Landing, 31 

McClung, battery of, 16 

McCook, Colonel Dan, brigade 
of, 13, 17, 63 et seq., 193, 
195 et seq. , 209, 314, 228 

McCook, Colonel E. M., cavalry 
division of, 231 

McCook, General A. McD. , placed 
in command under Sherman, 
4 ; given command of Second 
Division of Army of Ohio, 23, 
30, 32; at Athens, 43, 48 et 
seq. , 56, 61 et seq. , 64 ; at 
Perry ville, 65 et seq. ; at Bow 



282 



INDEX. 



ling Green, 71, 74 et seq. ; 
under Rosecrans, 77 ; position 
of, 87 et seq., fl4, 99, 101 et 
Beq. ; disaster of, 104 et seq. ; 
his orders to Sheridan, 110; 
rout of, 112, 117 et seq. ; 120, 
125 et seq. ; defective line of, 
129 et seq. ; at Tullahoma, 157, 
160 et seq., 1(J5; ordered in 
pursuit, 1G7 ; movements of, 
178, 180, 182 ; at Chickamauga, 
189 et seq., 198 ; position of, 
201 ; defects in his line, 2i)2, 
204 et seq., 211 et seq., 214, 
217 et seq., 221 ; reports con- 
cerning, ~24, 22C) ; relieved of 
his command, 233 

McCook, General Robert L. , 42 

McCormick's Gap, 4 

McCown, division of, 52, 91, 97 et 
seq., 101, 104, 107 et seq. 

McDowell, General, 27 

McHenry, Colonel, 25 

McLaughlin, Major, 4, 7 

McLemore's Cove, 170, 181, 185, 
188, 191, 218 

McMinnville, Tenn., 41, 43, 45, 48 
et seq., 147, 154 et seq., 158, 
174, 178 

McNair, brigade of, 104 

Manchester, Tenn., 125 et seq., 
147, 155 et seq,, 157, 159, 161 
et seq., 105, 168 et seq. 

Maney, Colonel, 107 

Manigault, brigade of, 107 

Manson, General M. D., 13, 16, 53 

Maps : Mill Spnng.s, 1 5 ; Perry- 
ville, 64 ; Stone's River, 103 ; 
Chickamauga Campaign, 172; 
Battle of Chickamauga, 194; 
Battlefield of Chattanooga, 
345 



Marshall, General Humphrey, 
sketch of, 6 et seq. 

Martin, division of, 139, 163, 231 

Matt's Hollow, 155 et seq., 162 

Maxville, Ky., 64 et seq. 

Maysvilie, Ky. , 4, 6 et seq. 

Meade, General, 217 

Memphis, Tenn., 28, 32, 41, 148 

Mendenhall, Major John, batteries 
of, 238 

Metcalfe, Colonel, 53 

Michigan, regiments of: First, 
238 ; Ninth, 44 

Middle Creek, 8 

Middleton Road, 157 et seq., 1(50 

Midway, Ky., 38 

Miller, Colonel John F., 79, 111, 
115, 122 et seq., 158 et seq. 

Millersburg, 157 et seq. 

Mill Springs, Ky., 4, 10, 14 et seq., 
19 et seq., 236 

Minnesota, regiments of : Second, 
14, 17 et seq. ; Third, 43 

Minty, Colonel, 125, 140, 143, 147, 
161, 163 et seq., 178, 192, 199, 
214 

Missionary Ridge, 176 et .seq., 181, 
191, 218 et seq., 230, 243 et 
seq., 247, 252, ;i56, 258, 200 

Mississippi, Department of, 28 

Mitchel, General O. M., given 
command of Third DivisioH 
of Army of Ohio, 22, 34 et 
seq., 28; at Murfreesboro, 
31, 33, 42, 48 

Mitchell, General Robert B., at 
Murfreesboro, Tenn. , 50 ; divi- 
sion of, .56, 63 et seq.; assigned 
to the command of Nash- 
ville, 87 ; on Tullahoma cam- 
paign, 156, 158, 160, 163, 
167 



INDEX. 



283 



Mitchell, General John G., brigade 

of, 209, 243 
Mitchellville, 81 

Moccasin Point, Tenn., 233, 238 
Monticello, Ky., 40 
Moore, Colonel A. B. , capture of, 

82 et seq. 
Moore, Colonel L. P., 6 
Morgan, General, George W., as- 
signed command of Seventh 
Division of Buell's Army, 38 ; 
assumes command of Eastern 
Kentucky, 34 et seq. ; official 
report of, 40, 45 et seq. ; aban- 
dons Cumberland Gap, 52 
Morgan. General John H. , history 
of his cavalry, 26 ; raids of, 35 
et seq. , 52 ; his raids in Ken- 
tucky, 81 et seq. ; made Briga- 
dier-General, 83 ; reverses of, 
84, 127, 136, 139, 143, 147 
Morgan, General J. D. , assigned 
command of Second Division 
of Reserve Corps under Rose- 
crans, 1.53 
Morris Ferry, 167 
Morton, Captain St. Clair, 96, 

114 
Moulton, Ala., 145 
Mount Top, 178 
Mount Washington, Ky., 61 
Muldraugh's Hills, 3, a5, 136 
Munfordsville, Ky., 20, 23, 57, 59, 

72etseq., 84 
Munroe, Col., 164 
Murfreesboro, Tenn., 29, 31, 35, 43, 
50 et seq., 55, 78 et seq., 85 et 
seq., 87 et seq., 93 et seq., 102, 
109 et seq., 117 et seq., 124 et 
seq., 136 et seq., 141, 144, 147, 
149, 153, 1.54, 157, 159 et seq., 
168, 178, 199 



Nashville, Tenn., 2, 9 et seq., 
19 et seq., 22, 24 et seq., 28 
et seq., 31 et seq., 35, 41 et 
seq., -45 et seq., 48 et seq., 56 
et seq., 70 et seq., 76 et seq., 
87, 96 et seq., 101, 108, 111 et 
seq., 114, 117, 119, 125 et seq., 
136 et seq., 141, 143, 145, 149 
154 et seq., 168, 175, 183, 232 
Negley, General, 32 et seq. ; divi- 
sion of, 56 et seq., 79 et seq., 
87, 90 et seq. ; at Murfrees- 
boro, 96, 100; at Stone's River, 
110 et seq., 114 et seq., 117; 
supports McCook, 120 et seq., 
1.58, 160 et seq. ; at Manches- 
ter, 163, 166, 168 ; movements 
of, 178, 180 et seq. ; at McLe- 
more's Cove, 185 et seq., 189, 
196, 1 98 ; ordered to report to 
Thomas, 201 et seq., 205, 208, 
214 ; delay of, 219 et seq., 224 

Nelson, General William, 4 et 
seq. ; given command of Fourth 
Division of Army of Ohio, 
23, 25 et seq.; given Second 
Division of Buell's Army, 29 
et seq., 43 et seq.; endeavors 
to intercept Forrest, 45 ; or- 
dered to McMinnville, 48, 51 ; 
at Richmond, 53, 75 

Newr Hope Church, 37 

Newport, Ky., .55 

Nicholasville, Ky., 4 

Noale Fork, 163 

Nolin, Ky., 85 

Nolinsville. 80, 87 et seq., 93 et 
seq., 125, 140 

Norton, Colonel, 4 

Ohio, Department of, description 
of, 5 et seq., 21 et seq., 28, 30 



284 



INDEX. 



et seq., 59 ct seq., 71 et seq., 
75et seq., 137, 234 

Ohio, regiments of : Second, 4 ; 
Ninth, 14, 17 et seq.; Four- 
teenth, 18; Seventeenth, 11; 
Eighteenth, 33, 180, 238 ; 
Twenty-first, 4 ; Twenty- 
third, 5 ; Thirty-fifth, 13 ; 
Thirty-eighth, 11, 16; For- 
tieth, 7 ; Forty-second, 6 et 
seq.; Seventy-fourth, 79 ; One 
Hundred and Sixth, 8:3 

Olympia Spring.?, 4 

Orchard Knob, 24s, 253 ct seq. 

Osterhaus, division of, 246, 249 et 
seq., 2.58, 260 

Overall's Creek, 90, 117, 120 

Owensboro, Ky., 25 

Paducah, Ky., 27 

Paine, General E. A. , 51 ; division 
of, 57, 80 

Paintville, 6 et seq. 

Palmer, brigade of, 98, IIR, 121 

Palmer, General J. M., at Na.sh- 
ville, 51 ; division of, 56, 79 ; 
under Crittenden, 87 ; at Mur- 
freesboro, 93 et seq., 100, 111 
et seq., 114 et seq., 121 et seq., 
157, 160, 183, 191 et seq., 196 
et seq., 202, 204, 208, 238; 
commands Fourteenth Corps, 
247 ; at Chattanooga, 256, 259 

Paris, Comte de, 74 et seq. 

Paris, Ky., 7, 38 

Patterson, General, 27 

Pea Vine Creek, 176 

Pegram, Confederate cavalry un- 
der, 96. 120, 188 

Pelham, Tenn., 165, 167 et seq. 

Pemberton, General, 151 

Penney, battery of, 67 



Pennsjdvania, regiments of: Sev 
enth, 35, 46 ; Ninth, 37 

Pennington, Tenn., 168 

Perry ville, Ky., 61 et seq., 130, 236 

Pigeon Mountain, 176 et seq., 184 

Piketon, Ky., 5, 8 

Pikeville, 178 

Pillow, General, assigned command 
of Palmer's biigade, 121 

Pine Mountain. 34 

Pittsburg Landing, Tenn., 28, 31, 
75,77 

Poe's Cross-roads, 178 

Poik, Gen. Leonidas, occupies Co- 
lumbu.s, 9 ; with Bragg, 51 ; 
at Bard.stowTi, 63 ; at battle of 
Perry ville, 69 ; at Murf rees- 
boro, 87, 97, 101, 104, 110, 115 
et seq., 119 et seq., 125; at 
Shelby ville, 1.54, 156 ; at Chat- 
tanooga, 108 ; ordered to sup- 
port Hindman, 186 et seq., 
197 ; assigned command of 
half Bragg's force, 200, 203, 
213, 219 

Pond Spring, Ga., 189 et seq. 

Pope, General John, at Pittsburg 
Landing, 31 

Port Hudson, 228 

Post, brigade of, 107 et seq., 134, 
191, 228 

Pound Gap, 5 et seq., 8 

Powell's Valley, 34 

Preston, brigade of, 98, 116 et seq., 
121, 206, 210 

Prestonburg, Ky., 4 et seq., 7 

Prewitt's Knob, .59 

Price, brigade of, 121 et seq. 

Pulaski, Tenn., 35 

Raccoon Mountain, 175, 177, 240 
Rains, brigade of, 104 



INDEX. 



285 



Rankin's Ferry, 238 

Ready ville, Tenn., 97 

Reed's Bridge, 188, 190, 193, 195, 
201 

Reid, Whitelaw, 76 et seq. 

Reynolds. General, J. J. , division 
of, 87; at Murfreesboro, 139, 
143, 147, 153, 159 et seq. ; at 
Manchester, 163, 16(i et seq. ; 
movements of, 178; at Shell- 
mound, 180 et seq.; at Chicka- 
mauga, 189 et seq., 19(5 ; over- 
powered, 197 et seq. , 204, 206, 
208, 212 et seq., 220, 222 et seq. 

Richmond, Ky., 39, 53 et seq. 

Richmond, Va., 26, 32 

Ringgold, Ga., 183 et seq., 187 et 
seq., 209, 214, 257 

Roberts, under Sheridan, 110 ; 
killed, 111 

Robertsport, 14 

Robinson, General, 213 

Rochester, 25 

Rock Castle Hills, 3, 9 

Rock Creek Ford, 167 

Roger's Gap, 52 

Rogersville, Ala., 33, 54 

Rome, Ga., 141, 146, 176, 185, 216 

Rosecrans, Major General William 
S., assigned command of De- 
partment of Cumberland, 72 ; 
organizes his army, 77 ; at 
Nashville, 81, 83 et seq. ; his 
plans, 87 ; instruction to Mc- 
Cook, 91 et seq. ; orders to 
Crittenden, 94 et seq., 99 et 
seq. ; plan of battle of, 1 01 et 
ceq. ; at Stone's River, 104 et 
Beq.; orders the movement 
of troops, 113, 114, 116 et 
Beq., 124, 126; losses and suc- 
cess of, 127 ; bravery of, 128 



et seq.; his report of Mc- 
Cook, 130 et seq.; loss of guns 
of, 133 ; plans of, 136 ot seq., 
139 et seq., 143, 145 ; contro- 
versy with the authorities at 
Washington, 148 et seq. ; reply 
to Halleck, 150 et seq.; or- 
ganizes a reserve corps, 153; 
plans of. 155 et seq. ; orders of, 
1(50 ; at Manchester, 1(52 et 
seq.; at TuUahoma, 16(5; plans 
of, 168 ; report of, 109 et seq.; 
plan of, 173 et seq., 177, 179, 
182 et seq., 185, 190 et seq., 
193 ; orders of, 196 ; headquar- 
ters at Widow Glenn's house, 
198, 200; assembles his corps 
commanders, 201, 205 et seq., 
211 ; retires to Chattanooga, 
212 ; masterly manoeuvring 
of, 215, 217 et seq., 219 et seq. ; 
reprimands Wood, 222 ; re- 
ports concerning, 224 et seq. ; 
effective force of, 228 ; rein- 
forced from Washington, 232 et 
seq. ; superseded by Thomas, 
234 ; character of, 235 et seq. 

Rossville, Ga., 176, 183 et seq., 192 
et seq., 197, 199, 201, 209, 211 
et seq., 214 et seq., 234 et .seq., 
227 et seq., 251 et seq.. 261 

Round Forest, 116, 119, 129 

Round Mountain, 146 

Rousseau, General, ordered by An- 
derson to report at Louisville, 
2, 22, 48, 56 ; division of, 64 et 
seq. , 87 ; encamps at Owen's 
store, 92 et seq., 100, 111 et 
seq., 117, 124, 159, 163, 166 

Rover, Tenn., 140, 160 

Rowlett's Station, 33 

Running Water Creek, 183 



286 



INDEX. 



Rutherford's Creek, 143 
Rutledge, battery of, 16 

Salem, Tenn., 91, 100, 143, 157, 
160, 178 

Salvisa, Ky., 63 

Salyersville, Ky. , 5 

Sand Mountain, 145, 175, 177, 180, 
182 

Saunders, cavalry of, 16 

Savannah, Tenn., 28 et seq., 33 

Schoepff, General, 3 ; on the Cum- 
berland, 11 et seq. ; at Mill 
Springs, 18; at Perry ville, 67 

Schurz, General, 241 

Scottsboro, 51 

Scribner, brigade of, 114, 160, 
106 

Sequatchie Valley, 49, 167 et seq., 
174, 177, 182,216, 230 

Shafer, brigade of, 110 et seq. 

Shelby ville, Ky., 69,87, 89 

Shelbyville, Tenn., 29, 31, .33, 125 
et seq., 138, 151, 1.54 et seq., 
157 et seq., 163 et seq., 169, 
231 

Sheldon, Colonel, 7 et seq. 

Shellmound, Tenn., 180, 183 

Shepardsville, Ky., 61 

Sheppard, Colonel, 114 

Sheridan, division of, 63, 66 et seq. ; 
under McCook, 87 et seq. , 100, 
107 et seq., 118; gallant fight 
of, 130, 134 ; ordered to the 
front, 143; at Millersburg, 
158; at Minchester, 165 et 
seq.; ordered in pursuit, 167 et 
seq., 177; at Bridgeport, 180, 
182, 191, 197 ; position of, 201, 
204 et seq. , 206 et seq. ; sepa- 
rated from the main command, 
211 et seq., 219 ; his movement 
to the aid of Thomas, 221 , 247, 



253, 2.55 et seq. ; losses of, 258 ; 
gallant charge of. 261 

Shf rman. General William T., sec- 
ond in command, 2 ; succeeds 
General Anderson 4 et seq.; 
succeeded by Burll, 21 et S' q., 
75, 170 ; ordered to reinforce 
Rosecrans, 232, 236 ; ordered 
to Chattanooga, 243 et seq., 
246, 248 et seq., 252; pursues 
the enemy, 2.56 ; ordered to 
press forward, 257 ; losses of, 
2.58 ; prepares lor spring cam- 
paign, 2.59 ; his role in Grant's 
]'lan, 260 et seq. 

Shiloh, 30, 51, 74, 76, 130 

Sill, Co'onel, .5, 31 

Sill, General, commands two divi- 
sions 61, 63, 70; repulses the 
enemy at Stone's Rirer, 107; 
killed, 108; brigade of, 110; 
his report to Sheridan, 134 

Simonson, battery of, 31, 65, 106 

Sloan, battery of, 67 

Smith, Colonel Orland, 241 

Smith, General A. J., at Pittsburg 
Landing, 31 

Smith, General C. F., at Pitts- 
burg Landing, 28 

Smith, Giles A.. 246 

Smith, Green Clay, 35, .39 

Smith, John E., 246, 248, 2.53 

Smith, Kirby, 32; in East Ten- 
nessee, 34 ; marching on Lex- 
ington, 50 et seq.; occupies 
Lexington 54 et seq. ; at 
Frankfort, 61 et seq., 69 et 
seq. ; at Murf reesboro, 87 ; at 
Readyville, 97 

Smith, Lieutenant-Colonel, 85 

Smith, Major, 44 

Smith, Morgan L., 246, 248, 253 et 
seq. 



INDEX. 



287 



Smith, Preston, brigade of, 52 

Smith, Wil iara F., Rosecrans' 
Chief Engineer, 234, 237 et 
seq., 244, 246 

Smith, W. S., division of, 71 

Smyrna, Tenn., 94 

Snow Hill, 144 

Somerset, Tenn., 11, 20, 30, 71 

Sparta, 49, V.ti 

Spears, General, 34, 124 ; brigade 
of, 126 

Spring Creek, 166 

Springfield, Ky., 38, 61 

Spring Hill, Tenn., 141, 147 

Stagall's Ferry, 39 

Standart, battery of, 11, 14 

Stanford, Ky., 7, 12, 71 

Stanley, General D. S. , made 
chief of cavalry to Rosecrans, 
83, 89; at Murfreesboro, 125 
et seq., 144, 158, 160 ; Rose- 
crans's orders to, 161, 163, 168 

Stanley, Colonel T. R., Eigh- 
teenth Ohio, 33 ; brigade of, 
111, 204 et seq., 208, 238 

Stanton, Secretary of War, 148, 
151, 2,35 

Starkweather, Colonel, brigade of, 
66 et seq., 93, 118, 195 

Statesville, 144 

Steedman, Colonel J. B., 18, 67, 
139, 166 ; gallant conduct of, 
209, 214 

Steinwehr, division of, 241 

Stevens's Gap, 180 et seq., 186, 191 

Stevenson, division of, 52, 249, 251, 
253 

Stevenson, Ala., 33, 49, 171, 177 et 
seq., 232, 234 

Stewart, General A. P., division 
of, 197, 206; under Longstreet, 
210 et seq., 2.52,2.54 

Stewartsboro, 93 et seq. 



Stewart's Creek, 87 et .seq., 03 

Stokes, battery of, 112, 114, 122 

Stone, battery of, 66 

Stone's River, 97 et seq., 101, 118, 
120, 124, 126, 128, 130, 136, 
149, 197, 225, 227 

Stovall, brigade of, 203 

Streight, Colonel, repulses For- 
rest, 145etseq. ; surrenders to 
Forrest, 147 

"Suck," The, 233 

Summertown, 251 

Summerville, Ga., 176, 182 

Sumner, General E. V., 21 

Sweden's Cove, 167 



Tafel, Colonel, 82 et seq. 
Tantalon, Tenn., 165, 178 
Taylor's Ridge, 176 et seq., 257 
Tennessee, Army of, 28, 31, 50, 83 
Tennessee, department of, 234 
Tennessee, Regiments of, First, 
14, 18 ; Second, 14, 18 ; Nine- 
teenth, 17; Twentieth, 98; 
Twenty-sixth, 123 
TerrUl, killed, 66 
Terry, Colonel, killed, 24 
Texas, Regiment of. Eighth, 43, 45 
Therman, Tenn., 49, 177 
Thomas, General George H., 3; 
ordered to report for duty in 
Kentucky, 4 ; at Columbia, 11 
et seq. ; orders to Hansen, 16 ; 
at ilill Spring, 17 et seq. ; as- 
signed command of First Divi- 
sion of Army of the Ohio, 23, 
29 ; force of, 31 ; establishes 
headquarters at Dechard, 42 et 
seq. ; at McMinnville, 48 et 
seq. ; captures a despatch of 
Bragg's, 50 ; division of, 56 et 
seq., 59 ; at Perry ville, 61 et 



288 



INDEX. 



eeq., 68 ; his faith in Buell, 72 ; 
under Rosecrans, 77, 82 ; at 
Nashville, 87; at Nolinsville, 
88, 92 et seq., 100; at Stone's 
River, 110 et seq. ; calmness 
of, 118 et seq. ; at Mnrfrees- 
boro, 125 et seq. ; staying 
qualities of, 135, 147; at Sa- 
lem, 157, 159; Rosecrans's 
orders to, 160, 161 et seq. ; 
drives the enemy to Fairfield, 
163; at Tullahoma, 166 et 
seq. , 170 ; movements of, 178 
etseq., 181 et seq., 187 et seq. ; 
at Chickamauga, 189 et seq., 
193, 195 et seq. ; joins Negley, 
198, 205 et seq. ; at Chicka- 
mauga, 209 et seq., 218 et seq. ; 
official report of, 221 ; inter- 
view with Wood, 223 et seq. ; 
position after battle of Chicka- 
mauga, 226 et seq. ; supersedes 
Rosecrans, 234 ; ability of, 
235 et seq ; eulogy on, 236, 
237 ; congratulates Hooker's 
troops, 242, 244; orders to 
Howard, 246, 247, 249, 251, 
253 et seq. ; sends additional 
troops to Burnside, 256 ; orders 
to Hooker and Palmer, 257; 
losses of, 258 ; orders Fourth 
Corps to Cleveland, 259, 261 

Thompson's Station, 142 

Tompkinsville, Ky., 37 

Tracy City, Tenn., 49, 165 

Trenton, Ga., 17.5, 180, 182, 184, 
246, 260 

Triune, Tenn., 87 et seq., 94, 97 et 
seq., 139 et seq., 152, 156 

Tullahoma, Tenn., 48, 139, 151 et 
seq., 154, 163, 166, 168, 174 

Tunnel Hill. Ga., 2.56 

Turchin, brigade of, 24, 31 et seq., 



158, 160 et seq., 167, 189 et 
seq., 213, 238 et seq., 356 

Tuscumbia, Ala., 32, 145 

Tyndale, brigade of, 241 

Tyner's Station, 168 

Undkrwood, Colonel, 241 

Union ville, 140 

United States, regiments of : Sec- 
ond Cavalry, 9; Eighteenth 
Infantry, 14 

University, Tenn., 33, 167, 178 

Valley Head, 191, 218 
Van Cleve, division of, under Crit- 
tenden, 87, 9.5, 100, 102, 112 et 
seq., 117 etseq., 1.57, 160, 178, 
183, 191 et seq., 197 et seq., 
201, 20.5, 211 
Vanderveer, Colonel, brigade of, 

12, 204 et seq., 207 
Van Dorn, 50 ; reports to Bragg, 
139 ; assumes command at Col- 
umbia, 141 et seq. ; at Spring 
Hill, 143, 147 
Vaughan, Col. A. J., 107 
Versailles, Mo., 140, 143, 1.58, 160 
Vicksburg, Miss., 151, 153, 173, 

228 
Von Schrader, Lieut. -Col., 79, 206 
Von Trebra, Lieut. -Col., 23 

Wagner, brigade of, 68, 114 et 
seq., 178, 183, 226, 238 

Waitsborough, 11 

Walford. Colonel, 7, 11, 16, 3.5, 39 

Walker, Colonel, brigade of, 87, 
92 et seq.. 118, 162, 186 et 
seq., 189, 193, 195 et seq., 207 

Wallace, Lewis, division of, 76 

Walling's Ridge, Tenn., 175, 177, 
230 

Walthall, regiment of, 17 



INDEX. 



289 



Walworth, brigade of, 205, 207 ! 

Ward, General, 152 [ 

VVartrace, Tenn., 154 et seq., 157 ; 

Washington, D. C, 1, 71 et seq., | 
138, 148, 150, 151, 316, 219, 383 , 

Watkhis, Colonel Lewis D., gallant 
charge of, 147 

Wauhatchie, Tenn., 175, 184 ; bat- 
tle of, 23?, 240, 349 

"Webster, Colonel, battery of, 74 

West Liberty, Ky., 4 et seq. 

West Point, N. Y., 6, 10,31 

Wetmore, battery of, 14 

Wharton, Colonel, 43, 96, 120, 139 
et seq. ; division of, 163, 331 

Wheeler, Confederate cavalry un- 
der, 78 ; raid in West Tennes- 
see, 81, 96 et seq., 12(), 139 et 
seq., 141; at Guy's Gap, 163 
et seq., 187, 331 

Whitesburg, Ala., 178 et seq. 

Whiteside, 183, 338, 246 

Whitfield, Texan brigade of, 143 

Whittaker, brigade of, 2C9 et seq., 
342, 249 et seq. 

Widow Glenn's Farm, 190, 198, 
201, 206 

Widow's Creek, 32 

Wildcat, Ky., 9 

Wilder, Colonel John T., at Mun- 
fordsviile, 57 et seq., 138, 147, 
159, 165, 178, 184, 187, 189 et 
seq., 192, 199, 204 et seq., 207 

Wilkinson Pike, 90, 93, 98, 109 

Williams, Colonel J. S., 4 

Williams Island, 234 
Williamson, brigade of, 253 

Willich, General, 34 ; brigade, 89, 
91 ; neg".igence of, 105 et seq., 
131 et seq., 158, 207, 313 
Will's Valley, 175, 180, 182, 184, 
340 



Wilson, brigade of, 195 

Wilson's Creek, 89 

Wilson, Tenn., 88, 93 

Winchester, Ky., 39 

Winchester, Tenn., 33, 164, 168, 
175 

Winston's Gap, 176, 183 

Withers, division of, 63, 91, 97, 
101, 104, 107, 124, 164, 168 

Wisconsin, battery of Fifth, 67 

Woodbury Pike. 160 

Wood, Fort, see Fort Wood 

Wood, General T. J., given com- 
mand of Sixth Division of 
Army of Ohio, 23, 29, 48 et 
seq., 56, 68 ; at Stanford, 71 ; 
under Crittenden, bl ; at Mur- 
freesboro, 94 et seq., 100; at 
Stone's Rver, 102, 112, 114 et 
seq., 160; at Chattanooga, 183 
et seq., 191 et seq., 197 ; posi- 
tion of, 201 et seq., 205 etseq., 
209 et seq., 213, 219 etseq.; 
official report of, 321 et seq., 
2i8, 247, 250, 252, et seq., 356 ; 
losses of, 258 ; gallant charge 
of, 261 

Woodland, 25 

Woodruir, brigade of, 90 ; 107 
Woodbonville, Ky., 24 
Wright, battery of, 98 
Wright, General H. G., 53 
Wynkoop, cavalry of, 35 



Zahm, Colonel, 125 et seq. 

ZollicoflFer, General, ordered to ad- 
vance into Eastern Kentucky, 
3 ; sketch of, 9 et seq. ; at 
Mill Springs. 16 et seq. ; shot, 
18 ; his body sent to Buell, 20 



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